Opinion
No. 113, 2001
Decided: January 3, 2002
Family Court New Castle County File No. CN00-07650 Pet. Nos. 00-12607, 00-21399 00-22075
Reversed and Remanded.
Unpublished Opinion is below.
VERA M. HOLMES, Petitioner Below, Appellant, v. DAVID F. WOOLEY, Respondent Below, Appellee. No. 113, 2001 Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Decided: January 3, 2002
Before HOLLAND, BERGER and STEELE, Justices.
ORDER
This 3rd day of January 2002, upon consideration of the briefs of the parties, it appears to the Court that:
(1) This is the direct appeal of Vera M. Holmes, petitioner-below, from the Civil Disposition of the Family Court on the Cross-petitions for Custody of Veda and Davina Wooley filed by Appellant and David F. Wooley. Holmes argues in this appeal that the Family Court judge committed legal error in the application of the best interest standards listed in 13 Del. C. § 722. She contends that the trial judge applied the factors both mechanically and perfunctorily, and thus violated the statute's directive that the court consider all relevant factors when determining the best interests of a child. We find that the record does not support a bases to conclude that the Family Court judge weighed properly the relevant best interest factors. Accordingly we reverse.
(2) The Family Court conducted a custody hearing concerning the placement of Davina and Veda Wooley on February 2, 2001. In an order dated February 12, 2001, the trial judge granted the children's father, David Wooley, primary residential custody and held that their mother, Vera Holmes, was entitled to significant visitation rights. After a substantial discussion of the facts involved in this case and the application of those facts to the seven best interest factors, the trial judge's order concluded: "since the application of the majority of the best interest factors, including the domestic violence factor, favored residential custody of the children remaining with their father, the Court must accept Dr. Finkelstein's recommendation that he retain primary custody of Veda and Davina."
Holmes v. Wooley, Del. Fam. Ct., No. CN00-0756, Conner, J., Order at 13 (Feb. 13, 2001).
(3) The clear intent of the legislature in passing the best interest standards was that each factor listed in the statute be independently considered and then given its due weight and importance relative to the other factors in a manner reflecting the best interests of the child in question. Indeed, the statute states that the court is not to limit itself to consideration of the listed factors, but is instead to consider all relevant factors in making its determination. This open-ended language precludes the Family Court from adopting a mechanical or perfunctory approach when assessing the best interest of a child in a custody dispute.
See Friant v. Friant, Del. Supr., 553 A.2d 1186, 1188 (1989) (the General Assembly considered the paramount consideration in custody and visitation determinations to be the welfare and best interests of the child).
(4) The plain language of the trial judge's order implies that the court failed to value independently each factor relative to the others, instead giving each factor an absolutely equal value. The phrase "the application of the majority of the best interest factors," noted supra, indicates a process in which the trial judge 1) weighed the evidence favoring one party for each best interest category against the evidence favoring the other party in the same category; 2) decided whether the evidence in each category favored the Mother or Father; 3) gave no further consideration to this evidence when it examined evidence that fell into the other best interest categories, regardless of their relative strengths or weaknesses; and 4) determined the "best interests" of the children based solely on which parent had "prevailed" in the majority of these categories. This methodology is clearly improper. The statute anticipates that the Family Court will weigh the amalgam of all of the listed best interest factors that favor one parent against the amalgam of factors that favor the opposing parent and all other relevant evidence and only then make an independent determination of the placement that will be in the best interest of the children. The language of the Family Court's order strongly suggests that the trial judge did not conduct this required analysis.
(5) The language of the opinion that reads "since the application . . . favored residential custody of the children remaining with their father, the Court must accept Dr. Finkelstein's recommendation" is similarly suggestive of a failure to award custody based on what the statute defines as the sole determiner — the best interests of the children. The judge's conclusion that he "must accept" the custody recommendation of the Father's expert because the majority of the best interest factors favor the Father improperly shifts the trial judge's analysis away from the children by creating what amounts to a reward for "winning" primary residential custody. While the Family Court can and should consider the recommendations of any expert offered by the parties, the ultimate decision on custody must be made independently, based solely on the best interests of the children.
(6) This Court recognizes that the trial judge may have conducted the necessary evaluation of the children's best interests before rendering his decision; he simply may have reached the same conclusions on custody and visitation that were offered by Father's expert. However, we cannot ignore the plain language of the Family Court's opinion that is before us. It is neither our function nor our province to attempt to ascertain the methodology and intent behind a decision of a trial judge when so doing would require this Court to ignore a written judgment, even in those instances where the trial judge's conclusions are factually supported by the record. The General Assembly's enactment of 13 Del. C. § 722 indicates the importance this State places on the method the courts employ to reach a decision in child custody cases. This Court cannot uphold any ruling where the trial judge's own words suggest that he failed to follow the mandated process.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family Court be REVERSED and REMANDED for a determination on the custody of Veda and Davina Wooley and the attendant visitation rights of the parents in a manner consistent with this order.
BY THE COURT.