Opinion
D057521
08-16-2011
ALLEN ROY HOBBS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
(Super. Ct. No. EHC01228)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Imperial County, Jeffrey B. Jones, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (the Department) appeals an order granting Allen Roy Hobbs's petition for writ of habeas corpus and directing the Department to close Hobbs's work-related savings account and transfer the funds to his inmate trust account. We modify the order so that it grants Hobbs's petition for writ of mandate, rather than petition for writ of habeas corpus, and affirm the order as modified.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We report the facts as alleged in Hobbs's petition, which we accept as true because the Department did not file a return or otherwise controvert those facts. (See, e.g., California Portland Cement Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1967) 67 Cal.2d 578, 582, fn. 5; Kody P. v. Superior Court (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1030, 1033; Titmas v. Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 738, 741.)
Hobbs is an inmate of Calipatria State Prison serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a 1992 conviction of murder with a robbery special circumstance. (See Pen. Code, §§ 187, 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A).) From August 1997 to August 2003, he participated in a joint venture program (JVP) of employment between the Department and a private corporation. (See Pen. Code, § 2717.1 et seq.; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3480 et seq.) The Department terminated Hobbs's participation in the JVP, in part because he is serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.
JVP's were created by the passage of Proposition 139, an initiative that the voters approved in 1990 and that is now codified in part as Penal Code sections 2717.1 through 2717.9. (Vasquez v. State of California (2008) 45 Cal.4th 243, 248.) Proposition 139 "instructs the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to establish joint venture programs with private employers within state prison facilities to employ inmates [citations]." (Vasquez, at p. 248.) "The purposes of Proposition 139 are to (1) require inmates to 'work as hard as the taxpayers who provide for their upkeep,' (2) provide funds from which inmates can reimburse the State for a portion of their costs of incarceration, satisfy restitution fines and support their families, and (3) assist in inmates' rehabilitation and teach skills they may use after their release from prison." (Vasquez v. State of California (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 849, 851.)
Pursuant to regulations governing JVP's, 20 percent of Hobbs's net wages after taxes was deposited into a mandatory, interest-bearing savings account under the control of the Department (hereafter, "the JVP funds"). (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3485, subd. (i).) In January 2007, the JVP funds totaled $4,000. Since November 2007, Hobbs has been trying, without success, to access the JVP funds so that he can retain a lawyer to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Hobbs exhausted his administrative remedies within the Department when its Director denied his appeal. B. Trial Court Proceedings
Hobbs commenced this action by filing in the trial court a verified "petition for writ of habeas corpus," which according to its caption, "in the alternative, may be construed as a petition for writ of mandate and prohibition." (Capitalization omitted.) Hobbs alleged that the Department "has refused to return any part of [the JVP funds] on the illogical premise that they are reserved for his release . . . when he is in fact serving a life without the possibility of parole sentence." According to Hobbs, "By prison officials seizing and refusing to return [his] money until the time of his parole, which is statutorily unavailable to him, they are permanently depriving him from ever receiving his property . . . ," in violation of his federal constitutional rights. He further argued that "[t]he absence of logic in the statutory authority and California Code of Regulations cited in the denial and refusal to release the funds violates every concept of due process of law." Hobbs requested that the trial court issue a writ of habeas corpus directing the Department to release the JVP funds to his attorney or, alternatively, to issue an order directing the Department to show cause why the court should not order it to release the funds.
The trial court issued an order to show cause directing the Department to "address procedural issues as well as the merits of the petition." The court also authorized Hobbs to "file a denial within 30 days of service of the return."
The Department did not file a return. Instead, it filed an "informal response" in the form of a letter to the trial court in which it argued that it was precluded from releasing the JVP funds because "the statutory [sic] provisions mandate that a certain percentage be retained until [Hobbs's] release from prison — an event which will never occur." The following day, the Department filed with the trial court another letter, which attached what purported to be a copy of the inmate-employee work agreement Hobbs signed when he entered the JVP.
In his traverse, Hobbs asserted that the Department should have filed a formal return instead of an informal letter response. Hobbs repeated his principal argument that he had a constitutionally protected property interest in the JVP funds and that the Department was depriving him of that interest by refusing to disburse the funds until his release from prison, an event that will never occur because he is serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.
Because the Department did not file a return to the order to show cause, the trial court deemed the allegations of Hobbs's petition uncontroverted and determined that no substantial factual dispute required an evidentiary hearing. The court granted the petition and directed the Department to close Hobbs's JVP account and to transfer the JVP funds to his inmate trust account.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We begin by setting out the appropriate standard of review in this unusual case. As noted, the Department disobeyed the trial court's order to show cause and did not file a return to Hobbs's petition. The Department's informal letter response, which raised only legal arguments, and its subsequent letter, which attached an unauthenticated, unverified copy of Hobbs's inmate-employee work agreement, do not satisfy the requirements of a return. (See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Superior Court (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1286-1287 [unverified document consisting principally of legal arguments was not a return]; Dr. Ing H.C. F. Porsche A.G. v. Superior Court (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 755, 758 [letter requesting memorandum of points and authorities be adopted in lieu of formal return was not a return].) Since the Department did not file a return, "the facts alleged in [Hobbs's] petition must be accepted as true and the 'facts' alleged by [the Department] must be ignored" (Binder v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 893, 896, fn. 1; see also fn. 1, ante); and "the cause will be treated as before us on the petition which we will treat as not controverted, as though submitted upon demurrer" (Ringel v. Superior Court (1942) 54 Cal.App.2d 34). We thus accept as true all material facts properly alleged in the petition, disregard any conclusions of law, and determine de novo whether the petition states a cause of action warranting relief. (Stanton v. Dumke (1966) 64 Cal.2d 199, 201; Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 210, 225-226.) B. Hobbs Stated a Cause of Action Entitling Him to Access to the JVP Funds
The ultimate issue before us is whether Hobbs's petition stated a cause of action entitling him to recover the JVP funds. To decide that issue, we must answer three questions: (1) Does Hobbs have a property interest in the JVP funds? (2) Is the Department violating that interest by refusing to allow him access to the JVP funds? (3) To what relief, if any, is Hobbs entitled? We will address each question in turn.
1. Hobbs Has a Property Interest in the JVP Funds The first issue is whether Hobbs has a property interest in the JVP funds. "Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits." (Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth (1972) 408 U.S. 564, 577.) Under California law, a prisoner retains a general right to own and transfer personal property while in prison. (Pen. Code, § 2601, subd. (a).) The JVP statutes specifically create a property interest in the wages participating inmates earn. (See Pen. Code, § 2717.8 [requiring compensation of JVP participants at prevailing wage levels]; Wicker v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections (2004) 360 S.C. 421, 424 [602 S.E.2d 56, 58] (Wicker) [statute mandating that inmates be paid prevailing wage creates property interest].) The JVP regulations expressly recognize an inmate's property interest in the 20 percent of net wages deposited in a mandatory savings account under the control of the Department by stating that such savings "shall be retained for the inmate" and "shall be provided to the inmate upon their release." (Cal Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3485, subd. (i), hereafter section 3485(i) or section 3485(i)(3), as appropriate.) Further, the Department acknowledges that "there is no dispute that the money contained in an inmate's [JVP] account belongs to the inmate and is being held in trust for the inmate's benefit upon his release." We therefore conclude that Hobbs has a property interest in the JVP funds.
Other courts have recognized that inmates have a property interest in wages earned by participation in prison work programs. (See, e.g., Ward v. Ryan (9th Cir. 2010) 623 F.3d 807, 811 (Ward)["Arizona created a protected property interest in inmate wages by statute"]; Brooks v. George County, Miss. (5th Cir. 1996) 84 F.3d 157, 164 ["Mississippi law creates a cognizable property right in wages for a pretrial detainee's work on public property"]; Rudolph v. Cuomo (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 916 F.Supp. 1308, 1315-1316 [inmates possess property interest in wages earned under statutory scheme mandating compensation for work]; Wicker, supra, 602 S.E.2d at p. 58 ["the state's statutory mandate that inmates be paid the prevailing wage creates such an interest"]; see also Young v. Wall (1st Cir. 2011) 642 F.3d 49, 53 ["It is clear beyond hope of contradiction that an inmate has a property interest in the balances held in his accounts."].)
2. The JVP Regulations Do Not Authorize the Department to Deny Hobbs Access to the JVP Funds
Next, we must determine whether the Department is violating Hobbs's property rights by to refusing to allow him to access the JVP funds on the ground that the JVP regulations prohibit it from disbursing the funds until Hobbs's release from prison, an event the Department concedes will never occur. "[C]ourts have consistently held that . . . statutes granting inmates a protected property interest in their wages may also limit and define the contours of such interest." (Ward, supra, 623 F.3d at p. 811; accord, Washlefske v. Winston (4th Cir. 2000) 234 F.3d 179, 185 ["an inmate has no property interest in any 'wages' from his work in prison except insofar as the State might elect, through statute, to give him rights"].) Here, Hobbs received JVP "wages solely because of the state statutory scheme. Thus, the nature of his property interest in those funds may be defined by the reasonable provisions of that legislation." (Rochon v. La. State Penitentiary Inmate Account (5th Cir. 1989) 880 F.2d 845, 846.)
As the basis for denying Hobbs's access to the JVP funds, the Department relies exclusively on the regulations requiring that the 20 percent of an inmate's wages set aside as mandatory savings "shall be provided to the inmate upon their release." (§ 3485(i)(3).) The Department contends that in refusing to allow Hobbs to use any of the JVP funds, it is merely "complying with the express terms of Section 3485"; the Department insists it cannot release the funds because "it cannot act in violation of the law." We, of course, agree the Department cannot act in violation of law. But, for reasons we shall explain, we conclude that application of section 3485(i)(3) to Hobbs would raise serious questions about the validity of section 3485(i) that can be avoided by construing it not to apply to him.
During our consideration of the Department's appeal, a question arose about the validity of section 3485(i) under the statutes governing JVP's. Specifically, it appeared to us that the portion of net wages required to be deposited into mandatory savings accounts by section 3485(i) might be a type of deduction not authorized by Penal Code section 2717.8. In supplemental briefs we solicited from the parties, Hobbs contends that section 3485(i) is void because the portion of JVP wages it requires inmates to deposit in mandatory savings accounts is a type of deduction not authorized by Penal Code section 2717.8. (See Gov. Code, §§ 11342.1, 11342.2; Robinson v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 226, 234, 243-244 (Robinson); County of San Diego v. Bowen (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 501, 508.) The Department, on the other hand, contends that section 3485(i) is proper because the Department has authority under Penal Code section 2717.3 to prescribe rules and regulations for JVP's; and the "mandatory savings" prescribed by section 3485(i) do not constitute "deductions" under Penal Code section 2717.8, because those savings remain the inmates' property while they are held in trust for the inmates until release from prison.
Penal Code section 2717.8 provides that wages paid to inmates participating in JVP's "shall be subject to deductions, as determined by the Director of Corrections, which shall not, in the aggregate, exceed 80 percent of gross wages and shall be limited to the following: [¶] (1) Federal, state, and local taxes. [¶] (2) Reasonable charges for room and board, which shall be remitted to the Director of Corrections. [¶] (3) Any lawful restitution fine or contributions to any fund established by law to compensate victims of crime of not more than 20 percent, but not less than 5 percent, of gross wages, which shall be remitted to the Director of Corrections for disbursement. [¶] (4) Allocations for support of family pursuant to state statute, court order, or agreement by the prisoner." (Italics added.)
We agree with the Department that it has a general power to enact regulations to govern and implement JVP's. (Pen. Code, § 2717.3.) That begs the question whether the specific regulation at issue here — section 3485(i) — is invalid because, as applied to Hobbs, it conflicts with the limitations on deductions from JVP wages authorized by Penal Code section 2717.8. We are not persuaded by the Department's semantic argument, unsupported by citation to any authority, that the "mandatory savings" prescribed by section 3485(i) are not "deductions" within the meaning of section Penal Code 2717.8, simply because such savings are held in trust for inmates and then given to them upon release from prison. In other contexts, sums taken out of an employee's wages and contributed to savings plans or trust funds have been described as deductions, even though the expectation is that these sums eventually will become available to the employee. (See, e.g., American Medical Ass'n v. Weinberger (7th Cir. 1975) 522 F.2d 921, 923, fn. 2 [noting Medicare Part A "is financed by payroll deductions contributed to the Social Security Trust Fund"]; Smith v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (N.D.Ga. 2006) 422 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1314 [noting that employee contributed to savings plan "normally through payroll deduction"].) Moreover, even if the Department were correct that the mandatory savings required by section 3485(i) are not deductions within the meaning of Penal Code section 2717.8 because such savings are eventually returned to inmates upon release from prison, that definition of deductions would not apply to an inmate like Hobbs who will never be released from prison because of the sentence he is serving and never recover the mandatory savings. As applied to such an inmate, the mandatory savings required by section 3485(i) would, as a practical matter, be taken away and therefore would qualify as deductions even under the Department's definition. (See Webster's New Internat. Dict. (3d ed. 2002) p. 589, col. 2 [defining deduction as "an act of taking away: DIMINUTION, SUBTRACTION"].) On this record, then, the Department has not satisfactorily answered our question whether, as applied to Hobbs, section 3485(i) is authorized by the statutes governing JVP's.
Additional questions about the validity of section 3485(i) were raised by Hobbs's petition. He complained that the Department's application of section 3485(i)(3) to him was "illogical" and violated due process because it made no sense to hold the JVP funds for him until release from prison when he is serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Although Hobbs's rights are diminished because he is in prison, his state-granted property rights in the JVP funds remain entitled to protection under the due process clause against arbitrary state abrogation. (See U.S. Const., 14th amend., § 1; Wolff v. McDonnell (1974) 418 U.S. 539, 555-556; Harris v. Jacobs (9th Cir. 1980) 621 F.2d 341, 342.) Under due process principles, "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." (Turner v. Safley (1987) 482 U.S. 78, 89 (Turner).)Therefore, for section 3485(i) to be upheld, "there must be a 'valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it." (Ibid.)
The record here discloses no such legitimate penological interests as to Hobbs. As noted earlier, the Department did not file a return, and in the trial court offered no justification whatsoever for application of section 3485(i) to Hobbs. In its supplemental brief on appeal, the Department defends section 3485(i) on the sole ground that it serves the legitimate penological purpose of rehabilitation of prisoners. According to the Department, in recognition of "the need for inmates to obtain a fresh start upon their release, [section 3485(i)] was enacted to require the formation of a mandatory savings account whereby the funds would be held in trust." This asserted justification expressly assumes that inmates participating in JVP's are eligible for release from prison, not that they are serving sentences of life without the possibility of parole, as Hobbs is doing. But, as one federal court has held: "Inmates who will not be released do not need money withheld in preparation for discharge, while an inmate serving a term of years has a foreseeable need for such funds. [The] policy of withholding wages from those serving a term of years until the time of discharge serves the 'reasonably related to legitimate penological interests' of assisting inmates who will eventually be released from the facility, [citation], and there is a rational reason why those serving a life sentence would be treated differently." (Jones v. Houston (D.Neb., Nov. 2, 2007, No. 4:06CV3314) 2007 U.S.Dist. Lexis 81977, pp. *29-30.) Thus, because Hobbs is serving a sentence that makes him ineligible for release from prison, it is questionable on this record whether the Department may constitutionally rely on section 3485(i) to deny him access to the JVP funds. (See Turner, supra, 482 U.S. at pp. 89-90 ["a regulation cannot be sustained where the logical connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational"].)
The JVP initiative, statutes and regulations recognize rehabilitation of prisoners for return to society as one purpose of JVP's. (See Historical and Statutory Notes, 51A pt. 1 West's Ann. Pen. Code (2011 ed.) foll. § 2717.1, p. 288 [one purpose of JVP's is to " '[a]ssist [prison inmates] in their own rehabilitation in order to become responsible law-abiding citizens upon their release from prison' "]; Pen. Code, § 2717.2 [JVP's are intended "to provide inmates with the skills and work habits necessary to become productive members of society upon their release from state prison"]; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3480 ["The purpose of the program shall include preparing offenders for return to society by offering relevant job skills and work habits to increase success on parole, thereby benefiting society at large."].)
We are aware of the dangers of allowing prisoners access to large sums of money. (See, e.g., Lowery v. Cuyler (E.D.Pa. 1981) 521 F.Supp. 430, 433 [possession of money may allow inmate to buy contraband or to bribe staff, may facilitate escape, or may foster robbery attempts].) But prisons may minimize these dangers by prohibiting inmates from possessing money (see, e.g., Steffey v. Orman (10th Cir. 2006) 461 F.3d 1218, 1223; Harris v. Forsyth (11th Cir. 1984) 735 F.2d 1235, 1236; Lowery, at pp. 433-434), and setting up inmate trust accounts (see Vance v. Barrett (9th Cir. 2003) 345 F.3d 1083, 1086), as the Department has done (see Pen. Code, § 5008 [authorizing Department to set up inmate trust accounts]; Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3006, subd. (b) ["Inmates may not possess money."]). Moreover, Hobbs alleged in his petition that he intends to use the JVP funds to hire an attorney to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus (and even requested that the trial court order the transfer of the JVP funds to the attorney). The Department did not file a return or otherwise dispute these allegations. Thus, on this record, there is no indication that Hobbs will use the JVP funds for an improper purpose or that the Department has a legitimate penological interest in preventing him from accessing the funds.
Because the Department's interpretation of section 3485(i) and its application thereof to Hobbs raise doubts as to the validity of section 3485(i), we must look for an alternate interpretation. "Generally, the same rules of construction and interpretation which apply to statutes govern the construction and interpretation of rules and regulations of administrative agencies." (Cal. Drive-in Restaurant Assn. v. Clark (1943) 22 Cal.2d 287, 292.) One of those rules is that courts should construe a statute to avoid serious and doubtful questions about its constitutionality if that can be done without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the language used. (E.g., Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1105; Miller v. Municipal Court (1943) 22 Cal.2d 818, 828 (Miller))Similarly, questions about the validity of regulations should be avoided by interpreting them, as far as reasonably possible, to be consistent and not in conflict with the statutory scheme the regulations implement. (Gov. Code, § 11342.2; Armenta v. Churchill (1954) 42 Cal.2d 448, 454.) In short, "[l]ike a statute, . . . whenever possible a regulation should be construed to uphold validity." (Robinson, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 244.)
Furthermore, in interpreting section 3485(i), "[o]ur foremost aim is to ascertain the intent of the agency issuing the regulation to effectuate the purpose of the law." (Manriquez v. Gourley (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1227, 1235 (Manriquez).) "We look first at the language of the regulation." (Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1687, 1696.) "When the agency's intent cannot be discerned directly from the language of the regulation, we may look to a variety of extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the regulation, the legislative history, public policy, and the regulatory scheme of which the regulation is a part. [Citation.] Whenever possible, we will interpret the regulation to make it workable and reasonable." (Manriquez, at p. 1235.)
The language of section 3485(i) is unclear as to its scope. Section 3485(i) does not clearly and expressly limit the application of the regulations to inmates who are eligible for release from prison, but instead refers generically to "an inmate[]," "the inmate," and "[e]ach inmate[]." Section 3485(i)(3) does expressly provide, however, that "[e]ach inmate's savings, plus the interest accrued by their savings, shall be provided to the inmate upon their release." (Italics added.) The italicized limiting phrase indicates that JVP mandatory savings accounts are intended to provide a source of money to inmates when they are released from prison. Indeed, according to the Department the very purpose of JVP savings accounts is to allow "inmates to obtain a fresh start upon their release." Thus, it is consistent with the language of section 3485(i) and the rehabilitative purpose underlying it (see fn. 5, ante) to limit its application to inmates who are eligible for release from prison. (See, e.g., Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 743 [when sense of entire statute requires that qualifying phrase used in one part apply to preceding parts, its application will extend to all]; Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 148, 154 [same]; Manriquez, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 1235 [regulation should be interpreted to effectuate its purpose].) This narrowing construction also avoids potential statutory and constitutional infirmities (Robinson, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 243-244; Miller, supra, 22 Cal.2d at p. 828) and makes the regulation "workable and reasonable" (Manriquez, at p. 1235).
In sum, we hold that section 3485(i) applies only to JVP-participating inmates who are serving sentences that make them eligible for release from prison. It does not apply to Hobbs, who is serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.
We are not persuaded by the Department's argument, unsupported by citation to any authority, that section 3485(i) applies to inmates serving sentences of life without the possibility of parole because it applies to inmates serving indeterminate sentences in excess of 15 years to life, who "might not ever have a realistic expectation of being released from custody." Inmates serving such indeterminate sentences nevertheless remain eligible for release from prison, and upon release would benefit from receipt of the mandatory savings and interest accumulated through participation in a JVP. Moreover, inmates serving indeterminate sentences of 15 years or more might also accrue at least $6,500 in their JVP mandatory savings accounts and therefore be eligible to withdraw up to 50 percent of their savings. (See § 3485(i)(3).) Hobbs, by contrast, is not eligible for release from prison and is not eligible to withdraw any of his JVP funds because he accrued less than $6,500 when the Department expelled him from the JVP. Thus, application of section 3485(i) to Hobbs, as urged by the Department, would deprive him of the use of any portion of the JVP funds during his lifetime, without any legitimate penological justification offered by the Department for this deprivation.
3. Hobbs Is Entitled to Issuance of a Writ of Mandate Directing the Department to Allow Him Access to the JVP Funds
Finally, we must determine to what relief Hobbs is entitled. A writ of mandate is an appropriate remedy where, as here, a defendant is wrongfully withholding personal property from a prisoner or arrestee. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a); Holt v. Kelly (1978) 20 Cal.3d 560, 564-566; Minsky v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 113, 123; Escamilla v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 498, 511-512). It is of no moment that Hobbs sought and the trial court granted relief in the form of a writ of habeas corpus. "The label given a petition, action or other pleading is not determinative; rather, the true nature of a petition or cause of action is based on the facts alleged and remedy sought in that pleading." (Escamilla, at p. 511; accord, People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 340.) Moreover, Hobbs alternatively styled his pleading as a petition for writ of mandate. We therefore consider Hobbs's pleading as a petition for writ of mandate rather than a petition for writ of habeas corpus and treat the trial court's order as granting relief in mandate. (See Escamilla, at pp. 511-512, 518 [treating prisoner's petition for writ of habeas corpus that sought return of property as petition for writ of mandate].) C. The Department's Arguments for Reversal of the Trial Court's Order Have No Merit
The Department advances several arguments in support of reversal of the trial court's order directing the Department to transfer the JVP funds to Hobbs's inmate trust account. None is persuasive.
1. The Trial Court Did Not Order the Department to Violate Section 3485(i)
The Department's primary argument, repeated many times in various formulations throughout its briefing, is that the trial court's order compels it to violate section 3485(i) by disbursing the JVP funds before Hobbs is released from prison. As we have interpreted section 3485(i), however, it applies only to inmates eligible for release from prison. Since Hobbs is serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, he is not eligible for release from prison, and section 3485(i) does not apply to him. Therefore, the trial court's order did not require the Department to violate section 3485(i).
2. The Trial Court Did Not Exceed Its Jurisdiction or Violate the Doctrine of Separation of Powers
The Department also contends the trial court's order exceeded its jurisdiction and violated the separation-of-powers doctrine because the order required it to violate section 3485(i) and effectively rewrote those regulations. We are not persuaded.
As an initial matter, the Department did not raise either of these arguments in the trial court. We ordinarily deem previously unlitigated arguments forfeited and do not consider them for the first time on appeal. (See, e.g., In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 826; Newton v. Clemons (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1, 11.) In any event, the Department's jurisdictional and separation-of-powers arguments both fail on the merits because they proceed from the same false premise, namely, that the trial court's order requires the Department to violate section 3485(i). Again, as we have explained, the trial court did not order the Department to violate section 3485(i) because we have construed it in a way that makes it inapplicable to Hobbs.
3. The Department May Not Rely on the Terms of Hobbs's Inmate-Employee Work Agreement as a Basis for Reversal
The Department finally contends the trial court erred in granting Hobbs's petition because in doing so the court effectively rewrote the terms of the inmate-employee work agreement Hobbs signed when he enrolled in the JVP. The Department relies on the following provision of the agreement: "The remainder of my net wages [after specified deductions] shall be held as mandatory savings, which shall be provided to me upon my release." According to the Department, Hobbs must honor this provision because he knew he had been sentenced to prison for life without the possibility of parole when he signed the agreement but signed it anyway, "presumably because he wanted access to those portions of the funds which were not subject to mandatory savings and/or he simply was looking forward to a diversion and an ability to obtain gainful employment during the term of his sentence." We reject this argument as forfeited.
We decline to consider the Department's contract-based argument because "this argument was not presented to the trial court. '[I]t is fundamental that a reviewing court will ordinarily not consider claims made for the first time on appeal which could have been but were not presented to the trial court. [Citation.]' [Citations.] We will therefore 'ignore arguments, authority, and facts not presented and litigated in the trial court.' [Citation.] Such arguments raised for the first time on appeal are generally deemed forfeited." (Perez v. Grajales (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 580, 591-592 (Perez).)
Forfeiture is especially appropriate here because the Department did not allow Hobbs to assert potential defenses to the contract it seeks to enforce against him. "The policy behind the [forfeiture] rule is fairness. 'Appellate courts are loath to reverse a judgment on grounds that the opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider.' " (In re Marriage of Falcone & Fyke, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 826.) Had the Department argued that Hobbs was bound by the terms of the agreement and therefore could not withdraw the JVP funds until his release from prison, Hobbs might have defeated the argument. For example, he might have obtained rescission of the agreement based on a mistake of law regarding his eligibility to participate in the JVP. (See Civ. Code, §§ 1578 [defining mistake of law], 1689, subd. (b)(1) [authorizing rescission for mistake]; Adams v. Heinsch (1948) 89 Cal.App.2d 300, 303 [rescinding lease executed under mistaken view that transaction was legal and not subject to certain regulations].) Or he might have been able to void the agreement based on the illegality of his participation in the JVP. (See Civ. Code, § 1596 [contract with unlawful object is void]; Marathon Entertainment, Inc. v. Blasi (2008) 42
Cal.4th 974, 996 [if central purpose of contract illegal, contract cannot be enforced].)We, of course, express no view on whether Hobbs would have succeeded in establishing either potential defense; our point is simply that he had no opportunity to assert contract defenses in the trial court because the Department did not press its contract argument there. Fairness prevents it from doing so for the first time here. (Perez, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at pp. 591-592.)
In its reply brief, the Department grudgingly acknowledged that Hobbs was enrolled in the JVP "despite what appears to be a statutory prohibition (for reasons which are not part of this record)." Additionally, Hobbs alleged in his petition that the Department expelled him from the JVP in part because he is serving a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. It thus appears the Department considers an inmate's eligibility for release from prison to be a requirement for participation in a JVP.
DISPOSITION
The order is modified to provide that it grants Hobbs's petition for writ of mandate, rather than petition for writ of habeas corpus. As so modified, the order is affirmed.
IRION, J. WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
O'ROURKE, J.