With respect to the propriety of the denial of class certification, we must analyze Caro's CLRA claims separately from his other causes of action. ( Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 325].) (2) In Hogya v. Superior Court, supra, 75 Cal.App.3d 122, we concluded Civil Code section 1781, subdivision (b), established exclusive criteria for class certification in suits brought under CLRA. (75 Cal.App.3d at p. 140.)
" ( Francis v. Superior Court (1935) 3 Cal.2d 19, 28 [ 43 P.2d 300], quoting Gallup v. Smith (1890) 59 Conn. 354 [22 A. 334, 335, 12 L.R.A. 353]; accord, Fort Emory Cove Boatowners Assn. v. Cowett (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 508, 516 [ 270 Cal.Rptr. 527]; Friends of the Library of Monterey Park v. City of Monterey Park (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 358, 379 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 358]; Doyle v. Board of Supervisors (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1358, 1364 [ 243 Cal.Rptr. 572].) Construction of the word "shall" as used in a statute was discussed in Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 133 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 325] . The Court of Appeal, construing subdivision (b) of Civil Code section 1781, stated: "The word `shall' is ordinarily `used in laws, regulations, or directives to express what is mandatory.'
In such cases, the statutory requirement of inadequacy of appellate remedy may have been relaxed in favor of immediate review of a question of statewide importance so that lower decisions in other cases will be uniform." (Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 129, fns. omitted (Hogya); accord, Rescue Army, supra, 28 Cal.2d at pp. 466-467; Anderson v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1321, 1328 (Anderson).) Additionally, while "[a] remedy is not inadequate merely because more time would be consumed by pursuing it through the ordinary course of law than would be required in the use of the extraordinary writ" (Rescue Army, at p. 466), courts have utilized writ review where the facts and circumstances of a case require prompt resolution (Rescue Army, at p. 467; Kaulick, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 1296; Anderson, at p. 1328).
Although the use of "shall" in a statute is not always to be construed as evidencing a mandatory legislative intention ( Thurmond v. Superior Court (1967) 66 Cal.2d 836, 838-839 [ 59 Cal.Rptr. 273, 427 P.2d 985]), it has been held that where the Legislature employs the terms "shall" and "may" in different portions of the same statute, it must be concluded that the Legislature was aware of the different meanings of these words and intended them to denote mandatory and directory requirements, respectively. ( National Automobile etc. Co. v. Garrison, supra, 76 Cal.App.2d 415, 417; see Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 133, fn. 8 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 325].) (3) A final rule applicable to facial evaluation of a statute is that "every word, phrase or provision is presumed to have been intended to have a meaning and perform a useful function" ( Mahdavi v. Fair Employment Practice Com. (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 326, 334 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 421]) and a statute should be so construed where possible ( J.R. Norton Co. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 26 Cal.3d 1, 36-37 [ 160 Cal.Rptr. 710, 603 P.2d 1306].)
It may also properly rely on extrinsic aids. . . . Primarily, however, the words, in arrangement that superimposes the purpose of the Legislature upon their dictionary meaning, stand in immobilized sentry, reminders that whether their arrangement was wisdom or folly, it was wittingly undertaken and not to be disregarded. [¶] . . . If the words of the statute are clear, the court should not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history. [Citations.] Certainly the court is not at liberty to seek hidden meanings not suggested by the statute or by the available extrinsic aids. [Citation.]' ( People v. Knowles, 35 Cal.2d 175, 182-183 [ 217 P.2d 1].) (See also In re Miller, 31 Cal.2d 191, 198-199 [ 187 P.2d 722]; Code Civ. Proc., § 1858)" ( Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 132-133 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 325].) (2a) On its face Civil Code section 3291 appears to impose upon the court a mandatory obligation to award prejudgment interest where the statutory conditions are met. The words of the statute providing the judgment "shall" bear 10 percent prejudgment interest are reasonably clear. Generally the word "shall" connotes a mandatory obligation.
When the petitioner may immediately appeal, his remedy is considered adequate and writ relief is precluded, unless the petitioner "can show some special reason why it is rendered inadequate by the particular circumstances of his case." ( Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 128 ( Hogya).) "Where an order is not appealable, but is reviewable only upon appeal from a later judgment, various factors must be considered in evaluating the adequacy of the appellate remedy [citation].
[¶] (4) The representative plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." (Civ. Code, § 1781, subd. (b); see Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 140 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 325].) The trial court, however, has "considerable latitude" under those four conditions in deciding whether a class action is proper.
Under the CLRA, class certification is mandatory if the plaintiffs satisfy four statutory criteria. (Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 140; Caro v. Procter & Gamble Co. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 644, 654.) Those criteria are numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation.
Mutual).) Civil Code section 1781, subdivision (b), sets forth the four factors the trial court must apply in determining whether to certify a class in order to pursue a CLRA claim. (Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 136.) The CLRA factors are whether “(1) It is impracticable to bring all members of the class before the court. [¶] (2) The questions of law or fact common to the class are substantially similar and predominate over the questions affecting the individual members.
(2) Nonetheless, cases have found the delay and expense of a trial make the remedy of appeal inadequate. ( Phelan v. Superior Court (1950) 35 Cal.2d 363, 370 [ 217 P.2d 951]; Hogya v. Superior Court (1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 122, 128 [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 325].) Also, where a case involves one or more issues of significant legal importance a court may find an extraordinary writ to be appropriate.