Hogya v. Superior Court

92 Citing cases

  1. Caro v. Procter & Gamble Co.

    18 Cal.App.4th 644 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 191 times
    Holding that the requirements of the CLRA were not met where the purported class representative did not believe the alleged misrepresentation to be true

    With respect to the propriety of the denial of class certification, we must analyze Caro's CLRA claims separately from his other causes of action. ( Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 325].) (2) In Hogya v. Superior Court, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d 122, we concluded Civil Code section 1781, subdivision (b), established exclusive criteria for class certification in suits brought under CLRA. (75 Cal.App.3d at p. 140.)

  2. Cole v. Antelope Valley Union High School Dist.

    47 Cal.App.4th 1505 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 69 times
    Holding that the plaintiff could not bring an FEHA action against two codefendants in the case since he had not named in his DFEH complaint

    " ( Francis v. Superior Court (1935) 3 Cal.2d 19, 28 [ 43 P.2d 300], quoting Gallup v. Smith (1890) 59 Conn. 354 [22 A. 334, 335, 12 L.R.A. 353]; accord, Fort Emory Cove Boatowners Assn. v. Cowett (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 508, 516 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 527]; Friends of the Library of Monterey Park v. City of Monterey Park (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 358, 379 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 358]; Doyle v. Board of Supervisors (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1358, 1364 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 572].) Construction of the word "shall" as used in a statute was discussed in Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 133 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 325] . The Court of Appeal, construing subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1781, stated: "The word `shall' is ordinarily `used in laws, regulations, or directives to express what is mandatory.'

  3. People v. The Superior Court

    No. F082833 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2022)

    In such cases, the statutory requirement of inadequacy of appellate remedy may have been relaxed in favor of immediate review of a question of statewide importance so that lower decisions in other cases will be uniform." (Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 129, fns. omitted (Hogya); accord, Rescue Army, supra, 28 Cal.2d at pp. 466-467; Anderson v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1321, 1328 (Anderson).) Additionally, while "[a] remedy is not inadequate merely because more time would be consumed by pursuing it through the ordinary course of law than would be required in the use of the extraordinary writ" (Rescue Army, at p. 466), courts have utilized writ review where the facts and circumstances of a case require prompt resolution (Rescue Army, at p. 467; Kaulick, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1296; Anderson, at p. 1328).

  4. Rice v. Superior Court

    136 Cal.App.3d 81 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)   Cited 33 times
    In Rice v. Superior Court (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 81, the court observed that damages for pain, suffering, and disfigurement do not survive a plaintiff’s death and explained that the Legislature intended to protect a substantive right to such damages for litigants whose health is such that delays will result in prejudicing that party’s interests.

    Although the use of "shall" in a statute is not always to be construed as evidencing a mandatory legislative intention ( Thurmond v. Superior Court (1967) 66 Cal.2d 836, 838-839 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 273, 427 P.2d 985]), it has been held that where the Legislature employs the terms "shall" and "may" in different portions of the same statute, it must be concluded that the Legislature was aware of the different meanings of these words and intended them to denote mandatory and directory requirements, respectively. ( National Automobile etc. Co. v. Garrison, supra, 76 Cal.App.2d 415, 417; see Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 133, fn. 8 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 325].) (3) A final rule applicable to facial evaluation of a statute is that "every word, phrase or provision is presumed to have been intended to have a meaning and perform a useful function" ( Mahdavi v. Fair Employment Practice Com. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 326, 334 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 421]) and a statute should be so construed where possible ( J.R. Norton Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 26 Cal.3d 1, 36-37 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 710, 603 P.2d 1306].)

  5. Morin v. ABA Recovery Service, Inc.

    195 Cal.App.3d 200 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 20 times
    Remanding "to determine the portion, if any, of the verdict attributable to personal injury claims and [to] award prejudgment interest accordingly"

    It may also properly rely on extrinsic aids. . . . Primarily, however, the words, in arrangement that superimposes the purpose of the Legislature upon their dictionary meaning, stand in immobilized sentry, reminders that whether their arrangement was wisdom or folly, it was wittingly undertaken and not to be disregarded. [¶] . . . If the words of the statute are clear, the court should not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history. [Citations.] Certainly the court is not at liberty to seek hidden meanings not suggested by the statute or by the available extrinsic aids. [Citation.]' ( People v. Knowles, 35 Cal.2d 175, 182-183 [ 217 P.2d 1].) (See also In re Miller, 31 Cal.2d 191, 198-199 [ 187 P.2d 722]; Code Civ. Proc., § 1858)" ( Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 132-133 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 325].) (2a) On its face Civil Code section 3291 appears to impose upon the court a mandatory obligation to award prejudgment interest where the statutory conditions are met. The words of the statute providing the judgment "shall" bear 10 percent prejudgment interest are reasonably clear. Generally the word "shall" connotes a mandatory obligation.

  6. Anders v. Superior Court (Meritage Homes of California, Inc.)

    192 Cal.App.4th 579 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 12 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Considering similar report when analyzing legislative history of statute

    When the petitioner may immediately appeal, his remedy is considered adequate and writ relief is precluded, unless the petitioner "can show some special reason why it is rendered inadequate by the particular circumstances of his case." ( Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 128 ( Hogya).) "Where an order is not appealable, but is reviewable only upon appeal from a later judgment, various factors must be considered in evaluating the adequacy of the appellate remedy [citation].

  7. Steroid Hormone Product Cases

    181 Cal.App.4th 145 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)   Cited 147 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a named plaintiff in a UCL class action under the unlawful prong "must show that he or she suffered injury in fact and lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition" and under the CLRA both the named plaintiff and "unnamed class members must have suffered some damage caused by a practice deemed unlawful"

    [¶] (4) The representative plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." (Civ. Code, § 1781, subd. (b); see Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 140 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 325].) The trial court, however, has "considerable latitude" under those four conditions in deciding whether a class action is proper.

  8. In re Cellphone Termination Fee Cases

    No. A115457 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 9, 2008)   Cited 1 times

    Under the CLRA, class certification is mandatory if the plaintiffs satisfy four statutory criteria. (Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 140; Caro v. Procter & Gamble Co. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 644, 654.) Those criteria are numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation.

  9. Gatan v. Alarm One Inc.

    No. A114944 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2007)

    Mutual).) Civil Code section 1781, subdivision (b), sets forth the four factors the trial court must apply in determining whether to certify a class in order to pursue a CLRA claim. (Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 136.) The CLRA factors are whether “(1) It is impracticable to bring all members of the class before the court. [¶] (2) The questions of law or fact common to the class are substantially similar and predominate over the questions affecting the individual members.

  10. Smith v. Superior Court

    10 Cal.App.4th 1033 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 73 times
    Striking plaintiff's prayer for punitive damages where the complaint was "devoid of any factual assertions supporting a conclusion petitioners acted with oppression, fraud or malice"

    (2) Nonetheless, cases have found the delay and expense of a trial make the remedy of appeal inadequate. ( Phelan v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 363, 370 [ 217 P.2d 951]; Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 128 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 325].) Also, where a case involves one or more issues of significant legal importance a court may find an extraordinary writ to be appropriate.