Opinion
No. 01-06-00015-CV
Opinion issued June 8, 2006.
On Appeal from the 157th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 2005-35287.
Panel consists of Chief Justice RADACK and Justices TAFT and NUCHIA.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, the City of Houston (the City), appeals the trial court's order denying the City's plea to the jurisdiction, which asserted that the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claim asserted by appellee Southern Electrical Services, Inc. (SES) because (1) SES had failed to plead and could not demonstrate a waiver of the City's "sovereign/governmental immunity" and (2) SES did not have standing to bring a cause of action for breach of contract. On appeal, appellant raises these same two issues. We affirm.
Sovereign immunity refers to the State's immunity from suit and liability and protects the State and the various divisions of the State, including agencies, hospitals, and universities. Wichita Falls State Hosp. v. Taylor, 106 S.W.3d 692, 694 n. 3 (Tex. 2003). Governmental immunity protects political subdivisions of the State, including counties, cities, and school districts. Id. Thus, the doctrine applicable to the City of Houston is governmental immunity.
DISCUSSION
Appellee Southern Electrical Services, Inc., sued appellant, the City of Houston (the City), for breach of contract and, in the alternative, quantum meruit. The City specially excepted, asserting, among other things, that SES had not pleaded a basis for a waiver of the City's governmental immunity and that SES did not have standing to sue the City because the City did not have privity of contract with SES. The City also asserted a general denial and several affirmative defenses, including the doctrines of sovereign immunity and governmental immunity and SES's lack of standing to bring the lawsuit. SES sought leave to file an amended petition. The City opposed SES's motion and filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting governmental immunity and SES's lack of standing. The trial court granted SES's motion for leave to file, and SES filed it's first amended original petition. That amendment added The Morganti Group, Inc. as a plaintiff and asserted that the Texas legislature had waived the City's immunity from suit through the Local Government Code, which provided that a Home Rule municipality "may plead and be impleaded in any court" and that the City had waived its governmental immunity in the Houston City Charter, which provides that the City "may sue and be sued." Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 51.075 (Vernon 1999); City of Houston Charter, art. II, sec. 1. The trial court denied the City's plea to the jurisdiction, and the City appealed.
DISCUSSION Standard and Scope of Review
Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential for a court to have the authority to resolve a case. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). The plaintiff has the burden to plead facts affirmatively showing that the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 446. A party may challenge a court's subject-matter jurisdiction by filing a plea to the jurisdiction. See Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638-39 (Tex. 1999). Because jurisdiction is a question of law, we review de novo the trial court's ruling on such a plea. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). In conducting this de novo review, we do not look at the merits of the plaintiff's case but consider only the plaintiff's pleadings and the evidence pertinent to the jurisdictional inquiry. County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002). We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of conferring jurisdiction. Tex. Dept. of Transp. v. Ramirez, 74 S.W.3d 864, 867 (Tex. 2002). If the allegations in the plaintiff's petition do not establish jurisdiction, but do not affirmatively demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency, and the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to amend. County of Cameron, 80 S.W.3d at 555.
Standing
In its first issue, the City contends that SES did not have standing to bring a breach of contract or quantum meruit action against the City because SES did not have a contract with the City, and SES did not establish that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over its claims. The City argues that, because the original petition did not demonstrate that the trial court had jurisdiction, the defects could not be cured, and the trial court erred in granting SES's motion for leave to amend its original petition.
Standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction. Tex. Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 445-46. A plaintiff has standing to sue when he or she is personally aggrieved by the alleged wrong. Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson County Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 1996). A plaintiff may also have standing by assignment of a cause of action. See Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Marketing on Hold, Inc., 170 S.W.3d 814, 823 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.) (holding that appellee had standing by virtue of assignment of claims). A claim may be assigned except when such an assignment is invalid as against public policy. State Farm Fire Cas. Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696, 707 (Tex. 1996). The supreme court has held assignments invalid as against public policy in four instances: (1) a cause of action for legal malpractice arising out of litigation, (2) Mary Carter agreements, (3) a plaintiff's claim against one joint tortfeasor to another joint tortfeasor as part of a settlement between the plaintiff and the assignee tortfeasor, and (4) interests in an estate. Id. at 707-11.
In this case, appellee sued "as assignee of The Morganti Group, Inc." and alleged in its original petition, "Morganti has assigned this claim to SES." The breach of contract and quantum meruit claims asserted by SES do not fall within the types of claims that, for public policy reasons, cannot be assigned. Accordingly, we hold that SES's allegation of assignment was sufficient to establish standing, and that the trial court did not err in granting SES's motion for leave to file an amended petition. We overrule the City's first issue.
In its first issue, the City also complains that it is inconsistent to plead both breach of contract and quantum meruit. However, SES's claim for quantum meruit is clearly an alternative pleading.
Governmental Immunity
In the its second issue, the City contends that its immunity from suit is not waived by the "plead and be impleaded" language in section 51.075 of the Texas Local Government Code, or by the "sue and be sued" language in article II, section 1 of the Houston City Charter. See Tex. Loc. Gov't Code § 51.075; Houston City Charter art. II, § 1. This Court has previously considered the issue of the City's waiver of governmental immunity in United Water Services, Inc. v. City of Houston and has held that the "sue and be sued" language in the Houston City Charter is a clear and unambiguous waiver of the City's immunity from suit. 137 S.W.3d 747, 757 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st] 2004, pet. filed). We now follow that holding and, as in United Water Services, we need not address whether section 51.075 of the Local Government Code's provision that home-rule municipalities may "plead and be impleaded" also waives the City's immunity from suit. We overrule the City's second issue.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's order.