Opinion
Civil Action 21-1261
05-10-2022
MATTHEW HOESSLER, Plaintiff, v. WESTMORELAND COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, WESTMORELAND COUNTY PRISON/GREENSBURG MUNICIPAL, HEMPFIELD TOWNSHIP, ERIC B. SCHWARTZ Deputy Warden of Treatment and WEXFORD HEALTH SERVICES INC. Defendants.
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM S. STICKMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MAUREEN P. KELLY, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.
I. RECOMMENDATION
It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
II. REPORT
Plaintiff Matthew Hoessler (“Plaintiff”) brings this pro se civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and alleges claims arising from the violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights including: the denial of medical and mental health care during his confinement at the Westmoreland County Jail, an incident involving the alleged excessive use of force, and improper withdrawals from his inmate account. ECF No. 6. Plaintiff names as defendants: the Westmoreland County Sheriff's Department, Westmoreland County Prison, Greensburg Municipality, Hempfield Township, Eric B. Schwartz in his capacity as Deputy Warden of Treatment, and Wexford Health Sources Inc.
On February 1, 2022, the Westmoreland County Defendants and Wexford Health Services filed Motions to Dismiss. ECF Nos. 24 and 27. By Orders dated February 1, 2022, and February 2, 2022, Plaintiff was required to file his responses to the Motions to Dismiss on or before March 2, 2022. ECF Nos. 26 and 29. To date, Plaintiff has not filed a response to either motion.
On March 17, 2022, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause requiring Plaintiff to show cause why he failed to comply with the Court's scheduling Orders and informing Plaintiff that the failure to respond may result in dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. ECF No. 31. Plaintiff's response was due April 7, 2022. On April 13, 2022, the Order to Show Cause was returned to the Court as undeliverable, and marked “unable to forward.” ECF No. 32. A search of the Westmoreland County Inmate roster indicates that Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated at the facility and thus his address of record in this action is no longer accurate. The Court has also searched the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Inmate Locator for an updated mailing address, but Plaintiff does not appear to be in state custody. To date, Plaintiff has failed to provide a current mailing address or give any other indication that he wishes to proceed with this action. Thus, the Court is unable to communicate with Plaintiff nor advance this litigation.
See https://apps.co.westmoreland.pa.us/prison/PrisonInmates/PRISON INMATES.ASP?lname=H “Dismissal with prejudice is an ‘extreme' sanction” that should be employed as a “last, not first, resort.” Hildebrand, 923 F.3d at 132 (quoting Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976), and Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867, 869). A close case should “be resolved in favor of reaching a decision on the merits.” Id. (citing Adams v. Trs. of the N.J. Brewery Emps.' Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 870 (3d Cir. 1994)). Nevertheless, “[dismissal is a sanction rightfully in the district courts' toolbox, ” and the Third Circuit “has not hesitated to affirm the district court's imposition of sanctions, including dismissals in appropriate cases.” Id. (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 867 n. 1).
Such conduct has been deemed an abandonment of litigation justifying dismissal sua sponte pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). See Harris v. Lamas, No. 20-CV-2431, 2020 WL 6748487, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 2020).
Ordinarily, a court determining whether to sua sponte dismiss a case because of a plaintiff's failure to prosecute must consider several factors in reaching its decision, as set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984) (the “Poulis factors”). See, e.g., Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 454-55 (3d Cir. 1994). However, an analysis under Poulis is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the case or makes adjudication impossible. See Dickens v. Danberg, 700 Fed.Appx. 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Where a plaintiffs conduct clearly indicates that he willfully intends to abandon the case, or where the plaintiff's behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication of the case impossible, a
balancing of the Poulis factors is not necessary.”); Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six Poulis factors in cases where a party willfully abandons her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).
In an abundance of caution, however, the Court will apply the Poulis balancing test to determine whether this case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute. The Court must consider: 1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; 2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; 3) a history of dilatoriness; 4) whether the conduct of the party or attorney was willful or in bad faith; 5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and 6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Id. at 868. There is no “magic formula” or “mechanical calculation” to determine whether a case should be dismissed for failure to prosecute, Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992), and not all of the six factors need to weigh in favor of dismissal before dismissal is warranted. Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1988). Rather, the court must “properly consider and balance” each of the six factors based on the record. See Hildebrand v. Allegheny County, 923 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868).
The first Poulis factor requires the Court to consider the extent to which the dilatory party is personally responsible for the sanctionable conduct. See Adams, 29 F.3d at 873 (“[I]n determining whether dismissal is appropriate, we look to whether the party bears personal responsibility for the action or inaction which led to the dismissal.”). In this regard, the Court's order granting Plaintiff's motion for in forma pauperis status directs “that plaintiff must keep the court advised of plaintiff's current address at all times throughout this litigation. Specifically, plaintiff is ordered to notify the Court in writing as to any and all address changes, including all temporary transfers to another jail or prison or other facility. Plaintiff's failure to do so may result in dismissal of this action.” ECF No. 5 at 3 (emphasis omitted). Plaintiff has failed to comply or provide just cause for his failure to do so. Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he is solely responsible for his own conduct, including his failure to respond to orders from the Court. See e.g., Colon v. Karnes, 2012 WL 383666, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2012) (“Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and thus is responsible for his own actions.”). This factor weighs heavily in favor of dismissal.
With respect to the second factor -- the prejudice caused to the adversary by Plaintiff's failure to comply with this Court's orders - the Court recognizes that the Plaintiff's “continued failure to communicate with the Court and continued inaction frustrates and delays resolution of this action.” See Mack v. United States, 2019 WL 1302626, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2019) (“[F]ailure to communicate clearly prejudices the Defendants who seek a timely resolution of the case.”). However, at this early stage of the litigation, there appears to be no specific prejudice to Defendants other than the cost to prepare a motion to dismiss and general delay. Similarly, factor No. 6 -- the meritoriousness of the claim -- will be weighed neither in favor nor against Plaintiff. Nevertheless, “[n]ot all of these factors need be met for a district court to find dismissal is warranted.” Hicks, 850 F.2d at 156.
The third Poulis factor also weighs in favor of dismissal. Plaintiff's failure to respond to the Order to Show Cause is the third instance of unexcused delay. See ECF Nos. 26, 29, and 31. This conduct is sufficient to establish a history of dilatoriness.
With respect to the fourth Poulis factor, “[w]illfulness involves intentional or self-serving behavior.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874. In this case, despite a preliminary Court order to update his mailing address with each facility transfer or move, Plaintiff has failed to do so, and his failure to comply with the Court's orders therefore appears willful.
The fifth factor address the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal. Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869. It is well-established that monetary sanctions are ineffective where the Plaintiff is indigent. See, e.g., Brennan v. Clouse, 2012 WL 876228, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2012) (“Alternative sanctions, such as monetary penalties, are inappropriate as sanctions with indigent pro se parties.”) (citing Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 191 (3d Cir. 2002)). Moreover, alternative sanctions are unlikely to be effective against a party who refuses to communicate with the Court. Mack, 2019 WL 1302626, at *2 (noting that the court was “incapable of imposing a lesser sanction” on a plaintiff who refused to participate in his own lawsuit). As such, this factor weighs heavily in favor of dismissal.
On balance, the Court concludes that at least five of the six Poulis factors support dismissal, with the remaining factor (meritoriousness of claim) not weighed against nor in favor of dismissal. While the Court is mindful of the strong policy in favor of deciding cases on the merits, such a resolution is impossible where the plaintiff declines to participate in his own lawsuit. Consequently, the Court concludes that on the record presented here, the extreme sanction of dismissal is supported by the Poulis factors.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is respectfully recommended that this action be dismissed due to Plaintiff's failure to prosecute.
In accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(B) & (C), and Local Rule 72.D.2, Plaintiff is permitted to file written objections and responses thereto in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights. Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983). See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.