Opinion
98-CV-2389(JMR/RLE).
March, 2001.
ORDER
Plaintiff claims defendant discriminated against him when it sold a parcel of real estate to another individual. The matter is now before the Court on defendant's motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Fed.R.Civ.P."). For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is granted.
I. Background
The property in question lies within the boundaries of defendant, Clay County, Minnesota. Prior to the County's acquisition of the property, the land was owned by a private party. In 1991, petroleum contamination was reported on the site. The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency ("MPCA") remediated the condition and consequently placed a $1.3 million environmental lien against it. Ultimately, back taxes on the property resulted in a tax foreclosure by the County.
Plaintiff, Christopher Hodge, is a disabled veteran of African-American descent who wished to lease or purchase the land. On July 12, 1996, he claims he approached Pauline Sarbaum, the Clay County Auditor, with a proposal to lease the property. The County had no interest in selling or leasing the property because it did not yet own the land. [Goering Aff., Ex. 2.] The County Board did not consider a proposal to claim the land by forfeiture until the July 23, 1996, County Board meeting; and it was at this meeting that the County foreclosed. Id.
Defendant claims plaintiff sought only to purchase the land in July, 1996. However, because this matter is before the Court on a summary judgment motion, the Court treats the facts alleged in the non-moving party's pleadings and affidavits as true. Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305, 310 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2338 (1993). The Court, therefore, assumes for purposes of this motion, that plaintiff's first effort to secure the property occurred in 1996.
After foreclosure, the County continued to lease a portion of the property to Ronald Fitzgerald, who held a tenancy on the property at the time it was forfeited. [Goering Aff., Ex. 3.] The lease was terminable upon 30 days notice. Mr. Fitzgerald is a Caucasian. Id.
In November, 1996, Mr. Hodge again expressed an interest in the property, which carried a $350,000 appraisal. [Hodge Decl., Ex. 7.] At this time, he offered either to purchase the entire parcel for the sum of $81,490 — representing the back taxes owed on the property — or to lease the entire parcel for the sum of $825 per month for a ten year period. [Hodge Decl., Ex. 6.] Mr. Hodge resubmitted this offer at the Clay County Board meeting in February, 1997. [Goering Aff., Ex. 2, at 4; Ex. 10.] On each occasion, his offer was declined.
The County began preparations to sell the parcel at a tax forfeiture sale on December 17, 1997. The sale was advertised in both November and December of 1997. [Goering Aff., Ex. 13.] Notwithstanding these advertisements, the Board, at its December 9, 1997, meeting, voted to remove the parcel from the sale. According to the County, the Board withdrew the parcel because the pollution remediation lien had not been removed or reduced by the MPCA. [Goering Aff., Ex. 14.] Mr. Hodge, apparently unaware that the property had been withdrawn, attended the December 17 sale. [Hodge Aff., ~8.] Mr. Hodge was told at the conclusion of the sale that the property had been pulled because of the environmental lien. Id.
Plaintiff's counsel acknowledged at oral argument that the County Board did not know if anyone would bid on the property when it decided to remove it from the sale.
Following the Board's December 9, 1997, meeting, it sent the MPCA a letter proposing options under which the lien might be removed or reduced. [Goering Aff., Ex. 15.] The MPCA responded by submitting a proposal which included selling the property at public auction for a minimum of $300,000, and remitting the proceeds from the sale, minus property taxes and expenses, to the MPCA. [Goering Aff., Ex. 16.] The proposal further required the removal of underground tanks on the site. Id. The County reviewed the proposal at its meeting on June 2, 1998, and accepted the terms. [Goering Aff., Ex. 18.] The County advertised and accepted bids for the tank removal [Goering Aff., Ex. 19], which was subsequently performed in October, 1998. [Goering Aff., Ex. 24.] Finally, on May 25, 1999, the property, unencumbered by the environmental lien, was offered for sale. At this sale — open to the public, including Mr. Hodge — the County, pursuant to its agreement with the MPCA, set a minimum price of $300,000 for the property. The property was zoned for agricultural businesses only. [Goering Aff., Ex. 26.]
According to the County, the property did not draw any bids at the May 25, 1999, sale. [Goering Aff., Ex. 31.] On July 6, 1999, the Board was informed that a third-party was interested in the property but wanted it rezoned. Id. Later that day, the property was sold to the third-party for $300,000, without any rezoning condition. Id.
Mr. Hodge then brought this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Minnesota Human Rights Act.
II. Analysis
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 246 (1986). The party opposing summary judgment may not rest upon the allegations in its pleadings, but must produce significant probative evidence demonstrating a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 248-49. See also Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395-96 (8th Cir. 1992).
If the opposing party fails to carry that burden, or fails to establish the existence of an essential element of its case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment should be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Elec. Coop., Inc., 838 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff's §§ 1983 and 1981 claims are analyzed under the familiar McDonnell Douglas/Burdine test. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973); Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) test. See also Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046, 1056 (8th Cir. 1997).
Under this framework, plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of race discrimination. See Hill v. St. Louis University, 123 F.3d 1114, 1119 (8th Cir. 1997).
To do so, he must show he (a) was within a protected class; (b) applied for, and was qualified to purchase or lease the property; (c) had his offers rejected; and (d) the property remained available after the rejection and was sold or leased to a similarly-situated person not a member of the protected class. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
See also Clark v. Runyon, 218 F.3d 915, 918 (8th Cir. 2000).
A. The Lease Offers
Mr. Hodge is a member of a protected class. There is no dispute the property was initially leased and later sold to someone outside of the protected class. This does not, however, conclude the inquiry.
Mr. Hodge's first assertion of discrimination by the County stems from his July 12, 1996, offer to lease or purchase the property. This incident cannot support his discrimination claim, however. This is because the County did not own the property at the time. As such, the County lacked the power to rent or sell it to anyone. It was not until the County voted to foreclose on the property at its July 23, 1996, Board meeting that it had the power to do anything with the land.
Mr. Hodge acknowledges that he did not attend the County Board meetings which authorized the County to forfeit the property, and at which the Board decided to lease portions of it pending sale. He has offered no evidence to rebut the Board's assertion of a long-standing policy of only extending leases for current tenants, and of not offering leases of foreclosed property to the general public. It is undisputed that the only tenants who leased portions of the land merely continued their leases.
As a result, Mr. Hodge cannot satisfy element (d) of the standard for a prima facie case because he was not a tenant of the property. Thus, he is unable to show that he is similarly-situated to the person who was allowed to lease a small portion of the property pending sale.
Mr. Hodge also claims he should have been able to operate the property with an environmental lien against it, because he was certified under the MPCA's Voluntary Investigation and Cleanup Program ("VIC"), and the other tenants were not. This argument, however, does not address the critical issue of whether Mr. Hodge was treated differently than similarly-situated people who were outside the protected class. The County simply did not open leases to new tenants whether certified under the VIC or not; it merely continued current leases for the same rental price — which was the Board's established policy. [Hughes Aff.]
Mr. Hodge made subsequent offers in November, 1996, and February, 1997. Again, his claims fail because he cannot satisfy element (d) by showing he was similarly-situated to those who were extended leases. As mentioned above, the County did not open leases to new tenants; instead, it followed its customary policy by continuing current leases for the same rental price. [Hughes Aff.] Further, the County's statement that it wanted to sell the property as soon as possible and get it back on the tax rolls, thereby precluding a long-term lease, stands unrebutted. The County never entered into long-term leases with the current tenants, which was the only deal Mr. Hodge proposed; in fact, he specifically told the County he did not want a short-term lease because it would not be financially profitable. [Hodge Aff., Ex. 8.] Again, plaintiff fails to show how he was treated differently than similarly-situated members of the public.
B. The Purchase Offers
Plaintiff's proposals to purchase the property also fail to allege a prima facie case of disparate treatment. It is undisputed that the parcel of land was not for sale when Mr. Hodge made his offers of July 12, 1996; November, 1996; and February, 1997. After that, however, the property was offered in an advertised, public sale. It defies credulity to assert that Mr. Hodge was somehow treated differently than similarly-situated persons, when he did not even attempt to bid on the property at the public sale. As a result, having failed to make an offer, he cannot possibly prove his non-existent offer was rejected.
More than a month later, the ultimate purchaser made a successful bid to the County Board [Goering Aff., Ex. 31] and bought the parcel for $300,000. Id. Mr. Hodge has neither suggested nor offered any evidence showing he made any kind of similar offer. In fact, he does not allege he made any offer at all during the time between the public auction and the date the property sold. Consequently, Mr. Hodge has not shown a triable question of whether he was treated differently than similarly-situated persons.
Having failed to meet the burden of establishing a prima facie case for disparate treatment, the County's motion for summary judgment is granted on plaintiff's §§ 1983 and 1981 claims. Because the remaining claim — an alleged violation of the Minnesota Human Rights Act — is a state claim, this Court declines to exercise its discretion to accept jurisdiction over this supplemental claim and opts to dismiss it, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3).
III. Conclusion
Based on the files, records, and proceedings herein, and for the reasons set forth above, IT IS ORDERED that:
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted, and plaintiff's § 1983 and § 1981 claims are dismissed with prejudice.
2. Plaintiff's state law claims are dismissed without prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.