Opinion
C. A. 1:21-359-MGL-SVH
05-20-2021
Dean Alton Holcomb, Petitioner, v. Terri Wallace, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHIVA V. HODGES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dean Alton Holcomb (“Petitioner”) is an inmate at the Kirkland Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). He filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c) (D.S.C.) for a Report and Recommendation on Respondent's return and motion for summary judgment. [ECF Nos. 19, 191]. Petitioner responded to Respondent's motion on May 7, 2021. [ECF No. 22]. Also before the court is Petitioner's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. [ECF No. 23].
On March 5, 2021, the undersigned issued an R&R recommending dismissal of Grounds Two, Three, and Four of Petitioner's amended petition. [ECF No. 11]. Accordingly, this R&R and the underlying briefing address only Petitioner's Ground One.
Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the record in this case, the undersigned recommends Respondent's motion for summary judgment be granted.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On June 16, 2017, Petitioner was convicted of one count of obstruction of justice and one count of intimidation of court officials, jurors, or witnesses. (Indictment Nos. 2014-GS-08179, 08177). The Honorable John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge, sentenced Petitioner to 90 months on each conviction, to run consecutively, and indicated he should receive credit for time served between August 16, 2014, and September 11, 2016. [Sentencing Sheets, ECF No. 19-2 at 1-2].
On May 30, 2018, Petitioner filed a step one grievance asserting SCDC miscalculated his sentence by subtracting his time served from the total consecutive sentence, rather from each sentence. [Step 1 Grievance, ECF No. 19-5 at 1]. After the Warden denied his step one grievance, Petitioner filed a step two grievance, which was also denied. [Step 2 Grievance, ECF No. 19-5 at 3]. On August 30, 2018, Petitioner appealed to the Administrative Law Court (“ALC”) [See ALC Decision, ECF No. 19-4 at 1-2], which affirmed SCDC's decision on January 30, 2019. Id. at 2.
Petitioner alleges he then appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals (“Court of Appeals”) and that it denied his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. [ECF No. 7 at 4]. He further claims he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions and the South Carolina Supreme Court and that both petitions were denied and ignored. Id.
II. Discussion
A. Federal Habeas Issues
Petitioner raises the following ground:
Ground One: SCDC has aggregated the sentences to 15 years with only credit of 26 months given for both charges.
I maxed-out the intimidation charge around June 2019. My new max-out date is 2023 for obstruction of justice. The sentence should be the same. I filed a grievance denied; Administrative Law Court-Denied. I appealed to S.C. Appeals Court denied pauperis status. Habeas corpus to Greenville General Sessions and S.C. Supreme Court- denied & ignored.[ECF No. 7 at 4].
B. Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. At the summary judgment stage, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 255. However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248.
The moving party has the burden of proving that summary judgment is appropriate. Once the moving party makes this showing, however, the opposing party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials, but rather must, by affidavits or other means permitted by the Rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).
C. Habeas Corpus Standard of Review
1. Generally
“[F]ederal habeas petitions of prisoners who are ‘in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court' should be treated as ‘applications under section 2254,' . . . even if they challenge the execution of a state sentence.” In re Wright, 826 F.3d 774, 779 & n.5 (4th Cir. 2016) (settling debate over whether such petitions are governed by § 2254 or § 2241). Because Petitioner filed his petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), review of his claims is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998). Under the AEDPA, federal courts may not grant habeas corpus relief unless the underlying state adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(2); see Wiliams v Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398 (2000). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 410. Moreover, state court factual determinations are presumed to be correct and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
2. Procedural Bar
Federal law establishes this court's jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This statute permits relief when a person “is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States[, ]” and requires that a petitioner present his claim to the state's highest court with authority to decide the issue before the federal court will consider the claim. Id. The separate but related theories of exhaustion and procedural bypass operate in a similar manner to require a habeas petitioner to first submit his claims for relief to the state courts. A habeas corpus petition filed in this court before the petitioner has appropriately exhausted available state-court remedies or has otherwise bypassed seeking relief in the state courts will be dismissed absent unusual circumstances detailed below.
a. Exhaustion
Section 2254 contains the requirement of exhausting state-court remedies and provides as follows:
(b) (1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that-
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or
(B) (i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or
(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.
(2) An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the State.
(3) A State shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The statute requires that, before seeking habeas corpus relief, the petitioner first must exhaust his state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). The United States Supreme Court has held that “state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process”-which includes “petitions for discretionary review when that review is part of the ordinary appellate review procedure in the State.” OSulivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). This opportunity must be given by fairly presenting to the state court “both the operative facts and the controlling legal principles” associated with each claim. Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 276, 289 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)). That is to say, the ground must “be presented face-up and squarely.” Mallory v. Smith, 27 F.3d 991, 995 (4th Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that the presentation of claims to the state Court of Appeals without more is sufficient to exhaust state remedies for federal habeas corpus review. State v. McKennedy, 559 S.E.2d 850 (S.C. 2002); see also In re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and Post-Conviction Relief Cases, 471 S.E.2d 454 (S.C. 1990).
b. Procedural Bypass
Procedural bypass, sometimes referred to as procedural bar or procedural default, is the doctrine applied when a petitioner who seeks habeas corpus relief as to an issue failed to raise that issue at the appropriate time in state court and has no further means of bringing that issue before the state courts. In such a situation, the person has bypassed his state remedies and, as such, is procedurally barred from raising the issue in his federal habeas petition. Procedural bypass of a constitutional claim in earlier state proceedings forecloses consideration by the federal courts. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 533 (1986). Bypass can occur at any level of the state proceedings if the state has procedural rules that bar its courts from considering claims not raised in a timely fashion.
The South Carolina Supreme Court will refuse to consider claims raised in a second appeal that could have been raised at an earlier time. Further, if a prisoner has failed to file a direct appeal or a PCR and the deadlines for filing have passed, he is barred from proceeding in state court. If the state courts have applied a procedural bar to a claim because of an earlier default in the state courts, the federal court honors that bar. As the Supreme Court explains:
. . . [state procedural rules promote] not only the accuracy and efficiency of judicial decisions, but also the finality of those decisions, by forcing the defendant to litigate all of his claims together, as quickly after trial as the docket will allow, and while the attention of the appellate court is focused on his case.Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1984).
However, if a federal habeas petitioner can show both (1) “‘cause' for noncompliance with the state rule[, ]” and (2) “‘actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional violation[, ]'” the federal court may consider the claim. Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. at 533 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977)). When a petitioner has failed to comply with state procedural requirements and cannot make the required showing of cause and prejudice, the federal courts generally decline to hear the claim. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986), superseded by statute on other grounds (AEDPA).
If a federal habeas petitioner has failed to raise a claim in state court and is precluded by state rules from returning to state court to raise the issue, he has procedurally bypassed his opportunity for relief in the state courts and in federal court. A federal court is barred from considering the filed claim (absent a showing of cause and actual prejudice). In such an instance, the exhaustion requirement is technically met and the rules of procedural bar apply. See Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d at 915 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 297-98 (1989); George v. Angelone, 100 F.3d 353, 363 (4th Cir. 1996); Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 937 (4th Cir. 1990)).
3. Cause and Actual Prejudice
Because the requirement of exhaustion is not jurisdictional, this court may consider claims that have not been presented to the state courts in limited circumstances in which a petitioner shows sufficient cause for failure to raise the claim and actual prejudice resulting from the failure, Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, or that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” has occurred. Murray, 477 U.S. at 495-96. A petitioner may prove cause if he can demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel relating to the default, show an external factor which hindered compliance with the state procedural rule, or demonstrate the novelty of a particular claim. Id. Absent a showing of “cause, ” the court is not required to consider “actual prejudice.” Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d 924 (4th Cir. 1995). However, if a petitioner demonstrates sufficient cause, he must also show actual prejudice in order to excuse a default. Murray, 477 U.S. at 492. To show actual prejudice, the petitioner must demonstrate more than plain error.
D. Analysis
In Ground One, Petitioner alleges that because the sentencing judge wrote on both sentencing sheets that he was to receive credit for time served, SCDC should have deducted that time from each sentence rather than from the aggregate sentence. [ECF No. 7 at 4]. Respondent asserts the petition should be dismissed because (1) Petitioner fails to raise a cognizable habeas claim, (2) Petitioner failed to exhaust available state remedies, and (3) Petitioner's claim lacks merit. [ECF No. 19-1 at 2]. The undersigned agrees Petitioner has not presented a proper federal habeas claim or shown he has exhausted his state remedies.
A state prisoner seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 “must exhaust his remedies in state court” and “give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal courts.” O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842, 845 (1999). “Although a petitioner need not ‘cit[e] book and verse on the federal constitution' in order to satisfy the exhaustion requirement, the federal claim nevertheless must be ‘fairly presented' to the state court.” Baker v. Corcoran, 220 F.3d 276, 289 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Picard, 404 U.S. at 275, 278). “Fair presentation mandates that the federal claim ‘be presented face-up and squarely.... Oblique references which hint that a theory may be lurking in the woodwork will not suffice.'” Id. (quoting Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Barnette, 644 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2011)).
Here, Petitioner's grievance forms allege violations of S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-40 (2007) and South Carolina case law based on SCDC's misinterpretation of his state court sentencing sheets. [See ECF No. 19-5 at 1-3]. Likewise, there is no indication in the ALC decision that Petitioner raised a federal claim. [See ECF No. 19-4 at 1-2]. Rather, the ALC addressed Petitioner's contention that a state agency-SCDC-failed to comply with state law. Id. Thus, even if Petitioner intended to raise a federal issue to the ALC, the ALC did not address that issue and Petitioner has not alleged he filed a motion to alter or amend the ALC's judgment pursuant to SCRCP 59(e) to preserve the federal issue for appeal. See Home Med. Sys., Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 677 S.E.2d 582, 586 (S.C. 2009) (holding SCRCP Rule 59(e) motions are permitted in ALC proceedings and necessary to preserve issues not addressed by the ALC for appellate review).
Petitioner also fails to allege any violation of his federal rights in this action. In his petition, Petitioner asserts “SCDC has aggregated the sentences to 15 years with only credit of 26 months given for both charges, ” and then explains the procedural history of his claim. [ECF No. 7 at 4]. In his response to Respondent's motion for summary judgment, Petitioner states his “issue to the Court is can SCDC ignore the state court's order to give him[] credit for time served on two separate sentences.” [ECF No. 22 at 1]. In discussing the merits of his claim, Petitioner relies solely on state authority. See id. at 3-5.
“The habeas statute unambiguously provides that a federal court may issue the writ to a state prisoner ‘only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.'” Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a)). Thus, “federal habeas relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991). Because Petitioner has not alleged an error of federal law, this court cannot grant him habeas relief.
Further, to the extent Petitioner could conceivably have raised a cognizable claim, he has not shown proper exhaustion of his state remedies. Under South Carolina law, an inmate may challenge an SCDC decision regarding the calculation of his sentence by initiating a grievance with SCDC, obtaining a final decision from SCDC, seeking review by the ALC, appealing the ALC's decision to the Court of Appeals, and then seeking federal habeas review. See Al-Shabazz v State, 527 S.E.2d 742, 750, 752-57 (S.C. 2000); Rule 203(b)(6), SCACR; S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(A)(1). Petitioner has completed SCDC's grievance procedure and obtained a decision from the ALC. Petitioner alleges he appealed the ALC's decision to the Court of Appeals, but the Court of Appeals denied his application to proceed in forma pauperis, so he “could not exhaust his state remedies.” [ECF Nos. 7 at 4 (“I appealed to S.C. Appeals Court Denied Pauperis Status”), 22 at 3]. Petitioner further alleges he filed petitions for habeas corpus in the Greenville County Court of General Sessions and the South Carolina Supreme Court that were “denied & ignored.” [ECF No. 7 at 4]. However, neither Petitioner nor Respondent provided the case numbers for these actions or any related documents, and the undersigned has been unable to locate any record of any such actions in the South Carolina state courts' databases.
Regardless, assuming the truth of Petitioner's allegations, by failing to pay the filing fee after the Court of Appeals denied his in forma pauperis application, Petitioner failed to properly perfect his appeal, and, thus, has not exhausted his state remedies. See Odom v. Warden of Broad River Corr. Inst., C/A No. 8:17-2273-TMC-JDA, 2018 WL 2729168, at *3 (D.S.C. May 18, 2018), R&R adopted by 2018 WL 2718044 (D.SC. June 6, 2018) (granting summary judgment of § 2254 petition for failure to exhaust where Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal for failure to pay filing fee); James v. Cohen, C/A No. 9:07-4163-TLW-BM, 2009 WL 426301 (D.S.C. Feb. 19, 2009) (granting summary judgment of § 2254 petition for failure to exhaust where Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal for failure to pay filing fee or provide proof of service to the ALC). Petitioner does not argue cause and prejudice or assert a fundamental miscarriage of justice such that this court could excuse his failure to exhaust.
Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to present a cognizable federal habeas claim, nor one that has been properly exhausted, and his amended petition should be dismissed.
E. Motion for Injunctive Relief
Petitioner has filed a motion for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to (1) require SCDC employees to wear masks and enforce social distancing; (2) require Respondent to provide Petitioner with a vegetarian meal and orange juice; and (3) enjoin SCDC employees from injecting Plaintiff with his medications. [ECF No. 23]. As the undersigned previously opined in ECF No. 11, a habeas corpus action is not the appropriate action to bring claims related to conditions of confinement.
The “essence of habeas corpus” is “an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). In other words, the function of a habeas petition is to challenge “the very fact or duration of [the petitioner's] physical imprisonment, and the relief that [the petitioner] seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment . . . .” Id. at 500. With respect to conditions-of-confinement claims, the Supreme Court in Preiser noted that “when a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making custody illegal.” Id. at 499. The Court, however, expressly declined to decide whether conditions-of-confinement claims may be brought in a habeas corpus proceeding. Id.
While the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has not addressed the issue in a published opinion, it has noted that “[s]even of the ten circuits that have addressed the issue in a published decision have concluded that claims challenging conditions of confinement cannot be brought in a habeas petition.” Wlborn v. Mansukhani, 795 Fed.Appx. 157, 163 (4th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). In Wilborn, the Fourth Circuit ultimately concluded that “[t]his case presents no basis to deviate from our previous holdings” that conditions-of-confinement claims are not cognizable in a habeas action. 795 Fed.Appx. at 164. Thus, the weight of authority both within and outside this circuit suggests that, as a general matter, petitioners cannot challenge their conditions of confinement in a habeas corpus proceeding. The undersigned therefore recommends Petitioner's motion for injunctive relief [ECF No. 23] be denied.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends Respondent's motion for summary judgment be granted and Ground One of the amended petition be dismissed without prejudice. The undersigned further recommends Petitioner's motion for injunctive relief [ECF No. 23] be denied.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).