Assuming that the delay is chargeable to DOT and is unreasonable, the burden is still on the Appellee to bring forth evidence of actual prejudice to himself from reliance on DOT's failure to act. Horner v. Department of Transportation, 59 Pa. Commw. 519, 430 A.2d 387 (1981). DOT contends that any prejudice suffered by Appellee is insufficient to reverse the suspension it imposed.
Section 1501 of the Code provides that a driver must have a license to drive a motor vehicle, and section 1532(b)(2) of the Code provides that DOT shall suspend the operating privileges of any driver upon receiving a certified record of a driver's conviction under section 1501(a) of the Code. Section 1532 of the Code is distinguished from section 1551 in that it does not contain notice requirements as does section 1551. Horner v. Department of Transportation, 59 Pa. Commw. 519, 430 A.2d 387 (1981). Accordingly, we reverse.
Assuming, arguendo, that the delay is chargeable to DOT and is unreasonable, the burden was still on the appellee to bring forth evidence of actual prejudice to himself from reliance on DOT's failure to act. Horner v. Department of Transportation, 59 Pa. Commw. 519, 430 A.2d 387 (1981). The record in this case is devoid of any evidence of prejudice to the appellee or reliance by him on DOT's failure to act.