Opinion
No. 2D20-2853
10-01-2021
Jarret HONAHAN, Appellant, v. Karen BURGESON; Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois; and Geico General Insurance Company, Appellees.
William J. McFarlane, III, and Michael K. Mittelmark, of McFarlane Dolan & Prince, Coral Springs, for Appellant. Roy D. Wasson, of Wasson & Associates, Miami; Richard A. Bokor, of Richard A. Bokor, P.A., Tampa; and Samuel R. Hillman, Clearwater, for Appellee Karen Burgeson. No appearance for remaining Appellees.
William J. McFarlane, III, and Michael K. Mittelmark, of McFarlane Dolan & Prince, Coral Springs, for Appellant.
Roy D. Wasson, of Wasson & Associates, Miami; Richard A. Bokor, of Richard A. Bokor, P.A., Tampa; and Samuel R. Hillman, Clearwater, for Appellee Karen Burgeson.
No appearance for remaining Appellees.
BLACK, Judge.
Jarret Honahan challenges the order denying his motion to enforce the settlement agreement purportedly reached in the underlying lawsuit between Janet Burgeson and Mr. Honahan. The order states that the motion to enforce is denied, with no findings of fact or conclusions of law, and Mr. Honahan has not provided this court with a transcript of the hearing. Because the order does not determine "that, as a matter of law, [the] settlement agreement is unenforceable, is set aside, or never existed," we dismiss this appeal as from a nonfinal, nonappealable order. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ix) ; Powell v. Woodard , 300 So. 3d 784, 785 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020).
Although Mr. Honahan asserts that the trial court "made an express determination that there was no settlement," that is simply not reflected in the order on appeal. And because a determination that no settlement agreement existed as a matter of law is only one of the legal grounds for jurisdiction provided in rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ix), we cannot conclude that a denial necessarily means that the trial court made such a determination. The denial of a motion to enforce a settlement agreement without findings could mean that the trial court determined (1) that a settlement agreement exists but is unenforceable, (2) that a settlement agreement exists but is set aside, or (3) that a settlement agreement never existed. Any of these determinations would give this court jurisdiction, but they require different analyses. A fourth possibility, one which clearly would not give this court jurisdiction under the express terms of rule 9.130, is that the trial court denied the motion to enforce for lack of sufficient evidence. This court cannot presume that a determination giving us jurisdiction was made, much less presume jurisdiction and then guess upon what legal grounds the determination was made.
We note that our dismissal does not prevent Mr. Honahan from again seeking to enforce the settlement agreement or from otherwise obtaining an order from the trial court with sufficient, supported findings. See Powell , 300 So. 3d at 785 ("[W]e in no way suggest how the enforceability issue [should be] handled on remand."); cf. Guillen v. Rodriguez , 300 So. 3d 1233, 1233 (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) (affirming the order granting the motion to enforce a settlement agreement "in the absence of any error of law discernible on the face of the order reviewed").
Dismissed.
VILLANTI and LaROSE, JJ., Concur.