Hogston v. Schroyer

6 Citing cases

  1. K Mart Corp. v. Beall

    620 N.E.2d 700 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 11 times
    Affirming damages award for future medical expenses based on life expectancy

    Lewis by Lewis v. Bonahoom (1991) 3d Dist.Ind. App., 583 N.E.2d 175, 177. Upon appeal, we determine: (1) whether the tendered instruction correctly stated the law; (2) whether there was evidence of record to support giving the tendered instruction; (3) whether the instructions given by the court covered the substance of the refused instruction; and (4) whether Builder's Square, upon a showing of reversible error, was prejudiced by the court's failure to give the tendered instruction. Hogston v. Schroyer (1983) 1st Dist.Ind. App., 449 N.E.2d 291, 293. Builder's Square tendered the following instruction which the trial court refused:

  2. Miller v. Todd

    551 N.E.2d 1139 (Ind. 1990)   Cited 45 times
    Upholding the trial court's entry of summary judgment on the grounds that the alleged defect was open and obvious

    Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has held that a motorcycle rider is not required to expect that the cycle may be involved in an injury-producing accident. Hogston v. Schroyer (1983), Ind. App., 449 N.E.2d 291. If not required to expect an accident, a motorcycle rider should not be held to anticipate injuries which would likely result from the absence of leg crash bars in the event of such unexpected accident. Because of the presence of issues of material fact regarding the openness and obviousness of the danger, summary judgement was erroneously entered.

  3. Santini v. Consolidated Rail Corp.

    505 N.E.2d 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that train speed limit that applied citywvide, rather than to specific intersection or location, was too general in scope to constitute a local safety hazard

    Only upon an affirmative showing on all points will the refusal constitute reversible error. Hogston v. Schroyer (1983), Ind. App., 449 N.E.2d 291."

  4. City of Lake Station v. Rogers

    500 N.E.2d 235 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 12 times
    Holding that error in the admission of evidence at trial is waived on appeal when the complaining party submits evidence to substantially the same effect

    In reviewing the refusal to give tendered instructions, the court must determine the following: 1) whether the tendered instruction correctly states the law; 2) whether the record would support the giving of the instruction; 3) whether the substance of the tendered instruction is covered by other instructions which were given; and 4) whether the refusal to give the instruction resulted in prejudice to the party who tendered it. Only upon an affirmative showing on all points will the refusal constitute reversible error. Hogston v. Schroyer (1983), Ind. App., 449 N.E.2d 291. The first refused instruction upon which the City claims error stated:

  5. Mullins v. State

    486 N.E.2d 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 14 times
    Holding child molesting statute required proof of scienter

    The three-pronged standard by which we review a trial court's refusal to give a tendered instruction requires us to consider: (1) whether the tendered instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there is evidence in the record to support the giving of that instruction; and (3) whether the substance of that instruction is covered by the other instructions given. Mitchell v. Turner (1985), Ind. App., 484 N.E.2d 967; Shull v. B.F. Goodrich Co. (1985), Ind. App., 477 N.E.2d 924, 926; Hogston v. Schroyer (1983), Ind. App., 449 N.E.2d 291, 293. Since the substance of this instruction was covered by other instructions which were given, there was no reversible error in refusing to give this instruction.

  6. Mitchell by Mitchell v. Turner

    484 N.E.2d 967 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 3 times

    The trial court instructed the jury as to the law of the case without any distinction based upon Curtis Turner's age. The three-pronged standard by which we review a trial court's refusal to give a tendered instruction requires us to consider: (1) whether the tendered instruction correctly states the law, (2) whether there is evidence in the record to support the giving of that instruction, and (3) whether the substance of that instruction is covered by the other instructions given. Shull v. B.F. Goodrich Co. (1985), Ind. App., 477 N.E.2d 924, 926; Hogston v. Schroyer (1983), Ind. App., 449 N.E.2d 291, 293; Hahn v. Ford Motor Company (1982), Ind. App., 434 N.E.2d 943, 955. If the Mitchells' tendered instructions were read as simply applying an adult standard of care to a minor engaged in an adult activity such as driving, we would have to conclude that such an instruction correctly states the law.