Opinion
Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-1232
04-08-2020
RANDALL HOCKETT, Petitioner, v. ORLANDO HARPER, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is the petition for a writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 18) filed by state prisoner Randall Hockett ("Petitioner") under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Federal district courts have a pre-service duty to screen and summarily dismiss habeas petitions that plainly show the petitioner is not entitled to relief. See Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the Court dismiss the petition without prejudice because Petitioner is exhausting his state-court remedies.
II. REPORT
A. Relevant Background
On September 17, 2019, a jury convicted Petitioner in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County ("the trial court") of numerous offenses, including two counts of assault of a law enforcement officer and one count of firearms not to be carried without a license. On December 9, 2019, the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate term of 47-87 years of imprisonment.
Petitioner's criminal case is at the trial court's docket numbered CP-02-CR-2538-2018. He attached to his petition a printout of its docket sheet. (ECF No. 18-1). An up-to-date version of the docket sheet is available to the public online at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us and the Court takes judicial notice of it.
The purpose of a writ of habeas corpus is to challenge the legal authority under which a prisoner is held in custody. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Petitioner claims that he is entitled to the writ and in support he raises four grounds for relief. He alleges that his convictions were obtained in violation of this rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. He also asserts that he is innocent.
Petitioner acknowledges that he is exhausting his state-court remedies. He filed a pro se post-sentence motion with the trial court within days after it imposed his sentenced. The trial court recently appointed a new attorney, Kathryn Simmers, Esq., for him and she filed a motion to amend his post-sentence motion on January 14, 2020. If the trial court ultimately denies Petitioner's request for post-sentence relief, he will then be able to raise his claims to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in a direct appeal. In the event that Petitioner does not receive the relief he seeks on direct review, he will have the opportunity to raise additional federal constitutional challenges to his conviction in a state collateral proceeding under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq.
Petitioner initiated this case on September 26, 2019, which was after the jury had convicted him but before the trial court imposed his judgment of sentence. Because Petitioner had not paid the filing fee or moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court issued an order advising him that the case could not proceed until he did one of those two things. (ECF No. 2). The Court also provided Petitioner with the standard form for habeas cases proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which is the federal habeas statute that, in relevant part, applies to state prisoners who are challenging the validity of their custody prior to the issuance of a state-court judgment of sentence. Brian R. Means, FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL § 1.34, Westlaw (database updated May 2019); Spence v. Venango County Court of Common Pleas, No. 12-cv-107, 2014 WL 3055391, 2 (W.D. Pa. July 3, 2014) ("While [28 U.S.C.] § 2254 applies to post-trial situations, the more general habeas corpus statute of 28 U.S.C. § 2241 does provide federal courts with jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus before a state judgment is rendered, but only in very limited circumstances."). The Court granted Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis on February 6, 2020. (ECF No. 13). By that date, the trial court had imposed Petitioner's judgment of sentence and, therefore, he had to proceed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which is the federal habeas statute that applies to "a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). Thus, the Court provided Petitioner with the standard form for § 2254's cases and directed him to file it, which he did on March 10, 2020. (ECF No. 18).
B. Discussion
State prisoners must complete the exhaustion of their available state-court remedies before a district court may determine the merits of their habeas claims. Congress codified this requirement at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c). These provisions provide:
(b)(1) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that -
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or
(B) (i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or
(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.
- - -
(c) An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.
The exhaustion requirement is "grounded in principles of comity; in a federal system, the States should have the first opportunity to address and correct alleged violations of state prisoner's federal rights." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991). Federal court intervention would be premature whenever a state procedure still affords a petitioner with an opportunity to obtain relief from the judgment of sentence that he seeks to attack in a federal habeas proceeding. See, e.g., Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 513 (3d Cir. 1998) ("The exhaustion requirement does not foreclose federal relief, but merely postpones it.").
The general rule is that the district court must dismiss a federal habeas petition when the petitioner has available remedies in state court. See, e.g., Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 273-79 (2005) (discussing the general rule as set forth in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) and the limited exception to it, which does not apply in this case). That rule applies here. There is no basis to exempt Petitioner from the exhaustion requirement under either § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i) or (ii). Therefore, the Court should dismiss the petition without prejudice to Petitioner commencing another federal habeas case if, after the exhaustion of his state-court remedies, he does not receive the relief he seeks in state court.
After Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), federal habeas courts were faced with how to resolve the interaction between AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)) and the pre-AEDPA rule set forth in Lundy that required that federal courts dismiss without prejudice habeas petitions that contain unexhausted claims. Rhines, 544 U.S. at 275. In Rhines, the Supreme Court held that in order to avoid predicaments that may arise in attempting to comply with AEDPA's statute of limitations while at the same time exhausting claims in state court, a state prisoner may file a "protective" habeas petition in federal court and ask the district court to stay the federal habeas proceeding until state remedies are exhausted. There is no reason to stay this case while Petitioner exhausts his state-court remedies. His judgment of sentence is not yet final and, therefore, AEDPA's statute of limitations has not even begun to run. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 149-54 (2012) (judgment becomes final under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of time for seeking such review).
C. Certificate of Appealability
AEDPA codified standards governing the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate review of a district court's disposition of a habeas petition. It provides that "[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from...the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court[.]" 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). It also provides that "[a] certificate of appealability may issue...only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." Id. § 2253(c)(2).
This Court need not make a certificate of appealability determination because "[a] district court's order dismissing, without prejudice, a petition for federal habeas relief for failure to exhaust state-court remedies is not a final appealable order, since it explicitly entitles the petitioner to renew habeas proceedings upon completion of review of his claims in the state court system." FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL § 12:30 (citations omitted). See also Gacho v. Butler, 792 F.3d 732, 735-37 (7th Cir. 2015). To the extent a certificate of appealability determination is required, Petitioner is not entitled to one because jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether his claims should be dismissed because he is exhausting his state-court remedies. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
III. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the Court dismiss the petition (ECF No. 18) without prejudice. Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, Petitioner is allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011). Dated: April 8, 2020
/s/ Patricia L. Dodge
PATRICIA L. DODGE
United States Magistrate Judge