Opinion
Case No. 2:00-CV-995
April 29, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court for consideration of the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment with respect to the issue of liquidated damages. For the reasons that follow, the Plaintiffs request for liquidated damages is denied.
I.
On February 14, 2002, this Court granted Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of liability under the Family Medical Leave Act ["FMLA"], 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., for Defendant's violation of § 2614(a). This provision states:
(a) Restoration to Position
(1) In general
[A]ny eligible employee who takes leave under section 2612 of this title for the intended purpose of the leave shall be entitled on return from such leave —
(A) to be restored by the employer to the position of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced; or
(B) to be restored to an equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment.29 U.S.C. § 2614(a).
The Court held that the Defendant violated the FMLA by failing to restore Plaintiff to employment on June 28, 2000, after her return from leave. As a result of Defendant's violation, liability attaches under § 2615(a)(1), and Plaintiff is entitled to damages under section 2617(a)(1)(A)(i). Plaintiff can recover the loss of compensation suffered for the time period of June 28 through July 31, 2000, the date on which she was ultimately restored to employment. The issue now before the Court is whether Plaintiff is also entitled to liquidated damages under § 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii).
This section provides:
(a) Interference with rights
(1) Exercise of rights
It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter.29 U.S.C. § 2615 (a)(1).
The damages provision states:
Any employer who violates section 2615 of this title shall be liable to any eligible employee affected —
(A) for damages equal to —
(i) the amount of —
(I) any wages, salary, employment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to such employee by reason of the violation . . . [and]
(iii) an additional amount as liquidated damages equal to the sum of the amount described in clause
(i) and the interest described in clause (ii), except that if an employer who has violated section 2615 of this title proves to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission which violated section 2615 of this title was in good faith and that the employer had reasonable grounds for believing that the act or omission was not a violation section 2615 of this title, such court may, in the discretion of the court, reduce the amount of the liability to the amount and interest determined under clauses (i) and (ii), respectively. . . .29 U.S.C. § 2617 (a)(l)(A)(i), (iii).
In support of her claim for liquidated damages, Plaintiff argues that the evidence before the Court fails to show that Defendant's violation of the FMLA was in good faith or that the Defendant had reasonable grounds to believe that it was not violating the FMLA when it failed to restore Plaintiff to employment on June 28, 2000. The Defendant maintains that it never intended to evade its obligation to restore Plaintiff to employment. According to the Defendant, the time taken to restore Plaintiff to employment was attributable to the fact that her former job had been modified as a result of the New Model changeover and was attributable to the number of permanent restrictions Plaintiff necessitated on account of an earlier back injury.
II.
An award of liquidated damages under § 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii) is "the norm under the FMLA. . . ." Nero v. Industrial Molding Corp., 167 F.3d 921, 929 (5th Cir. 1999). The district court may, however, conclude that an award is not appropriate if the Defendant employer proves to the satisfaction of the Court "both good faith and reasonable grounds for the act or omission." Chandler v. Specialty Tires of America (Tennessee,), Inc., ___ F.3d ___, 2002 WL 445359 (6th Cir. March 25, 2002) (emphasis in original).
Neither the FMLA nor the implementing regulations provide the standard by which the Court is to assess the issues good faith and reasonableness. The Sixth Circuit, and other courts, have applied caselaw interpreting the liquidated damages provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act ["FLSA"], 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., to aid in resolving the issue. Id.; Morris v. VCW, Inc., No. 95-0737CVW36, 1996 WL 740544 at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 26, 1996). Indeed, the liquidated damages provision of the FMLA "parallels the provisions of the FLSA." S.Rep. No. 103-3 at 35, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 37.
The ELSA provides:
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 206 or section 207 of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. Any employer who violates the provisions of section 215(a)(3) of this title shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of section 21 5(a)(3) of this title, including without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. . . .
In any action commenced prior to or on or after May 14, 1947 to recover unpaid minimum wages, unpaid overtime compensation, or liquidated damages, under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended [ 29 U.S.C.A. § 201 et seq.], if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, the court may, in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages or award any amount thereof not to exceed the amount specified in section 216 of this title.29 U.S.C. § 216 (b), 260.
As the Morris court observed, in order to avoid the imposition of liquidated damages, the "defendant bears the burden of establishing that it acted with subjective good faith and that it had an objectively reasonable belief its conduct did not violate the law." Morris, 1996 WL 740544 at *3, citing Thomas v. Howard Univ. Hospital, 39 F.3d 370, 372-73 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Hultgren v. County of Lancaster, 913 F.2d 498, 509 (8th Cir. 1990). To this end, the Defendant must show that it "honestly intended to ascertain the dictates of the FMLA and to act in conformance with it." Id. (citations omitted). Further, "[s]uccessfully establishing reasonable grounds for the conduct taken generally requires a showing that the employer relied on a reasonable, although erroneous, interpretation of the Act or its implementing regulations." Id. , citing Thomas v. Howard, supra.
In Morris, the court concluded that the Defendant employer failed to meet this burden. The plaintiff in that case received a jury verdict in her favor on her FMLA claim. The evidence adduced at trial revealed that plaintiff was close to a "nervous breakdown." Because of her mental condition, plaintiffs physician ordered plaintiff to take several weeks off from her job. Despite receiving the doctor's written order, and speaking with plaintiff, the defendant terminated her employment. According to the court, the evidence showed that plaintiffs supervisor terminated her out of "resentment at a valid leave request." Morris, 1996 WL 740544 at *4.
The court concluded that defendant's conduct was not taken in good faith. The court observed that good faith has both an objective and a subjective component. Thus, the court found that, even if plaintiffs supervisor had an honest misunderstanding as to the need for plaintiffs leave, the court found that it was objectively unreasonable to terminate plaintiff without seeking clarification of the extent of leave sought. Thus, the court awarded plaintiff liquidated damages for the defendant's FMLA violation.
In contrast, in Thorson v. Gemini, Inc., 205 F.3d 370 (8th Cir. 2000), the Eighth Circuit concluded that a defendant employer who terminated plaintiff for excessive absenteeism violated the FMLA but nonetheless acted in good faith. The plaintiff in that case had a history of excessive absenteeism. Prior to her termination, plaintiff was, however, under a physician's order not to work on account of a stomach condition. The defendant did not perceive plaintiff as suffering from a "serious health condition" for purposes of the statute and terminated her employment. The termination was pursuant to defendant's policy that employees who were absent for more than five percent of scheduled work hours during the previous twelve months were subject to termination. The Eighth Circuit concluded that since the regulations explaining "serious health condition" were relatively new, the defendant's action was a violation of the law but that the violation was objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances. Thus, the court found that an award of liquidated damages was inappropriate.
The facts in the case at bar are more compelling than those in Thorson on the issues of good faith and reasonableness. As this Court recognized in its February 14, 2002 Opinion and Order, the FMLA and the accompanying regulations are silent on the issue of when an employee is to be restored to employment upon return from leave. Thus, the Court applied the literal language of 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (a)(1) which states that "any eligible employee who takes leave . . . shall be entitled, on return from such leave" to be restored to her former or to an equivalent position, and the Court concluded that Plaintiff should have been restored to employment on June 28, 2000.
Although the Defendant violated the FMLA in failing to restore Plaintiff to employment on June 28, this Court finds that the Defendant's action was taken in good faith. The undisputed evidence reveals that while Plaintiff was on leave from her door line assembly job, Honda implemented a New Model Changeover, which resulted in a variety of gradual changes to the types of duties performed by employees on the assembly line. (Affidavit of Brett Strine at ¶ 4). Further, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was subject to a number of permanent restrictions as to the type of work she could physically perform. (Exhibits 12 and 13 attached to Plaintiff's Deposition). In addition, it is undisputed that Plaintiffs former position had been filled by a temporary employee and that Plaintiff gave no advance notice of her anticipated return to work date. (Plaintiff's Depo. at 106, 141). Brett Strine, of the Safety Department, was in charge of restoring Plaintiff to a position of employment. In light of Plaintiffs physical restrictions and the changes in tasks associated with the New Model Changeover, Strine concluded that he needed time to assess what placement would be appropriate for Plaintiff. On July 26, 2000, Strine located a position suitable for Plaintiff on the engine assembly line. (Strine Affidavit at ¶ 15). Plaintiff commenced work on July 31, 2000.
Specifically, Plaintiff was not able to install glass; she was not able to push or pull liner racks; she was not able to jump in and out of cars; she was not able to extend her lower back in excess of 15 degrees or flex in excess of 30 degrees, nor was she able to lift weight greater than 15 pounds. Finally, Plaintiff was subject to a permanent five day, forty hour work week restriction.
The events that transpired between June 27, when Plaintiff appeared for work, and July 26, when a position was located, are relevant to the issue of whether Honda acted in good faith, despite its violation of the FMLA. On this issue, Strine avers as follows:
The New Model Changeover complicated my efforts to find a placement for Plaintiff on June 27, 2000 [because] placement reviews at [Honda] necessarily require the participation of numerous individuals who work directly in production. Many. . . supervisors were overburdened on June 27, 2000 because of the New Model changeover. On June 30, 2000 1 met with other Safety Representatives for the purpose of investigating potential placements accommodating Plaintiffs physical restrictions. During that meeting, some potential placements were eliminated as not meeting Plaintiffs restrictions, while others were designated as potential placements. [Honda] was on "shutdown" from June 30, 2000 to July 10, 2000 for the Fourth of July holiday. After returning from shutdown, I began the process of searching for placements that would accommodate Plaintiffs restrictions by personally observing various production processes, reviewing manpower needs, and interviewing production supervisors concerning the nature of processes performed in their respective areas as they had been modified by the new model changeover. On July 26, 2000, 1 found an available placement satisfying Plaintiffs physical restriction on [Honda's] engine line.
Strine Affidavit at ¶¶ 14-15.
As this Court previously held, the time it took to locate a position for Plaintiff is contrary to the FMLA's requirement that Plaintiff "shall be entitled, on return" from leave to be restored to her former position or to an equivalent position. 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (a)(1)(A). Nonetheless, the undisputed evidence presented indicates that Defendant's actions in this regard were subjectively done in good faith. Indeed, the evidence reveals that Strine engaged in a quite thorough review of what positions were available and whether the same would comport with Plaintiffs limitations. Further, the Court finds that Strine acted with the objective reasonable belief that the time it took to make the assessment was not in violation of the law. Moreover, it is undisputed that, until this Court's February 14, 2002 decision, the issue of when an employee returning from FMLA leave is to be restored to employment, was an open issue. Thus, the Court finds that the Defendant's actions, although contrary to law, were nonetheless reasonable at the time.
In light of this conclusion, the Court finds an award liquidated damages inappropriate. The Defendant has satisfied the Court that its violation of 29 U.S.C. § 2615 was done in good faith and that it had reasonable grounds for believing that its actions were not a violation of law. Plaintiffs request for liquidated damages under 29 U.S.C. § 2617 (a)(l)(A)(iii) is denied.
III.
In light of the foregoing, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #13) is DENIED on the issue of liquidated damages; the Motion is GRANTED to the extent previously set forth by the Court in its February 14, 2002 Opinion and Order. This action is hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.