Opinion
10-26-2017
Cathy A. HOHENBERGER, Respondent, v. SMITHTOWN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant.
Lamb & Barnosky, LLP (Matthew J. Mehnert, Esq.). Cathy A. Hohenberger, respondent pro se (no brief filed).
Lamb & Barnosky, LLP (Matthew J. Mehnert, Esq.).
Cathy A. Hohenberger, respondent pro se (no brief filed).
PRESENT: JERRY GARGUILO, J.P., BRUCE E. TOLBERT, TERRY JANE RUDERMAN, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court of Suffolk County, First District (Vincent J. Martorana, J.), entered August 11, 2015. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $3,107.75. ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiff, who had previously been employed by defendant school district as a school bus driver, commenced this small claims action to recover the principal sum of $3,107.75, constituting payment in lieu of unused sick days which plaintiff had accrued at the time she had been laid off from her employment. It was undisputed that, under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that had been negotiated between defendant and the Smithtown Schools Employees Association (SSEA), if plaintiff had resigned or retired, she would have been entitled to $3,107.75, premised on her accrual of unused sick days at the time her employment terminated.
At a nonjury trial, plaintiff testified that, prior to the termination of her employment, defendant's employees had represented to her that, upon the abolition of her position, she would receive separation pay for any unused accumulated sick leave, but that, following the termination of her employment, plaintiff had been informed that such payment would be contingent upon her signing a memorandum of agreement confirming that she had resigned and had forfeited all rights to unemployment benefits and all rights to sue. Plaintiff declined to sign that memorandum. Defendant argued that only the SSEA could enforce rights under the CBA. It further contended that, because plaintiff had been laid off when her position had been eliminated, the termination of her employment did not fit within the categories of "resignation" or "retirement," and, thus, that plaintiff had no right under the CBA to separation pay based on her unused accumulated sick leave. Following the trial, the District Court awarded plaintiff the principal sum of $3,107.75.
In a small claims action, our review is limited to a determination of whether "substantial justice has ... been done between the parties according to the rules and principles of substantive law" ( UDCA 1807 ; see UDCA 1804 ; Ross v. Friedman, 269 A.D.2d 584, 707 N.Y.S.2d 114 [2000] ; Williams v. Roper, 269 A.D.2d 125, 126, 703 N.Y.S.2d 77 [2000] ). Furthermore, the determination of a trier of fact as to issues of credibility is given substantial deference, as a trial court's opportunity to observe and evaluate the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses affords it a better perspective from which to assess their credibility (see Vizzari v. State of New York, 184 A.D.2d 564, 584 N.Y.S.2d 332 [1992] ; Kincade v. Kincade, 178 A.D.2d 510, 511, 577 N.Y.S.2d 436 [1991] ). This deference applies with greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court (see Williams v. Roper, 269 A.D.2d at 126, 703 N.Y.S.2d 77 ). In addition, "a small claims judgment may not be overturned simply because the determination appealed from involves an arguable point on which an appellate court may differ; the deviation from substantive law must be readily apparent and the court's determination clearly erroneous" ( Forte v. Bielecki, 118 A.D.2d 620, 621, 499 N.Y.S.2d 771 [1986] ; see also Tranquility Salon & Day Spa, Inc. v. Caira, 141 A.D.3d 711, 712, 35 N.Y.S.3d 652 [2016] ).
With respect to the issue of standing, we note that the CBA recognized the SSEA as the "exclusive representative" of transportation personnel, among others; thus, under the CBA, absent a determination that the union as bargaining agent had breached its duty of fair representation, the SSEA alone was authorized to enforce the CBA's contractual rights of such personnel (see Spano v. Kings Park Cent. School Dist., 61 A.D.3d 666, 670–671, 877 N.Y.S.2d 163 [2009] ; Hickey v. Hempstead Union Free School Dist., 36 A.D.3d 760, 829 N.Y.S.2d 163 [2007] ). Plaintiff testified, however, that the SSEA was made up of defendant's current employees and, because she was a former employee, the SSEA would not represent her. Since the CBA failed to address whether the SSEA's representation of "transportation personnel" was confined to current employees or included former employees, such as plaintiff, we conclude that it was not "clearly erroneous" ( Tranquility Salon
& Day Spa, Inc. v. Caira, 141 A.D.3d 711, 712, 35 N.Y.S.3d 652 ; Forte v. Bielecki, 118 A.D.2d 620, 621, 499 N.Y.S.2d 771 ) for the District Court to determine that plaintiff had standing to bring an action against defendant to enforce rights allegedly contained in the CBA (see Buff v. Village of Manlius, 115 A.D.3d 1156, 983 N.Y.S.2d 145 [2014] ; Matter of DeRosa v. Dyster, 90 A.D.3d 1470, 936 N.Y.S.2d 402 [2011] ; cf. Peters v. Union–Endicott Cent. School Dist., 77 A.D.3d 1236, 910 N.Y.S.2d 191 [2010] ).
While we do not disturb the court's determination that plaintiff had standing to enforce the CBA claim she asserted, the CBA provided that payment for unused accumulated sick leave, as separation pay, was available only to employees with adequate tenure who resigned or retired, and plaintiff, who had been terminated, clearly did not fit within either category. Consequently, to the extent that her cause of action is based on the CBA, it lacks merit.
However, plaintiff's uncontradicted testimony at trial was that she relied on express verbal assurances made by an individual employed in defendant's personnel office that she would be paid for her unused accumulated sick leave, and that, had she been informed that she would not receive that pay, she would instead have used her unused accumulated sick leave prior to her termination. While, as a general rule, estoppel may not be invoked against a governmental body, there is an exception to that rule where that body " ‘comports itself wrongfully or negligently, inducing reliance by a party who is entitled to rely and who changes his position to his detriment’ " ( Agress v. Clarkstown Cent. School Dist., 69 A.D.3d 769, 771, 895 N.Y.S.2d 432 [2010], quoting Bender v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 662, 668, 382 N.Y.S.2d 18, 345 N.E.2d 561 [1976] ). Here, plaintiff's testimony was sufficient to warrant an award to plaintiff of damages under a theory of promissory estoppel (see Agress v. Clarkstown Cent. School Dist., 69 A.D.3d at 771, 895 N.Y.S.2d 432 ; see also Colton v. Sperry Assoc. Fed. Credit Union, 50 Misc.3d 129[A], 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 51894[U], 2015 WL 9321215 [App.Term, 2d Dept., 9th & 10th Jud.Dists.2015]; Garrigan v. Incorporated Vil. of Malverne, 12 A.D.3d 400, 401, 786 N.Y.S.2d 525 [2004] ; Gendalia v. Gioffre, 191 A.D.2d 476, 594 N.Y.S.2d 322 [1993] ), and, thus, we conclude that the judgment in favor of plaintiff rendered substantial justice between the parties (see UDCA 1804, 1807 ).
We reach no other issue.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.