After the entry of the court's judgment, Parker may appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. We are mindful that in Hooten v. State, 212 Ga. App. 770, 775 (1) ( 442 S.E.2d 836) (1994), we disapproved the conditional plea procedures established in Mims henceforth; however, since the entry of a proper conditional plea would otherwise have preceded the effective date of Hooten, but for the trial court's failure to follow our previous decision, Parker will not be barred by Hooten from entering such plea on remand. Judgment vacated and case remanded.

Of the remaining States, fifteen do not allow conditional guilty pleas. See State v. Zunino, 133 Ariz. 117, 118, 649 P.2d 996 (Ct. App. 1982) ; Neuhaus v. People, 2012 CO 65, ¶¶ 11-20, 289 P.3d 19 ; Hooten v. State, 212 Ga.App. 770, 775, 442 S.E.2d 836 (1994) ; People v. Gonzalez, 313 Ill.App.3d 607, 618-619, 246 Ill.Dec. 509, 730 N.E.2d 534 (2000) ; Alvey v. State, 911 N.E.2d 1248, 1250 (Ind. 2009) ; State v. Freilinger, 557 N.W.2d 92, 93 (Iowa 1996) ; State v. Kelly, 295 Kan. 587, 592, 285 P.3d 1026 (2012) ; Bishop v. State, 417 Md. 1, 20, 7 A.3d 1074 (2010) ; State v. Ford, 397 N.W.2d 875, 878 (Minn. 1986) ; State v. Liston, 271 Neb. 468, 471, 712 N.W.2d 264 (2006) ; State v. Parkhurst, 121 N.H. 821, 822, 435 A.2d 522 (1981) ; State v. Keohane, 814 A.2d 327, 329 (R.I. 2003) ; State v. Downs, 361 S.C. 141, 145, 604 S.E.2d 377 (2004) ; State v. Rondell, 2010 S.D. 87, ¶¶ 4-10, 791 N.W.2d 641 ; State v. Smith, 134 Wash.2d 849, 853, 953 P.2d 810 (1998).

Held: The procedure approved in Mims v. State, 201 Ga. App. 277, 279 ( 410 S.E.2d 824), for entering a guilty plea while reserving the opportunity to appeal rulings by the trial court which ordinarily would be waived by such a plea was disapproved in Hooten v. State, 212 Ga. App. 770 (1) ( 442 S.E.2d 836). Guilty pleas entered after July 9, 1994, "in which the accused attempts to condition upon the preservation of the rights to raise non-jurisdictional errors by the trial court will not be considered by this court, and all the usual rules of appellate practice, including the waiver of errors by guilty pleas, will be applied." Hooten v. State, 212 Ga. App. 770 (1), 775, supra.

We note that Williams' plea of double jeopardy was not barred by her guilty plea on the charge of aggravated assault. See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 29-31, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974) (claims such as those based on constitutional double jeopardy, that go to " very power of the State to bring the defendant into court to answer the charge brought against him," survive entry of guilty plea); Gerisch v. Meadows, 278 Ga. 641(2), 604 S.E.2d 462 (2004) (double jeopardy claim survives entry of guilty plea); Addison v. State, 239 Ga. 622, 624, 238 S.E.2d 411 (1977) (discussing Blackledge); Hooten v. State, 212 Ga.App. 770, 771(1), 442 S.E.2d 836 (1994) (unconditional guilty plea generally does not preclude appeal grounded on " double jeopardy-type errors" ).           2.

Id., 423 U.S. at 62. See also Hooten v. State, 212 Ga. App. 770, 771 (1) ( 442 SE2d 836) (1994) (an unconditional guilty plea generally does not preclude appeal grounded on "double jeopardy-type errors"), citing Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (94 SC 2098, 40 LE2d 628) (1974). Compare Addison v. State, 239 Ga. 622 ( 238 SE2d 411) (1977) (valid guilty plea will stand where no constitutional violation or ineffective assistance of counsel claim asserted).

Smith v. State , 350 Ga. App. 19, 20, 827 S.E.2d 716 (2019) (punctuation omitted); accordSkinitis v. State , 271 Ga. App. 549, 550, 610 S.E.2d 571 (2005) ; seeThompson v. State , 240 Ga. App. 539, 540 (2), 524 S.E.2d 239 (1999) (holding that defendant's guilty plea waived challenge to the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress); see alsoLefkowitz v. Newsome , 420 U.S. 283, 288, 95 S.Ct. 886, 43 LE2d 196 1975 (noting the general rule that "[w]hen a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea" (punctuation omitted)).Smith , 350 Ga. App. at 20, 827 S.E.2d 716 (punctuation omitted); seeHooten v. State , 212 Ga. App. 770, 775 (1), 442 S.E.2d 836 (1994) (disapproving the conditional plea procedures previously established in Mims v. State , 201 Ga. App. 277, 278 (1), 410 S.E.2d 824 (1991).Skinitis , 271 Ga. App. at 550, 610 S.E.2d 571 ; seeSmith , 350 Ga. App. at 20, 827 S.E.2d 716 (noting that if defendant's conviction resulted from a negotiated guilty plea, as shown on the judgment of conviction, she effectively waived her challenge to the denial of her motion to suppress, and this Court would not reach the merits of the appeal); Thompson , 240 Ga. App. at 540 2, 524 S.E.2d (2)39 (declining to review the denial of defendant's motion to suppress given the fact that defendant entered a guilty plea to charges).

We may review this claim of error notwithstanding McKeever’s guilty plea, because it is "grounded upon the right not to be haled into court at all[.]" Hooten v. State , 212 Ga. App. 770, 771 (1), 442 S.E.2d 836 (1994) (citation and punctuation omitted). Accord Davis v. State , 251 Ga. App. 436, 437, 554 S.E.2d 583 (2001).

We may review this claim of error notwithstanding McKeever's guilty plea, because it is "grounded upon the right not to be haled into court at all[.]" Hooten v. State, 212 Ga. App. 770, 771 (1) (442 SE2d 836) (1994) (citation and punctuation omitted). Accord Davis v. State, 251 Ga. App. 436, 437 (554 SE2d 583) (2001).

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hooten v. State, 212 Ga. App. 770-771 (1) ( 442 SE2d 836) (1994). Because the superior court lacked jurisdiction to enter its judgment on Hill's guilty plea, his claim under OCGA § 17-7-50.

Although not significant in this appeal, this Court does not consider conditional guilty pleas. Hooten v. State, 212 Ga. App. 770 ( 442 SE2d 836) (1994). Tindell argues on appeal that the trial court erred in concluding that OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (c) (1) (F) does not require that the child actually had to be restrained at the time Tindell committed the charged offense of sexual exploitation of children.