Opinion
No. 05-03-01694-CV
Opinion issued May 27, 2005.
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. cc-03-9899-c.
Affirmed.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, BRIDGES, and FRANCIS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Hope's Financial Management appeals the trial court's judgment ordering that Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corporation have full and unencumbered possession of the property located at 9914 Castle Bay Drive in Dallas, Texas. In five points of error, Hope's argues the trial court erred in overruling its motion to expunge a deed, conducting a trial when Chase was not present, awarding Chase attorney's fees, overruling Hope's motion to set aside the judgment, and overruling Hope's objections to affidavits submitted by Chase. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
In August 2002, this Court determined the subject property located at 9914 Castle Bay Drive in Dallas, Texas, was lawfully foreclosed upon by Chase. Hope's Fin. Mgmt. v. Chase Mortgage Serv., Inc./Chase Manhattan Mgt. Corp., No. 05-01-00751-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 5952 (Dallas August 19, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication). In July 2003, Chase filed the underlying forcible entry and detainer action in which it alleged ME Okere, on behalf of Hope's, retook the property by force and leased it to various occupants. Despite notice to vacate the property, the occupants remained, and Chase sought a writ of possession of the property and attorney's fees. The trial court ultimately entered judgment in favor of Chase and ordered that Chase should have full and unencumbered possession of the property. The judgment further ordered Okere, Hope's, and all occupants to vacate the property. This appeal followed.
Okere, representing himself pro se in this appeal on behalf of Hope's, identifies himself as "ME" Okere. See M.E. Okere v. Apex Fin. Corp., 930 S.W.2d 146 n. 1 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1996, writ denied). In Apex, Okere attempted to change the record and removed documents from the Court's file. See id. at 151.
In its first, fourth, and fifth points of error, Hope's complains the trial court erred in overruling its motion to expunge a deed, overruling its motion to set aside the judgment after Hope's produced "new evidence" in the form of a deed, and overruling Hope's objection to affidavits filed by Chase concerning Hope's allegedly fraudulent "payment." All three of these points of error concern the issue of whether Chase or Hope's had title to the subject property. The sole issue in a forcible entry and detainer action is who has the right to immediate possession of the premises. Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2001, no pet.). In a forcible entry and detainer action, the merits of the title shall not be adjudicated. Tex. R. Civ. P. 746. Moreover, in this case it has already been determined that Chase lawfully foreclosed on the subject property. See Hope's Fin. Mgmt. v. Chase Mortgage Serv., Inc./Chase Manhattan Mgt. Corp., No. 05-01-00751-CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 5952 (Dallas August 19, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication). Accordingly, we conclude Hope's arguments concerning who properly holds title to the subject property are not properly before us. See Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 709; Ward v. Malone, 115 S.W.3d 267, 270-71 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied). We overrule Hope's first, fourth, and fifth points of error.
In its second point of error, Hope's argues Chase was not "present at trial" because no company representative appeared at trial, only a "legal secretary from one of the law farms [sic]" appeared on behalf of Chase. The record indicates that Susan Scott, an employee of the law firm that represents Chase in its "bank activities in the State of Texas," appeared and testified concerning the prior foreclosure. Further, it appears that attorney Lori Lamoreaux represented Chase at trial. In litigation, only a licensed attorney can appear and represent a corporation. Elec. Data Sys. Corp. v. Tyson, 862 S.W.2d 728, 737 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, no writ). We overrule Hope's second point of error.
In its third point of error, Hope's argues the trial court erred in awarding Chase attorney's fees pursuant to property code section 24.006. Specifically, Hope's argues it had no landlord-tenant relationship with Chase, and section 24.006 did not apply. Section 24.006 provides that, in a forcible entry and detainer action, attorney's fees are recoverable, provided that written notice is provided to the party sought to be evicted by registered or certified mail at least ten days before suit is filed. Tex. Prop. Code Ann. § 24.006 (Vernon 2000). In a forcible entry and detainer action, it is not necessary that there be a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. American Spiritualist Ass'n v. Ravkind, 313 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Here, Hope's does not complain that it did not receive proper written notice, and the record supports Chase's argument that it provided written notice on multiple occasions. Thus, we cannot conclude the trial court erred in awarding Chase its attorney's fees. See id. We overrule Hope's fourth point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.