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Hoge v. Chautauqua Cnty.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.
Jun 14, 2019
173 A.D.3d 1731 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)

Opinion

160 CA 18–01186

06-14-2019

In the Matter of Bradley K. HOGE and Lynn A. Hoge, v. CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY, Respondent–Respondent.

BRAUTIGAM & BRAUTIGAM, LLP, FREDONIA (ANDREW D. BRAUTIGAM OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONERS–APPELLANTS. STEPHEN M. ABDELLA, COUNTY ATTORNEY, MAYVILLE, FOR RESPONDENT–RESPONDENT.


BRAUTIGAM & BRAUTIGAM, LLP, FREDONIA (ANDREW D. BRAUTIGAM OF COUNSEL), FOR PETITIONERS–APPELLANTS.

STEPHEN M. ABDELLA, COUNTY ATTORNEY, MAYVILLE, FOR RESPONDENT–RESPONDENT.

PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., PERADOTTO, LINDLEY, DEJOSEPH, AND NEMOYER, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Memorandum: Petitioners appeal from an order granting respondent's motion to dismiss petitioners' application for surplus proceeds resulting from a tax foreclosure sale of real property formerly owned by them. Prior to petitioners' application, respondent obtained the real property by default judgment of foreclosure pursuant to RPTL article 11 and resold the property at auction. We affirm.

Preliminarily, to the extent that petitioners challenge the validity of the default judgment of foreclosure on the ground that respondent failed to comply with constitutional and statutory requirements during the in rem tax foreclosure proceeding (see generally Matter of County of Seneca [Maxim Dev. Group], 151 A.D.3d 1611, 1611–1612, 56 N.Y.S.3d 704 [4th Dept. 2017] ), that challenge is not properly before us inasmuch as this is not an appeal from the order denying petitioners' motion to vacate the default judgment (see Matter of Scott, 116 A.D.2d 1020, 1020, 498 N.Y.S.2d 634 [4th Dept. 1986], lv denied 67 N.Y.2d 608, 502 N.Y.S.2d 1026, 494 N.E.2d 113 [1986] ). We reject petitioners' contention that they have a right to the surplus proceeds of the foreclosure sale. As respondent correctly contends, petitioners' application for surplus proceeds was improperly predicated upon provisions of RPAPL article 13 that apply to surplus monies arising from the sale of property in mortgage foreclosure proceedings (see e.g. RPAPL 1361[1] ). RPAPL article 13, entitled "Action to Foreclose a Mortgage," does not apply to properties acquired by a tax district pursuant to an in rem foreclosure proceeding under RPTL article 11. Thus, petitioners' reliance on RPAPL article 13 and cases involving mortgage foreclosures is misplaced (cf. Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Berthole, 130 A.D.3d 881, 881–882, 15 N.Y.S.3d 82 [2d Dept. 2015], appeal dismissed 26 N.Y.3d 1022, 20 N.Y.S.3d 334, 41 N.E.3d 1150 [2015] ).

Moreover, petitioners are not entitled to surplus proceeds under RPTL article 11. Contrary to petitioners' assertion that RPTL article 11 is "silent" regarding any remaining interest that former property owners may have, such as entitlement to surplus proceeds upon the sale of the property following a default judgment of foreclosure, the statute provides that, when property owners neither redeem the property nor interpose an answer, the tax district is entitled to a deed conveying an estate in fee simple absolute and the property owners are "barred and forever foreclosed of all ... right, title, interest, claim, lien or equity of redemption" that they may have had in the property ( RPTL 1136[3] ; see Matter of Ellis v. City of Rochester, 227 A.D.2d 904, 904–905, 643 N.Y.S.2d 279 [4th Dept. 1996] ). Where the tax district obtains a valid default judgment of foreclosure, which is presumed here given that the default judgment is not subject to challenge on this appeal, the former property owners are not "entitled to any compensation upon the resale of the property" ( Ellis, 227 A.D.2d at 905, 643 N.Y.S.2d 279 ), and the tax district may "retain ... the entire proceeds from [the re]sale" ( Scott, 116 A.D.2d at 1020, 498 N.Y.S.2d 634 ; see Nelson v. City of New York, 352 U.S. 103, 109–110, 77 S.Ct. 195, 1 L.Ed.2d 171 [1956] ; Sheehan v. County of Suffolk, 67 N.Y.2d 52, 59, 499 N.Y.S.2d 656, 490 N.E.2d 523 [1986], rearg. denied 67 N.Y.2d 918, 501 N.Y.S.2d 1028, 492 N.E.2d 1236 [1986] ; Matthew v. Thompson, 65 A.D.3d 1095, 1097, 887 N.Y.S.2d 588 [2d Dept. 2009] ; Matter of City of Lockport [Marine Midland Bank], 187 A.D.2d 993, 993–994, 593 N.Y.S.2d 472 [4th Dept. 1992] ).


Summaries of

Hoge v. Chautauqua Cnty.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.
Jun 14, 2019
173 A.D.3d 1731 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)
Case details for

Hoge v. Chautauqua Cnty.

Case Details

Full title:In the Matter of Bradley K. HOGE and Lynn A. Hoge, v. CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY…

Court:Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, New York.

Date published: Jun 14, 2019

Citations

173 A.D.3d 1731 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)
104 N.Y.S.3d 813

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