Opinion
Case Number: 18-62506-CIV-MARTINEZ-SNOW
02-03-2020
Helen Dahiana HOLLINGSWORTH., Plaintiff, v. Laura B. ZUCHOWSKI, in her official Capacity as Field Office Director, Vermont Service Center, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Defendants.
Mark Andrew Prada, Prada Urizar, PLLC, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff. Maria Catala, Marlene Rodriguez, Marlene Alicia Fernandez-Karavetsos, United States Attorney's Office, Miami, FL, for Defendants.
Mark Andrew Prada, Prada Urizar, PLLC, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff.
Maria Catala, Marlene Rodriguez, Marlene Alicia Fernandez-Karavetsos, United States Attorney's Office, Miami, FL, for Defendants.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
JOSE E. MARTINEZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE THIS CAUSE came before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment [ECF Nos. 60, 62]. The parties have each filed responses [ECF Nos. 64, 66], and Plaintiff filed a reply [ECF No. 67]. Additionally, the Court has benefitted from the assistance of amicus counsel on behalf of various organizations, [ECF No. 74]. Upon review of the record, the parties' briefs, and the relevant legal authorities, and after reconsidering the Court's previous rulings and hearing oral argument, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 62] and GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 60].
I. Background
Plaintiff filed suit seeking judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. , of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' ("USCIS") denial of her Form I-360, Special Immigration Petition ("I-360 Petition"), seeking classification of her as the battered spouse of a U.S. citizen under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 ("VAWA") and her contemporaneously filed Form I-485 application for permanent resident status (ECF No. 1).
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff is a twenty-eight-year-old native and citizen of Colombia. She met her husband-to-be, a sixty-three-year-old U.S. citizen named Hollingsworth, in 2008, when she was eighteen years old. Plaintiff began dating Mr. Hollingsworth and in January 2012, she moved into his home in Medellin, Colombia, where she resided with him until January 2013. On June 27, 2013, Plaintiff was issued a B1/B2 visa, which she used to enter the U.S. on multiple occasions.
On June 28, 2015, Plaintiff and Mr. Hollingsworth were married. Thereafter, Mr. Hollingsworth filed on behalf of the Plaintiff an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative and the Plaintiff filed a Form I-485 Application to Adjust Status. Over a period of many months beginning in mid-2014, the Plaintiff looked for an apartment where the couple could jointly reside in the United States, but Mr. Hollingsworth did not approve any of the residences she found. Other than short-term hotel stays, the Plaintiff and Mr. Hollingsworth never lived together in the U.S. In August 2015, Mr. Hollingsworth raped the Plaintiff, and he subsequently raped her several more times. Mr. Hollingsworth behaved abusively during the couple's USCIS interview on November 15, 2015, for adjustment of her status, and they failed to convince the adjudicating officer that their marriage was bona fide.
USCIS noted that although Plaintiff resided at an apartment in South Florida beginning in August 2014, Mr. Hollingsworth did not stay with Plaintiff during his three visits to South Florida in July, August and November 2015, after they were married. Mr. Hollingsworth, in Plaintiff's words, "preferred paying for a Hotel" instead of staying with Plaintiff (ECF No. 1-2 at 10).
Shortly after that interview, the Plaintiff permanently left Mr. Hollingsworth. On November 22, 2016, as a VAWA self-petitioner, she filed an I-360 Petition, as well as a Form I-485 Application for Adjustment of Status. On March 7, 2018, USCIS sent the Plaintiff a request for evidence, seeking evidence that the Plaintiff jointly resided with Mr. Hollingsworth during the time of their marriage (ECF No. 1-2 at 16-20), as USCIS said was required by 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(dd). The Plaintiff responded, through counsel, that this statutory provision was satisfied by her joint residency with Mr. Hollingsworth in Colombia from January 1, 2012 through January 1, 2013. On August 2, 2018, USCIS denied the Plaintiff's I-360 Petition and Form I-485 Application for Adjustment Status on the basis that she did not reside with Mr. Hollingsworth during the period of their marriage (ECF No. 1-2 at 8-11).
The sole issues raised, under the governing statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii), are: 1) whether the petitioning alien and her U.S. citizen spouse must share a residence during their qualifying marriage (emphasis added), and 2) whether the petitioning alien and her U.S. citizen spouse must have resided together in the United States.
II. Legal Standards
a. Summary Judgment Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, "summary judgment is appropriate where there ‘is no genuine issue as to any material fact’ and the moving party is ‘entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ " See Alabama v. North Carolina , 560 U.S. 330, 130 S. Ct. 2295, 2308, 176 L.Ed.2d 1070 (2010) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ). Here, the material facts are not in dispute and the Court's review is limited to the administrative record before the agency. Thus, this case is suited for summary disposition under Rule 56. See Mahon v. U.S. Dep't of Agric. , 485 F.3d 1247, 1253 (11th Cir. 2007) ("Summary Judgment is particularly appropriate in cases in which a district court is asked to review a decision rendered by a federal administrative agency."); see also Occidental Eng'g Co. v. INS , 753 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1985) ("summary judgment is an appropriate mechanism" for the district court "to determine whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did").
b. APA Standard of Review
When reviewing agency action under the APA, the district court must determine whether the agency's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. See Mathews v. USCIS , 458 F. App'x 831, 833 (11th Cir. 2012). This standard "provides the reviewing court with very limited discretion to reverse an agency decision, and is exceedingly deferential," especially "in the field of immigration." See id. (citations omitted). The relevant inquiry is "whether an agency's decision was based on consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment." See Mahon , 485 F.3d at 1253 (citation omitted).
c. Statutory Interpretation Standard
When reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute, the Court must "first ask whether congressional intent is clear." Wilderness Watch & Pub. Emps. for Envtl. Responsibility v. Mainella , 375 F.3d 1085, 1091 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). If Congress's intent is clear and unambiguous, "that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted; quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) ); see also United States v. Steele , 147 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 1998) ("Where the language Congress chose to express its intent is clear and unambiguous, that is as far as we go to ascertain its intent because we must presume that Congress said what it meant and meant what it said."). When a statute is ambiguous, agency rules, interpretations and opinions "are entitled to a measure of respect" under the Skidmore standard. Fed. Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki , 552 U.S. 389, 399, 128 S.Ct. 1147, 170 L.Ed.2d 10 (2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Under Skidmore, "[t]he weight [given to these judgments] in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in [their] consideration, the validity of [their] reasoning, [their] consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give [them] power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Skidmore v. Swift & Co. , 323 U.S. 134, 140, 65 S.Ct. 161, 89 L.Ed. 124 (1944).
III. Analysis
The governing statute, Section 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I)(aa)-(bb), provides that:
(I) An alien who is described in subsection (II) may file a petition with the Attorney General under this clause for classification of the alien (and any child of the alien) if the alien demonstrates to the Attorney General that—
(aa) the marriage or the intent to marry the United States citizen was entered into good faith by the alien; and
(bb) during the marriage or relationship entered by the alien to be legally a marriage, the alien or a child of the alien has been battered or has been the subject of extreme cruelty perpetrated by the alien's spouse or intended spouse.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I)(aa)-(bb). After proscribing abuse outside of marriage from entitling an alien to self-petition for classification as an abused spouse, the statute proceeds to define who qualifies as a self-petitioner:
(II) For purposes of subclause (I), an alien described in this subclause is an alien—
(aa)(AA) who is the spouse of a citizen of the United States;
(BB) who believed that he or she had married a citizen of the United States and with whom a marriage ceremony was actually performed and who otherwise meets any applicable requirements under this chapter to establish the existence of and bona fides of a marriage, but whose marriage is not legitimate solely because of the bigamy of such citizen of the United States; or
(CC) who was a bona fide spouse of a United States citizen within the past 2 years and—
(aaa) whose spouse died within the past 2 years;
(bbb) whose spouse lost or renounced citizenship status within the past 2 years related to an incident of domestic violence; or
(ccc) who demonstrates a connection between the legal termination of the marriage within the past 2 years and battering or extreme cruelty by the United States citizen spouse;
(bb) who is a person of good moral character;
(cc) who is eligible to be classified as an immediate relative under section 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) of this title or who would have been so classified but for the bigamy of the citizen of the United States that the alien intended to marry; and
(dd) who has resided with the alien's spouse or intended spouse.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)-(dd).
a. Whether Shared Residency is Required During the Marriage
Defendants argue that, by using the term "spouse," Congress placed a temporal limitation on the shared residency requirement so that the shared residency must occur during the marriage (ECF No. 60 at 8). Defendants also argue that, even if the statute is ambiguous, the government's interpretation is entitled to Skidmore deference (ECF No. 66 at 6-7). Plaintiff argues, however, that the statute's use of the word "spouse" is merely as an identifier (ECF No. 62 at 15). Plaintiff further asserts that, under the applicable tools of statutory construction, the statute is unambiguous, and there is no temporal limitation associated with "has resided with" to require an alien to have lived with their U.S. citizen-spouse during their marriage. Id. at 7-17. Notwithstanding an opposite ruling previously (ECF No. 53), this Court now agrees.
In a recent decision out of the Northern District of Illinois, Judge Manish S. Shah addressed this particular issue of statutory interpretation. Despite this Court's previous language in its Order Adopting Report and Recommendation, [ECF No. 53], the Court now agrees with the well-reasoned analysis espoused in Bait It v. McAleenan , 410 F. Supp. 3d 874, 878 (N.D. Ill. 2019). Nonetheless, the Court finds that the facts of this case are distinguishable in that Plaintiff never lived with Mr. Hollingsworth in the United States—for any given period.
--------
First, the section of the statute in question uses the word "spouse" as an identifier by referring to such persons who no longer retain legal status as a spouse due to death or divorce. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(II)(aa)(CC)(aaa), (ccc). Employing the word "spouse" in this manner is consistent with ordinary usage. Bait It v. McAleenan , 410 F. Supp. 3d 874, 878 (N.D. Ill. 2019) ("The label identifies the person but does not demand that the person have that legal status at every moment in time referring to that person.").
Second, the use of present-perfect tense—has resided with—signifies an indefinite, rather than definite, time in the past. Carr v. United States , 560 U.S. 438, 448, 130 S.Ct. 2229, 176 L.Ed.2d 1152 (2010) (citing Barrett v. United States , 423 U.S. 212, 216, 96 S.Ct. 498, 46 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976) as "observing that Congress used the present perfect tense to denote an act that has been completed" (internal quotation omitted)).
Third, the imposition of a temporal limitation on the shared residency requirement would render superfluous the phrase "during the marriage" in the abuse section of the statute, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii)(I)(bb). Defendants have not offered, nor does the Court upon reflection discern, a satisfactory explanation for Congress's use of a temporal restriction in one part of the statute while not using such language, even though still intending such limitation, in a neighboring part of the statute. See Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp. , 568 U.S. 371, 386, 133 S.Ct. 1166, 185 L.Ed.2d 242 (2013) ("the canon against surplusage is strongest when an interpretation would render superfluous another part of the same statutory scheme").
Accordingly, the Court finds that the statute is unambiguous in requiring that a petitioning alien and their U.S. citizen-spouse must have cohabitated at some time in the past, but not necessarily during the marriage. Further, having found no ambiguity, the Court does not reach the issue of deference.
b. Whether Shared Residency is Required to be in the United States
Defendants state in their response (ECF No. 66 at 3) that the original VAWA self-petitioning provisions described a qualifying alien, inter alia , as one "who has resided in the United States with the alien's spouse." 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(iii) (1995) (emphasis added). During oral argument, Plaintiff asserted that Congress removed the requirement for the residency to have occurred in the United States, and the regulations have not been updated to reflect the change. Thus, promulgated regulations still require a self-petitioning alien to show that he or she "has resided in the United States with the citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse." 61 Fed.Reg. 13061 (1996) (interim rule). Given that the statute is now silent regarding the geographic restriction, the Court defers to the implementing regulations unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843–44, 104 S.Ct. 2778. The regulations are not contrary to the statute, nor are they arbitrary or capricious, because they serve the purpose of establishing a petitioning alien's connection to the United States through the U.S. citizen spouse and help the agency in determining that the alien entered into a bona fide marriage. The fact that Congress chose not to remain redundant with the implementing regulations does not change the analysis.
In the instant case, Plaintiff claims that her "joint residency with Mr. Hollingsworth in Colombia from January 1, 2012 through January 1, 2013," qualifies her to self-petition under the statute. Because Plaintiff does not show joint residency with Mr. Hollingsworth at any time in the United States, this Court finds that she fails to establish that she is entitled to relief.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 62) is DENIED.
2. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 60) is GRANTED, and this case is CLOSED.
DONE and ORDERED in Chambers, Miami, Florida, this 3rd day of February 2020.