In Willard, Sutherland & Co. v. United States, a case that also involved a contract with the Government, the contract was found to be unenforceable as written, but enforceable as it was actually performed. 262 U.S. 489, 494 (1923) ("While the contract at its inception was not enforceable, it became valid and binding to the extent that it was performed."); cf Horn v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 500, 504-05 (2011). As explained above, the "Government would provide delivery orders or task orders to JRS requesting services, JRS would render service, and then JRS would invoice the Government for payment."

Those are the court records that D'Apuzzo is contractually entitled to for free. In this way, the term "opinion" is "sufficient[ly] definite[] so as to provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy," Horn v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 500, 505 (2011); indeed, were the Government to charge D'Apuzzo for "opinions" so designated on PACER, it would breach the contract and entitle D'Apuzzo to damages. Both parties argue that numerous extraneous documents either render, or don't render, the term "opinion" ambiguous or indefinite as used in the contract. (See, e.g., ECF Nos. 67 at pp. 6-8 and 80 at pp. 3-6 (citing to the PACER user manual, the official guidance documents issued by the Judicial Conference, and various other PACER-related announcements).)

See, e.g.,48 C.F.R. § 37.101 (2013); 32 C.F.R. §§ 107.1 to 107.6 (2013); see also Horn v. United States, 98 Fed.Cl. 500, 502 (2011); Glenn v. Performance Anesthesia, P.A., No. 5:09–CV00309–BR, 2010 WL 3420538 (Aug. 27, 2010) (unpublished order). ¶ 28 In the present case, the Board did not make a determination that plaintiff entered into a “personal services contract with” the City.