Ordinarily, even post-hearing disciplinary segregation for a limited number of days "fails to implicate a protected liberty interest." Hornsby v. Jones, 392 Fed. App'x. 653, 655 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished). For that reason alone, Plaintiff fails to state a plausible due-process claim against either Adams or Franklin.
In that case, the Supreme Court held that 30 days in disciplinary segregation did not represent an atypical or significant deprivation, nor did it inevitably affect the duration of confinement.Hornsby v. Jones, 392 F. App'x 653, 655-56 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972)). Id. (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-57 (1974)).
The punishment of segregation for a certain number of days generally "fail(s) to implicate a protected liberty interest." Hornsby v. Jones, 392 Fed.Appx. 653, 655 (10th Cir. 2010)(unpublished)(citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84, 487 (1995)). The due process requirements set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), simply do not apply to "hardly atypical" sanctions, like limited administrative segregation, which "do not rise to the level of disciplinary measures that 'inevitably affect the duration of (plaintiff's) sentence.'"
Even accepting the main facts alleged by plaintiff as true, that he was charged with disciplinary infractions, that he was removed from the disciplinary hearing, and that the hearing officer falsely represented in the written hearing summary that a staff representative was appointed and a video of the incident was reviewed, the court finds that plaintiff has failed to state a claim of federal constitutional violation. See Hornsby v. Jones, 392 Fed.Appx. 653, 655 (10th Cir. Aug. 20, 2010) (unpublished). This is because plaintiff was not sanctioned with the loss of good time as a result of these disciplinary proceedings.
To the extent that plaintiff is attempting to recover under § 1983 based upon this disciplinary action for which loss of good time was not a sanction, he states no claim of federal constitutional violation. See Hornsby v. Jones, 392 Fed.Appx. 653, 655 (10th Cir. Aug. 20, 2010) (unpublished) (Punishments of fines generally "fail to implicate a protected liberty interest.") (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84, 487 (1995)). As a consequence, the due process requirements set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), simply did not apply to the 2007 proceedings at LCF.
To the extent that plaintiff is attempting to challenge other disciplinary convictions for which loss of good time was not imposed as a sanction, he states no claim of federal constitutional violation. See Hornsby v. Jones, 392 Fed.Appx. 653, 655 (10th Cir. Aug. 20, 2010) (unpublished). Punishments of fines with segregation and reduction in credit level for a certain number of days generally "fail to implicate a protected liberty interest."
Plaintiff does not allege that the disciplinary actions affected the duration of his sentence, and the punishment imposed, 90 days of privilege restriction and $60 in disciplinary fines, is not the type of atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life that creates a protected liberty interest. See Beauclair v. High, No. 14-3020-SAC, 2015 WL 93636, at *3 (D. Kan. Jan. 7, 2015) (citing Hornsby v. Jones, 392 Fed.Appx. 653, 655 (10th Cir. 2010), for the proposition that punishments of fines and segregation for a limited number of days generally fail to implicate a protected liberty interest); see also Marshall v. Laird, 2013 WL 3226632, at *3 (D. Kan. June 25, 2013) (“[A] denial of privileges does not impose an atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life, and consequently no liberty interest is at stake where the inmate may be sanctioned with a loss of privileges only.”);
In Hornsby v. Jones, punishments of fines with segregation and reduction in credit level for a certain number of days did not “rise to the level of disciplinary measures” as to trigger a constitutionally protected interest. 392 Fed.Appx. 653, 655 (10th Cir. Aug. 20, 2010) (citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487); see also Guiden v. Werholtz, 2011 WL 1807443, at *8 (D. Kan. May 11, 2011). But next year, the Tenth Circuit said that a “fine imposed in prison disciplinary proceeding implicates property interest protected by due process.”
As for the sanction of thirty days in disciplinary restrictive housing, Mr. Lovato does not claim, and the record does not indicate, that this placement imposed an atypical and significant hardship on him in relation to the ordinary incidents of life such that it gave rise to a protected liberty interest. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995) (holding that thirty days of disciplinary segregation was not an "atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might conceivably create a liberty interest"); see also Hornsby v. Jones, 392 F. App'x 653, 655 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (finding that "a sentence of 20 days in disciplinary segregation does not rise to the level of punishment that would invoke constitutional concern"). When a prison disciplinary hearing may result in the loss of earned credits, a prisoner must be accorded "(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action."
Instead, the custody classification of prisoners is among the "wide spectrum of discretionary actions that traditionally have been the business of prison administrators rather than of the federal courts." Meachum, 427 U.S. at 225; see also Hornsby v. Jones, 392 F. App'x 653, 656 (10th Cir. 2010). Count 23 fails to state a claim.