Opinion
C. A. 1:22-2017-SAL-SVH
07-25-2022
Myra Horan, Plaintiff, v. Brad Lee Coen; Vicki J. Snelgrove; Angela W. Abstance; and State of South Carolina, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Shiva V. Hodges United States Magistrate Judge.
Myra Horan (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this complaint against Brad Lee Coen, South Carolina Family Court Judges Vicki J. Snelgrove and Angela W. Abstance, and the State of South Carolina (“Defendants”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be dismissed.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff alleges she and Coen entered into a contract in 2016 regarding their divorce, alimony, and custody agreement. [ECF No. 1 at 9]. She further alleges Snelgrove held an ex parte hearing on September 1, 2021, to “enforce the erroneaous ‘child support' request of Defendant Coen.” Id. at 10. Plaintiff alleges she appeared on May 4, 2022 for a contempt hearing before Judge Abstance, in which Abstance “proceeded to threaten that if Plaintiff failed to cure the fictitious debt, Plaintiff would be incarcerated for debt.” Id. She alleges violation of her constitutional rights, as well as diversity jurisdiction.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
B. Analysis
1. No Diversity Jurisdiction
The diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), requires complete diversity of parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000. Complete diversity of parties in a case means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373-74 nn.13-16 (1978). Plaintiff has failed to allege facts showing this court has diversity jurisdiction over this case. Although Plaintiff alleges Coen is a citizen of Idaho, she does not state the citizenship of any other party. Although not definitive on citizenship, the court notes Plaintiff's address is in South Carolina, as are Snelgrove and Abstance. Because Plaintiff's complaint fails to allege facts showing complete diversity of citizenship pursuant to § 1332(a), the court has no diversity jurisdiction over her claims.
2. Snelgrove and Abstance
Defendants Snelgrove and Abstance should be dismissed based on judicial immunity. It is well-settled that judges have immunity from claims arising out of their judicial actions. Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991). The judicial immunity bar includes damages claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as well as cases where a plaintiff seeks both damages and injunctive or declaratory relief. See, e.g., Lepelletier v. Tran, 633 Fed.Appx. 126, 127 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that a plaintiff's “claims seeking injunctive relief against a sitting state court judge for actions taken in his judicial capacity also were barred by the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983”). Judicial immunity is a protection from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages, and such immunity is not pierced by allegations of corruption or bad faith. See Mireless, 502 U.S. at 11; see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in the ‘clear absence of all jurisdiction.'”) (citation omitted). As Plaintiff's claims against Snelgrove and Abstance relate to their judicial actions, they are entitled to absolute immunity.
3. Family Court Proceedings
a. Younger abstention
To the extent Plaintiff's family court is ongoing, the Younger abstention applies. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, (1971), the United States Supreme Court held a federal court should not interfere with ongoing state criminal proceedings “except in the most narrow and extraordinary of circumstances.” Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). Younger abstention applies “as well ‘to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved.'” Harper v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W.Va., 396 F.3d 348, 351 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)).
From Younger and its progeny, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has derived the following test to determine when abstention is appropriate: (1) “there are ongoing state judicial proceedings”; (2) “the proceedings implicate important state interests”; and (3) “there is an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings.” Martin Marietta Corp. v. Md. Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d 1392, 1396 (4th Cir. 1994) (citing Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432).
Applying the above standards, the parties appear to be currently involved in a family court case relating to the custody of Plaintiff and Coen's son that predates this action. Therefore, there are ongoing state judicial proceedings involving the parties. Additionally, it is uncontroverted the family court case implicates important state interests. Family law is a core source of state authority and thus is an “important” state interest. See Harper, 396 F.3d at 351. Thus, the second factor is also met. The final factor is also met, as there is an adequate opportunity to raise the federal claim in the family court case. Plaintiff is able to present all of her arguments to the family court. Therefore, the undersigned recommends the court dismiss this action based on Younger abstention.
b. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
Out of an abundance of caution, and in the event that the family court case has concluded, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (holding that under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal districts courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments”). Other courts, including the Fourth Circuit and district courts within it, have concluded the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would bar a federal court's consideration of claims like Plaintiff's. Stratton v. Mecklenburg Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 521 Fed.Appx. 278, 291 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that, because the plaintiff's “due process claim is a mere pretext for the real focus of the [c]omplaint, which challenges the validity of records and proceedings of the North Carolina courts that resulted in the termination of the [plaintiff's] parental rights,” the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars consideration of that claim); see also Johnson v. Byrd, No. 1:16CV1052, 2016 WL 6839410, at *7 (M.D. N.C. Nov. 21, 2016), subsequently aff'd, 693 Fed.Appx. 219 (4th Cir. 2017); Davis v. Singer, No. 4:13cv7, 2014 WL 12598862 (E.D. Va. Aug. 5, 2014) (concluding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precluded consideration of plaintiff's civil rights complaint, which effectively challenged the termination of his parental rights and explaining that “a plaintiff may not seek a reversal of a state court judgment simply by recasting his complaint in the form a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983”) (quotation and citation omitted); Powell v. Williams, No. 5:14-CV-282, 2014 WL 3809964, at *3 (E.D. N.C. July 14, 2014) (holding that, “to the extent such [child custody or child support] matters have been determined by the state court, this court is ... barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine from reviewing the state court's decisions”). Therefore, in the event that the family court case has concluded, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies and the case should be dismissed.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends this case be dismissed.
Because Plaintiff's claims would ultimately fail if she were permitted to amend her complaint, the undersigned recommends the district judge order the dismissal with prejudice.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).