Opinion
CASE NO. 4:03CV3047
December 17, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Motions for Summary Judgment submitted by Defendant Ron Ross (Filing No. 24) and Defendant Angie Roby (Filing No. 30). Ross filed an Index of Evidence (Filing No. 26) and Brief (Filing No. 25) in support of his Motion. The Plaintiff, Chrystal Holt, filed no evidence or brief in opposition to Ross's Motion. Roby filed a Brief (Filing No. 32), Reply Brief (Filing No. 39) and Indexes of Evidence (Filing Nos. 31 and 40) in support of her Motion. Holt did submit a Brief (Filing No. 34) and Index of Evidence (Filing No. 35) in opposition to Roby's Motion. For the reasons discussed below, the Motions will be granted.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On May 9, 2003, this Court issued a Memorandum and Order finding that the only remaining claims in this action are those against Ross, Roby and "Unknown Servants and/or Employees" in their individual capacities, for monetary damages, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985. (Filing No. 11.)
At all times relevant to this action, Holt was a resident of Wood River, Hall County, Nebraska. (Filing No. 1 (Complaint), ¶ 1.) On June 26, 2001, Holt gave birth to a daughter, Lakisha Leas, at the Howard County Hospital in St. Paul, Nebraska. (Filing No. 31, Ex. 1, Declaration of Angela L. Roby ("Roby Decl."), ¶ 11; Filing No. 1, ¶ 10.)
At all times relevant to this action, Ross was the Director of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS"). (Filing No. 26, Ex. 1, Affidavit of Ron Ross ("Ross Aff."), ¶ 1.) Ross never took any action or engaged in any conversation regarding Holt or Lakisha, and Ross did not know Holt or Lakisha prior to the service of summons on him in connection with this lawsuit. ( Id., ¶¶ 6-8.)
At all times relevant to this action, Roby was a Protection and Safety Worker for HHS. (Roby Decl., ¶ 2.) In June 2001, Roby was assigned to investigate whether Lakisha was at risk of abuse or neglect while in her parents' custody. ( Id., ¶¶ 3-4.) Roby's investigation revealed that Holt gave birth to a son, Jordan Hibbs, on May 23, 1996, and that Jordan was adjudicated as a child who lacked proper parental care by reason of the fault of habits of his parents. ( Id., ¶¶ 5-7 Ex. A; Filing No. 31, Ex. 3 (certified copy of court records, In re Interest of Jordan Hibbs, County Court of Hall County, Nebraska, No. JV 96-460).) Roby's investigation, including a review of Jordan's HHS file and his medical records from St. Francis Hospital in Grand Island, Nebraska, showed that Holt had failed to comply with a number of court-ordered plans for Jordan's care, and that Holt relinquished her parental rights to Jordan when he was six months old and diagnosed as a "failure to thrive" child. (Roby Decl., ¶¶ 5-7.) Roby also reviewed the criminal history of Lakisha's father, Larry Leas ("Leas"), supplied by the Hall County Sheriff's office. ( Id., ¶¶ 8-10 Exs. B, C, D E; Filing No. 31, Ex. 4.) The criminal history revealed that Leas had been arrested for assault on 12 occasions, with at least four arrests resulting in convictions. (Roby Decl., ¶ 8 Exs. B C.) One offense report revealed that at the time of Lakisha's birth, Leas had pending charges for third-degree assault, first-degree false imprisonment, and felon in possession of a firearm. ( Id., ¶ 9 Ex. D.) Roby reviewed the HHS records of another child, Alfredo Garcia, Jr., which included a Grand Island Police Department offense report with allegations that Leas had "punched" Alfredo and struck him with an object in or about August 2000, injuring Alfredo when he was five years old. ( Id., ¶ 10 Ex. E. Filing No. 31, Ex. 4.) Finally, Roby contacted staff at the Howard County Hospital where Lakisha was born. Hospital staff informed Roby that Holt had refused assistance from Healthy Starts, an organization that educates new parents in the proper care of children, and that Holt had expressed an intention to reside with Leas. (Roby Decl., ¶ 11.)
Roby provided the results of her investigation to the Hall County Attorney's Office on June 29, 2001, and prepared an affidavit detailing the results of her investigation. ( Id., ¶ 12 Ex. F.) A Hall Deputy County Attorney prepared a Juvenile Petition, and requested an order placing temporary custody of Lakisha with HHS. ( Id., ¶ 12: Filing No. 31, Ex. 2.) The Hall County Court entered an ex parte order placing temporary custody of Lakisha in HHS on June 29, 2001. (Filing No. 31, Ex. 2.) Roby requested that the Howard County Sheriff's office serve Holt with the order at the Howard County Hospital in St. Paul, Nebraska. (Roby Decl., ¶ 13.) Roby accompanied a Howard County Deputy Sheriff to the Howard County Hospital, took Lakisha into custody, and placed her with a foster family. ( Id., ¶ 14.) At the time Roby took custody of Lakisha, Roby believed that Holt had been served with a copy of the County Court order. ( Id., ¶ 14.) Physical custody of Lakisha was returned to Holt on or about August 17, 2001, and legal custody was returned to Holt on or about September 28, 2001 (Filing No. 1, ¶¶ 15-16.)
Holt alleges that Roby's affidavit of June 26, 2001, contained "material falsehoods and material omissions," and that her actions were motivated by "prejudicial bias and outright dishonesty" (Filing No. 1, ¶ 13; Filing No. 34, Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition") at 8.) Holt claims that Roby "intentionally failed to inform herself of pertinent facts regarding the case because of her own bias and dishonesty." (Plaintiff's Brief in Opposition at 8.) Holt contends that she: planned to return to her mother's home after leaving the hospital; did not know she was in jeopardy of losing custody of Lakisha if she lived with Larry Leas; and was willing to accept assistance from certain social service organizations to care for Lakisha. (Filing No. 35, Ex. 1, Declaration of Chrystal Holt, ¶¶ 8, 12, 13.) Holt also contends that she was not provided with a copy of the Hall County Court order before HHS took temporary custody of Lakisha. ( Id., ¶¶ 5-6.)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
With respect to summary judgment, the Court must examine the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. U.S. ex rel. Quirk v. Madonna Towers, Inc., 278 F.3d 765, 767 (8th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment, however, is "properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
The proponent of a motion for summary judgment "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 322 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). The proponent need not, however, negate the opponent's claims or defenses. Id. at 324-25.
In response to the proponent's showing, the opponent's burden is to "come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). A "genuine" issue of material fact is more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id.
As the non-moving party, Holt is entitled to all reasonable inferences — those that "can be drawn from the evidence without resort to speculation." Kincade v. U.S. Elec. Motors, Inc., 219 F.3d 800, 801 (8th Cir. 2000). However, "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). The Court's function is not to weigh the credibility and persuasiveness of evidence in the context of a motion for summary judgment. Kampouris v. St. Louis Symphony Soc., 210 F.3d 845, 847 (8th Cir. 2000).
DISCUSSION
Holt failed to respond to Ross's Motion for Summary Judgment and his Affidavit. The factual assertions in the Ross affidavit are accepted as true, and the Ross Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted.
Absolute Immunity
Roby contends that she is entitled to absolute immunity for her role in initiating prosecution of the juvenile case, executing her affidavit of June 29, 2001, and taking Lakisha into custody pursuant to the County Court order. Roby also contends that she is entitled to qualified immunity for all of her conduct, because she did not violate any clearly-established law.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit "has recognized the liberty interest which parents have in the care, custody and management of their children." Manzano v. South Dakota Dept. of Soc. Serv., 60 F.3d 505, 509 (8th Cir. 1995). That liberty interest in familial relations "is limited by the compelling governmental interest in the protection of minor children, particularly in circumstances where the protection is considered necessary as against the parents themselves." Id. at 510 (citing Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1462 (8th Cir. 1987)).
In Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Servs., Inc., 85 F.3d 1365 (8th Cir. 1996), an agency charged with the responsibility of investigating and reporting suspected child abuse and neglect, and a case worker for that agency, were found to have absolute immunity for their participation in ex parte proceedings in state court that led to the award of temporary protective custody of a child. Id. at 1373. The Court found that to the extent the defendants were sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for initiating the judicial proceedings, their role was "functionally comparable to that of a prosecutor," id., and to the extent that one of the defendants was sued for making arguably false statements in an affidavit submitted to the state court, the defendant was entitled to absolute immunity as a witness. Id. (citing Manzano, 60 F.3d at 512, and Myers, 810 F.3d at 1466). The Eighth Circuit Court has also recognized that absolute immunity from § 1983 liability extends to public officials who act "under court order or at a judge's direction." Rogers v. Bruntrager, 841 F.2d 853, 856 (8th Cir. 1988), quoted in Martin v. Hendren, 127 F.3d 720, 721 (8th Cir. 1997). This "`[a]bsolute quasi-judicial immunity derives from absolute judicial immunity.'" Martin, 127 F.3d at 721 (quoting Roland v. Phillips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1994)). Accordingly, this Court finds that Roby is entitled to absolute immunity from liability under §§ 1983 and 1985 for her conduct in initiating juvenile court proceedings regarding the custody of Lakisha, executing the affidavit as a witness in the proceedings, and taking custody of Lakisha pursuant to the county court order.
Qualified Immunity
While it may be unnecessary to address Roby's claim to qualified immunity in light of the findings of absolute immunity, this Court also finds that Roby is entitled to qualified immunity from suit because she did not violate any of Holt's clearly-established constitutional rights.
As noted above, a parent has a liberty interest in the care, custody and management of children, limited by the compelling governmental interest in the protection of such children. The two-step qualified immunity analysis asks: 1) whether a deprivation of a constitutional right existed; and, if so, 2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the deprivation. Vaughn v. Ruoff, 253 F.3d 1124, 1128 (8th Cir. 2001). The answers to these questions are evaluated as follows:
If either question is answered in the negative, the public official is entitled to qualified immunity. If both questions are answered in the affirmative, a public official can avoid a denial of qualified immunity only if she meets her burden of establishing undisputed and material predicate facts which demonstrate that her actions were reasonable under the circumstances. If the material predicate facts are undisputed, the reasonableness inquiry is a question of law. If there is a genuine dispute over material predicate facts, a public official cannot obtain summary judgment.Id. See also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
Applying this analysis, this Court finds: 1) Holt did not have a constitutional right to be free from investigation regarding Lakisha's safety or to maintain physical custody of Lakisha when a court of competent jurisdiction ordered HHS to take temporary custody of the child; and 2) the scope of Roby's investigation, including the preparation of her affidavit and her actions taking temporary custody of Lakisha pursuant to court order, did not violate any of Holt's clearly-established constitutional rights.
Finally, even if Roby were not entitled to absolute immunity from liability or qualified immunity from suit, the affidavits and other evidence before this Court demonstrate that there are no genuine issues of material fact remaining in this case, and that both Ross and Roby are entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law. There is no support for Holt's allegation that Roby intentionally withheld material information from the Hall County Court or that Roby was motivated by bias or dishonesty. With respect to service of the Hall County Court order, there is an issue of fact regarding whether the order was first served on Holt on June 29 or July 1, 2001, but that issue is not material to the disposition of this case.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Court finds that both summary judgment motions should be granted.
IT IS ORDERED:
1. Defendant Ron Ross's Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 24) is granted;
2. Defendant Angie Roby's Motion for Summary Judgment (Filing No. 30) is granted.
3. The Plaintiff is granted ten business (10) days from the date of this order to amend the Complaint to state a cause of action against the "unknown agents, servants, an/or employees of the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services" if there is any such cause of action. In the absence of such a timely filed Amended Complaint, the Complaint will be dismissed by the Court's entry of final judgment.