Opinion
C/A No.: 1:16-1132-RMG-SVH
02-24-2017
Rohaime Jamar Hopkins, Plaintiff, v. Richard Johnson and Natasha Merrell, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Rohaime Jamar Hopkins ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brought this action alleging violations of his constitutional rights during his incarceration at the Charleston County Detention Center ("CCDC"). Plaintiff asserts claims against South Carolina Law Enforcement Division ("SLED") Agents Richard Johnson and Natasha Merrell ("Defendants").
This matter comes before the court on Defendants' motion to dismiss. [ECF No. 22]. Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Plaintiff of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Defendants' motion. [ECF No. 23]. The motion having been fully briefed [ECF No. 34], it is ripe for disposition.
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this matter has been assigned to the undersigned for all pretrial proceedings. Having carefully considered the record in this case, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion to dismiss. I. Factual Background
The relevant facts of this case have also been discussed in Plaintiff's federal criminal case, USA v. Hopkins, Cr. No. 9:08-cr-132-MBS ("Hopkins I") at ECF Nos 116, 134.
In April 2015, Plaintiff was housed at the CCDC in federal custody for a supervised release violation. [ECF No. 1 at 3]. Plaintiff alleges that on April 7, 2015, the U.S. Marshal Service advised Johnson that he would need a writ to take Plaintiff out of federal custody to travel to Jasper County, South Carolina, to make an initial appearance on a murder charge. Id. Plaintiff alleges that on April 8, 2016, Johnson provided CCDC staff with a writ signed by the Honorable Mary Gordon Baker, United States Magistrate Judge, giving federal agents permission to take Plaintiff out of the Marshal's custody to conduct interviews. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that when Defendants took Plaintiff into state custody, they attempted to question him about the state criminal charge, but that he refused to answer and invoked his right to remain silent. Id. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants misused the federal order to remove Plaintiff from federal custody to transport him to state court in Jasper County, and that the misuse of the order violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. II. Discussion
A. Standard on Motion to Dismiss
To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court is "not required to accept as true the legal conclusions set forth in a plaintiff's complaint." Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999). Indeed, "[t]he presence of a few conclusory legal terms does not insulate a complaint from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged in the complaint cannot support" the legal conclusion. Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
1. Questioning
To the extent that Plaintiff asserts his constitutional rights have been violated by Johnson's alleged failure to read him his Miranda rights before questioning him, he has failed to state a claim. The Supreme Court has made clear that "police do not violate a suspect's constitutional rights (or the Miranda rule) by negligent or even deliberate failures to provide the suspect with the full panoply of warnings prescribed by Miranda. Potential violations occur, if at all, only upon the admission of unwarned statements into evidence at trial." U.S. v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641 (2004). Here, Plaintiff indicates that he invoked his right to remain silent, and, therefore, did not make any incriminating statements.
2. Misuse of court order
In his response brief, Plaintiff argues that Johnson violated his rights by misusing Judge Baker's order—which only provided for him to be taken into custody of a federal agent—to take him into state custody. He argues that "had [Johnson] followed the proper procedure . . . , me and my lawyer would have received adequate notice and all this would not be necessary." [ECF No. 34 at 4]. However, Plaintiff fails to specify the notice to which he believes he was entitled. Although his lawyer on his federal charges did not receive notice of the state charges, Plaintiff has not provided authority for the proposition that she was entitled to receive notice of Plaintiff's state charges. Although Johnson allegedly did not follow proper procedure for Plaintiff's transport to state court, Plaintiff has failed to show that the alleged failure resulted in a constitutional deprivation. "Process is not an end in itself. Its constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement." Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983). Here, Plaintiff has failed to show that he was deprived of a constitutional entitlement. Therefore, the undersigned recommends Defendants be granted summary judgment. III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the district judge grant Defendants' motion to dismiss [ECF No. 22].
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED. February 24, 2017
Columbia, South Carolina
/s/
Shiva V. Hodges
United States Magistrate Judge
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached
"Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation."
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).