Opinion
Civil Action No. 4:02-CV-265-Y
July 26, 2002
This cause of action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), as implemented by an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge are as follows:
I. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS A. NATURE OF THE CASE
Hollis's petition does not specifically refer to § 2241 or § 2254 as the basis of this court's jurisdiction. This court will construe Hollis's pro se petition as seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. E.g., Brown v. Smith, 828 F.2d 1493, 1495 (10th Cir. 1987); Fisher v. Rose, 757 F.2d 789, 792 n. 2 (6th Cir. 1985).
B. PARTIES
Petitioner James Carl Hollis, TDCJ-ID #524375, is incarcerated in the Ferguson Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division in Midway, Texas.
Respondent Janie Cockrell is the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
Cockrell has lawful custody of Hollis pursuant to four Parker County convictions for burglary of a habitation. While incarcerated pursuant to these convictions at the Gib Lewis Unit, which is located within the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Hollis was charged on December 23, 2001 with the institutional offense of refusing or failing to obey an order given by an officer. (Discip. Packet at 2.) That same day, Hollis was notified of the offense and his rights in the disciplinary process. (Id. at 1, 10.) Hollis was assigned counsel to assist him in defending against the charge. (Id. at 10.) A hearing was held on January 7, 2002, and Hollis pleaded not guilty. (Id. at 1, 13.) The officer stated that Hollis refused to put his hands on the wall when ordered to after he stayed in the dining hall past his allotted meal time. (Id. at 13.) Hollis asserted that the officer threatened him and that he did not put his hands on the wall because he feared for his personal safety. (Id.) Considering the testimony given at the hearing, the hearing officer found Hollis guilty of the charge and assessed punishment at a reduction in line class from L1 to L3, the loss of 30 days' good-time credit, 45 days' cell restriction, and 45 days' loss of commissary privileges. (Id. at 1.)
Thus, this court has jurisdiction over Hollis's petition. Wadsworth v. Johnson, 235 F.3d 959, 961-62 (5th Cir. 2000). For a detailed explanation of the procedural history of these convictions, see Hollis v. Cockrell, No. 4:01-CV-819-Y (N.D. Tex. May 10, 2002), appeal docketed, No. 02-10701 (5th Cir. June 12, 2002).
Hollis then pursued his administrative remedies, essentially challenging the disciplinary proceeding on the grounds raised in this federal petition. His "Step 1" grievance was denied on February 8, 2002 because "no evidence has been found to warrant action to overturn this case." (Grievance Forms at 4.) He then filed a "Step 2" grievance, which was also denied on March 1, 2002:
You were present at your hearing and provided your defense. There were no objections noted by the counsel substitute. Investigation failed to yield any evidence of any staff misconduct or abuse of authority or discretion by the charging officer. Your disciplinary documentation has been reviewed and no valid reason was found to overturn the decision of the Hearing Officer. The evidence used was both proper and sufficient to support a finding of guilt. The punishment was within established guidelines. There were no procedural errors noted. No further action is warranted by this office. (Id. at 2.)
On March 5, 2002, Hollis filed the instant habeas corpus petition in the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, and that court transferred the case to this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d); Wadsworth, 235 F.3d at 961-62.
Contrary to Hollis's assertion that this is his "first major case" (Pet'r Mem. in Supp. at 2), he has filed many previous federal habeas corpus applications. Hollis filed a petition challenging a parole revocation hearing, which this court denied. Hollis v. Johnson, No. 4:00-CV-240-E (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2001), appeal dismissed, No. 01-10880 (5th Cir. Aug. 13, 2001). Hollis filed another federal petition challenging a subsequent parole revocation hearing, which was dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies. Hollis v. Cockrell, No. 1:01-CV-185-C (N.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2001). After exhausting his state remedies, he again challenged his parole revocation hearing; but, this court denied his petition. Hoffis v. Cockrell, No. 4:01-CV-819-Y (N.D. Tex. May 10, 2002), appeal docketed, No. 02-10701 (5th Cir. June 12, 2002). Hollis then filed a federal petition attacking an August 31, 2001 disciplinary proceeding at the Ferguson Unit, which this court denied. Hons v. Cockrell, No. 4:01-CV-969-A (N.D. Tex. May 28, 2002), appeal docketed, No. 02-10756 (5th Cir. June 28, 2002). These previous petitions do not render the instant petition abusive. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485-86 (2000).
D. ISSUES
Hollis challenges the prison disciplinary proceeding as violative of his constitutional rights on the following grounds:
1. The disciplinary hearing officer denied him the opportunity to properly question the charging officer and created a hostile environment, which violated his rights to due process.
2. The disciplinary process was abused to lengthen the term of his confinement, violating the Eighth Amendment.
3. The disciplinary action was brought in retaliation for expressing his free-speech rights.
4. His actions were justified by self-defense, which rendered the evidence insufficient to support the disciplinary punishment.
E. EXHAUSTION
Cockrell asserts that Hollis did not exhaust his administrative remedies by failing to pursue the internal prison dispute resolution procedures. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 501.008 (Vernon Supp. 1998). Therefore, she claims that Hollis's petition should be dismissed for failing to exhaust the appropriate administrative grievance procedures. (Resp't Answer at 5-6.) In response to this argument, Hollis pointed out that he had filed evidence that he had exhausted his administrative remedies in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division, before he received notice that his petition had been transferred to this court. (Pet'r Reply at 3-5.) Indeed, it is clear from the documents submitted by Hollis and from the records Cockrell submitted to this court on May 17, 2002 that Hollis properly exhausted the available administrative grievance procedures. (Grievance Forms at 1-4.)F. DISCUSSION
As a preliminary matter, Hollis's arguments regarding the cell and commissary restrictions and the reduction in line class status are not cognizable on federal habeas corpus. The Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner and will only protect a state-created liberty interest. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 478, 483-84 (1995). Here, the non-good-time restrictions and reduction that Hollis received do not create a liberty interest; thus, federal habeas relief is not appropriate on these claims. See Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding inmates do not have property or liberty interest in custodial classifications); Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding administrative segregation placement is not a deprivation of a constitutionally cognizable liberty interest), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1196 (1996); see also Turner v. Johnson, 46 F. Supp.2d 655, 664-65 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
An inmate charged with an offense that would deprive him of good-conduct time credit is entitled to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to ensure that his rights are not arbitrarily abrogated. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). While it is settled that minimal due process requirements must be met in prison disciplinary proceedings, the law does not afford a prisoner at a disciplinary hearing the full panoply of rights that constitute due process for a criminal trial. Id. Moreover, in cases where there is an actual loss of good-time credits as a result of the disciplinary proceeding, federal courts will not review the sufficiency of the evidence at a disciplinary hearing; a finding of guilt requires only the support of some facts or any evidence at all to support the action taken by prison officials. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Stewart v. Thigpen, 730 F.2d 1002, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Rabalais, 659 F.2d 539, 542 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 992 (1982). In sum, the disciplinary determination must not be arbitrary or capricious, but a reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of prison authorities. Stewart, 730 F.2d at 1005; Smith, 659 F.2d at 545.
Specifically, the prisoner must be provided the following minimal procedural due process: (1) advance written notice of the claimed violation; (2) a written statement as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken; and (3) an opportunity to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense, unless this would be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563-66. There is, however, no constitutional right to cross-examination or confrontation of witnesses in a prison disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 567-69.
Under this standard, as long as there is any evidence in the record to support the conclusion of the disciplinary body, its determination will be upheld. Adams v. Gunnell, 729 F.2d 362, 370 (5th Cir. 1984); Turner, 46 F. Supp.2d at 662.
The record reveals that Hollis received written notice before the disciplinary hearing of the charges against him. Hollis was assisted by counsel at the hearing, who read Hollis's prepared statements and questioned the charging officer by asking him the questions Hollis had prepared. Hollis admitted during the hearing that he had taken his hands off the wall after he was ordered to keep them on the wall. The record includes a written statement of the hearing officer's findings, which shows that the fact-finder relied on the charging officer's testimony and Hollis's admission of guilt in reaching the conclusion that Hollis committed the offense of refusing or failing to obey an order given by a correctional officer. (Discip. Hr'g Tape; Discip. Packet at 1, 6-9.) Hollis, therefore, received all the procedural due process to which he was entitled.
Moreover, the record demonstrates that the fact-finder's conclusion was neither arbitrary nor capricious and there were at least some facts and evidence to support the finding of guilt and resultant loss of good-conduct time. As indicated, the hearing officer's decision was based upon Hollis's own admission of guilt. Thus, the disciplinary hearing officer found Hollis's explanation of the event, i.e., that he took his hands off of the wall because he feared for his safety, additional evidence of his guilt, rather than exculpatory as intended by Hollis. The disciplinary hearing officer is entitled to make such determinations regarding the credibility and reliability of the evidence presented. Smith, 659 F.2d at 545-46. Thus, the hearing officer's finding that Hollis was guilty did not constitute an arbitrary and capricious exercise of his discretionary disciplinary function sufficient to give rise to a claim by Hollis of a constitutional violation. Id. at 546. Further there is sufficient evidence to support the finding of guilt. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455. In conclusion, the disciplinary action comported with due process and did not offend the constitution.
Hollis's claims that the disciplinary proceeding violated the First and Eighth Amendments are likewise unavailing. Hollis is essentially arguing that the disciplinary action was an abuse of authority by prison officials. There is no evidence in the record to support Hollis's assertions. At the hearing, Hollis admitted he failed to obey the order to put his hands on the wall, and the charging officer testified that Hollis was never under any threat of physical violence. (Discip. Hr'g Tape.) Hollis's own actions resulted in the disciplinary action. (Id.) The disciplinary action was, thus, not brought to retaliate against Hollis or in an attempt to frustrate his free-speech rights. The sanctions imposed for violating an institutional rule were proper under the circumstances. (Id.; Discip. Packet at 1.) See generally Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) (holding broad deference must be accorded to institutional policies that are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to ensure institutional security).
II. RECOMMENDATION
Hollis's petition should be construed as a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and should be denied.
III. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within ten (10) days after the party has been served with a copy of this document. The court is hereby extending the deadline within which to file, not merely place in the mail, specific written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation until August 16, 2002. Failure to file written objections within the specified time shall bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice, from attacking on appeal any unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc op. on reh'g); Carter v. Collins, 918 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1990).
IV. ORDER
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is hereby ORDERED that each party is granted until August 16, 2002 to serve and file, not merely place in the mail, written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed and the opposing party chooses to file a response, a response shall be filed within seven (7) days of the filing date of the objections. It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendations, be and hereby is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.