Hollman v. Warren

79 Citing cases

  1. Carsten v. Psychology Examining Com.

    27 Cal.3d 793 (Cal. 1980)   Cited 138 times
    Considering scope of standing in light of prudential and separation of powers concerns

    We agree there are circumstances under which a citizen-taxpayer may compel a governmental instrumentality to comply with its constitutional or statutory duty. (See, e.g., Hollman v. Warren (1948) 32 Cal.2d 351, 357 [ 196 P.2d 562]; but also see Atlanta v. Ickes (1939) 308 U.S. 517 [84 L.Ed. 440, 60 S.Ct. 170]; Davis, op. cit. supra, p. 266.) However, the cases relied upon by petitioner are not apposite; and in any event she possesses none of the virtues discussed therein, and has noteworthy detriments, for entitlement to exemption from the requirements of section 1086

  2. State of South Dakota v. Brown

    20 Cal.3d 765 (Cal. 1978)   Cited 47 times
    In State of South Dakota v. Brown (1978) 20 Cal.3d 765 [ 144 Cal.Rptr. 758, 576 P.2d 473], dealing with the scope of the California Governor's discretion under the extradition act, supra, the Supreme Court upheld his power to refuse to issue an arrest warrant in certain limited circumstances.

    Petitioner, however, would confine application of Dennison to the exercise of federal power. Relying on the rule, well established in California, that mandamus will issue to compel performance of a Governor's ministerial duties (e.g., Hollman v. Warren (1948) 32 Cal.2d 351, 354-355 [ 196 P.2d 562]; Jenkins v. Knight (1956) 46 Cal.2d 220, 222-223 [ 293 P.2d 6]), South Dakota argues that a state court may enforce the mandate of the Extradition Clause. In this connection, however, petitioner has neither cited, nor have we found, a single case in the history of the Republic in which any state court has issued mandamus to compel extradition.

  3. Belridge Farms v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd.

    21 Cal.3d 551 (Cal. 1978)   Cited 46 times
    In Belridge Farms, supra, 21 Cal.3d 551, this court, after considering decisions under the federal NLRA, held that a refusal to issue a complaint under the state ALRA is judicially reviewable only in limited circumstances.

    In California mandamus is available to compel an official to exercise his discretion when his refusal is based on an erroneous view of the power vested in him. ( Hollman v. Warren (1948) 32 Cal.2d 351, 355-357 [ 196 P.2d 562].) (8a) The general counsel interpreted section 1154, subdivision (a)(1), properly.

  4. Parker v. Bowron

    40 Cal.2d 344 (Cal. 1953)   Cited 128 times
    In Parker v. Bowron, 40 Cal. 2d 344, 353 (1953), there is no discussion of whether it would be appropriate to permit substitution of an appropriate class representative.

    There is no indication that any benefit could accrue to him if the writ were issued, nor that he will suffer any detriment if it is denied. The situation is clearly distinguishable from that in Hollman v. Warren, 32 Cal.2d 351 [ 196 P.2d 562], where the petitioner was both an applicant for appointment as a notary and a resident and taxpayer of the city and county. Under those circumstances, the majority of the court held that the petitioner had shown a proper interest to contest the validity of the statute under which the governor refused to consider her application. There, the petitioner had a direct interest in securing consideration of her application in addition to her interest as a citizen in having a sufficient number of notaries commissioned to serve the needs of the public.

  5. Stout v. Democratic County Central Com

    40 Cal.2d 91 (Cal. 1952)   Cited 14 times
    In Stout, the court reviewed whether section 2833 of the Elections Code, made applicable by the Legislature solely to the County of San Francisco (by virtue of the fact that it was the only county in the state that is also a single city), was an improper local and special law.

    There is no reasonable relation between the method of ascertaining the number and the population or the fact that San Francisco City and County is a compact area with little or no rural territory. The recent case of Hollman v. Warren, 32 Cal.2d 351 [ 196 P.2d 562], is closely in point. We there held a statute which limited the number of notaries public in San Francisco was an invalid special and local law.

  6. In re Veterans' Industries, Inc.

    8 Cal.App.3d 902 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)   Cited 36 times
    Applying principle that "[b]eneficiaries of a charitable trust, unlike beneficiaries of a private trust, are ordinarily indefinite and therefore unable to enforce the trust [on] their own behalf" to potential cy pres beneficiaries

    On the other hand, a writ of mandamus may be issued "to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. . . ." (Code Civ. Proc., ยง 1085) (24) Here the petitioner for the writ need not show any legal or special interest other than that of a citizen to have the laws of the state executed and the duty in question enforced. ( Pitts v. Perluss (1962) 58 Cal.2d 824, 829 [ 27 Cal.Rptr. 19, 377 P.2d 83]; Hollman v. Warren (1948) 32 Cal.2d 351, 356-357 [ 196 P.2d 562].) This is especially true where the Attorney General appears in unmeritorious opposition.

  7. Sklar v. Franchise Tax Board

    185 Cal.App.3d 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 31 times
    In Sklar, the California appellate court conceded that the tax board had a mandatory duty to prescribe rules and regulations, but that it was not an abuse of discretion for the tax board to fail to enact the specific rules and regulations sought by the Petitioner. 185 Cal. App. 3d at 626, 230 Cal.Rptr. at 49-50.

    ( State of California v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 237, 247 [ 115 Cal.Rptr. 497, 524 P.2d 1281]; People ex rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado (1971) 5 Cal.3d 480, 491 [ 96 Cal.Rptr. 553, 487 P.2d 1193]; Duff v. City of Gardena (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 930, 935-936 [ 167 Cal.Rptr. 4].) Between these opposing standards is the rule that "`[w]hile ordinarily, mandamus may not be available to compel the exercise by a court or officer of the discretion possessed by them in a particular manner, or to reach a particular result, it does lie to command the exercise of discretion โ€” to compel some action upon the subject involved.'" ( Ballard v. Anderson (1971) 4 Cal.3d 873, 885 [ 95 Cal.Rptr. 1, 484 P.2d 1345] [citing and quoting Hollman v. Warren (1948) 32 Cal.2d 351, 355 ( 196 P.2d 562)]; accord In re Veterans' Industries, Inc. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 902, 926 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 303]; Knoff v. City etc. of San Francisco (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 184, 197 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 683].) (1b) Precisely where along this spectrum plaintiffs' petition falls is hotly disputed.

  8. Vandermost v. Bowen

    53 Cal.4th 421 (Cal. 2012)   Cited 39 times
    Noting courts will frequently exercise original writ jurisdiction to speedily resolve a legal issue affecting the electoral process

    Although the petition in this case asserted that it was filed under the authority granted by article XXI, section 3(b)(2), the representations disclosed by the petition demonstrated that petitioner, as a registered voter and the official proponent of the proposed referendum in question, unquestionably had standing to file a petition for an original writ of mandate seeking the relief in question under the so-called โ€œpublic-interest exceptionโ€ applicable to mandate proceedings. (See, e.g., Hollman v. Warren (1948) 32 Cal.2d 351, 356โ€“357, 196 P.2d 562; see generally 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Extraordinary Writs, ยง 84, pp. 970โ€“973, and cases cited.) In analyzing this issue, it is important to recognize at the outset that it is firmly established that this court possesses โ€œjurisdiction,โ€ in the fundamental sense, to entertain a petition for an original writ of mandate that is directed to the Secretary of State and concerns her official duties related to the electoral process, and to grant appropriate relief in such a proceeding.

  9. People v. Ledesma

    16 Cal.4th 90 (Cal. 1997)   Cited 133 times
    Noting that "the 'shall'/'may' dichotomy . . . is not a fixed rule of statutory construction. Moreover, unlike some codes that expressly define 'shall' as mandatory and 'may' as permissive, the Penal Code provides only that '[w]ords and phrases must be construed according to the context and the approved usage of the language . . . .' (ยง 7, subd. 16.)."

    " (Citation.)'"]; Hollman v. Warren (1948) 32 Cal.2d 351, 356 [ 196 P.2d 562] ["may" construed as mandatory in Government Code section 8200]; see also Black's Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 979, col. 2; Webster's New World Dict., supra, at p. 837 ["may" in law means "shall; must"].) (1b) Given this definitional diversity, it is impossible to conclude with sufficient certainty what the Legislature intended by its use of "may" if we consider the word in isolation.

  10. Green v. Obledo

    29 Cal.3d 126 (Cal. 1981)   Cited 172 times
    Explaining that it is "well established that in the absence of relevant state precedents our trial courts are urged to follow the procedures prescribed in rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for conducting class actions"

    It has often been invoked by California courts. (See, e.g., Hollman v. Warren (1948) 32 Cal.2d 351, 357 [ 196 P.2d 562]; American Friends ServiceCommittee v. Procunier (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 252, 256 [ 109 Cal.Rptr. 22]; Fuller v. San Bernardino Valley Mun. Wat.Dist. (1969) 242 Cal.App.2d 52, 57 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 120], and cases cited.) Properly read, our recent decision in Carsten v. PsychologyExamining Com. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 793 [ 166 Cal.Rptr. 844, 614 P.2d 276], does not hold to the contrary.