Horta v. State

Full title: JOSE GILBERTO HORTA, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Thirteenth District, Corpus Christi

Date published: Aug 31, 2005

No. 13-04-285-CR (Tex. App. Aug. 31, 2005)

Opinion

No. 13-04-285-CR

Memorandum Opinion Delivered and Filed: August 31, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).

On Appeal from the 404th District Court of Cameron County, Texas.

Before Justices YAZEZ, CASTILLO, and GARZA.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Memorandum Opinion by Justice GARZA.

Appellant, Jose Gilberto Horta, was indicted for aggravated assault and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 22.01, 22.02 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05).¹ Appellant pled not guilty. After a jury trial, appellant was found guilty of both counts. The trial court assessed punishment at fifteen years' imprisonment in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division. On November 17, 2002, appellant allegedly hit his wife, Alma Dominguez, with his vehicle's door as he backed out of a driveway at a restaurant. According to Dominguez's testimony, they had been arguing earlier that day. When they arrived at the restaurant, they continued arguing and remained in the vehicle for about forty-five minutes. Dominguez, who was in the front passenger seat, got out of the vehicle and stood outside the vehicle for a moment before deciding to retrieve her purse. According to Dominguez, appellant watched her as she stood outside of the vehicle and as she reached in for her purse. Dominguez testified that, as she reached in for the purse, appellant started the vehicle and backed it up. The open door hit Dominguez and knocked her down to the ground. After the incident, appellant picked up Dominguez and attempted to force her into the vehicle. As he did so, he stated that he had to leave before the police arrived.² Appellant then shoved Dominguez aside and fled the scene of the incident. Dominguez was severely hurt and required surgery. On appeal, appellant contends that (1) he was harmed by the State's violation of the motion in limine, (2) Officer Culver's statement that the victim in this case was a victim of family violence provided the jury with an improper conclusion by a non-expert that appellant was guilty of the offenses charged, (3) the evidence showing that he backed the vehicle up and hit Dominguez is factually insufficient to convict him of intentionally assaulting her with the vehicle, and (4) the State committed an improper jury argument when it praised Dominguez's testimony and told the jurors they would be calling her a liar if they found appellant not guilty.

1 The offenses appellant was convicted of occurred on November 17, 2002, and appellant was tried in April 2004. Effective September 1, 2003, the legislature amended sections 22.01 and 22.02 of the Texas Penal Code. Because the amendments to these sections do not change the portions of the statutes relevant to this case, we cite to the current version of the statutes.

2 Dominguez testified that appellant told her that he was on probation and had to leave before police arrived. At some point after the incident, appellant called Dominguez and asked her to tell the police that the incident was only an accident.

Motion in Limine

Motions in limine do not preserve error. See Webb v. State, 760 S.W.2d 263, 275 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988) (en banc). This is true whether the motion is granted or denied. Willis v. State, 785 S.W.2d 378, 384 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989) (en banc); Webb, 760 S.W.2d at 275. A ruling on a motion in limine does not purport to be one on the merits but a ruling regarding administration of the trial. See Harnett v. State, 38 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tex.App.-Austin 2000, pet. ref'd). The remedy for a violation of a ruling on a motion in limine rests with the trial court. Brazzell v. State, 481 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Tex.Crim.App. 1972). The trial court may hold the litigant or attorney in contempt or use other remedies or sanctions. See Harnett, 38 S.W.3d at 655. Even if there has been a violation of the order on the motion in limine, a party must object to the admission or exclusion of evidence or other action in order to preserve error for appeal as to the evidentiary ruling. Id. A trial court's determination on the admissibility of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990) (en banc) (op. on reh'g). To preserve a complaint for appellate review, a party must present a timely request, objection, or motion to the trial court stating the specific grounds for the desired ruling if the specific grounds are not apparent from the context. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; see Blue v. State, 41 S.W.3d 129, 131 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (en banc). Generally, a party's failure to timely and specifically object at trial waives error. See Blue, 41 S.W.3d at 131. Specifically, a timely objection is required to preserve error in the admission of evidence. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 355 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995) (en banc). To preserve error, the objecting party must do the following until an adverse ruling is received: (1) object, (2) request an instruction to disregard, and (3) move for a mistrial. Coe v. State, 683 S.W.2d 431, 436 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984) (en banc). In his first issue, appellant complains of two areas of testimony which he believes constituted a violation of the motion in limine. The first concerns the comment on appellant's probationary status at the time of the alleged assault. During her testimony, Maria Culver, a detective with the Brownsville Police Department, mentioned in the jury's presence that appellant was served at the probation office.³ The prosecutor asked Culver:

Q: Okay. Do you know if that warrant was ever served on Mr. Horta?

A: Yes, it was, because I guess about a year-and-a-half later I was called over at the Westside Community Center where I was transferred to and they asked me if I had a warrant out for him, and I said, "Yes. It should be in the computer and there is a hard copy somewhere." I went over and I found it there at the main building, and they served it. I believe he was served at the Probation Office.

The second area of complained-of testimony pertains to the testimony of Dominguez. Appellant contends that the State violated the motion in limine when Dominguez referred to allegedly violent conduct committed by appellant on other occasions. The prosecutor asked Dominguez:

Q: Okay. And so after you left, did you two — were you discussing anything on the way to Brownsville?

A: Yes. He was arguing with me because he wanted me to dedicate this entire day to him. And I said no. On one occasion I had committed a mistake. And I told him that my mother and my daughter came before him, that in the past he had behaved very badly with me.

This Court has reviewed the entire record in this case, and paid particular attention to the testimony of which appellant now complains. There is no indication in the record that the complained-of testimony, even if inadmissible, was so unduly prejudicial or emotionally inflammatory that it could not be cured by a jury instruction to disregard. See Lusk v. State, 82 S.W.3d 57, 60 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, pet. ref'd). Generally, courts have acknowledged that testimony or evidence referring to extraneous offenses can be cured by such instructions. See id. (stating that testimony, as it related to extraneous offenses and to appellant's guilt for assault, was not such that its effect was incurable by the jury being instructed to disregard); see also Dooley v. State, 65 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex.App.-Dallas [5th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd) (holding that the trial court's instruction to the jury to disregard prosecutor's reference to probation cured any harm). The record does not show that appellant's trial counsel ever requested a jury instruction to disregard the complained-of testimony. Instead, counsel insisted that the court declare a mistrial. Under such circumstances, a mistrial would have been appropriate only if the testimony was so clearly calculated to inflame the minds of the jury and of such a nature as to suggest the impossibility of withdrawing the impression created. See Lusk, 82 S.W.3d at 60. This is not the case here. In regards to Officer Culver's testimony, the entirety of this testimony relates to where appellant was served. The reference to being served at the probation office was general and there is no indication that it was deliberately elicited by the State, as the question asked if, and not where, appellant was served. Likewise, there is no indication that the complained-of testimony from Dominguez was solicited deliberately. Given how routinely such testimony has been cured by instructions to disregard, in our estimation, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. See Ladd v. State, 3 S.W.3d 547, 567 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (stating that trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial is reviewed for abuse of discretion). We also overrule appellant's sub-issue, which complains that the State's line of questioning amounted to prosecutorial misconduct. In order to preserve error in cases of prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must (1) make a timely and specific objection, (2) request an instruction that the jury disregard the matter improperly placed before it, and (3) move for a mistrial. Cockrell v. State, 933 S.W.2d 73, 89 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). Appellant did not specifically object based upon the theory of prosecutorial misconduct during the trial. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). Although trial counsel objected to the complained-of testimony, the objection was not on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. Therefore, appellant's objection did not adequately inform the trial court of the complaint now urged on appeal. Jackson v. State, 516 S.W.2d 167, 175 (Tex.Crim.App. 1974). Thus, the failure to make a specific objection at trial based upon prosecutorial misconduct precludes our review based on this theory. See id. We overrule appellant's first issue.

Officer Culver's Testimony

In his second issue, appellant contends that Officer Culver's testimony that Dominguez was a "victim of family violence" constituted an improper conclusion of guilt. On appeal, appellant argues that Officer Culver was not competent to render such a conclusion and that the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its probative value.⁴ In reviewing the admissibility of such testimony, we review the trial court's decision for abuse of discretion. Powell v. State, 63 S.W.3d 435, 438 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). Texas Rule of Evidence 701 allows opinion testimony from a non-expert witness if the testimony is limited to those opinions or inferences that are rationally based on the perception of the witness and helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact issue. TEX. R. EVID. 701. A police officer may give lay opinion testimony if the testimony is based on his own personal observations and experiences as a police officer. See Solomon v. State, 49 S.W.3d 356, 364 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). In the present case, the prosecutor asked Officer Culver if she had a chance to talk to Dominguez. Culver stated that she had and that "[Dominguez] was a victim of family violence. [Dominguez] came in to file charges against her husband." Appellant objected to the testimony as being a legal conclusion as to guilt. The objection was overruled. Culver further testified that based upon her conversation with Dominguez and her investigation of the claim, which included Dominguez's sworn statement and photographs of Dominguez's injuries, she decided to obtain a warrant of arrest. We find that the statement by Culver referring to Dominguez as a victim of family violence was based upon her personal observations and experience as a police officer working in the family violence division. The testimony more appropriately suggests that the State was asking Culver to elaborate on the events leading up to obtaining and actually executing the warrant for appellant's arrest. Therefore, Culver's perception of Dominguez as a victim of family violence is admissible. See TEX. R. EVID. 701.⁵ We cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in admitting this testimony. Moreover, in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt,⁶ as well as the admission of similar testimony without objection, error, if any, was harmless. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).⁷

Factual Sufficiency

In his third issue, appellant contends that the evidence is factually insufficient to support his conviction for assault.⁸ Sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). Such a charge would accurately set out the law, would be authorized by the indictment, and would not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof. Id. Appellant maintains that the evidence adduced at trial by the State is insufficient because it does not prove that appellant intentionally assaulted Dominguez with his vehicle.⁹ In a factual sufficiency review, the evidence is viewed in a neutral light, favoring neither party. See Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 134 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996) (en banc). In this neutral light, we determine whether "the proof of guilt is so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination, or the proof of guilt, although adequate if taken alone, is greatly outweighed by contrary proof." Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). A clearly wrong and unjust verdict occurs where the jury's finding "shocks the conscience" or "clearly demonstrates bias." Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 164-65 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). We are authorized to disagree with the fact finder's verdict even if probative evidence exists that supports the verdict. Id. at 164; see also Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 7. Viewed in a neutral light, the proof of guilt in this case is not so obviously weak as to undermine confidence in the fact-finder's determination. The only testimony presented at trial regarding the incident was from Dominguez. The testimony stated, in relevant part, that while at the restaurant, and while arguing with appellant, Dominguez exited the vehicle and stood by the passenger door with the door partially open. Appellant watched Dominguez as she reached in to retrieve her purse. When she was reaching in for her purse, appellant asked Dominguez why she hated him so much. Then while Dominguez was still partially in the vehicle, appellant turned the vehicle on and reversed the vehicle causing the vehicle's door to knock Dominguez down. The vehicle struck Dominguez on her chin and leg. After the incident, appellant attempted to push Dominguez into the vehicle before police arrived. Appellant then fled the scene leaving Dominguez in the parking lot. Appellant later asked Dominguez to tell police that the incident was an accident. Appellant contends that this evidence alone is insufficient because a completely opposite conclusion is probable.¹⁰ However, a factual sufficiency challenge will not necessarily be sustained because the record contains conflicting evidence upon which the fact finder could have reached a different conclusion. Santellan, 939 S.W.2d at 164. Moreover, the trier of fact is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony, and it is free to accept or reject all or any part of the testimony of any witness. See Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). Based on the above testimony, the jury could have inferred that appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to Dominguez. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 22.01; see also Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). We find that the jury's finding is not "manifestly unjust," does not "shock the conscience," or "clearly demonstrate bias." Santellan, 939 S.W.2d at 164-65. As such, the verdict is not "so contrary to the overwhelming evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust." Id. Appellant's third issue is overruled.

Jury Argument

In his fourth issue, appellant contends that the prosecutor's closing argument amounted to reversible error because the prosecutor told the jury that a non-guilty verdict would be tantamount to telling Dominguez that she was a liar, especially in view of her willingness to testify at trial. Proper jury argument falls within one of four categories: (1) summation of the evidence, (2) reasonable deduction from the evidence, (3) answer to the arguments of opposing counsel, and (4) a plea for law enforcement. Coleman v. State, 881 S.W.2d 344, 358 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) (en banc). Defense counsel objected to the complained-of jury argument on the grounds that it did not fall within any of the four categories. The court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the comment. Defense counsel did not move for mistrial. On appeal, appellant urges that the prosecutor's argument was so prejudicial that the instruction to disregard could not have cured the harm. The State contends that appellant's failure to move for mistrial waives any error. We agree. To preserve error for improper jury argument, a party must object to the argument, request an instruction to disregard, and then move for a mistrial. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Mathis v. State, 67 S.W.3d 918, 926-27 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002); Cockrell, 933 S.W.2d at 89. Before a defendant will be permitted to complain on appeal about an erroneous jury argument or that an instruction to disregard could not have cured an erroneous jury argument, he will have to show he objected and pursued his objection to an adverse ruling. Valencia v. State, 946 S.W.2d 81, 82-3 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997) (op. on reh'g); Cockrell, 933 S.W.2d at 89. Appellant's failure to pursue to an adverse ruling on his objection to the jury argument forfeits his right to complain about the argument on appeal. See Cockrell, 933 S.W.2d at 89.¹¹ We overrule appellant's fourth issue. Having overruled all of appellant's issues, we affirm the trial court's judgment.