Opinion
A19-0448
04-27-2020
In re the Marriage of: Charles Edward Honke, petitioner, Appellant, v. Jennifer Hodapp Honke, Respondent.
Susan A. Daudelin, Joani C. Moberg, Henschel Moberg, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant) Michael P. Boulette, Karen L. Schreiber, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn . Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018). Affirmed
Jesson, Judge Hennepin County District Court
File No. 27-FA-13-8973 Susan A. Daudelin, Joani C. Moberg, Henschel Moberg, P.A., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellant) Michael P. Boulette, Karen L. Schreiber, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent) Considered and decided by Bratvold, Presiding Judge; Jesson, Judge; and Bryan, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JESSON, Judge
Appellant Charles Edward Honke challenges several aspects of the district court's order modifying his spousal-maintenance obligation. Additionally, respondent and cross-appellant Jennifer Hodapp Honke contests the district court's decision to impute income to her. Because we are satisfied that the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding the spousal-maintenance-modification motion, we affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Charles Edward Honke (husband) married respondent and cross-appellant Jennifer Hodapp Honke (wife) in 1992. During their marriage, the parties had three children—all of whom are now adults—and accumulated an estate worth around $4.5 million.
In late 2013, husband filed a petition to dissolve the marriage. Over the course of about the next year and a half, the parties reached agreements about child custody, parenting time, and property division. But they were unable to agree on spousal maintenance. Accordingly, the district court held a four-day trial in 2015. At trial, both parties agreed that wife needed permanent spousal maintenance but disagreed as to the amount. Therefore, each party submitted extensive evidence of their income and expenses to the court.
With respect to wife, the district court found that she had been a homemaker and the primary caretaker of the parties' children for the past 18 years. And although wife has a bachelor's degree, she last worked full-time in 1997. Based on wife's qualifications, the district court concluded that she could work full-time and earn a salary of $35,000. Wife also would receive investment income amounting to $7,966 per year.
Additionally, during their marriage, the parties received cash gifts from wife's parents each year. But the district court declined to include the cash gifts in wife's income. This decision was based on wife's father's testimony. Wife's father testified that the cash gifts were "legacy gifts." He adamantly explained that he would stop providing the gifts to wife if it reduced husband's responsibility to his family. Crediting this testimony, the district court determined that the cash gifts were "not regularly received from a dependable source" and did not include them in wife's income.
Based on the imputed income from wife's earning capacity and her investment income, the district court calculated wife's monthly income as $3,581. And in evaluating wife's expenses, the district court examined more than 50 separate budget categories. These ranged from general expenses like home maintenance and groceries to specific expenses including sprinkler maintenance, therapy, and pet expenses. After assessing each category, the district court found wife's monthly expenses to be $10,029.
The district court's order differentiated between expenses before and after July 1, 2016. This opinion cites the figures applicable beginning July 1, 2016.
Turning to husband's income, both parties agreed to use $269,284 as husband's yearly salary. They also agreed that $55,425 represented husband's additional bonus income, earned through his position as a partner at IBM Global Business Services, where he worked for 26 years. Additionally, husband's investment income amounted to $10,400 each year. In total, husband's monthly income totaled $27,926. And after thoroughly reviewing husband's budget, the district court calculated husband's monthly expenses to be $8,094, not including his child-support obligation.
After calculating each party's income and expenses, the district court examined each of the seven statutorily required factors to determine the amount of wife's permanent spousal maintenance. Ultimately, the district court dissolved the parties' marriage and awarded wife $7,900 per month in permanent spousal maintenance.
A little over one year later, husband filed a motion to modify his spousal-maintenance obligation. Husband's position at IBM was eliminated. He accepted a job offer at a smaller company earning a lower salary. The new position paid him a salary of $230,000 per year, with a $10,000 signing bonus and eligibility for an annual incentive bonus. Husband sought to adjust his spousal-maintenance obligation accordingly.
Beginning in November 2017—before his motion was decided by the district court—husband unilaterally reduced his monthly maintenance payment to $5,000. According to husband, the reduced payment represented his attempt to balance his ability to pay with wife's needs.
Nearly seven months later, husband filed an amended motion seeking to terminate his spousal-maintenance obligation. During the discovery process of husband's initial modification motion, the parties exchanged financial information. Husband learned that, after the divorce, wife received significant cash gifts from her parents. According to husband, that income included: two tax-free "legacy gifts" totaling $500,000, a $24,700 cash gift in both 2016 and 2017, and $3,300 per year in 2015, 2016, and 2017 in gifts from a trust. Based on this additional income, husband requested that, in lieu of modifying his spousal maintenance obligation, the district court terminate it entirely.
The district court found that a substantial change in circumstances occurred, making the original spousal-maintenance award unreasonable. In doing so, it determined that husband's income—including his salary, potential bonus income, and investment income—represented between an 8.5 and 16 percent decrease from his income at the time of the dissolution. And the district court accepted husband's assertion that he had reduced his monthly expenses. In contrast, the district court concluded that wife's income had increased since the divorce. The increase resulted from wife's increased earning potential and $20,000 of imputed investment income that should have yielded from the cash gifts. The district court did not include the principal amount of the cash gifts from wife's parents in her income, finding that the issue was extensively litigated during the divorce proceeding. And the district court declined to reevaluate wife's expenses, reasoning that they were thoroughly litigated at trial, and wife claimed that they had not changed.
We note that the district court's modification order appears to cite two different figures as the lower end of the range of husband's income. Neither party raises this discrepancy as a basis for appeal.
Ultimately, the district court concluded that husband's reduced income and wife's increased income represented a substantial change in circumstances warranting modification of the amount of spousal maintenance. The district court reduced husband's monthly spousal-maintenance payment to $5,817, a $2,083 monthly reduction. Husband appeals, challenging several aspects of the modification order. Additionally, wife filed a notice of related appeal, contesting the amount of income the district court imputed to her.
DECISION
In this appeal, husband raises several arguments related to the district court's decision to modify his spousal-maintenance obligation. "Spousal maintenance is an award made in a dissolution or legal separation proceeding of payments from the future income or earnings of one spouse for the support and maintenance of the other." Curtis v. Curtis, 887 N.W.2d 249, 251 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). We review the decision to modify a spousal-maintenance award for an abuse of discretion. See Hecker v. Hecker, 568 N.W.2d 705, 710 (Minn. 1997). In deciding to modify a spousal-maintenance award, a district court abuses its discretion if its findings of fact are unsupported by the record or if it improperly applies the law. Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997). We review factual findings for clear error but consider questions of law de novo. Gessner v. Gessner, 487 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Minn. App. 1992); Melius v. Melius, 765 N.W.2d 411, 414 (Minn. App. 2009).
Husband contends that the district court abused its discretion or erred in the following ways: (1) by concluding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded him from arguing that cash gifts from wife's parents should be included in wife's income; (2) by determining that Minnesota law dictates that wife is not required to invade the principal of cash assets she received from her parents after the dissolution; (3) by including a potential bonus in his income; and (4) by refusing to examine wife's reasonable expenses at the time of the modification motion. In her cross-appeal, wife contends that the district court erred by incorrectly calculating her income and overstating her financial resources. We consider each argument in turn.
I. The district court's treatment of the postdissolution cash gifts from wife's parents does not amount to an abuse of discretion.
Husband raises two arguments related to the district court's treatment of the cash gifts wife received from her parents after the divorce. First, husband contends that the district court erroneously concluded that the doctrine of collateral estoppel precluded reconsidering whether to include the gifts in wife's income. Second, he argues that the district court should have required wife to invade the principal of the cash gifts to meet her needs.
Collateral Estoppel
Generally, the availability of collateral estoppel is a mixed question of law and fact that we consider de novo. Heine v. Simon, 702 N.W.2d 752, 761 (Minn. 2005). But collateral estoppel has limited applicability in family-law proceedings. Maschoff v. Leiding, 696 N.W.2d 834, 838 (Minn. App. 2005). This limited availability stems from the fact that a district court's maintenance rulings are not "final judgments" in the traditional sense. Id. Without an enforceable waiver, district courts have "continuing jurisdiction over dissolution proceedings" which allows them to modify spousal maintenance. Loo v. Loo, 520 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Minn. 1994).
The doctrine of collateral estoppel requires four elements: "(1) the issue must be identical to one in a prior adjudication; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the estopped party was a party or was in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the estopped party was given a full and fair opportunity to be heard on the adjudicated issue." Hauschildt v. Beckingham, 686 N.W.2d 829, 837 (Minn. 2004) (quotation omitted).
In this case, husband filed his motion to modify his spousal-maintenance obligation a little over a year after the district court issued the amended judgment and decree. He amended his motion roughly seven months later. The district court issued its modification order just under two years after it issued its amended judgment and decree. With this time frame in mind when deciding the modification motion, the district court found that "[t]he parties exhaustively litigated" whether the annual cash gifts from wife's parents should be treated as income during the dissolution proceeding. As a result, the district court concluded that collateral estoppel prohibited the relitigation of previously decided issues and stated that its prior conclusion was final.
The district court's legal conclusion that collateral estoppel precluded reconsideration of the treatment of the cash gifts was erroneous. Because the district court maintains continuing jurisdiction over dissolution proceedings—which allows it to modify spousal maintenance—the district court was not collaterally estopped from reconsidering whether the cash gifts should be included in wife's income. See id.
Despite the erroneous statement that collateral estoppel barred reconsideration of the cash gifts, we conclude that this error does not warrant reversal. See Minn. R. Civ. P. 61 (requiring harmless error to be ignored); see also Wibbens v. Wibbens, 379 N.W.2d 225, 227 (Minn. App. 1985) (refusing to remand for de minimis error). By declining to permit the parties to relitigate whether the cash gifts should be treated as income, the district court acted within its discretion. During the dissolution proceeding, wife's father testified that he and his wife made annual gifts to their children. But wife's father stopped giving the gift when husband filed for divorce. And he "testified forcefully" that he would not resume giving wife the gifts if they in any way reduced husband's responsibility for taking care of his family. Based on this testimony, the district court concluded that the gifts were "not regularly received from a dependable source" and did not include them in wife's income. Although wife's father resumed the cash gifts after the divorce, this action was consistent with his testimony during the dissolution proceeding. Because they did not reduce husband's obligation to wife, wife's father continued to give her the cash gifts.
Additionally, we observe that a relatively short amount of time—just over a year—passed between the amended judgment and decree and husband's initial modification motion. And less than two years had passed by the time the district court issued its modification order. During their dissolution proceeding, the parties spent over two and a half years mediating and litigating issues including spousal maintenance. In short, considering the facts supporting the district court's original decision, the relatively short time frame between the amended judgment and motion for modification, and the amount of time spent litigating the issue of the cash gifts during the recent dissolution, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to decline to permit the parties to relitigate the cash-gift issue when deciding the modification motion.
Husband contends that the postdissolution annual cash gifts present a different question than the treatment of the cash gifts received by the parties during their marriage. And he maintains that the postdissolution cash gifts are relevant to the district court's determination about whether circumstances have changed, particularly with respect to wife's available financial resources. See Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(a) (2018). But the district court determined that its prior conclusion—that the annual cash gifts were not income—was final. And the same rationale—that the gifts were not regularly received from a dependable source—applies to the postdissolution gifts in the same way it applied to the cash gifts received during the marriage.
Invading the Principal of Postdissolution Gifts
Next, husband maintains that the district court misapplied Minnesota law by concluding that wife did not have to invade the principal of the postdissolution gifts totaling $500,000 to assist her in meeting her financial needs. Husband argues that Minnesota law does not prohibit requiring a spouse receiving maintenance to spend down assets acquired after the dissolution proceeding. But the district court concluded that a party is not required to exhaust a gift or inheritance to provide for their support. Accordingly, it rejected husband's proposal to require wife to amortize the cash gifts from her parents to meet her needs until she could access retirement assets.
Minnesota caselaw is clear that a party is not required to "diminish the value of the property received in the distribution to cover monthly expenses" or "sell off assets to provide for the spouse's reasonable needs or to provide adequate self-support." Curtis, 887 N.W.2d at 254 (quotations omitted). But caselaw does not contain that same explicit protection for assets acquired by a party after a divorce that were not part of the property division award. Accordingly, it is unclear from caselaw whether a district court may require a party receiving spousal maintenance to invade the principal of assets acquired after a dissolution to meet his or her financial needs.
Both parties cite several cases in an attempt to demonstrate why a district court either can or cannot require a party to invade the principal of assets acquired after a divorce. But many of wife's cited cases deal with property divided as part of the marital dissolution, so they are of limited precedential value when assessing assets acquired by one party after the dissolution. See, e.g., Nardini v. Nardini, 414 N.W.2d 184, 197-98 (Minn. 1987), Broms v. Broms, 353 N.W.2d 135, 138 (Minn. 1984), Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn. 1982). Both parties reference Lee v. Lee, 775 N.W.2d 631, 641-42 (Minn. 2009). But Lee involved a pension plan that was awarded as part of a dissolution and postmarital pension benefits. 775 N.W.2d at 641-42. Because the asset at issue in Lee was initially awarded as part of a dissolution proceeding, we do not read Lee as dictating the outcome here. Similarly, both parties also rely on an unpublished opinion from this court, Winer v. Winer, No. A15-0339, 2016 WL 456818, at *2 (Minn. App. Feb. 8, 2016). Aside from being unpublished, the persuasive value of Winer is low. Because Winer involved an asset distributed at the time of dissolution, which increased in value after the dissolution, it does not dictate how a district court may treat assets acquired entirely after the dissolution, as is the case here.
An abuse of discretion occurs when the district court misapplies the law. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d at 202. And here, because the law is unclear regarding the treatment of assets acquired after a divorce, we cannot say that the district court misapplied the law by declining to require wife to invade the principal of the cash gifts to meet her financial needs. Further, in maintenance proceedings, the district court has significant discretion "to determine what needs are reasonable" and "what amount of self-support is adequate." Curtis, 887 N.W.2d at 254. And the supreme court has reiterated that "each marital dissolution proceeding is unique and centers upon the individualized facts and circumstances of the parties." Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d at 201. Despite the decision not to require wife to invade the principal of the cash gifts, it is clear from the record that the district court carefully considered each party's income and expenses to determine what amount of spousal maintenance would allow wife to meet her reasonable needs. And we observe that the district court ultimately reached a reasonable result by reducing husband's spousal-maintenance obligation by just over $2,000 each month, even without requiring wife to invade the principal of the cash gifts. Therefore, we are satisfied that the district court acted within its discretion by declining to require wife to invade the principal of the postdissolution cash gifts to meet her financial needs.
II. The district court did not err by including husband's potential bonus in his income.
Husband argues that the district court erred by including his potential bonus in his income. According to husband, he had not yet earned a bonus from his new employer, making any bonus income speculative. The district court's calculation of income for spousal-maintenance purposes is a factual finding that we do not reverse unless it is clearly erroneous. Peterka v. Peterka, 675 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Minn. App. 2004).
Bonuses may be included in a party's income, even if they are "not guaranteed and uncertain as to amount" provided that they are "a dependable form of periodic payment." Desrosier v. Desrosier, 551 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Minn. App. 1996). Here, at the time of the spousal-maintenance-modification request, husband had not received a bonus from his new employer. But the record contained an explanation of how the new company awarded bonuses. Husband's new job awarded bonuses based on a combination of husband's performance and the company's performance, and the company provided both target and maximum amounts.
The district court concluded that any bonus income husband could earn was not speculative. It observed that husband's bonus was no less regular than at the time of the divorce. Further, at that time, the parties recognized that husband's bonus could fluctuate, which is why they used a five-year average to calculate the amount. The district court also noted that husband received a bonus every year "for many years" and, in denying husband's motion for amended findings, stated that husband acknowledged that he was well-suited for his new employment position. Accordingly, the district court included an amount in the middle of husband's target bonus and his maximum bonus when calculating his income.
This finding is not clearly erroneous. The record reflects that, although husband had a new employer, he was working in a similar position in a similar industry. Husband acknowledged that in his previous position, he had received a bonus of varying amounts for at least nine consecutive years. And, as the district court noted, husband's bonus from his new employer appeared to be an important part of the compensation package. The bonus contained an individual component, giving husband some control over his bonus. Accordingly, the district court did not err by including the bonus in husband's income.
Still, husband maintains that, based on precedent, his bonus was too speculative to be included in his income. In past cases, we have treated arguments regarding the certainty of bonuses in different ways. In Haasken v. Haasken, this court affirmed the district court's decision to exclude any bonuses from the husband's income. 396 N.W.2d 253, 261 (Minn. App. 1986). There, husband's receipt of a bonus depended on the store's profitability, and his past bonuses varied from $0 to $9,000. Id. But in Desrosier, this court reversed a district court's exclusion of bonus income because the bonuses had been a dependable form of payment and the district court expected them to continue, even though they were not guaranteed and the amount was uncertain. 551 N.W.2d at 508-09.
Most recently, in an unpublished opinion, this court affirmed the inclusion of husband's bonus income where he had only received one bonus from his employer. Jayawardena v. Jayawardena, No. A19-0390, 2019 WL 4013973, at *3 (Minn. App. Aug. 26, 2019). In doing so, this court reasoned that husband received the full amount of the bonus in his one year of eligibility and was expected to continue to be eligible for a bonus. Id.
We read these cases as providing the district court discretion to include bonuses in income calculations, provided that the record shows the bonuses are a "dependable form of periodic payment." Id. at 509. And here, the record supports the district court's conclusion that husband's bonus income was sufficiently reliable to be included in his income. As such, the district court did not clearly err by including husband's bonus in his income.
Alternatively, husband argues that the district court should have adopted a base-plus-percentage model. This model awards wife spousal maintenance based on husband's salary and then a percentage of husband's bonus once earned. This court has expressed reservations about the continued contact between parties this arrangement requires. See Doherty v. Doherty, 388 N.W.2d 1, 2 n.1 (Minn. App. 1986). And here, the district court noted that "[t]he fighting between these parties over this dissolution has been nearly nonstop for five years." Given the continued contact between the parties and ongoing court involvement the base-plus-percentage approach requires, the district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to adopt it.
III. The district court did not err by declining to reevaluate wife's monthly expenses.
Finally, husband argues that the district court erred by not reexamining wife's expenses at the time of the modification motion. According to husband, the district court erred by relying on wife's assertion that her expenses had not changed since the dissolution.
When considering a motion to modify spousal maintenance, "the court shall apply, in addition to all other relevant factors, the factors for an award of maintenance under section 518.552 that exist at the time of the motion." Minn. Stat. § 518A.39, subd. 2(e) (2018). One such factor is the party seeking maintenance's financial resources and ability to meet their needs independently. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2018). Another factor is the ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet their needs while providing spousal maintenance. Id., subd. 2(g).
Here, the district court accepted wife's assertion that her expenses at the time of the modification motion were the same as her expenses at the time of the dissolution. In doing so, the court stated that it would "not revisit [wife's] budget items" because they were exhaustively reviewed during trial and posttrial motions. Again, husband filed his initial motion to modify spousal maintenance just over a year after the district court issued its amended judgment and decree. And the court concluded that husband's challenges to wife's budget relied on a "limited snapshot" of wife's bank statements, were unsupported, or were "otherwise unreasonable." The district court did state that, in any future modification motion, wife may be required to provide proof of certain expenses that the court expected to decrease or disappear.
These statements by the district court indicate that it did consider wife's expenses—at a high level—even if it did not go through each item in wife's budget line-by-line. The statute does not require specific findings about each of wife's expenses, as long as the district court considered them when considering wife's ability to provide for her financial needs. See generally id., subd. 2(a). Additionally, the short time frame between the amended judgment and decree and husband's initial modification motion provides support for the district court's decision declining to reevaluate wife's expenses. Accordingly, accepting wife's assertion that her expenses remained the same was within the district court's discretion.
Still, husband argues that in light of his reduced budget, wife should be required to "share in the hardship." This court has previously stated that "[a] separated spouse should share in the hardship resulting from a good-faith career change as if the family had remained together." Savoren v. Savoren, 386 N.W.2d 288, 291-92 (Minn. App. 1986). But this presumes that there is hardship to share. We note that, based on his revised expenses, the record reflects that husband can pay the modified spousal maintenance award with money to spare each month. And the fact that husband voluntarily reduced his budget does not necessitate wife doing the same, particularly considering that an award of spousal maintenance is based, at least in part, on the marital standard of living. See Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2(c). The record reflects that the district court considered wife's expenses by adopting her assertion that they remained the same. Accordingly, the district court did not err, and this argument is not a basis for reversal.
IV. The district court did not clearly err by imputing income to wife.
In her cross-appeal, wife argues that the district court overstated her income. According to wife, the district court did so in two ways: (1) by imputing income to her from an increased salary which she does not earn and (2) by imputing income to her from investments she does not have. Again, "[a] district court's determination of income for maintenance purposes is a finding of fact and is not set aside unless clearly erroneous." Peterka, 675 N.W.2d at 357.
In its order addressing the modification motion, the district court made findings regarding wife's income. At the time of the dissolution, wife agreed she could earn $35,000 per year working full-time. A vocational expert also testified that, within three years, she could earn $40,000-$45,000. The district court found that, for nearly a year after the dissolution, wife worked part-time. That position paid $20 per hour. But in June 2017, wife accepted a full-time position, earning $35,000 annually. According to wife, although the full-time position had a lower hourly-rate ($17.50 per hour), she received other benefits like a set schedule and eligibility to enroll in the company health plan. In deciding the modification motion, the district court imputed $40,000 of annual income to wife. The district court based this finding on the vocational expert's testimony during the dissolution proceeding and the fact that wife had previously earned $20 per hour.
Turning to the postdissolution cash gifts, the district court did not include the principal of them in wife's income. But it considered investment income that wife could have received had she invested the gifts totaling $500,000. Wife argued that she only has $166,470 remaining from those gifts. She asserted that she spent much of the gifts paying for attorney fees, home repairs, and her daughter's wedding. Nevertheless, the district court rejected wife's argument. The district court concluded that the fact that wife spent much of the money did not relieve her of her obligation to invest it in the first place. Accordingly, using a four-percent return on a $500,000 investment, the district court imputed $20,000 of annual investment income to wife.
We conclude that the district court did not clearly err in calculating wife's income in either respect. In terms of wife's imputed employment income, the record reflects that, at the time of the dissolution, an expert testified that wife could earn $40,000 annually within three years. And wife's part-time hourly wage reflected that she could reasonably earn that amount. With regard to the imputed investment income, the supreme court has stated that it would expect a maintenance-seeking spouse to invest cash assets in an effort to meet his or her reasonable needs. Curtis, 887 N.W.2d at 254. Although wife chose to spend the cash gifts on other expenses, she could have invested the amount in an effort to meet her financial needs.
In support of her argument, wife draws our attention to Madden v. Madden, 923 N.W.2d 688, 698-99 (Minn. App. 2019). In that opinion, this court distinguished between the different types of obligations imposed by the different kinds of spousal-maintenance awards. Madden, 923 N.W.2d at 698-99. For instance, some types of awards imply that the maintenance recipient has an obligation to make reasonable efforts to increase his or her earning capacity. Id. In contrast,
an award of permanent spousal maintenance, by itself, without any conditions requiring the recipient to make efforts to increase his or her earning capacity, implies that the recipient will not become fully self-supporting, and has no obligation to increase his or her earning capacity.Id. at 699. Accordingly, this court stated that "[a] district court may attribute employment income to a recipient on a motion to modify based on the recipient's present earning capacity only if the district court makes a finding of the recipient's earning capacity as of the time of the modification proceeding." Id. at 700.
Madden is distinguishable from this case. In the dissolution order, the district court found that wife was capable of earning $35,000 per year. At the time of the modification motion, the district court found that wife had been earning $20 per hour in a part-time position, which would equate to just over $40,000 annually at a full-time job. Because the district court, in deciding the modification motion, made findings about wife's increased earning capacity that are supported by the record, we conclude that this case differs from Madden. Accordingly, the district court did not clearly err by imputing income to wife.
In sum, we conclude that the district court made thorough findings regarding complex issues in both the dissolution order and the modification. Because we discern no error or abuse of discretion in the modification order, we affirm.
Affirmed.