Thus, "[i]t is well settled that jurisdiction depending on diversity of citizenship is not lost . . . by the reduction of the amount demanded below the jurisdictional amount." Hood ex rel. N.C. Bank & Trust Co. v. Bell, 84 F.2d 136, 137 (4th Cir. 1936). The Fiallos are not the first plaintiffs to seek to secure remand by reducing their demands.

); Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 (1991) ("We have consistently held that if jurisdiction exists at the time an action is commenced, such jurisdiction may not be divested by subsequent events."). Defendant's claim is also contradicted, inter alia, by Hood v. Bell, 84 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1936). In that case, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) sued Bell to recover on promissory notes, with federal jurisdiction predicated on the United States' majority ownership of the RFC.

Williams v. Nottawa, supra; Barry v. Edmunds, supra; Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 468; Lion Bonding S. Co. v. Karatz, 262 U.S. 77; First National Bank v. Louisiana Highway Comm'n, 264 U.S. 308; Simon v. House, 46 F. 317; Horst v. Merkley, 59 F. 502; Cabot v. McMaster, 61 F. 129; Bank of Arapahoe v. David Bradley Co., 72 F. 867; Armstrong v. Walters, supra; Maurel v. Smith, 220 F. 195; Le Roy v. Hartwick, 229 F. 857; Sclarenco v. Chicago Bonding Co., 236 F. 592; Operators Piano Co. v. First Wisconsin Trust Co., 283 F. 904; Wilderman v. Roth, 17 F.2d 486; Chick v. New England Tel. Tel.Page 290 Co., 36 F.2d 832; Nixon v. Town Taxi, Inc., 39 F.2d 618; Cohn v. Cities Service Co., 45 F.2d 687; Miller-Crenshaw Co. v. Colorado Mill Co., 84 F.2d 930.Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Rose, 294 F. 122; Hood v. Bell, 84 F.2d 136. What already has been said, and circumstances later to be discussed, lead to the conclusion that a dismissal would not have been justified had the suit been brought in the federal court.

"Events occurring subsequent to the institution of suit which reduce the amount recoverable below the statutory limit do not oust jurisdiction." St. Paul Mercury Indent. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289-90, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938); see Hood v. Bell, 84 F.2d 136, 137 (4th Cir.1936) (holding that a court does not lose diversity jurisdiction "because of a subsequent change in the conditions upon which jurisdiction was originally based"). Because the district court simply stayed this action, and then reopened it to confirm the award, we must determine the amount in controversy from the complaint itself.

Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537, 6 L.Ed. 154. It was proper for the District Court under Rule 25(c) F.R.Civ.P. 28 U.S.C.A. to substitute Jones for the United States of America upon its transfer to him of the subject matter of the litigation. In the case of Hood ex rel. North Carolina Bank Trust Co. v. Bell, 84 F.2d 136 (C.A.4, 1936) it was held that jurisdiction of a suit initially commenced by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was not lost when notes, which were the subject matter of the suit, were transferred to a private party. Denial of a motion to substitute the transferee of the RFC as party plaintiff was reversed.

Having taken jurisdiction in the case, jurisdiction continued in the Court to enable it to dispose of all issues raised by the pleadings. Ober v. Gallagher, 93 U.S. 199, 206, 23 L.Ed. 829; Hood ex rel. North Carolina Bank Trust Co. v. Bell, 4 Cir., 84 F.2d 136, 137; Wichita Railroad Light Co. v. Public Utilities Comm., 260 U.S. 48, 54, 43 S.Ct. 51, 67 L.Ed. 124; United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm., 278 U.S. 300, 307, 49 S.Ct. 150, 73 L.Ed. 390. It may be that only partial relief or no relief will be eventually granted, but this is not because of lack of jurisdiction, but because the particular facts of the case and the applicable law as construed by the Court do not entitle appellants to all of the relief demanded.

In the absence of bad faith or collusion, not here present, jurisdiction attaches at the moment of the filing of the complaint and the existence of a good defense or a voluntary or involuntary reduction of the amount claimed, or a change in the cause of action, will not defeat jurisdiction previously acquired. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845; Ford, Bacon Davis v. Volentine, 5 Cir., 64 F.2d 800; Grant County Deposit Bank v. McCampbell, 6 Cir., 194 F.2d 469, 31 A.L.R.2d 909; Southern Pacific Co. v. Haight, 9 Cir., 126 F.2d 900, certiorari denied 317 U.S. 676, 63 S.Ct. 154, 87 L.Ed. 542; Hood ex rel. North Carolina Bank Trust Co. v. Bell, 4 Cir., 84 F.2d 136, 137. It is clear that at the time of the filing of the complaint, which was an action for the balance of the purchase price and storage charges, the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeded $3,000.

Mullen v. Torrance, 9 Wheat 537, 539, 6 L.Ed. 154; Kirby v. American Soda Fountain Co., 194 U.S. 141, 24 S.Ct. 619, 48 L.Ed. 911; Wichita R. Light Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 260 U.S. 48, 64, 43 S.Ct. 51, 67 L.Ed. 124; Kentucky Home Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Duling, 6 Cir., 190 F.2d 797, 802. For example, a substitution of one party for another, or a change in citizenship of one of the parties, after the action has started, with a resulting loss of diversity of citizenship, does not oust jurisdiction previously acquired at the time of filing. Dunn v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 1, 8 L.Ed. 845; Hardenbergh v. Ray, 151 U.S. 112, 14 S.Ct. 305, 38 L.Ed. 93; Sanders v. Hall, 10 Cir., 74 F.2d 399, certiorari denied, 295 U.S. 739, 55 S.Ct. 653, 79 L.Ed. 1686; Cross v. Evans, 5 Cir., 86 F. 1, 4; Clarke v. Mathewson, 12 Pet. 164, 171, 9 L.Ed. 1041; Hood ex rel. North Carolina Bank Trust Co. v. Bell, 4 Cir., 84 F.2d 136, 137. Nor does a reduction of the amount claimed below the required jurisdictional amount defeat jurisdiction previously acquired. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845. But it does not follow that, in the absence of collusion, if jurisdiction does not exist at the time of filing it can not be later acquired by supplemental pleadings showing jurisdiction to exist.

"We thing that a reasonable interpretation of the language of the clause in the light of its history, its obvious purpose at the time of its enactment, and judicial declarations as to its meaning and effect, and the fact that the provision for jurisdiction generally over suits arising under the laws of the United States was enacted later, and without any exceptions, lead to the conclusion that it should be so applied as not to limit jurisdiction arising from the nature of the subject-matter of the suit, as is the case in suits brought by or against corporations organized under the laws of the United States." And see, also, United States v. Greene, 26 Fed.Cas. page 33, No. 15,258; 4 Mason 427; Federal Reserve Bank v. Webster, D.C., 287 F. 579; Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Krauss, D.C., 12 F. Supp. 44; Hood ex rel. North Carolina Bank Trust Co. v. Bell, 4 Cir., 84 F.2d 136. Nor can we approve the contention of Marks that the operation of the "Assignee Clause" and the authority of the Sowell case are impaired in any measure by the enactment of 28 U.S.C.A. § 42:

Although the situation arises far more frequently where jurisdiction is founded on diversity of citizenship which is later lost upon a transfer of interest, there is authority for holding, and indeed it is the better rule of law, that successors in a suit originally brought by a federal agency may continue to litigate in federal court. See Jones v. Proctorville, 303 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1962); Hood v. Bell, 84 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1936). Second, by retaining a substantial interest in the outcome of the lawsuit, the FDIC, despite the assignment of its claims against defendants to the trustee, remains an interested party whose continued participation in the suit is anticipated by our decision to join, as opposed to substitute, the trustee.