Opinion
J. A15023/16 No. 1643 EDA 2015 No. 1739 EDA 2015
10-04-2016
LISA PAIGE HELMKAMP HOBYAK, Appellant v. MICHAEL SCOTT HOBYAK LISA PAIGE HELMKAMP HOBYAK v. MICHAEL SCOTT HOBYAK, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order, April 28, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Civil Division at No. 93-08569 BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., PANELLA AND FITZGERALD, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
Lisa Paige Helmkamp Hobyak ("Wife") and Michael Scott Hobyak ("Husband") each appeal from the trial court's March 6, 2015 amended equitable distribution order, as made final by the entry of a divorce decree on April 28, 2015. After careful review, we affirm on the basis of the comprehensive and well-reasoned Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinions of the Honorable John L. Braxton.
The trial court summarized the relevant facts and procedural history of this case as follows:
[Wife] and [Husband] were married on April 16, 1983. On or about June 14, 1993, Wife filed a Complaint in Divorce; however, thereafter, the parties reconciled until their ultimate separation on January 2, 2004. From 2004 until 2011, multiple petitions and appeals were filed including petitions related to the following: injunctive relief, discovery issue resolution, contempt allegations, special relief requests, conference requests, requests to relist, and multiple appeals to the Superior Court. On or about September 6, 2011, the Honorable Kathrynne Durham issued an Order after a hearing Ordering that "if [there is] an appeal from the recommendation of the hearing officer, Donald Lehrkinder, Esquire, the appeal will be assigned to the Honorable John L. Braxton."
Thereafter the Equitable Distribution hearing officer, Master Lehrkinder[,] issued a recommendation which was signed as an Order of Court and thereafter appealed on September 20, 2011 upon [Wife's] Request for a hearing de novo. A hearing was scheduled before the Honorable John L. Braxton for January 4, 2012. At the hearing, Stipulations of the Parties (hereafter "the Stipulation") were presented to the Trial Court and a Court Order was entered thereafter on January 10, 2012, entering the Stipulation as an Order of Court. The Stipulation contained background information of the parties, including Wife's W-2 information for the years 2007-2010, Husband's gross and net income for 2002-2011, the parties' marriage information, stipulated values of certain marital assets, the parties' agreed upon separate assets, and certain information relative to Wife's support claim.
At the hearing, both parties' waived their right to present live testimony, choosing instead, "to proceed by colloquy with the Court where I [Counsel for Husband] state our position with regard to various positions, Ms. Casale [Counsel for Wife] states the position of [Wife], and the Judge then if he has any questions of either of us [counsel] or you [Husband] and [Wife] will do it in a manner without you getting on the witness stand and testifying." Both parties responded on the record that they understood and agreed to the procedure as outlined by their counsel. Importantly, this was a scheme developed and agreed to exclusively by the parties. The [trial c]ourt permitted counsel to try the case as they [chose] to do and accepted counsel's summation of testimony and evidence, as the parties mutually agreed on how to procedurally advance at trial.
Counsel likewise jointly agreed to supplement the record post-hearing by agreeing on the record to submit various proofs and items. Counsel agreed to submit certain items and proofs directly to the Trial Court in lieu of presenting testimony and evidence during the Trial Court proceeding. Both parties were fully cognizant that the Trial Court would be considering post-trial submissions in rendering an Equitable Distribution Order, this again being a joint decision by the parties. Indeed, the parties' requested the Trial Court to consider post-trial submissions and such submissions, although available to each other for review, were never objected to in written form or otherwise. Importantly, both counsel had abundant opportunity to review the hefty submissions and make objections as the Equitable Distribution Order was not issued until November 25, 2013.
On or about January 2, 2014, Wife, by and through her counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the November 25, 2013 Order. On or about July 14, 2014, the Trial Court held a hearing on Wife's Motion for Reconsideration and Husband's response thereto. After the July 14, 2014
hearing, the Trial Court found sufficient grounds to reconsider portions of the November 25, 2013 Order, although specifically refusing to rehear the case in its entirety as Wife requested. Wife was, however, granted an additional hearing with respect to a certain parcel of property, 3805-A Otter Street, Bristol, Pennsylvania (hereafter "3805-A Otter Street")[,] which Wife contended was an asset never before disclosed to her. A full and fair hearing on the limited issue of 3805-A Otter Street occurred on January 7, 2015.Trial court opinion, 9/18/15 at 2-5 (No. 1643 EDA 2015) (citations to notes of testimony and footnotes omitted; some bracketed information in original).
On or about March 6, 2015, the Trial Court entered an Amended Equitable Distribution Order, which corrected certain valuations that were inconsistent with the Stipulation (although consistent with certain of the parties' post-trial submissions), modified the November 25, 2013 Order based upon the parties' joint representation that the Stipulation erroneously contained the incorrect number of shares of Bancorp stock, and furthermore found 3805-A Otter Street to be a pre-marital asset with a de minimus increase in value based upon its assessment and the landlocked nature of the parcel at issue.
On April 28, 2015, the trial court entered a decree in divorce, which made final its March 6, 2015 amended equitable distribution order. On May 26, 2015, Wife filed a timely notice of appeal, and Husband filed a timely cross-appeal on June 8, 2015. Both parties complied with the trial court's directive and filed timely concise statements of errors complained of on appeal, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Thereafter, on September 22, 2015, the trial court filed separate Rule 1925(a) opinions addressing each party's claims. ( See id.; trial court opinion, 9/22/15 (No. 1739 EDA 2015).)
Our standard of review of awards of equitable distribution is well settled:
A trial court has broad discretion when fashioning an award of equitable distribution. Our standard of review when assessing the propriety of an order effectuating the equitable distribution of marital property is whether the trial court abused its discretion by a misapplication of the law or failure to follow proper legal procedure. We do not lightly find an abuse of discretion, which requires a showing of clear and convincing evidence. This Court will not find an abuse of discretion unless the law has been overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence in the certified record. In determining the propriety of an equitable distribution award, courts must consider the distribution scheme as a whole. We measure the circumstances of the case against the objective of effectuating economic justice between the parties and achieving a just determination of their property rights.Reber v. Reiss , 42 A.3d 1131, 1134 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied , 62 A.3d 380 (Pa. 2012), citing Biese v. Biese , 979 A.2d 892, 895 (Pa.Super. 2009).
In fashioning an equitable distribution award, the trial court is required to consider, at the very least, the enumerated factors set forth in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a)(1)-(11). However, this court has noted that,
[t]here is no simple formula by which to divide marital property. The method of distribution derives from the facts of the individual case. The list of
factors [enumerated in Section 3502(a)] serves as a guideline for consideration, although the list is neither exhaustive nor specific as to the weight to be given the various factors. Thus, the court has flexibility of method and concomitantly assumes responsibility in rendering its decisions.Wang v. Feng , 888 A.2d 882, 888 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citations omitted).
Instantly, Wife raises 11 multi-layered issues in her 77-page appellate brief to this court. ( See Wife's brief at 13-16.) Wife's Rule 1925(b) statement, in turn, raises 20 claims of error, some of which have not been briefed on appeal. After a thorough review of the record, including the briefs of the parties and the applicable law, and in light of this court's scope and standard of review, it is our determination that there is no merit to the issues Wife raises on appeal. We conclude that the trial court's September 22, 2015 opinion authored in response to Wife's Rule 1925(b) statement comprehensively discusses and disposes of each of her claims. ( See trial court opinion, 9/22/15 (No. 1643 EDA 2015).) For the ease of our discussion, we have set forth the applicable pages of the trial court's opinion where each of these claims is addressed, and adopt those portions as our own for purposes of this appellate review.
1. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion and misapply the law when it evenly divided the marital estate given the length of the marriage, the tremendous disparity in income between the parties, and the disparities between the separate, non-marital estates of the parties?Wife's brief at 13, 45 (emphasis added); addressed in trial court opinion, 9/22/15 at 9-11 (No. 1643 EDA 2015).
2. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion and misapply the law when it ignored the stipulated earnings history of Wife, and found that, at the time of the hearing, Wife was employed by Hope Paige Designs, Inc., and held an interest in Hope Paige Designs, Inc. when, at the time of the hearing, Wife was never a shareholder, officer, director, or partner of Hope Paige Designs, Inc., and was otherwise unemployed?Wife's brief at 13, 51 (emphasis added); addressed in trial court opinion, 9/22/15 at 9-11 (No. 1643 EDA 2015).
3. Did the Trial Court commit an abuse of discretion, misapply the law, and fail to follow proper legal procedure when it determined Husband's earnings and future earning capacity when it did not consider, as set forth in the Stipulation of the Parties, Husband's 2009 income of $1,690,000.24 and Husband's 2011 income of $2,668,109.00, and when it ignored the credible evidence regarding Husband's ability to receive future bonuses from the business, ignored the fact that Husband was running the business, and ignored the fact that, pursuant to a May 6, 2010 agreement with [his] father, Husband has full control and authority over the business?Wife's brief at 13-14, 53 (emphasis added); addressed in trial court opinion, 9/22/15 at 11 (No. 1643 EDA 2015).
4. Did the Trial Court abuse discretion and misapply the law when it accepted and
permitted Husband to claim 3803 Otter Street was pre-marital property, where, throughout the litigation and until the day before trial, Husband represented that it was marital property, and when it ignored the stipulated increase in value of 3803 Otter Street when Husband presented no credible evidence to establish the value at the time of the gift?Wife's brief at 14, 56 (emphasis added); addressed in trial court opinion, 9/22/15 at 11-12 (No. 1643 EDA 2015).
5. Did the Trial Court commit an abuse of discretion and misapply the law when it ignored the sworn testimony of Wife's expert appraiser as to the value 3805 Otter Street, and imposed upon Wife the duty to present evidence of the alleged value of the gift of 3805 Otter Street to Husband?Wife's brief at 14, 58 (emphasis added); addressed in trial court opinion, 9/22/15 at 12-13 (No. 1643 EDA 2015).
6. Did the Trial Court commit an abuse of discretion and misapply the law when it ignored the New Jersey litigation between the parties involving Rycoja, maintained the parties' status and interest as partners in Rycoja, and credited the Husband with $85,734.00 he paid in taxes on the management fees he improperly received from Rycoja, which he was ordered to repay by the New Jersey Court, thereby not providing for an equitable distribution of all marital property and leaving the parties involved in continuing litigation?Wife's brief at 14-15, 60 (emphasis added); addressed in trial court opinion, 9/22/15 at 13-14 (No. 1643 EDA 2015); see also trial court opinion, 9/22/15 at 7-8 (No. 1739 EDA 2015).
7. Did the Trial Court commit an abuse of discretion and misapply the law when after the Trial Court granted Wife's Motion for Reconsideration, the Trial Court did not permit the parties to introduce updated appraisals and evidence regarding the value of and the depreciation of debt encumbering appreciating martial assets, such as inter alia Rycoja, 3803 Otter Street, and the Dreyfus IRA, which all appreciated in value between the date of the hearing, in January 2012 and the Court's Amended Equitable Distribution Order, entered March 6, 2015?Wife's brief at 15, 65 (emphasis added); addressed in trial court opinion, 9/22/15 at 14 (No. 1643 EDA 2015).
8. Did the Trial Court commit an abuse of discretion and misapply the law by not including the cash value of the Lincoln Benefit Life Insurance policy in the marital estate where the life insurance trust created by Husband had expired, thereby making him the owner of the life insurance, and where, until the eve of trial, Husband had represented that the cash value was included in the marital estate?Wife's brief at 15, 67 (emphasis added); addressed in trial court opinion, 9/22/15 at 16 (No. 1643 EDA 2015).
9. Did the Trial Court commit an abuse of discretion and misapply the law when it
credited Husband for (i) repairs to the marital home where there was no evidence to prove that Husband, and not his Company, paid for the repairs and issued payment for those repairs from his personal accounts; (ii) credited Husband for voluntary post-separation payments to Wife consisting gifts and expense payments, and (iii) failed to provide Wife with 100% credit for payments she made for repairs and maintenance of the marital home?Wife's brief at 15-16, 69 (emphasis added); addressed in trial court opinion, 9/22/15 at 17 (No. 1643 EDA 2015).
10. Did the Trial Court commit an abuse discretion and misapply the law when it refused to consider post-separation, marital estate distributions totaling $91,000.00 that Husband received from Second Generation, which were specifically excluded from income for support and alimony pendente lite purposes and, therefore, should have been considered at the time equitable distribution?Wife's brief at 16, 71 (emphasis added); addressed in trial court opinion, 9/22/15 at 18 (No. 1643 EDA 2015).
We note that there is a typo on page 17, line 19 of the trial court's September 22, 2015 opinion, wherein the trial court inadvertently replaced the word "Appellee" (Husband) with "Appellant" (Wife). ( See trial court opinion, 9/22/15 at 17 (No. 1643 EDA 2015).) It is apparent from the context that this sentence should properly read: "Appellee (Husband), however, produced credible evidence that he did not actually receive the entire amount due to tax liabilities amounting to $85,734.00." ( Id.) --------
Additionally, Wife raises the following issue with respect to Husband's claims on cross-appeal:
11. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion, misapply the law, and fail to follow proper legal procedure when after the trial in this matter, the Trial Court granted Wife's Motion for Reconsideration?Wife's brief at 16, 73 (emphasis added).
Husband, in turn, raises the following issues in his cross-appeal:
1. Whether the Trial Court erred as a matter of law in issuing an equitable distribution order on March [6], 2015 when it never issued an Order granting reconsideration within thirty (30) days of the original equitable distribution Order of November 23, 2013, which would make the aforementioned Order a final, unappealed Order of Court Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1930.2?Husband's brief at 15.
2. Whether the Trial Court erred as a matter of law in issuing an equitable distribution order on March [6], 2015 when more than one hundred and twenty (120) days had expired since the time in which the Court could have issued an Order granting reconsideration, that being May 6, 2014, which would make the aforementioned Order a final, unappealed Order of Court Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1930.2?
The trial court filed an opinion with regard to Husband's cross-appeal wherein it comprehensively discusses and disposes of these claims, with appropriate reference to the record and without legal error. ( See trial court opinion, 9/22/15 at 6 (No. 1739 EDA 2015).) Upon review, we affirm on the basis of that opinion as well for purposes of this appellate review.
Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's March 6, 2015 amended order of equitable distribution, made final by the April 28, 2015 divorce decree.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 10/4/2016
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