Summary
employing McDonnell Douglas in a racial discrimination context
Summary of this case from Murphey v. City of MinneapolisOpinion
Civil No. 03-3090 (JRT/FLN).
September 3, 2004
Edwin L. Sisam and Dorothy J. Buhr, SISAM WATJE, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for plaintiff.
James F. Baldwin and Philip J. Young, MOSS BARNETT, P.A., Minneapolis MN, for defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Hieu Hoang ("Hoang"), who is Vietnamese, filed this action against his former employer, Seagate Technology, LLC ("Seagate"), alleging racial and national origin discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Defendant moves for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the Court grants defendant's motion.
Plaintiff moves the Court to strike "all inadmissible evidence submitted by defendant in connection with [defendant's] motion for summary judgment." The Court is cognizant of its duty to consider only evidence that would ultimately be admissible at trial. Mays v. Rhodes, 255 F.3d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 2001). The Court notes that Hoang's statements to either Curry or Engelke are not hearsay, and their testimony as to any such statements would be admissible at trial. Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). Additionally, Curry, as well as any other witness, may testify to his own statements. Fed.R.Evid. 602. The Court bases its decision on defendant's motion for summary judgment on the deposition testimony of plaintiff, Engelke, and Curry, and affidavits of Hoang, Nguyen, and Engelke. Additionally, the Court has considered Engelke's hand-written notes submitted by plaintiff. Having determined, based solely on the above described, admissible evidence, that defendant's motion for summary judgment must be granted, the Court need not consider plaintiff's motion further and will deny it as moot.
BACKGROUND
Hoang was employed by Seagate for twe nty-one years and, before his termination, worked the night shift at Seagate's facility in Bloomington, Minnesota. (Dep. of Hieu Hoang ("H.D.") at 7, 11, 14-16, 37-39.) Hoang's long-time girlfriend, Ngoc-Hue Nguyen ("Nguyen"), who Hoang lived with, also worked for Seagate at its Bloomington facility. (H.D. at 32-33.)In the summer of 2001, Hoang's and Nguyen's relationship deteriorated, and Nguyen told Hoang to move out. (H.D. at 38-42.) Hoang became suicidal, and told Nguyen that he would "rather die" than live without her. (H.D. at 68; July 22, 2004 Affidavit of Ngoc-Hue Nguyen ("Nguyen Affidavit") at ¶ 4.) Nguyen asked Hoang if it was "easy to die," and Hoang responded that it was easy to buy a gun for $200. (H.D. at 68; Nguyen Affidavit at ¶ 4.)
Also in the summer of 2001, Nguyen developed a friendship with another man. (Dep. of Jim Curry ("C.D.") at 37-53.) This other man was Jim Curry ("Curry"), another Seagate employee who worked at Seagate's Riverbluff facility. (C.D. at 37-53.) Hoang did not know who this other man was, but became jealous and upset that another man was trying to break up his family. (H.D. at 51-52, 54; July 23, 2004 Aff. of Hieu Hoang ("Hoang Affidavit") at 1.)
Hoang confronted Nguyen about the relationship. (H.D. at 35-46, 57-58.R.S.F. at 3.) Nguyen denied that the relationship with Curry was romantic or sexual. (H.D. at 35-58.) Despite Nguyen's statements, Hoang installed eavesdropping equipment in Nguyen's basement and began recording her phone calls in early September. (H.D. at 43-49.) On September 11 or 12, Hoang recorded a conversation between Nguyen and Curry in which Curry encouraged Nguyen to end her relationship with Hoang. (H.D. at 51, 53-54.) In this recorded conversation, Curry told Nguyen that if he ever met Hoang, he would identify himself as "the man [Hoang] threatened to kill" and punch him. (Ex. B Hoang Affidavit; H.D. at 51, 53-54.) Curry also told Nguyen that he could call the police and have Hoang arrested for threatening Curry. (Ex. B to Hoang Affidavit.)
After listening to the conversation between Nguyen and Curry, Hoang found Curry's phone number and called him at home. (H.D. at 58-59, 61, 65-66.) Hoang left two messages on Curry's answering machine, the first of which was threatening and the second of which was, if not threatening, at least vulgar. (H.D. at 58-59, 61, 65-66.)
The first message said:
Hey, asshole. It's ah [Hoang]. Motherfucker, you leave my woman alone, ok? If you keep, keep popping her, I come fucka your head, ok, you remember that, you know that, asshole?
The second message said:
Hey, motherfucker, pick up the phone, you at home, you hear me do ya, talk to me asshole.
(H.D. at 58-59, 61, 65-66 and ex. 8 to H.D.)
Curry retrieved the messages while at work, and then called Hoang. (C.D. at 53-57.) Hoang recalls that Curry threatened to "turn Hoang in to the police," swore at him and called him a "little punk." (H.D. at 71-73.) Curry reported the conversation to his supervisor, Milo Holsten ("Holsten"), and told Holsten that he felt unsafe at work because Hoang had threatened him. (C.D. 57-59, 65-66, 76, 82-87.)
Douglas Engelke ("Engelke"), a representative from Seagate's Human Resources Department, and another Seagate employee, Marianne Moreno, interviewed Curry about the concerns Curry had voiced to Holsten. (C.D. at 59-60.) Curry played the phone messages for Engelke and Moreno. (C.D. at 60.) Engelke told Curry that Seagate would ensure his safety at work, and advised Curry to contact his local police department if he thought he was in danger at home. (Dep. of Douglas Engelke ("E.D.") at 53.)
Engelke and Moreno also interviewed Nguyen. (E.D. at 54; Nguyen Affidavit at ¶ 8.) Nguyen confirmed her relationship with Hoang, and that the relationship was not going well. (Nguyen Affidavit at ¶ 8.) Nguyen also told them that Hoang had told her that he could buy a gun easily and that it was not hard to find a gun for $200. (Nguyen Affidavit at ¶ 8.) Nguyen reported that she had spoken to Hoang that morning, and that Hoang was very depressed. (Nguyen Affidavit at ¶¶ 7,8.)
Seagate has a company policy and code of employee conduct prohibiting violent or threatening conduct by employees whether on or off company property. (E.D. at 44-45.) Engelke discussed the situation with the legal department. (E.D. 59-60.) Based on Engelke's interviews of Curry and Nguyen, Hoang was suspended and his access to the facility was disabled. (E.D. at 59-61.)
Early in the morning of September 13, Hoang and Nguyen argued over Nguyen's relationship with Curry. (H.D. at 85-89.) During the argument, Hoang called Curry. (H.D. at 86.) The argument escalated, and Curry, listening over the telephone, called the police. (C.D. at 61-62; H.D. at 89-90.) Hoang was arrested for assault. (H.D. at 90.)
Engelke learned of Hoang's arrest later on September 13. (May 25, 2004 Aff. of Douglas Engelke; Ex. 7 to July 23, 2004 Aff. of Amy Flom ("Flom Affidavit").) Engelke spoke to Curry about Hoang's call to Curry that had led to Hoang's arrest. (C.D. at 66.) Curry told Engelke that Hoang had been threatening Nguyen and had made mention of a gun. (C.D. at 66; Engelke Affidavit at ¶ 3.)
On September 14, Hoang called and spoke with Engelke, who informed him that he had been suspended pending further investigation. (H.D. at 114; E.D. 62, 66-67.) At that time, Hoang learned Curry's identity, and that Curry was also a Seagate employee. (H.D. at 115; Hoang Affidavit at 2; E.D. at 63-64.) Hoang told Engelke that he was angry with Curry and that he had threatened to "kick [Curry's] ass, fuck with [him]." (H.D. at 114-15; E.D. at 63-64.) Hoang also told Engelke that he would "fight back like the [September 11] bombing." (H.D. at 119; E.D. at 64-65.) Engelke recalls Hoang volunteering that he had not purchased a gun, and telling Engelke that he was "not a violent person." (E.D. at 67, 88.) Hoang indicated to Engelke that he had evidence that Curry had threatened Hoang. (H.D. at 119-121; E.D. at 65.) Hoang asked Engelke if he could meet with Engelke to present this evidence, but Engelke refused. (H.D. at 120-22.)
Hoang and Engelke spoke again on September 17. (H.D. at 122; E.D. at 68-69.) Hoang again stated that he had evidence that Curry had harassed him, and asked to meet with Engelke. (H.D. at 122.) Hoang asserted that Curry should also have been suspended, and that Seagate "didn't treat [him] right." (H.D. at 124-25; E.D. at 69.)
Engelke terminated Hoang on September 18 for violating Seagate's workplace violence policy. (E.D. at 75.) Hoang told Engelke that he felt he was being treated differently than Curry, and that "this isn't fair; I'm As ian and you're American." (H.D. at 125-127; Ex. 9 to Flom Affidavit; E.D. at 98.)
ANALYSIS
I. Summary Judgment Standard of Review
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is not appropriate if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment is to be granted only where the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
The moving party bears the burden of bringing forward sufficient evidence to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The nonmoving party is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the record. Vette Co. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 612 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th Cir. 1980). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the Court properly considers all evidence before it that will be admissible at trial. Mays v. Rhodes, 255 F.3d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 2001). The Court is not limited to the evidence presented by the non-moving party. Id. Howe ver, the nonmoving party may not merely rest upon allegations or denials in its pleadings, but it must set forth specific facts by affidavits or otherwise showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Forrest v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 285 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 2002). The non-moving party's mere denial or disagreement with otherwise admissible evidence presented by the moving party is insufficient to create an issue of material fact. Mays, 255 F.3d at 648.
II. Discrimination
Hoang alleges that Seagate discriminated against him on the basis of his race and national origin in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Specifically, Hoang contends that Seagate suspended and ultimately terminated him because he is Asian and Vietnamese.
Hoang also seems to argue that the manner in which Seagate investigated the incident — namely, interviewing Curry and then suspending Hoang based solely on Curry's statements without obtaining Hoang's version of events, listening to Hoang's evidence of Curry's threatening behavior, or also suspending Curry — was discriminatory. "An adverse employment action is one that causes a material change in the terms or conditions of employment." Fenney v. Dakota, Minnesota Eastern R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 716 (8th Cir. 2003). While the manner of investigation may indicate that the resulting suspension was discriminatory, the manner of investigation is not itself an adverse employment action.
At the summary judgment stage, claims of racial or national origin discrimination are addressed according to the three-step burden shifting analysis initially articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Hannoon v. Fawn Eng'g Corp., 324 F.3d 1041, 1046 (8th Cir. 2003). At the first step, plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by presenting evidence (1) that he is a member of a protected class, (2) that he was qualified for the relevant position, (3) that there was an adverse employment action, and (4) that some evidence of record supports an inference of improper motivation. Id. If the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case, summary judgment is properly granted to the defendant.
Hoang is Vietnamese, and thus is a member of a protected class. Additionally, the Court is satisfied the Hoang's twenty-one year history of satisfactory work at Seagate demonstrates that Hoang was, until the events in question, qualified for the position from which he was terminated. Termination is the quintessential adverse employment action, and the Court assumes for purposes of this motion that Seagate's suspension of Hoang pending investigation of the events also constituted an adverse employment action. See Fenney v. Dakota, Minnesota Eastern R. Co., 327 F.3d 707, 716 (8th Cir. 2003) (adverse employment action is one that causes a material change in the terms or conditions of employment). However, Hoang cannot satisfy the fourth element of his prima facie case.
Construed in the most favorable light possible, Hoang argues that discriminatory animus can be inferred from the differing treatment that he and Curry, a Caucasian, received. Essentially, Hoang contends that while he was suspended and then terminated for having threatened Curry, Seagate knew that Curry had threatened Hoang but chose not to suspend or terminate Curry. "Instances of disparate treatment can support a claim of [discrimination], but [plaintiff] has the burden of proving that he and the disparately treated [employees] were similarly situated in all relevant respects." Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Kohler Co., 335 F.3d 766, 776 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation and citation omitted). "For discriminatory discipline claims, `[e]mployees are similarly situated when they are involved in or accused of the same offense and are disciplined in different ways." Id. "To be probative evidence of [discrimination], the misconduct of the more leniently disciplined employees must be of comparable seriousness." Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In this case, Hoang and Curry were not similarly situated at the time of either the suspension or the termination. At the time of the suspension, Engelke had been informed that Hoang had threatened to physically harm another Seagate employee, Curry. Engelke had no corresponding information about Curry's behavior. Thus, Hoang and Curry were not similarly situated and the allegedly disparate treatment of the two at that time is irrelevant.
Hoang emphasizes that Engelke testified that he "only talk[ed] to Mr. Curry" before deciding to suspend Hoang. This argument is of no moment. "It is not unlawful for an employer to make employment decisions based upon poor job performance, erroneous evaluations, personal conflicts between employees, or even unsound business practices, as long as these decisions are not the result of discrimination based on an employee's membership in a protected class." Evers v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 241 F.3d 948, 959 (8th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted). The relevant inquiry is whether the employer believed that the employee had engaged in conduct justifying the disciplinary action taken. See Harvey v. Anheuser Busch, Inc., 38 F.3d 968, 972 n. 2 (8th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Whether the information that Seagate had regarding Hoang's behavior was accurate or not, it was certainly a sufficient basis upon which to suspend Hoang pending further investigation. Hoang has simply failed to present any evidence indicating that his race or national origin played any part in Seagate's decision to suspend him.
At the time of Hoang's termination, Seagate knew that Hoang had called Curry at home and threatened Curry physically, had again threatened Curry over the telephone while Curry was at work, was depressed and potentially violent, and had been arrested for assaulting another Seagate employee, Nguyen. In contrast, Curry had told Nguyen that if he were to meet Hoang he would punch him, had threatened to report Hoang to the police, and ultimately had reported Hoang to the police. Hoang's direct threat to physically harm Curry is of an entirely different character than Curry's assertion that he would report Hoang's perceived dangerous conduct to the proper authorities. Hoang's behavior is also substantially different from Curry's comment to a third party that in the event of a hypothetical meeting, he would punch Hoang. Seagate was not obligated to respond to Hoang's and Curry's behaviors in the same manner because they involved objectively different conduct. See Wheeler v. Aventis Pharms., 360 F.3d 853, 858 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). That Hoang was terminated while Curry was not terminated does not support an inference of discrimination.
Plaintiff and Nguyen, in her affidavit, contend that Hoang was not dangerous or violent, that Nguyen had not told Curry that Hoang was dangerous or violent, and that Curry's statements to Engelke about Hoang were exaggerated and untrue. It is not disputed, however, that Curry told Engelke that Hoang presented a danger to either Curry or Nguyen. As noted above, the accuracy of the information that defendant had is irrelevant. The relevant question is whether the information that defendant had was sufficient to warrant defendant's action.
Beyond the allegedly disparate treatment that Hoang and Curry received, Hoang points only to his own statement that "This isn't fair; I'm Asian, you're American" as evidence of discrimination. Hoang has not, either to Engelke at the time that he made this statement or to the Court, elaborated on or provided any support for this assertion. Hoang's perception of how he was treated, without at least some statement or action on Seagate's part, or some other supporting evidence, does not give rise to an inference that Hoang was suspended or terminated based on unlawful considerations. See Griffin v. Super Valu, 218 F.3d 869, 872 (8th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted) (plaintiff's unsupported assertions of unfair treatment or discriminatory treatment are not sufficient to support a claim for discriminatory treatment).
III. Conclusion
"Federal courts do not sit as super-personnel departments reviewing wisdom or fairness of employer's judgments, unless they were intentionally discriminatory." Edmund v. MidAm. Energy Co., 299 F.3d 679, 686 (8th Cir. 2002). It is in all cases the plaintiff's burden to demonstrate that the employer intentionally discriminated against him. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993). As Hoang has presented no evidence indicating that Seagate's actions were intentionally discriminatory, defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, all the records, files, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 9] is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion to Strike All Inadmissible Evidence Submitted by Defendant, Re: Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion in Limine to Preclude All Inadmissible Evidence Submitted by Defendant, Re: Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 22] is DENIED AS MOOT.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.