Opinion
6:21-cv-00553-JD-JDA
08-23-2022
Stephon L. Hopkins, Plaintiff, v. Jacob A. Walters, Officer; Austin Fowler, Officer, Defendants.[1]
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants. [Doc. 60.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff filed this action pro se, asserting claims arising out of his encounters with law enforcement in Greenville, South Carolina, on April 22, 2019. [Doc. 1.] Subsequently, Plaintiff obtained counsel and filed an Amended Complaint. [Doc. 22.]
On April 22, 2022, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 60.] Plaintiff filed a response on May 20, 2022, and Defendants filed a reply on May 27, 2022. [Docs. 64; 66.] The motion is now ripe for review.
BACKGROUND
Viewing the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as is appropriate on consideration of Defendants' summary judgment motion, the undersigned gleans the following facts.
On April 22, 2019, Greenville County Sheriff Deputies Jacob Walters and Austin Fowler each responded to 6 Athelone Avenue in reference to two 911 hangup calls. [Doc. 64-2 at 3.] Dispatch advised that on one of the calls a female provided the address and then hung up and that on the next call the dispatchers could hear a disturbance in the background before the caller hung up again. [Id.] Walters and Fowler arrived at the scene at the same time and found Rosa Brannon standing outside by the road in front of the house (“the Residence”), smoking. [Id.; FR 0:30.] The officers did not notice that she had any visible injuries. [Docs. 64-1 at 9; 64-3 at 6.] Fowler asked if she had called 911 and she said she had not. [FR 0:31-0:34.] He asked why she was in the street, and she said she was just walking. [FR 0:38-0:40] She said that she lived in the Residence and no one else was home. [FR 0:44-0:47, 0:56-0:57.] Fowler told her that they had had a 911 hangup call and asked if she had been on the phone, and she denied that she had. [FR 1:00-1:06.] Walters then asked Plaintiff if she lived there, and she again indicated that she did and that her daughter lived with her but was not home. [FR 1:10-1:16; WR 0:53-0:59.] At that point, Fowler walked toward a neighboring house. [FR 1:20-1:40.]
Walters had been promoted to sergeant by the time of his deposition. [Doc. 60-3 at 3.]
Both deputies wore body cameras that were activated prior to the officers' making contact with Brannon. [Doc. 64-2 at 8.]
Docket entry 60-20 contains three DVDs. The first DVD contains several recordings. The Court cites the recording labeled “BWC Fowler 1 - 19-068401" in the format [FR x:xx-x:xx]; the recording labeled “BWC Walters 3 - 19068401" in the format [WDC x:xx-x:xx]; and the recording labeled “BWC Shetley 1 - 19-068401" in the format [S x:xx-x:xx]. The recording labeled “BWC Metrinko - 19068401" is cited as “M.” The second DVD in docket entry 60-20 contains two recordings. The Court cites the recording labeled “BWC Walters 1 - 19-068401" in the format [WR x:xx-x:xx]; and the recording labeled “BWC Walters 2 - 19-068401" in the format [WT x:xx-x:xx.]
As Fowler walked away, Walters continued to question Brannon, who repeated that she had not called 911 and stated that no one else was inside the home. [Doc. 64-2 at 8; WR 1:06-1:24.] Walters asked if she had her phone with her, and she said that her phone was not even on. [WR 1:15-1:18.] When he asked where the phone was, she said she had a tablet and that it was inside the house. [WR 1:19-1:22.]
As Fowler approached the neighboring house, he asked a woman in the front yard if she had called 911, and she said she had not and that there had been an argument in front of the Residence. [FR 1:37-1:55.] With that information, Fowler returned to the Residence and asked Brannon who was inside. [FR 2:05-2:22.] She answered, “No one,” and Fowler responded, “That's a lie.” [FR 2:24.] Brannon then explained that the man that had been there had left. [FR 2:27-2:33.] Fowler asked if the officers could look inside the house, and she said, “Ain't nobody going in my house. Nuh-uh.” [FR 2:35-2:39; see Doc. 64-2 at 3.] Walters told Brannon that they had had two 911 calls from this house and they had to make sure that no one was inside and hurt. [FR 2:39-2:48; WR 2:25-2:33.] Brannon repeated that no one was inside. [FR 2:49-2:51; WR 2:34-2:36.]
Walters asked Brannon if she had her identification with her. [WR 2:53.] She walked toward a car under a carport attached to the Residence, opened the car door, and retrieved her identification. [FR 3:11-3:45; WR 2:56-3:26.] From the perspective of a person in the road in front of the house, the carport was situated to the left of the front of the Residence. [FR 0:44.] Walters walked into the carport and saw what appeared to be a tablet sitting on an air conditioning unit on the outside of the house, and he asked Brannon if it was her tablet. [FR 3:47-3:52; WR 3:31-3:36.] Around that time, Walters heard a noise from inside the house and asked Brannon who was home. [WR 3:42-3:44.] Walters walked toward a door on the side of the home that opened into the carport, he opened the screen door with his right hand, and he held it open while he knocked on the inside door with his left hand. [FR 4:04-4:10; WR 3:47-3:53.] Immediately, a man (“Plaintiff”) opened the door, and said, “Hey, how you doing?” then looked at Brannon and said “I know you cheatin' on me; I know you cheatin'.” [WR 3:54-3:57.] Walters told him, “Hold on. Hold on.” [WR 3:57-3:58.] As Plaintiff stepped down from the doorway into the carport, he rotated to the left, faced Brannon-who was only a few feet away-and said through the screen door, which Walters was still holding, “I know you cheatin' on me. I know you cheatin'. I know you cheatin'.” [FR 4:13-4:15; WR 3:57-3:59.] Walters again said, “Hold on.” [WR 4:00.] As Walters said this, Fowler asked Brannon to walk out to the carport, away from Plaintiff, which she did. [FR 4:15-4:16.]
Plaintiff and Brannon have a child together. [Docs. 64-4 at 12; 64-5 at 11.]
With Walters continuing to hold the screen door, blocking Plaintiff's path out to the carport, Plaintiff said, “‘Scuse me, sir. ‘Scuse me. It's on my record she cheatin' on me, man. I just want to leave. She cheatin' on me with my brother. I'm good. She cheatin' on me with my own brother, man. She cheatin' on me with my own brother, man.” [WR 4:00-4:10.] Walters then let go of the screen door and thus was no longer blocking Plaintiff's path out to the carport. [WR 4:10.] Walters told Plaintiff, “Come out here for a minute,” pointing outside of the carport in the direction of the road in front of the Residence. [WR 4:11-4:12.] Plaintiff said, “I'm gone, man,” and walked toward the front of the carport. [FR 4:28-4:29; WR 4:13-4:14.] Walters said, “Alright, hold on.” [WR 4:14.]
At that point, Plaintiff, who had been walking beside the car, turned right, walking in front of the car and then, when he cleared the car, turned right again, walking beside the house toward the back yard. [FR 4:29-4:37; WR 4:10-4:18.] As he did so, he continued to repeat, in an increasingly agitated tone, that Brannon had cheated on him with his own brother; Walters, walking behind him, told him four more times, “Come here.” [FR 4:29-4:41; WR 4:10-4:22.]
As Plaintiff approached the backyard, Walters reached out and attempted to grab Plaintiff around his right shoulder. [FR 4:38; WR 4:18-4:21.] Plaintiff resisted the attempt and yelled for Walters to get off of him, as the two men struggled, with Walters holding on to the top of Plaintiff's sweatshirt, pulling it over the back of Plaintiff's head and pulling Plaintiff's head toward the ground. [FR 4:41-4:42; WR 4:21-4:24.] As soon as the struggle began, Fowler ran toward the men and grabbed Plaintiff from behind, and the struggle continued, with Plaintiff and Fowler falling to the ground. [FR 4:38-4:42; WR 4:27-4:31.] As the officers continued to wrestle with Plaintiff, Walters repeatedly demanded that Plaintiff put his hands behind his back, but Plaintiff tucked his arms underneath him and refused to give the officers his hands. [WR 4:31-4:35; Doc. 64-2 at 4.] Because Plaintiff's hands were near his waist, Walters was concerned that he could possibly be trying to reach for a weapon. [Doc. 64-2 at 4.]
During the struggle, Fowler's and Walters' body cams fell off onto the ground, although they continued to record. [Id. at 4, 8; FR 4:59; WR 4:37.] From the recordings, one can hear Plaintiff repeatedly saying that he is trying to leave and Walters telling Plaintiff that he is going to get tased. [WR 4:50-4:57; see also Doc. 60-2 at 12 (Fowler's deposition testimony that Walters told Plaintiff that he would be tased if he did not quit resisting).] Walters eventually did tase Plaintiff, possibly multiple times. [Docs. 60-7 at 12-15; 64-2 at 4; 64-5 at 19-22.]
Despite the officers' attempt to subdue him, Plaintiff was able to push the officers off of him, stand up, and start running through the back yard. [Docs. 60-7 at 16-17; 64-2 at 4, 8-9.] Walters called out over the radio that they were chasing Plaintiff on foot. [Docs. 64-2 at 4, 9.] He also told Plaintiff he was under arrest. [Id. at 9.] As Plaintiff began to run, he still had taser prongs in his shoulder, but he broke the taser wires from the cartridge when he was able to achieve sufficient separation from the officers, and he pulled the prongs out of his shoulder as he ran and threw them to the ground. [Id. at 4-5; Doc. 64-5 at 19.] He proceeded across a road and into a patch of woods, then stopped when he came to a gate and “put [his] hands up.” [Docs. 64-2 at 5, 9; 60-7 at 17-18.] Walters ran up to Plaintiff and punched him in the face. [Doc. 60-7 at 18.] A moment later, Fowler tackled Plaintiff and held him down as Walters repeatedly punched him many more times, including in the face, jaw, head, and back, and Fowler tased him. [Id. at 17-21; Doc. 64-4 at 17.] The officers subsequently secured Plaintiff's arms and handcuffed him. [Doc. 64-2 at 5.]
Walters estimated that “[f]rom the start of [Plaintiff's] resistance to finally getting him handcuffed” the officers “covered a distance of approximately 400 yards.” [Doc. 64-2 at 5.]
The parties' versions of what occurred once Plaintiff entered the wooded area differ significantly. Plaintiff testified that after he stopped running and put his hands up, Walters “put[] his handcuffs around his wrists and superman punched [Plaintiff] in the face with his handcuffs,” as if he were using the handcuffs as “brass knuckles” [Doc. 60-7 at 18-19; see id. at 17]; as Plaintiff was going to the ground, Fowler “slammed” Plaintiff to the ground and “stayed on top of” Plaintiff while Walters continued to punch him with the handcuffs in the face, jaw, head, and back [id. at 19-21; Doc. 64-4 at 17]; all told, Walters hit Plaintiff in the face “at least 20 times” [Doc. 60-7 at 21]. In contrast, Walters testified that when he caught up with Plaintiff in the wooded area, he “was able to tackle him to the ground again” but that Plaintiff continued to resist the officers, held Walters down on the ground, and shoved Walters' glasses off his face. [Doc. 60-3 at 16-17.] Walters testified that it was only at that point that he punched Plaintiff once in the face, and only with his fist, not with the handcuffs. [Id. at 16.] Walters testified that the one punch, along with Fowler's assistance, allowed him to grab Plaintiff's arms and handcuff him. [Id. at 17.] Fowler also testified that during the struggle Fowler attempted “three or four” times to “drive stun” Plaintiff with his taser on the back of Plaintiff's thigh but that Plaintiff did “not seem to experience any discomfort from that.” [Doc. 64-3 at 8.]
Other officers arrived on the scene to assist in transporting Plaintiff back to the Residence. [Id.] Plaintiff was taken from the woods and placed Plaintiff in Deputy James Shetley's patrol vehicle. [S 0:00-11:36; M.] Walters then returned to the Residence to speak with Brannon. [Doc. 64-2 at 5.] With Brannon's consent, the officers searched the home and found a lever action .22 rifle. [Id.; Doc. 64-5 at 27.] When Brannon denied the gun was hers and Walters learned that Plaintiff was not allowed to own a gun, the officers took possession of the weapon. [Docs. 64-2 at 5; 64-5 at 27.] Brannon provided Plaintiff's name but did not know his date of birth, and she refused to provide a statement about what had happened to her and did not want to press charges. [Docs. 64-2 at 5-6; 64-5 at 22.]
Walters eventually transferred Plaintiff to his patrol vehicle from Shetley's and drove him to the Greenville County Detention Center (“the Detention Center”). [S 54:00-55:25; Docs. 60-3 at 20; 64-2 at 6.] When moving to Walters' vehicle and on the ride to the Detention Center, Plaintiff continued to complain about Walters punching him in the eye and using his handcuffs as brass knuckles. [E.g., WT 29:50-29:52, 43:28-44:15.]
Meanwhile, Walters repeatedly asked Plaintiff his name, but Plaintiff would not tell him. [ E.g., WT 31:27-31:37.] When they arrived at the Detention Center, Walters told Plaintiff that he intended to charge him at least with resisting arrest and interfering with a police officer. [WT 48:26-48:32.]
Walters muted his body cam at this point [Doc. 64-4 at 20] and later unmuted the body cam while looking through the vehicle's trunk [WDC 0:28].
Walters exited the vehicle, walked around to the passenger side, opened the vehicle's passenger-side back door, and positioned Plaintiff, who was still handcuffed and seated, with his feet on the ground beside the car. [WDC 0:00-1:08.] Plaintiff asked Walters to go get other officers because Plaintiff “did not feel comfortable with” Walters. [Doc. 60-7 at 24.]. Plaintiff continued to complain about Walters beating him with his handcuffs. [WDC 0:36-1:08; Doc. 64-2 at 6.] Walters radioed for some assistance and began attempting to take Plaintiff out of the vehicle. [WDC 0:49-0:57.] As soon as Walters touched Plaintiff, Plaintiff told Walters to get off of him, struggling and continuing to complain about the earlier abuse. [WDC 0:56-1:12.] Accordingly, Walters ended up dragging Plaintiff out of the vehicle feet first. [WDC 1:08-1:12.] As Plaintiff was sliding out, Plaintiff said, “Alright, I'm out your car,” and he dropped to the ground, so that he was on his left side, perpendicular to the vehicle, with the back of his head inches away from the inside of the car and his head and face inches away from the open door. [WDC 1:11-1:12.] Walters promptly closed the car door on Plaintiff's head, causing the door to pop back open. [WDC 1:12-1:14.] Showing no reaction other than to smile, Walters then dragged Plaintiff's top half toward the back of the car and shut the car door successfully. [WDC 1:17-1:20; Doc. 64-4 at 21.]
As Plaintiff angrily complained about the violent treatment, Walters calmly twice told him, “You're doing it to yourself,” and repeatedly told him that he had turned on his body cam for Plaintiff's benefit. [WDC 1:48-2:25.] Another officer then emerged from the Detention Center, and Walters said, “Look, Charlie.” [WDC 2:30-33.] When Plaintiff complained to the other officer that Walters had just slammed his head in the car door, Walters commented, “We have a lively one,” and the other officer told Plaintiff, “We're gonna do it again if you don't f****n' stop.” [WDC 2:34-2:42; see Doc. 64-4 at 22.] The other officer assisted Walters in escorting Plaintiff into the Detention Center. [WDC 2:43-4:25.]
Walters subsequently confirmed Plaintiff's identity and discovered he had an active warrant for failing to appear for a charge of failure to stop for a blue light. [Doc. 64-2 at 6.] He also discovered that Plaintiff was listed by the National Crime Information Center as wanted out of the Union County Sheriff's Office. [Id.] Walters obtained the listed warrants and attempted to turn Plaintiff over to the Detention Center, but the Detention Center refused to accept him as a result of injuries to his face. [Id.; Docs. 60-13 at 4; 64-1 at 15; 64-4 at 22; 64-8 at 2.] Accordingly, Shetley transported Plaintiff to Greenville Memorial Hospital to be evaluated, and the Detention Center sent an officer to take custody of Plaintiff. [Doc. 64-2 at 6.] At the hospital, Plaintiff was diagnosed with “[c]ontusion of face,” “[f]acial laceration, initial encounter,” “[s]imple bruising,” and “[s]ubconjunctival hemorrhage of left eye.” [Doc. 64-8 at 3.]
At one point Walters put Plaintiff in a “spit hood.” [Docs. 64-1 at 15; 64-4 at 22.] When asked in his deposition why he did that, Walters answered that Plaintiff “made motions and indications with his mouth that he may possibly try to spit on us.” [Doc. 64-1 at 15.] Despite the fact that Plaintiff had the spit hood over his head, an officer at the Detention Center noticed that Plaintiff was injured and instructed that he be taken to the hospital. [Docs. 64-2 at 6; 64-4 at 22.]
Plaintiff was subsequently charged with interfering with a police investigation and resisting arrest. [Doc. 60-7 at 25.] Arrest warrants were issued for both charges by a magistrate judge. [Doc. 60-5.] On October 7, 2019, Plaintiff pled no contest to the resisting-arrest charge, and he was sentenced to time served. [Doc. 60-7 at 25]; see also Greenville County Thirteenth Judicial Circuit Public Index, available at https://publicindex.sccourts.org/Greenville/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx (search by case number 2019A2330203625) (last visited Aug. 22, 2022); Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that courts “may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record”); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (“We note that ‘the most frequent use of judicial notice is in noticing the content of court records.'”).
Plaintiff testified that he pled no contest to both charges [Doc. 60-7 at 25], but the public index shows that the interfering charge at case number 2019A2330203624 was dismissed.
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges three causes of action. Count I alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by seizing him without legal justification. [Doc. 22 ¶¶ 25-36.] Count II alleges that Defendants violated his Fourth Amendment rights by subjecting him to excessive force. [Id. ¶¶ 37-48.] Count III alleges that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment by bringing unsubstantiated charges against him, resulting in an unduly long sentence. [Id. ¶¶ 49-56.] As his relief, Plaintiff seeks money damages, including punitive damages, as well as court costs and attorneys' fees. [Id. at 14.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
Plaintiff's claims are filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .”42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the “state action” requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed."Id. (quoting Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual” may at times be treated “as if a State has caused it to be performed.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible” and that “the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to “begin by identifying the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Ross v. Commc'ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985), overruled on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.
Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from civil damage suits as long as the conduct in question does not “violate clearly established rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Thus, qualified immunity does not protect an official who violates a constitutional or statutory right of a plaintiff that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that an objectively reasonable official in the official's position would have known of the right. Id. Further, qualified immunity is “an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
“In determining whether an officer is entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry.” Smith v. Ray, 781 F.3d 95, 100 (4th Cir. 2015). The first concerns whether the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, demonstrate that the officer's conduct violated a federal right. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). The second “asks whether the right was clearly established at the time the violation occurred such that a reasonable person would have known that his conduct was unconstitutional.” Smith, 781 F.3d at 100. For purposes of this analysis, a right is “clearly established” if “[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
District court judges are “permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). If a court decides in the negative the first prong it considers-i.e., the court decides the plaintiff has not alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right or the right was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation-the court need not consider the other prong of the qualified immunity analysis. See id. at 243-45; Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding the court “need not formally resolve” the constitutional question of “whether the [plaintiffs] were arrested without probable cause” to address the plaintiffs' § 1983 claim; the court stated that it “need only determine whether [the defendant]-a deputy sheriff performing within the normal course of his employment-acted with the objective reasonableness necessary to entitle him to qualified immunity”).
DISCUSSION
Count I (Illegal Seizure)
Count I alleges that Defendants seized Plaintiff without legal justification. [Doc. 22 ¶¶ 25-36.] Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment as to Count I because the record demonstrates as a matter of law that they were justified in briefly detaining Plaintiff to investigate the 911 calls involving possible domestic abuse. [Doc. 601 at 20-21.] The Court agrees.
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court “held that an officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). “The level of suspicion must be a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 539 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). The officer must be able to articulate something more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.'” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. Courts must look at the totality of the circumstances and consider the “cumulative information available to the officer.” United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 337 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). And, in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, courts may credit “the practical experience of officers who observe on a daily basis what transpires on the street.” United States v. Lender, 985 F.2d 151, 154 (4th Cir. 1993).
Stated another way, “[a]n officer may stop and briefly detain a person when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.” United States v. Monteith, 662 F.3d 660, 665 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The Supreme Court has held that a suspect is not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment until officers apply physical force or the suspect submits to a show of authority.” United States v. Smith, 396 F.3d 579, 586 n.5 (4th Cir. 2005). Here, Plaintiff did not submit to any show of authority prior to the officers' application of physical force. Thus, he was first seized when the officers applied physical force against him. The Court therefore turns to the question of whether the officers were justified in briefly detaining him under Terry at that point.
The officers here had responded to two 911 hang-up calls. [Doc. 64-2 at 3.] Dispatch had advised that a female had provided an address on the first call before hanging up and that on the second call, dispatch could hear a disturbance before the hang up. [Id.] Brannon was outside waiting by the roadway when Defendants arrived, and she denied that anyone had called 911 or that anyone was in the home. [ Id.; Doc. 60-3 at 6-7.] Plaintiff subsequently emerged from the home, angrily stating that he had caught Brannon cheating on him with his own brother. [Docs. 60-2 at 8; 60-3 at 8-9.] Pointing toward the road, Walters told Plaintiff to “[c]ome out here for a minute.” [WR 4:11-4:12.] However, Plaintiff told the officers he was “gone” and began to walk away. [FR 4:28-4:29; WR 4:13-4:14.] As Plaintiff continued to walk away, Walters told him repeatedly, “Come here,” but Plaintiff refused to stop. [FR 4:29-4:41; WR 4:10-4:22.] It was at that point that the officers first employed physical force in an attempt to stop Plaintiff, with Walters attempting to grab Plaintiff by the shoulder. [FR 4:38; WR 4:18-4:21.]
Given these facts, Defendants had reason, at the time force was first employed, to suspect that Plaintiff was involved in criminal activity. Plaintiff's display of anger toward Brannon, combined with the disturbance that the dispatcher had heard during the second 911 call, gave the officers reason to suspect that it was fear of Plaintiff that had prompted the 911 calls. In light of Brannon's false statements that Plaintiff had left and that no one was in the Residence, the officers had reason to suspect that Brannon was lying to protect Plaintiff, including preventing them from questioning him about possible domestic violence. “[C]ourts have recognized that domestic situations can escalate quickly: [d]omestic disturbances have a low flash point, and violence may be lurking and explode with little warning.” Trull v. Smolka, 411 Fed.Appx. 651, 656 (4th Cir. 2011) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). And even though the officers here observed “no outward evidence that there was any violence, . . . a definite determination [about what had happened] could not be made without talking to both parties.” Id.; see also Hiibel v Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004) (noting that “questions concerning a suspect's identity are a routine and accepted part of many Terry stops” and that “[o]fficers called to investigate domestic disputes need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim”). Thus, it was critical that the officers be able to question Plaintiff regarding whether he was a continuing danger and whether there was anyone else was in the home-including possibly Brannon's daughter-who might be in need of assistance. See Pleasants v. Town of Louisa, 524 Fed.Appx. 891, 895 (4th Cir. 2013) (“Courts have shown particular concern for emergency situations of domestic violence, given their combustible nature, as well as for children who may be in danger.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); United States v. Grigg, 498 F.3d 1070, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting that a court must consider “the potential for ongoing or repeated danger” within the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a Terry stop is justified); United States v. Jegede, 294 F.Supp.2d 704, 708 (D. Md. 2003) (noting that the “potential for repeated danger” weighs in favor of authorization for a Terry stop). It was also important that the officers be able to attempt to defuse any ongoing conflict so as to prevent further threats or violence. See United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 326 (4th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he very point of Terry was to permit officers to take preventive action and conduct investigative stops before crimes are committed, based on what they view as suspicious-albeit even legal-activity.”); Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 198 (2d Cir. 1998) (“The logical means to defuse the [possible ongoing domestic dispute] was to find the other person [involved] and ensure that he or she presented or was in no further danger.”).
Plaintiff argues that the fact that Brannon had no visible injuries precluded any reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot [Doc. 64 at 9], but the lack of visible injuries did not foreclose the possibility that Plaintiff had attempted to harm her or threatened to do so, or that she had injuries and they were not immediately visible. See S.C. Code § 16-25-20 (providing that criminal domestic violence includes acts that “cause physical harm or injury to a person's own household member” and “offer[ing] or attempt[ing] to cause physical harm or injury to a person's own household member with apparent present ability under circumstances reasonably creating fear of imminent peril”); see also S.C. Code § 16-25-10(3) (defining “[h]ousehold member” to mean “a spouse,” “a former spouse,” “persons who have a child in common,” or “a male and female who are cohabiting or formerly have cohabited”). Nor did it foreclose the possibility that another person inside the house-such as Brannon's daughter-had been the victim.
Although not discussed by the parties, the Court also has considered whether “unprovoked flight” by Plaintiff gave the officers additional reason to suspect that Plaintiff was engaged or had engaged in criminal activity to justify the stop under Terry. See, e.g., Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. However, a factfinder considering the forecasted evidence could reasonably determine that Plaintiff walked right by the officers, stated that he was leaving, and did not flee in panic. See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 797 Fed.Appx. 744, 745, 749-50 (4th Cir. 2019) (noting that the suspect “could have declined to answer questions and walked away” but instead acted suspiciously by exhibiting “sudden panic” and taking “precipitous flight” when he “ran from one side of the house around to the other side” when questioned by the officer (internal quotation marks omitted)).
For these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to forecast evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Defendants were legally entitled under Terry to stop Plaintiff and briefly question him. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Defendants' summary judgment motion be granted as to Count I.
Assuming arguendo that the officers lacked authority to execute a Terry stop at the moment Walters attempted to grab Plaintiff, Defendants would still be entitled to qualified immunity on Count I, as Defendants argue they would be [Doc. 60-1 at 34], because it was not clearly established on the day of the incident that a Terry stop was unjustified based on the facts known to the officers. Smith, 781 F.3d at 100. Indeed, Plaintiff does not point to any case from any jurisdiction in which the court ruled, on analogous facts, that the officer was not justified in executing a Terry stop.
Count II (Excessive Force)
The Court now turns to Count II, which alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by employing excessive force against him in taking him into custody and in slamming his head in a car door. [Doc. 22 ¶¶ 37-48.]
Because the Terry stop was justified, once Plaintiff refused Walters' repeated attempts to stop Plaintiff and speak with him about the 911 calls and what prompted them, the officers were authorized to use reasonable force to accomplish the Terry stop. See United States v. Haye, 825 F.2d 32, 35 (4th Cir. 1987) (“By its very nature . . . a Terry stop is involuntary, and the suspect is not free to avoid it by flight. To that extent, his freedom is limited, and the policeman is authorized to use such reasonable force as may be necessary to accomplish the purpose of the limited stop.”). Claims of excessive use of force during an investigatory stop or arrest or other seizures are governed by the Fourth Amendment's “objective reasonableness” standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). “Objective reasonableness” requires “balanci[ng] the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the government's interests alleged to justify the intrusion.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[R]easonableness is determined based on the information possessed by the officer at the moment that force is employed.” Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471, 477 (4th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, “force justified at the beginning of an encounter is not justified even seconds later if the justification for the initial force has been eliminated.” Id. at 481.
The Graham Court set forth several factors to consider when determining whether an officer's use of force is reasonable, including “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 96. The Supreme Court explained this reasonableness inquiry by noting that there must be an “allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 396-97.
Defendants primarily argue that Plaintiff has not forecasted evidence that could support a reasonable finding that the force they employed was constitutionally unreasonable [Doc. 60-1 at 27-31], and they alternatively argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because the unconstitutionality of their actions was not clearly established on the date of the incident [Id. at 32-34]. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants employed excessive force against him in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights on the Residence property, in the wooded area across the road, and at the Detention Center when Deputy Walters closed the car door on his head. [Doc. 22 ¶¶ 37-48.] The Court will address these three instances separately.
Force Employed on the Residence Property
As explained before, at the moment that Walters grabbed at Plaintiff's shoulder, Defendants had reason to suspect that Plaintiff had threatened to assault, attempted to assault, or actually assaulted Brannon or someone else in the home. The Court has already noted the combustible nature of domestic violent issues, and the dangers it presents. The Court notes as well that criminal domestic violence is among “the very types of crime that are most dangerous to law enforcement officers.” Moss v. Mackey, No. 1:07cv135, 2008 WL 11508993, at *13 (W.D. N.C. Oct. 1, 2008). As such, the Court concludes that the severity of the crime weighed in favor of the officers. Although the officers had no particular reason to believe Plaintiff was armed, Walters was understandably concerned that Plaintiff could be reaching for a weapon when he had his hands tucked under him [Doc. 64-2 at 4], and Plaintiff was actively resisting their attempts to stop and question him. See Davis v. Richland Cnty., No. 4:12-cv-3429-RMG-TER, 2014 WL 3805798, at *5 (D.S.C. July 2, 2014) (noting that the suspect “was actively resisting by fleeing from [the officer] and refusing to obey her verbal commands to stop”), Report and Recommendation adopted in relevant part by 2014 WL 3805802, at *3 (D.S.C. July 30, 2014). Plaintiff forecasted evidence that during the approximately 40-second struggle, Defendants attempted to grab him and they tackled him, choked him, and tased him.[FR 4:39-5:19; Doc. 60-7 at 12-14.] However, “[c]ourts have held that use of a taser gun to subdue a belligerent suspect who has repeatedly ignored police instructions is not excessive force,” Davis, 2014 WL 3805798, at *5, Report and Recommendation adopted in relevant part by 2014 WL 3805802, at *3 (D.S.C. July 30, 2014), and Plaintiff has not forecasted any evidence indicating that Defendants employed force greater than was needed to accomplish the purpose of the stop. Especially given that the force the officers used at the Residence was insufficient to bring Plaintiff under control, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not forecasted evidence that could support a reasonable finding that the force employed was objectively unreasonable.
Plaintiff testified that Plaintiff was tased in his neck, back, and genitals. [Doc. 60-7 at 12-15.] The Court notes that he does not contend that Defendants specifically targeted those areas during the struggle, nor has he forecasted any evidence that would support such an inference. Walters stated in his deposition that he attempted to complete a three-point hookup by deploying the taser close to Plaintiff's shoulder area and then down to his leg area, but he was unsuccessful. [Doc. 60-3 at 12-14; see also Docs. 60-2 at 12 (Fowler's testimony that Walters attempted to deploy the taser around Plaintiff's shoulder area); 64-2 at 4 (Walters' statement in his incident report that he “pressed the taser into [Plaintiff's] upper left shoulder area and pulled the trigger, and then brought the taser down to his left leg area to complete a three point hook up” but that the taser “seemed to have no effect on” Plaintiff).] In any event, Plaintiff has not offered any authority for the proposition that where he was struck with the taser affects the reasonableness of the force employed under the Graham analysis. See, e.g., Howard v. St. Johns Cnty. Sheriff, No. 3:20-cv-939-MMH-PDB, 2022 WL 657359, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 2022) (noting that the plaintiff “fail[ed] to offer any relevant authority suggesting that being tased [near the groin] elevates the ordinary constitutional use of a taser to a constitutional violation).
Assuming arguendo that a factfinder could reasonably find that either of the officers employed excessive force on the Residence property, Defendants would still be entitled to qualified immunity because it was not clearly established on the day of the incident that the level of force employed was excessive based on the facts known to the officers. Smith, 781 F.3d at 100. Indeed, Plaintiff does not point to any case from any jurisdiction in which the court ruled, on analogous facts, that the force employed was excessive.
Force Employed in the Wooded Area
During the struggle on the Residence property, Plaintiff was able to break free from the officers. [Docs. 60-3 at 15; 60-7 at 17.] After initially running from them, Plaintiff stopped when he reached a gate in a wooded area and put his hands in the air. [Doc. 60-7 at 17-18.] At that point, Walters ran up to Plaintiff and punched him in the face, and, as Plaintiff was going to the ground, Fowler “went ahead and slammed” Plaintiff to the ground and stayed on top of Plaintiff while Walters repeatedly punched Plaintiff several more times. [Id. at 18-21.]
Defendants suggest that no factfinder could reasonably believe that Walters repeatedly struck him in the face using handcuffs as brass knuckles, especially given the relatively limited injuries Plaintiff suffered, as reflected in the photographs of his face and the lack of indication in the body cam videos that Walters injured his hand. [Doc. 60-1 at 8 n.1; see Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (holding that when “opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted” by video evidence in the record, to the point that “no reasonable jury could believe it,” a court should not adopt the version of the facts that is contradicted by the video evidence).] The Court questions whether the evidence Defendants rely on is sufficient to discredit as a matter of law Plaintiff's testimony that Walters used his handcuffs as brass knuckles when he repeatedly punched Plaintiff. See Harris v. Pittman, 927 F.3d 266, 276 (4th Cir. 2019) (“Scott is the exception, not the rule. It does not abrogate the proper summary judgment analysis, which in qualified immunity cases usually means adopting the plaintiff's version of the facts.” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). The Court need not resolve this question, however, because, as the Court will explain, even if the Court assumes that Walters did not use the handcuffs to strike Plaintiff, Defendants still are not entitled to summary judgment to the extent Plaintiff's claims Defendants employed excessive force on him when he was in the wooded area. Accordingly, for purposes of this Report and Recommendation, the Court will simply assume that Walters did not use his handcuffs to strike Plaintiff.
As noted earlier, Defendants dispute Plaintiff's account of what they did when they caught up with Plaintiff.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the facts here are closely analogous to those of Doricchi v. County of Greenville. In that case, the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, showed that a police officer responded to a report that an individual-the plaintiff-was walking down the middle of a highway swinging a machete. No. 6:17-cv-01636-TMC-KFM, 2019 WL 4307463, at *1 (D.S.C. May 15, 2019), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 3162402 (D.S.C. July 15, 2019). When the officer arrived on the scene and told the plaintiff to drop the weapon, the plaintiff did so but then took off running before eventually stopping and putting his hands in the air. Id. at *1, 4. The officer then tackled the plaintiff and placed his arm in an arm bar. Id. Even then, the plaintiff did not resist, but the officer applied so much force that he broke the plaintiff's arm. Id. at *4-5. The court considered whether the plaintiff had forecasted evidence sufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the officer had employed excessive force. Id. The court reasoned that the first Graham factor, the severity of the crime at issue, was the only one that could weigh in the officer's favor, as the offense, resisting arrest, carried a maximum term of a year in prison, and the plaintiff was holding a machete when the officer first encountered him. Id. at *5. However, the court concluded that the other Graham factors weighed in favor of the plaintiff because, after he stopped resisting, he posed no immediate threat to the officers and was not actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id. On those facts, the court determined that a jury could conclude that the force employed against the plaintiff was excessive. Id.
Similarly, in the present case, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that, as already noted, the severity of the offense, criminal domestic violence, weighs in favor of the officers, and, by the time the officers used force in the wooded area, Plaintiff had been resisting arrest as well. However, that is the only Graham factor weighing in the officers' favor. A factfinder could reasonably find that although Plaintiff had resisted the officers at the Residence, once he got to the wooded area, he stopped and allowed the officers to catch up with him and he communicated his surrender by raising his arms. A reasonable factfinder could conclude that at that point, with his hands in the air, Plaintiff had stopped actively resisting or seeking to evade arrest by flight and that he no longer presented a significant threat to the two armed officers. See Doricchi, 2019 WL 4307463, at *5; Waterman, 393 F.3d at 481 (“[F]orce justified at the beginning of an encounter is not justified even seconds later if the justification for the initial force has been eliminated.”); cf. Valladares v. Cordero, 552 F.3d 384, 387, 390 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that when an officer picked a suspect off the ground after a struggle and he did not resist, that “signif[ied] a point of surrender,” and any reasonable officer would have known that slamming his head into the car after that point was unconstitutional). A factfinder could reasonably find that, with Plaintiff having offered his surrender, Walter's punching Plaintiff in the face-and Fowler's slamming Plaintiff to the ground and holding him while Walters continued to punch Plaintiff-were unreasonable. See Doricchi, 2019 WL 4307463, at *5.
In the “Factual Background” portion of their memorandum in support of their summary judgment motion, Defendants acknowledge Plaintiff's testimony that he stopped running and put his hands in the air. [Doc. 60-1 at 8.] In analyzing Defendants' summary judgment motion, the Court must take that testimony as true, Diebold, 369 U.S. at 655, and Defendants have not forecasted any contrary evidence in any event. Nonetheless, Defendants, in their brief analysis of the reasonableness of the force the officers employed in the wooded area, do not discuss Plaintiff's testimony that he stopped and put his hands in the air. [Doc. 60-1 at 28.] Defendants' failure to discuss why it was reasonable for them to continue to punch and tackle Plaintiff rather than accept his surrender is, by itself, sufficient reason to reject their argument that Plaintiff failed to forecast evidence of excessive force. See Clayton v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 260 F.Supp.3d 514, 521 (D.S.C. 2017) (“As a general rule, parties may not outsource their legal research to the court or otherwise foist upon it the necessary legwork to flesh out a legal claim or defense.”)
Regarding qualified immunity, Defendants' only argument that the unconstitutionality of their actions was not clearly established on the date of the incident is a conclusory contention that “a reasonably prudent officer, faced with a suspect in a domestic violence situation who was plainly trying to get away and resist would believe that the use of a taser and a closed fist was an appropriate way to gain control of the suspect so that he could be detained.” [Doc. 60-1 at 34.] As noted, however, the forecasted evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, is that Plaintiff was not trying to get away or resist by the time Walters began punching him and Fowler tackled him in the wooded area. Because Defendants' qualified immunity argument depends upon a fact that is in genuine dispute, Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment. See Doricchi, 2019 WL 4307463, at *6 (“The case law is clear: when the resolution of the qualified immunity question as well as the case itself depends upon a determination of what actually happened, the court must deny summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity.”).
Force Employed Outside of the Detention Center
To the extent that Count II is based on the car-door incident, Defendants argue that the claim is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fourth Amendment, and that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment under a Fourteenth-Amendment analysis for two reasons: first, Plaintiff has not forecasted evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Walters' closing the car door on Plaintiff's head was intentional; and second, Plaintiff has not forecasted evidence that his injuries were sufficient to sustain a Fourteenth-Amendment claim. [Doc. 60-1 at 29-31.]
Initially, the Court agrees with Defendants that, although Plaintiff alleges that Walters' closing the car door on his head in the Detention Center parking lot violated his Fourth Amendment rights [Doc. 22 ¶¶ 37-48], the claim is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Fourth. The Fourth Amendment governs claims of excessive force only if the challenged force was applied “during the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure of a person.” Orem v. Rephann, 523 F.3d 442, 446 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38-39 (2010). “[E]xcessive force claims of a pretrial detainee or arrestee are governed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, claims of excessive force applied during transportation of a suspect to a jail following his arrest but before he is charged are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause rather than by the Fourth Amendment. Id.
Nonetheless, the Court does not agree with Defendants that Plaintiff has not forecasted sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment under a FourteenthAmendment analysis. To prevail on a Fourteenth-Amendment claim for excessive force, “a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396-97 (2015). “[O]bjective reasonableness turns on the facts and circumstances of each particular case,” and a “court must make this determination from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 397 (internal quotation marks omitted). A court may consider the following non-exclusive list of factors in determining the reasonableness of the force employed:
the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff's injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.Id.
Here, a factfinder could reasonably find from the forecasted evidence that Walters' closing the car door on Plaintiff's head was intentional. A factfinder viewing the video evidence could reasonably find that from the time Walters dragged Plaintiff out of the vehicle and onto the ground, Plaintiff's head was inches from the vehicle, inches from the door, and directly in the door's path. [WDC 1:12.] That Walters' only reaction to closing the door on Plaintiff's head was to smile [WDC 1:17-1:20; Doc. 64-4 at 21] also supports the inference that Walters' use of force was intentional. Of course, Defendants do not argue that there was any need for Walters to close the door on Plaintiff's head, nor do they contend that any security concern or threat justified such a use of force. A factfinder could reasonably find Plaintiff, on the ground handcuffed, was not actively resisting. As for injuries, Plaintiff testified that being hit by the car door worsened injuries that he had suffered in his face, mouth, and jaw from a car accident several years before and that it may necessitate removal of a plate that had been placed in his face. [Doc. 64-4 at 25, 26.]
And a factfinder could reasonably find that Walters did nothing to attempt to temper Plaintiff's injuries. In sum, a factfinder could reasonably find that Walters violated Plaintiff's due process rights by slamming his head in the door.
Defendants maintain that Walters would not have turned on his body camera were he intending to slam Plaintiff's head in the door and that the video evidence indicates that Walters did not realize that Plaintiff was in the door's path. [Doc. 60-1 at 30.] However, as noted, a factfinder could view the video evidence and reasonably conclude that Plaintiff made no late move into the door's path as Walters closed it and that his head was clearly in the door's path the entire time after Walters dragged Plaintiff out of the vehicle. [WDC 1:12.] As for the argument that Walters would not have intentionally closed the door on Plaintiff's head with his body camera recording, that is one Defendants may present to a factfinder, but it is not one that a reasonable factfinder would be required to accept.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff must forecast evidence of more than a de minimis injury to sustain his cause of action, and that he has not done so. [Doc. 60-1 at 30-31.] Defendants are incorrect. “So long as the force used is more than de minimis, the objective component is satisfied, regardless of the extent of the injury.” Dean v. Jones, 984 F.3d 295, 303 (4th Cir. 2021) (emphasis added); see Wilkins, 559 U.S. at 39; Hill v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[T]here is no de minimis injury threshold for an excessive force claim.”); French v. Richland Cnty., No. 3:11-00717-MBS, 2014 WL 1320239, at *9 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2014). Here, a factfinder could reasonably find that Walters' slamming the car door on Plaintiff's head represented more than de minimis force, and thus was sufficient to support Plaintiff's claim. See Dean, 984 F.3d at 303 (noting that the de minimis force threshold “is not a high bar”).
For the first time in their reply memorandum, Defendants appear to argue that, regardless of whether Plaintiff is required to show more than a de minimis injury from being struck by the car door, they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's claim based on the car-door incident because Plaintiff has not forecasted any evidence that any of his injuries were causally related to his head being slammed in the door. [Compare Doc. 60-1 at 30-31 with Doc. 66 at 5.] Because Defendants did not raise this issue in their initial memorandum in support of their summary judgment motion, Plaintiff has not had the opportunity to address it, and the Court declines to consider it. See Moore v. Laurens Cnty., No. 6:09-cv-03083, 2011 WL 4345893, at *3 (D.S.C. Sept. 16, 2011) (“Courts often refuse to consider arguments made for the first time in a reply brief on the basis that doing so effectively denies the party opposing the motion an opportunity to respond.”); Zinner v. Olenych, 108 F.Supp.3d 369, 398 (E.D. Va. 2015) (“Typically, courts will not consider an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief.”).
The Court notes that Defendants do not argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Count II regarding the car-door incident due to any gray area in the law. [Doc. 60-1 at 34.]
Regardless of Walters' liability for slamming the car door, Defendants argue that Fowler could not be liable for that incident because Plaintiff has not forecasted any evidence that Fowler was present at the Detention Center when Walters slammed the car door on Plaintiff. [Doc. 60-1 at 29 n.6.] The Court agrees and concludes that Fowler is entitled to summary judgment to the extent that Count II is based on the car-door incident. See Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012) (“[C]onstitutional torts, like their common law brethren, require a demonstration of both but-for and proximate causation.”).
In sum, for the aforementioned reasons, regarding Count II, the Court recommends that Defendants' summary judgment motion be granted as to the force employed on the Residence property, denied as to the force employed in the wooded area, and granted as to Fowler but denied as to Walters regarding the car-door incident.
Count III (Unjustified Charges and Excessive Sentence)
Defendants also argue they are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's Count III, which is based on Plaintiff's prosecution and imprisonment [Doc. 22 ¶¶ 49-56]. [Doc. 61 at 31-32.] The Court agrees with Defendants.
Section 1983 actions premised on malicious prosecution or false arrest are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating claims of false arrest and false imprisonment “are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment”); Curtis v. Devlin, No. 1:04-cv-409, 2005 WL 940571, at *6 (E.D. Va. Apr. 19, 2005) (explaining that § 1983 actions for false arrest and malicious prosecution should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment). That is true even of claims alleging Eighth-Amendment violations. Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, N.C. , 85 F.3d 178, 184 (4th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment provides all of the pretrial process that is constitutionally due to a criminal defendant in order to detain him prior to trial.”); Seabrook v. City of N. Charleston, No. 2:20-cv-03093-RMG-MGB, 2020 WL 7647394, at *5 & n.8 (D.S.C. Oct. 29, 2020), Report and Recommendation adopted in relevant part by 2020 WL 7417411, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 17, 2020).
To prove a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he was arrested without probable cause. Brown, 278 F.3d at 367. And a “§ 1983 claim for damages due to false imprisonment is akin to a malicious prosecution claim.” McCormick v. Wright, No. 2:10-cv-00033-RBH, 2010 WL 565303, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 17, 2010); see also Lambert v. Williams, 223 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir. 2000) (“What is conventionally referred to as a ‘§ 1983 malicious prosecution' action is nothing more than a § 1983 claim arising from a Fourth Amendment violation.”). “To [prove] such a claim, a plaintiff must [show] that the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff's favor.” Evans, 703 F.3d at 647.
Defendants argue that Count III is barred in light of the doctrine set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). [Doc. 60-1 at 31-32.] In Heck, the Supreme Court explained that “civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486. The Court then held that
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Id. Further, the Supreme Court stated that,
when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.Id. This is known as the “favorable termination” requirement. See Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 263 (4th Cir. 2008).
At the center of the application of Heck to Count III is Plaintiff's conviction on the resisting-arrest charge and his resulting sentence. Under Heck, the initial question before the Court is whether a judgment in favor of Plaintiff on Claim III would necessarily imply the invalidity of that conviction or sentence. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486. Here, it would to the extent it alleges false arrest or malicious prosecution, see Scott v. City of Camden, S.C., No. 3:17-cv-0602-CMC, 2017 WL 5500873, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 16, 2017); Legette v. Wilson, No. 6:17-cv-2933-JFA-KFM, 2017 WL 9289400, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 14, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 525476 (D.S.C. Jan. 24, 2018), and to the extent it challenges the length of the sentence imposed, see Williams v. Gibson, No. 8:12-3500-MGL-JDA, 2013 WL 594888, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 2, 2013), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2013 WL 594286 (D.S.C. Feb. 15, 2013).
The Court thus turns to the question of whether Plaintiff “can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. Plaintiff makes no argument that either has been invalidated. As Plaintiff has not forecasted evidence that his resisting-arrest conviction or sentence has been invalidated, the Court concludes that Count III is not cognizable under the Heck doctrine, and the Court recommends that summary judgment be granted to Defendants as to Count III.
Because the Court concludes that Count III is barred by Heck, it does not address Defendants' other arguments.
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Defendants' summary judgment motion [Doc. 60] be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Court recommends that the motion be GRANTED on Counts I and III; GRANTED on Count II to the extent it is based on the force applied on the Residence property and to the extent the claim is asserted against Fowler regarding the car-door incident; and DENIED on Count II to the extent the claim is based on the force applied in the wooded area and to the extent it is asserted against Walters regarding the car-door incident.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.