Lewis by Lewis v. Bonahoom (1991) 3d Dist.Ind. App., 583 N.E.2d 175, 177. Upon appeal, we determine: (1) whether the tendered instruction correctly stated the law; (2) whether there was evidence of record to support giving the tendered instruction; (3) whether the instructions given by the court covered the substance of the refused instruction; and (4) whether Builder's Square, upon a showing of reversible error, was prejudiced by the court's failure to give the tendered instruction. Hogston v. Schroyer (1983) 1st Dist.Ind. App., 449 N.E.2d 291, 293. Builder's Square tendered the following instruction which the trial court refused:
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals has held that a motorcycle rider is not required to expect that the cycle may be involved in an injury-producing accident. Hogston v. Schroyer (1983), Ind. App., 449 N.E.2d 291. If not required to expect an accident, a motorcycle rider should not be held to anticipate injuries which would likely result from the absence of leg crash bars in the event of such unexpected accident. Because of the presence of issues of material fact regarding the openness and obviousness of the danger, summary judgement was erroneously entered.
Only upon an affirmative showing on all points will the refusal constitute reversible error. Hogston v. Schroyer (1983), Ind. App., 449 N.E.2d 291."
In reviewing the refusal to give tendered instructions, the court must determine the following: 1) whether the tendered instruction correctly states the law; 2) whether the record would support the giving of the instruction; 3) whether the substance of the tendered instruction is covered by other instructions which were given; and 4) whether the refusal to give the instruction resulted in prejudice to the party who tendered it. Only upon an affirmative showing on all points will the refusal constitute reversible error. Hogston v. Schroyer (1983), Ind. App., 449 N.E.2d 291. The first refused instruction upon which the City claims error stated:
The three-pronged standard by which we review a trial court's refusal to give a tendered instruction requires us to consider: (1) whether the tendered instruction correctly states the law; (2) whether there is evidence in the record to support the giving of that instruction; and (3) whether the substance of that instruction is covered by the other instructions given. Mitchell v. Turner (1985), Ind. App., 484 N.E.2d 967; Shull v. B.F. Goodrich Co. (1985), Ind. App., 477 N.E.2d 924, 926; Hogston v. Schroyer (1983), Ind. App., 449 N.E.2d 291, 293. Since the substance of this instruction was covered by other instructions which were given, there was no reversible error in refusing to give this instruction.
The trial court instructed the jury as to the law of the case without any distinction based upon Curtis Turner's age. The three-pronged standard by which we review a trial court's refusal to give a tendered instruction requires us to consider: (1) whether the tendered instruction correctly states the law, (2) whether there is evidence in the record to support the giving of that instruction, and (3) whether the substance of that instruction is covered by the other instructions given. Shull v. B.F. Goodrich Co. (1985), Ind. App., 477 N.E.2d 924, 926; Hogston v. Schroyer (1983), Ind. App., 449 N.E.2d 291, 293; Hahn v. Ford Motor Company (1982), Ind. App., 434 N.E.2d 943, 955. If the Mitchells' tendered instructions were read as simply applying an adult standard of care to a minor engaged in an adult activity such as driving, we would have to conclude that such an instruction correctly states the law.