We acknowledge the rule that "[t]he exclusion of admissible evidence does not constitute reversible error where the evidence 'would have been merely cumulative of other evidence of the same nature, which was admitted.' " Houston v. State, 565 So.2d 277, 281 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990). Nonetheless, while the excluded testimony supported the appellant's own testimony, it was not "merely cumulative."

"'[T]he exclusion of admissible evidence does not constitute reversible error where the evidence "would have been merely cumulative of other evidence of the same nature, which was admitted."' Houston v. State, 565 So.2d 277, 281 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990)." Nettles v. State, 683 So.2d 9, 13 (Ala.Crim.App. 1996).

"'[W]here objection is sustained, but the party, nevertheless, proceeds to get in the evidence sought, in substance and effect, which is not excluded and remains for the jury's consideration, the initial ruling, if erroneous, is harmless.'"Houston v. State, 565 So.2d 277, 281 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990), quotingRoberson v. State, 233 Ala. 442, 444, 172 So. 250, 251 (1937). The appellant also contends that the state failed to timely disclose the existence of the pending charges against McMillian and Looney, and that its failure to do so violated a discovery motion that granted the defense discovery of all pending criminal charges of any of the state's witnesses. He claims that he was not informed of any pending charges until after he attempted to cross-examine McMillian and Looney and that, therefore, he is entitled to a new trial.

"The exclusion of admissible evidence does not constitute reversible error where the evidence 'would have been merely cumulative of other evidence of the same nature, which was admitted.'" Houston v. State, 565 So. 2d 277, 281 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (quoting Ex parte Lawson, 476 So. 2d 122, 122 (Ala. 1985)). Accordingly, for the reasons stated above we find no reversible error.

"The exclusion of admissible evidence does not constitute reversible error where the evidence `would have been merely cumulative of other evidence of the same nature, which was admitted.'" Houston v. State, 565 So.2d 277, 281 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990) (quoting Ex parte Lawson, 476 So.2d 122, 122 (Ala. 1985)). Therefore, the trial court's error, if any, in finding that the excluded medical records were not properly authenticated was not prejudicial to Jordan, and we affirm the trial court's denial of Jordan's motion for a new trial on this issue.

The Court of Criminal Appeals has noted on numerous occasions that "[t]he exclusion of admissible evidence is not reversible error when it would have been merely cumulative of other evidence that was admitted." Kolmetz v. State, 600 So.2d 389, 391-92 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991), cert. denied, 600 So.2d 396 (Ala. 1992) (citing Houston v. State, 565 So.2d 277 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990)). This rule has no application here, because the testimony was not cumulative.

Respecting a trial judge's credibility determination as it relates to potential bias or prejudice warranting recusal, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals has clarified: To disqualify [a trial judge], prejudice must be of a personal character, directed at the litigant, "must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from . . . participation in the case."Id.; see also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 1710, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966); Houston v. State, 565 So.2d 277 (Ala.Crim.App.1990). . . . If the bias is based upon actual observance of witnesses and evidence given during the trial, the judge's prejudice does not disqualify the judge.

To disqualify, prejudice must be of a personal character, directed at the litigant, "must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from ... participation in the case." [State ex rel. Wesolich v. Goeke, 794 S.W.2d 692, 697 (Mo. App. 1990)]; see also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583, 86 S. Ct. 1698, 1710, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966); Houston v. State, 565 So.2d 277 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990).. . . If the bias is based upon actual observance of witnesses and evidence given during the trial, the judge's prejudice does not disqualify the judge.

" ‘[T]he exclusion of admissible evidence does not constitute reversible error where the evidence "would have been merely cumulative of other evidence of the same nature, which was admitted." ’ " Brownfield v. State, 44 So.3d 1, 25 (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (quoting Houston v. State, 565 So.2d 277, 281 (Ala.Crim.App.1990) ). Maddox testified that he supervised the stores where Johnson worked, that he did not recall any drug shortages in the stores where Johnson worked, that he was not aware of any anger issues with Johnson, that Johnson was a good employee, and that he asked Johnson to help him open a new store in Bayou La Batre. (R. 1555–56.)

“ ‘The exclusion of admissible evidence does not constitute reversible error where the evidence “would have been merely cumulative of other evidence of the same nature, which was admitted.” ’ ” Jordan v. Calloway, 7 So.3d 310, 315 (Ala.2008) (quoting Houston v. State, 565 So.2d 277, 281 (Ala.Crim.App.1990), quoting in turn Ex parte Lawson, 476 So.2d 122, 122 (Ala.1985)). Thus, any error on the part of the trial court in limiting the husband's ability to prove that Vest was biased in favor of the wife was harmless error not affecting the husband's substantial rights.