"'[T]he exclusion of admissible evidence does not constitute reversible error where the evidence "would have been merely cumulative of other evidence of the same nature, which was admitted."' Houston v. State, 565 So.2d 277, 281 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990)." Nettles v. State, 683 So.2d 9, 13 (Ala.Crim.App. 1996).

"The exclusion of admissible evidence does not constitute reversible error where the evidence 'would have been merely cumulative of other evidence of the same nature, which was admitted.'" Houston v. State, 565 So. 2d 277, 281 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (quoting Ex parte Lawson, 476 So. 2d 122, 122 (Ala. 1985)). Accordingly, for the reasons stated above we find no reversible error.

Respecting a trial judge's credibility determination as it relates to potential bias or prejudice warranting recusal, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals has clarified: To disqualify [a trial judge], prejudice must be of a personal character, directed at the litigant, "must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from . . . participation in the case."Id.; see also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 1710, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966); Houston v. State, 565 So.2d 277 (Ala.Crim.App.1990). . . . If the bias is based upon actual observance of witnesses and evidence given during the trial, the judge's prejudice does not disqualify the judge.

"'Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.' "See also Houston v. State, 565 So.2d 277, 281 (Ala. Crim.App. 1990) (holding that '[t]he exclusion of admissible evidence does not constitute reversible error where the evidence "would have been merely cumulative of other evidence of the same nature, which was admitted."')• In this case, much of the information that was included in the excluded documentation was not relevant and could have resulted in a confusion of the issues for the jury.

"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."See also Houston v. State, 565 So.2d 277, 281 (Ala.Crim.App.1990) (holding that "[t]he exclusion of admissible evidence does not constitute reversible error where the evidence ‘would have been merely cumulative of other evidence of the same nature, which was admitted’ "). In this case, much of the information that was included in the excluded documentation was not relevant and could have resulted in a confusion of the issues for the jury.

Townsell v. State, 255 Ala. 495, 498, 52 So.2d 186, 189 (1951).' Houston v. State, 565 So.2d 277, 279 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990). See also Tombrello v. State, 421 So.2d 1319, 1322 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Carson v. State, 49 Ala. App. 413, 272 So.2d 619, 622 (1973).

h improper when considered within the context of a particular case, are not necessarily grounds for recusal when they do not arise from an extrajudicial source. See also Ex parte Hunt, 642 So.2d 1060 (Ala. 1994); Kitchens v. Maye, 623 So.2d 1082 (Ala. 1993); Ex parte Whisenhant, 555 So.2d 235 (Ala. 1989); Ex parte Melof, 553 So.2d 554 (Ala. 1989), abrogated in part by Ex parte Crawford, 686 So.2d 196 (Ala. 1996); Medical Arts Clinic, P.C. v. Henry, 484 So.2d 385 (Ala. 1986); Ex parte Knotts, 716 So.2d 262 (Ala.Crim.App. 1998); Stewart v. State, 730 So.2d 1203 (Ala. Crim App. 1997); Ex parte Bryant, 675 So.2d 552 (Ala.Crim.App. 1996); Bush v. State, 695 So.2d 70 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995), aff'd, 695 So.2d 138 (Ala. 1997); Beard v. State, 661 So.2d 789 (Ala.Crim.App. 1995); Riddle v. State, 669 So.2d 1014 (Ala.Crim.App. 1994); Parker v. State, 587 So.2d 1072 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991); Wright v. State, 628 So.2d 1071 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993); Adkins v. State, 600 So.2d 1054 (Ala. Crim App. 1990); and Houston v. State, 565 So.2d 277 (Ala. Crim App. 1990). I recognize that Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994), in which the United States Supreme Court construed a federal statute similar to Canon 3.C.(1), is persuasive authority with respect to the proper interpretation of Canon 3.C.(1).