Opinion
No. CV 02 0188498 S
April 14, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION IN PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (107.00)
The present action arises out of a motor vehicle collision which allegedly occurred between the plaintiff, Brent Hood, and Kenneth J. Meahan (Meahan), who is not a party to this action. The plaintiff has brought this underinsured motor vehicle coverage action against his insurer, Great American Insurance Co., for injuries and damages he sustained as a result of the collision.
The following facts are alleged in the first count of the complaint. On or about May 10, 2000, the plaintiff and Patricia Messnier entered into a personal automobile insurance contract (the policy) with the defendant, Great American Insurance Co. The policy insured two vehicles owned by the plaintiff, one of which was involved in the motor vehicle collision in question, and was in effect from May 10, 2000, to May 20, 2001. On or about May 31, 2000, the vehicle the plaintiff owned and operated was struck by a vehicle owned and operated by Meahan after Meahan's vehicle went through a red light. The plaintiff contends that the collision was caused by Meahan's negligence, that Meahan violated General Statutes §§ 14-299 and 14-218a, and that the plaintiff suffered and continues to suffer numerous injuries.
According to the allegations in count one, at the time of the collision, Meahan carried automobile liability insurance for his vehicle with Peerless Insurance Company (Peerless). With the defendant's consent, the plaintiff settled his claims with Peerless, thereby exhausting the limits of liability under Meahan's insurance policy. Because he allegedly incurred additional costs related to the collision, the plaintiff sought benefits under the underinsured motorist provisions of his policy with the defendant. The defendant has refused to pay such benefits to the plaintiff.
In count two, the plaintiff alleges that Meahan intentionally or with reckless disregard operated his vehicle at an excessive rate of speed in violation of General Statutes § 14-218a, and/or in a reckless manner in violation of General Statutes § 14-222. In connection with count two, the plaintiff in the third prayer for relief, seeks double or treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295. It is this prayer for relief that is the subject of the pending motion. On November 6, 2002, the defendant moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that because the plaintiff is not entitled to recover statutory multiple damages under General Statutes § 14-295, the defendant is entitled to judgment on the third paragraph of the prayer for relief as a matter of law.
General Statutes § 14-295 provides: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property."
"Summary judgment procedure is designed to dispose of actions in which there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fraser v. United States, 236 Conn. 625, 639, 674 A.2d 811, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 872, 117 S.Ct. 188, 136 L.Ed.2d 126 (1996). It is a "method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Wilson v. New Haven, 213 Conn. 277, 279, 567 A.2d 829 (1989). It is well-established that "[t]he party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gaynor v. Payne, 261 Conn. 585, 590-91, 804 A.2d 170 (2002).
Our Supreme Court held in Bodner v. United Service Automobile Assn., 222 Conn. 480, 610 A.2d 1212 (1992), that common law punitive damages are not recoverable in the context of an uninsured motorist claim. In Connecticut, common law punitive damages are "limited to the plaintiff's attorneys fees and nontaxable costs, and thus serve a function that is both compensatory and punitive." Id., 492. "Statutory multiple damages, however, are imposed for the sole purpose of punishment of one who has committed a public wrong . . ." Caulfield v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., 31 Conn. App. 781, 787 n. 4, 627 A.2d 466, cert. denied, 227 Conn. 913, 632 A.2d 688 (1993). Still, "[t]he nature of both the common law punitive damages at issue in Bodner and the statutory multiple damages at issue in this case is that they are imposed to punish the wrongdoer." Id.
The court in Bodner v. United Service Automobile Assn., supra, 222 Conn. 480, examined the insurance policy in question and concluded, in light of the court's previous decisions in Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty Co., 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941) and Avis Rent A Car System, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 203 Conn. 667, 526 A.2d 522 (1987), that Bodner's insurance policy did not cover "attorneys fees incurred in the pursuit of his claim against [United Services Automobile Association]." Bodner v. United Service Automobile Assn., supra, 497. Coverage under the insurance policy, nevertheless, was determined to be irrelevant. As the Appellate Court has explained, "[n]otwithstanding policy language that would permit coverage of common law damages, the Bodner court concluded that public policy considerations precluded such coverage in the context of uninsured motorist coverage." Caulfield v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 31 Conn. App. 786. The Supreme Court held that "[e]ven for common law punitive damages, as they are defined in this state, there is no discernible reason of public policy why uninsured motorist coverage should impliedly encompass a claimant's right to recover attorneys fees for pursuit of a claim against his own insurer that is premised on the egregious misconduct of the third party tortfeasor." Bodner v. United Service Automobile Assn., supra, 499.
The defendant relies heavily on Caufield v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 31 Conn. App. 781, where the Appellate Court held that, like common law punitive damages, statutory multiple damages under General Statutes § 14-295 were not recoverable against an insurer in an uninsured motorist context. Upon examination of Bodner v. United Services Automobile Assn., supra, 222 Conn. 480, the Appellate Court was convinced "that there is no principled way to distinguish Bodner from the present case without wholly ignoring the reasoning articulated therein by our Supreme Court." Caufield v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 788.
In opposition, the plaintiff argues that Caulfield v. Amica Mutual, Ins. Co., supra, 31 Conn. App. 781, is not binding precedent because the underlying facts involved an uninsured motorist claim, not an underinsured motorist claim, and therefore, statutory multiple damages are allowed in the latter case. This court is not persuaded that, with regard to statutory multiple damages, there is a distinction between uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage claims.
The purpose of underinsured motorist coverage is to "put the injured party in the same position — no worse and no better — than the party would have been in had the tortfeasor carried liability insurance equal to or more than the amount of underinsured motorist coverage available to the injured party." Doyle v. Metropolitan Property Casualty Ins. Co., 252 Conn. 79, 88, 743 A.2d 156 (1999). Similarly, "the public policy established by the uninsured motorist statute is that every insured is entitled to recover for the damages he or she would have been able to recover if the uninsured motorist had maintained a policy of liability insurance." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bodner v. United Services Automobile Assn., supra, 222 Conn. 499. Our Appellate Court has pointed that, "[c]onsistent with the similar purposes of the two types of coverage, our Supreme Court has `often held that statutes and regulations that apply to uninsured motorist coverage equally apply to underinsured motorist coverage.' Buell v. American Universal Ins. Co., 224 Conn. 766, 769 n. 1, 621 A.2d 262 (1993); Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Huntley, 223 Conn. 22, 28 n. 9, 610 A.2d 1292 (1992); General Accident Ins. Co. v. Wheeler, 221 Conn. 206, 210-11, 603 A.2d 385 (1992); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Gode, 187 Conn. 386, 399-400, 446 A.2d 1059 (1982), overruled on other grounds, Covenant Ins. Co. v. Coon, 200 Conn. 30, 36 n. 6, 594 A.2d 977 (1991)." Gohel v. Allstate Ins. Co., 61 Conn. App. 806, 817, 768 A.2d 950 (2001).
This court is not the first trial court to consider this issue. Many decisions issued after Caulfield v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 31 Conn. App. 781, have held that statutory multiple damages under General Statutes § 14-295 are not recoverable against an insurer in an underinsured motorist context. See Tworzydlo v. Safeco Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Windham at Putnam, Docket No. CV 01 0066113 (June 18, 2002, Potter, J.) ( 32 Conn.L.Rptr. 364); Kisson v. C.G.U. Southern New England, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia/Milford at Milford, Docket No. CV 00 0069803 (May 8, 2001, Arnold, J.) ( 29 Conn.L.Rptr. 738); Laudette v. Peerless Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New London at Norwich, Docket No. 118880 (June 30, 2000, Dyer, J.) ( 27 Conn.L.Rptr. 456); Allessa v. Allstate Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia/Milford at Milford, Docket No. CV 95 0050550 (November 7, 1995, Skolnick, J.) ( 16 Conn.L.Rptr. 317).
The plaintiff argues that there are issues of material fact, and, therefore, summary judgment must be denied. It is true, as stated above, that genuine issues of material fact render summary judgment inappropriate. Resolution of the issue before this court, however, does not depend on the facts of this case. The Supreme Court in Bodner v. United Service Automobile Assn., supra, 222 Conn. 480, and the Appellate Court in Caufield v. Amica Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 31 Conn. App. 781, did not rely on the underlying facts; in fact, the provisions in the insurance policies in question were deemed irrelevant. Instead, the courts considered the issues before them to be questions of law and public policy. Therefore, while the legal sufficiency of a prayer for relief is normally contested through a motion to strike; Practice Book § 10-39; here, because this issue is best considered solely as a matter of law and public policy, summary judgment on this issue is available.
For the foregoing reasons, this court holds that the plaintiff may not, as a matter of law, recover from the defendant double or treble damages pursuant to General Statutes § 14-295. The motion for partial summary judgment is, therefore, granted.
So Ordered.
Taggart D. Adams
SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE