Opinion
04-22-00508-CR
02-07-2024
William James HODGE, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
DO NOT PUBLISH
From the 437th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2021CR9880 Honorable Melisa C. Skinner, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Beth Watkins, Justice, Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Appellant William James Hodge pled to one count of theft. The trial court suspended Hodge's sentence for four years of community supervision. After the State filed a motion to revoke, the trial court revoked Hodge's community supervision. On appeal, Hodge argues the trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing on the State's motion within the twenty-day statutory mandate. We affirm.
Background
On October 27, 2021, Hodge was indicted on a two-count indictment. Hodge pled to one count of theft, and the trial court sentenced Hodge to four years of confinement, suspended for four years of community supervision. On March 4, 2022, the State filed a motion to revoke. Hodge was later arrested on a warrant from the motion and remained in custody. On May 4, 2022, the State filed a first amended motion to revoke. The same day, Hodge filed a motion requesting a hearing on his revocation proceeding.
On May 26, 2022, a hearing was held in which Hodge, his counsel, and the State appeared. Hodge pled not true to the allegations in the State's motion to revoke, requested the trial court allow him to proceed pro se, and he requested a continuance for additional time to prepare. The trial court granted Hodge's request to proceed pro se and set a hearing on the merits of the State's motion for June 16, 2023.
After hearing from several witnesses during the June 16 hearing, the State requested a continuance because a witness was unavailable. Hodge objected to the continuance, which the trial court overruled. On July 14, 2022, the hearing reconvened. After testimony from the formerly unavailable witness, the case proceeded to closing arguments. Hodge argued, among other things, that his community supervision should be reinstated because the trial court failed to hold a hearing on the State's motion to revoke within twenty days of his request for a hearing. The trial court rejected Hodge's argument and entered judgment revoking his community supervision.
On appeal, Hodge argues the trial court committed reversible error by failing to hold a hearing on the State's motion to revoke within twenty days after he filed a motion requesting a hearing.
Applicable Law and Analysis
"At any time during the period of community supervision, the judge may issue a warrant for a violation of any condition of community supervision and cause the defendant to be arrested." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42A.751(b). Following his arrest, the defendant may be released on bail. Id. art. 42A.751(c). However, if the defendant is not released on bail, he may file a motion requesting a hearing on the State's motion to revoke, which must occur "within 20 days of the date" the defendant files his motion. Id. art. 42A.751(d); see also id. 42A.751(g) ("[T]he trial court may continue the revocation hearing for good cause shown by either the defendant or the [S]tate.").
Hodge contends he is entitled to a new hearing or the reimposition of his original community supervision terms because the trial court failed to hold a hearing within twenty days of his request. The record in this case reveals that the trial court did not have a hearing on the State's motion to revoke within twenty days of Hodge's motion. However, it is also apparent from the record that Hodge's case proceeded to a hearing on the State's motion and that Hodge received a final ruling. Where a defendant asserts a statutory challenge to confinement exceeding the twenty-day mandate, "the defendant may attack the legality of his confinement by means of the writ of habeas corpus." Aguilar v. State, 621 S.W.2d 781, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). A writ of habeas corpus-not a direct appeal-is the proper appellate vehicle to contest continued confinement because the trial court's decision to proceed with a final revocation hearing and to render a judgment more than twenty days after a defendant's request "is not 'error' which taints the trial court's decision to revoke the probation and therefore mandates a reversal of the judgment." Id.
Aguilar contemplates art. 42.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which was repealed and replaced by art. 42A.751(d) without any substantive changes.
Here, just like the defendant in Aguilar, the trial court's failure to hold a hearing within twenty days after Hodge filed his motion does not constitute reversible error. Hodge could have sought redress, if any, through the filing of a writ of habeas corpus. See id. Once the probation has been revoked, Hodge cannot be protected against confinement. Id. Relief must be obtained before the revocation. See id. Accordingly, we reject this argument.
Hodge also argues the trial court's delay violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-31 (1972). A speedy trial claim is actionable in revocation proceedings. Wisser v. State, 350 S.W.3d 161, 164 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2011, no pet.). However, Hodge did not raise this argument in the trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a); Henson v. State, 407 S.W.3d 764, 769 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (holding a speedy trial claim is subject to the rules of preservation). Constitutional speedy trial claims must be asserted in the trial court to allow the development of a sufficient record. See Henson, 407 S.W.3d at 769 ("A requirement that the appellant assert his complaint at the trial level enables the court to hold a hearing and develop this record so that the appellate courts may more accurately assess [a speedy trial] claim."). By failing to raise the claim below, Hodge failed to preserve a constitutional speedy trial complaint for our review. We overrule Hodge's sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.