Hoffman v. Rockey

11 Citing cases

  1. Gaston v. Parsons

    117 Or. App. 555 (Or. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 5 times
    Discussing informed consent claims: claim accrues when plaintiff suffers harm about which he has not been warned.

    He knew at that time that he had not been warned of that risk. As we said in Hoffman v. Rockey, 55 Or. App. 658, 664, 639 P.2d 1284, rev den 292 Or. 722 (1982), "[P]laintiff's discovery was complete when he perceived his difficulties and knew that his doctor had failed to warn him of these particular problems — permanent or not." We agree with the trial court that, as a matter of law, the claim based on lack of informed consent is time-barred.

  2. Duncan v. Augter

    62 Or. App. 250 (Or. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 20 times

    245 Or at 315-16. In Hoffman v. Rockey, 55 Or. App. 658, 663, 639 P.2d 1284, rev den 292 Or. 722 (1982) (involving medical malpractice and applying ORS 12.110(4)), we explained: "A plaintiff should discover that he has a cause of action when he realizes (1) that he has been injured, (2) that the injury can be attributed to an act of the alleged tortfeasor, and (3) that the act of the alleged tortfeasor was somehow negligent. * * *"

  3. Bussineau v. President Dir. of Georgetown

    518 A.2d 423 (D.C. 1986)   Cited 108 times
    Equating accrual of a cause of action for statute of limitation purposes with occurrence of "injury" and requiring that the injury be discoverable with reasonable diligence

    In Oregon, the appellate court likewise concluded that a "plaintiff should discover that he has a cause of action when he realizes (1) that he has been injured; (2) that the injury can be attributed to an act of the alleged tortfeasor, and (3) that the act of the alleged tortfeasor was somehow negligent." Hoffman v. Rockey, 55 Or. App. 658, 663, 639 P.2d 1284, 1286 (1982). The Oregon court rationalized such a construction of the discovery rule by noting:

  4. Raethke v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ

    115 Or. App. 195 (Or. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 21 times

    We held that the plaintiff's cause of action had accrued at the time of the accident, because he knew then that he had been injured and that the accident was attributable to the negligence of the defendant. The fact that he initially thought that his injury was only minor did not mean that a new cause of action accrued when he later learned that he had suffered an unanticipated kind of harm. So, too, in Hoffman v. Rockey, 55 Or. App. 658, 639 P.2d 1284 (1982), we held that the plaintiff knew that he was harmed when he had an infection in his leg shortly after surgery; he did not have a new cause of action when he learned that his leg would have to be amputated. "[P]laintiff's discovery was complete when he perceived his difficulties and knew that his doctor had failed to warn him of these particular problems — permanent or not." 55 Or App at 664.

  5. Fidler v. Eastman Kodak Co.

    714 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1983)   Cited 97 times
    Finding that knowledge of injury does not require knowledge that defendant's breached a duty to cause the injury

    A number of courts have, however, adopted discovery rules under which a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff discovers or in the exercise of due diligence should discover, in addition to his injury and its cause, that the injury has resulted from some negligence or wrongdoing on the part of the defendant, some actionable wrong. See Dawson v. Eli Lilly and Co., supra (applying D.C. Law); Goodman v. Mead Johnson Co., 534 F.2d 566, 575 (3d Cir. 1976) (applying New Jersey law); Anderson v. Shook, 333 N.W.2d 708 (N.D. 1983); Hoffman v. Rockey, 55 Or.App. 658, 639 P.2d 1284, 1286 (1982); Jacoby v. Kaiser Foundation Hospital, 1 Haw.App. 519, 622 P.2d 613 (1981); Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 147 (Utah 1979); Brown v. Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hospital, 117 N.H. 739, 378 A.2d 1138 (1977); Owens v. Brochner, 172 Colo. 525, 474 P.2d 603 (Colo. 1970).

  6. Walton v. Arrendondo

    Case No. 2:14-cv-00626-KI (D. Or. Jan. 20, 2016)

    Further, under Oregon law, in the context of an alleged violation of informed consent, "plaintiff's discovery was complete when he perceived his difficulties and knew that his doctor had failed to warn him of these particular problems-permanent or not." Hoffman v. Rockey, 55 Or. App. 658, 664, 639 P.2d 1284, rev. denied, 292 Or. 722, 644 P.2d 1131 (1982) (emphasis added); see also Gaston v. Parsons, 117 Or. App. 555, 558, 844 P.2d 941 (1993) (doctor's assurances relevant to timeliness of medical malpractice claim, but court did not consider them in context of informed consent claim), aff'd on other grounds, 318 Or. 247, 864 P.2d 1319. Any assurances Dr. Arrendondo gave Walton after the surgery, and whether they constitute "fraud, deceit or [a] misleading representation," are irrelevant. Walton knew at least as of February 15, 2011 that he suffered from a condition Dr. Arrendondo had not warned him about. Consequently, Dr. Arrendondo's assurances do not toll the statute of limitations.

  7. Doe v. American Red Cross

    322 Or. 502 (Or. 1996)   Cited 29 times
    Holding that, without any evidence as to what Doe would have discovered if he had inquired, defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on its statute of limitations defense

    " (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) In the trial court, plaintiff relied on the formulation of those elements found in Hoffman v. Rockey, 55 Or. App. 658, 639 P.2d 1284 (1982). The third prong of the test in that case was described as "the act of the alleged tortfeasor was negligent."

  8. Anderson v. Shook

    333 N.W.2d 708 (N.D. 1983)   Cited 17 times
    Discussing the difficulties in defending a stale claim with the passage of time and describing the statute of limitations as a product of necessity

    An Oregon appellate court similarly concluded that a "plaintiff should discover that he has a cause of action when he realizes (1) that he has been injured, (2) that the injury can be attributed to an act of the alleged tortfeasor, and (3) that the act of the alleged tortfeasor was somehow negligent." Hoffman v. Rockey, 55 Or. App. 658, 663, 639 P.2d 1284, 1286 (1982). See Dawson, supra, 543 F. Supp. at 1334-36 for further discussion of jurisdictions which adopt this view.

  9. Keller v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.

    197 Or. App. 450 (Or. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 9 times

    In that respect, this case is similar to those malpractice and products liability cases in which courts have held that statutes of limitation did not begin to run where plaintiffs received reassurances from defendants that prevented plaintiffs from having sufficient certainty about the existence of facts pertaining to the elements of the statutes of limitation. See Gaston, 318 Or at 260-61; Forest Grove Brick v. Strickland, 277 Or 81, 559 P2d 502 (1977); Hoeck, 149 Or App at 613-14; Penuel v. Titan/Value Equities Group, Inc., 127 Or App 195, 200-01, 872 P2d 28, rev den, 319 Or 150 (1994); Hoffman v. Rockey, 55 Or App 658, 662-63, 639 P2d 1284, rev den, 292 Or 722 (1982). In those cases, a manufacturer's assurance that a product could be fixed or a doctor's assurance that an untoward effect was normal and not the result of negligence presented each plaintiff with several alternative explanations for the injury, only one of which supported the plaintiff's tort claim.

  10. Krasnow v. Allen

    29 Mass. App. Ct. 562 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 41 times
    Holding that the discovery rule did not delay accrual where the plaintiff merely lacked knowledge of the identity of a particular defendant

    In that respect, the discovery rule may be somewhat more narrow in Massachusetts than in many other States where a cause of action accrues only when a plaintiff has notice of all the elements of a cause of action. See, e.g., Anderson v. Shook, 333 N.W.2d 708, 712 (N.D. 1983); Hoffman v. Rockey, 55 Or. App. 658, 663 (1982); Jacoby v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 1 Haw. App. 519, 525 (1981). Our courts have not had occasion to rule on the more general question, related to the precise issue in the present case, whether application of the discovery rule delays accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff knows or should know the identity of the particular defendant claimed to be responsible for the harm.