Opinion
C. A. PC-2022-01156
06-22-2023
MICHAEL HOFFMAN Plaintiff, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, PETER NERONHA, in his official capacity as Attorney General Defendants.
For Plaintiff: Peter Petrarca, Esq. John M. Verdecchia, Esq. For Defendant: Katherine C. Sadeck, Esq.
For Plaintiff: Peter Petrarca, Esq. John M. Verdecchia, Esq.
For Defendant: Katherine C. Sadeck, Esq.
DECISION
CRUISE, J.
Before this Court for decision is Michael Hoffman's (Plaintiff) Motion to Reconsider this Court's June 6, 2022 Order that granted the Rhode Island Department of Attorney General for the State of Rhode Island and Peter Neronha's, in his official capacity as Attorney General, (collectively Defendants or Attorney General) Motion to Dismiss and denied Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. Jurisdiction is pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.
I
Facts and Travel
Plaintiff previously held a Concealed Carry Permit (CCP) issued by the Attorney General that expired on August 1, 2022. Compl. ¶¶ 5-7; id. Ex. 1. Plaintiff held that CCP since 1995 and had continuously and successfully renewed it. Id. ¶ 6. However, on September 1, 2021, Plaintiff was charged with a misdemeanor and, as a result, the Attorney General sent a letter to Plaintiff on September 2, 2021 that informed him that his CCP was being revoked and ordered him to surrender his CCP. Id. ¶¶ 13-14; see also Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration Under the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(6) and Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Pl.'s Mot.) 1. Plaintiff immediately complied and surrendered his CCP to the Attorney General. (Compl. ¶ 15.)
On December 12, 2021, Plaintiff's criminal charges were dismissed. Id. ¶ 16. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Seal his record related to the arrest in the Sixth Division District Court, which was granted on January 6, 2022. Id. ¶¶ 17, 19; id. Ex. 2. After the record was sealed, the Attorney General was notified that the Motion to Seal had been granted and Plaintiff inquired how to get his CCP back. Id. ¶ 20; see also Pl.'s Mot. 2. Plaintiff was informed that there was no specific time frame for when he would receive his CCP back because typically people submit a renewal application which may take a month to review. (Compl. ¶ 21.)
Plaintiff did not submit a renewal application and instead waited for the Attorney General to return his CCP, which he did not receive. Id. ¶ 22. As a result, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Superior Court on March 1, 2022 seeking (1) a declaratory judgment that the Attorney General's actions were in violation of the Rhode Island Constitution and General Laws and (2) a mandatory injunction ordering the Attorney General to return Plaintiff's CCP. See id. ¶¶ 24-27, 29.
On March 10, 2022, the Attorney General filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. (Docket.) Plaintiff objected to the Attorney General's Motion to Dismiss and filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on April 18, 2022. Id. On May 31, 2022, this Court held a hearing on the Attorney General's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and issued a bench decision that granted the Attorney General's Motion to Dismiss and denied Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (the Decision). Id.; see also Order (June 6, 2022). Judgment was entered in favor of the Attorney General on June 6, 2022. (J. (June 6, 2022) (Cruise, J.).)
On May 2, 2023, just under one year from the date of the Decision, Plaintiff filed his Motion in response to our Supreme Court's decision in Montaquila v. Neronha, 289 A.3d 568 (R.I. 2023) (Montaquila) that was issued on March 2, 2023. See generally Pl.'s Mot. The Attorney General objected to Plaintiff's Motion on May 3, 2023. (Docket.) This Court heard argument on Plaintiff's Motion on May 16, 2023. Id.
II
Standard of Review
A motion to reconsider has historically been treated as a motion to vacate under Rule 60(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Atmed Treatment Center, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Company, 285 A.3d 352, 359 (R.I. 2022). Rule 60(b) states, in pertinent part:
"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
"(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
"(2) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
"(3) Fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party;
"(4) The judgment is void;
"(5) The judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which the judgment is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
"(6) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Super. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
"'It is well settled that a motion to vacate a judgment is left to the sound discretion of the trial justice[.]'" Atmed, 285 A.3d at 359 (quoting Renewable Resources, Inc. v. Town of Westerly, 110 A.3d 1166, 1171 (R.I. 2015)). "Neither a Rule 60 motion nor a motion to reconsider may serve as a substitute for a party's failure to file a timely appeal." Turacova v. DeThomas, 45 A.3d 509, 515 (R.I. 2012).
Furthermore, a motion to reconsider "should not be undertaken lightly." Atmed, 285 A.3d at 362. "Because the prevailing party has a stake in the original decision, when confronted with a motion to reconsider, a trial justice must balance the interests of the parties against a thoughtful determination that a change of course is proper under the circumstances, a serious event to all concerned." Id. Further, the Court "must rely not on the parties' after-the-fact arguments as set forth in their papers in support of or opposition to the motion to reconsider, but rather on the arguments originally made." Id. (citing Cochran v. Quest Software, Inc., 328 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2003)) ("It is generally accepted that a party may not, on a motion for reconsideration, advance a new argument that could (and should) have been presented prior to the district court's original ruling.").
III
Analysis
Plaintiff argues that the Court should reconsider the Decision in accordance with our Supreme Court's decision in Montaquila under Rule 60(b)(6) because "the facts and travel of [Montaquila] are almost identical to the case at hand." (Pl.'s Mot. 2.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends that according to the Supreme Court's holding in Montaquila, "the only way the Attorney General can deny a renewal of a CCP is by legally competent evidence" which Plaintiff argues was not provided to him in this case. Id.
Conversely, Defendants argue that the Supreme Court's decision in Montaquila "has nothing to do with the reasons why Plaintiff's case was [previously] dismissed" and "the facts and travel of this case are nothing like Montaquila." (Objection to Plaintiff's Rule 60(b) Motion for Reconsideration (Defs.' Obj.) 4.) Specifically, Defendants submit that (1) Montaquila is distinguishable from the current case because Plaintiff never applied for a new CCP after his criminal case was dismissed and sealed; (2) the reasons why Plaintiff's case was dismissed are still applicable following Montaquila, and Plaintiff has failed to articulate how Montaquila "has any material effect on the reasons his case was properly dismissed nearly a year ago[;]" (3) Plaintiff is barred under Rhode Island's raise-or-waive rule from raising any issue with the sufficiency of the evidence to deny a CCP because Plaintiff never submitted a new application and it was not alleged in the Complaint; and (4) Plaintiff's case is moot because his CCP expired by its own terms in August of 2022. Id. at 5-8.
Before analyzing whether the Court should reconsider and vacate the Judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), a summary of Montaquila is necessary.
A
The Montaquila Case
In Montaquila, the plaintiff, Mr. Montaquila, possessed a Rhode Island CCP and was arrested for a misdemeanor which caused the Attorney General to revoke his CCP. Montaquila, 289 A.3d at 570. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Montaquila's criminal charges were dismissed, and he submitted a renewal application for his CCP that was going to expire in one month. Id. As part of the renewal application, Mr. Montaquila attached a letter explaining that his criminal charges had been dismissed and his record was scheduled to be sealed in a couple of months, i.e., after the expiration of his CCP. Id. at 570-71. While his renewal application was pending, Mr. Montaquila's criminal record was sealed; however, the Attorney General denied his renewal application because of factual discrepancies in the arrest report and the letter that he attached to the renewal application. Id. at 571.
In response to the denial, Mr. Montaquila filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with our Supreme Court seeking a review of the Attorney General's decision. Id. at 572. The Supreme Court determined that the Attorney General's denial was not based on legally competent evidence because the Attorney General clearly relied upon the arrest report-prior to it being sealed-to deny Mr. Montaquila's renewal application. Id. at 574. Consequently, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Attorney General with directions to renew Mr. Montaquila's CCP. Id. at 575.
B
Applicability of Montaquila
The Montaquila case is distinguishable from the case at bar for several reasons. First, unlike Mr. Montaquila, there is no evidence before the Court that Plaintiff ever submitted a renewal application, or an entirely new CCP application, after his CCP was revoked in September of 2021. Moreover, Mr. Montaquila filed his renewal application prior to the expiration of his revoked CCP, which is something Plaintiff did not do; his CCP expired in August of 2022 and there is no evidence of any renewal or new application prior to or after the expiration of Plaintiff's CCP. Furthermore, because there is no evidence of a renewal or new CCP application submitted by Plaintiff, there is no denial of a CCP for the Court to review, unlike the Montaquila case.
Even if there was a denial of Plaintiff's renewal or new CCP application, the proper avenue for review of that decision would not be properly before this Court pursuant to our Supreme Court's holding in Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1051 (R.I. 2004) (the only method to obtain judicial review of a denial of an application filed under G.L. 1956 § 11-47-18 is to seek a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court).
Under Rule 60(b)(6), the Court may grant relief from a judgment only "for some 'other reason justifying relief' than the reasons specified in Rule 60(b)(1) through (5) and 'only in unique circumstances to prevent manifest injustice.'" Bailey v. Algonquin Gas Transmission Company, 788 A.2d 478, 482 (R.I. 2002) (quoting Vitale v. Elliott, 120 R.I. 328, 332, 387 A.2d 1379, 1382 (1978)). However, Rule 60(b)(6) is not without limitations and is not meant to serve as a "catchall" provision. Bendix Corporation v. Norberg, 122 R.I. 155, 158, 404 A.2d 505, 506 (1979). Rule 60(b)(6)'s "'other reason clause should not be applied unless there has been a showing by appropriate evidence of circumstances that would establish a uniqueness that puts the case outside of the normal and usual circumstances accompanying failures to comply with the rules.'" McLaughlin v. Zoning Board of Review of Town of Tiverton, 186 A.3d 597, 609 (R.I. 2018) (quoting Bendix Corp., 122 R.I. at 158, 404 A.2d at 506.)
It is clear to the Court that the Montaquila case is factually distinct from the present case, and as such, the Montaquila case does not create a unique circumstance for Plaintiff that would suggest that the Court should relieve Plaintiff from the Judgment to prevent manifest injustice. See Bailey, 788 A.2d at 482. Moreover, the evidence presented by Plaintiff-i.e., the Montaquila decision-is not sufficient evidence of a unique situation that would warrant the granting of relief from the Judgment under Rule 60(b)(6). See McLaughlin, 186 A.3d at 609. Accordingly, the Court will not reconsider its Decision under Rule 60(b).
IV
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider is DENIED.