Nos. 14-07-00189-CR, 14-07-00191-CR
Memorandum Opinion filed June 19, 2008. DO NOT PUBLISH. — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 122nd District Court, Galveston County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. 05CR2756 01CR0556.
Panel consists of Justices FOWLER, SEYMORE and GUZMAN.
CHARLES W. SEYMORE, Justice.
A jury found appellant, David Sidney Hisey, guilty of murdering his parents, Hollis and Sunnye Hisey. The trial court assessed concurrent sentences of fifty years' confinement. In two issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his convictions. All dispositive issues are clearly settled in law. Accordingly, we issue this memorandum opinion and affirm. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1995, appellant moved to Galveston, Texas, purportedly to care for Hollis and Sunnye Hisey, his elderly parents. The State alleges that appellant strangled and killed his parents sometime before September 1, 2000. In August 2000, the Galveston County Sheriff's Department began an investigation into the welfare of Hollis and Sunnye. On September 1, 2000, Sergeants Bruce Balchunas and Perry Larkin attempted to locate Hollis and Sunnye at their home. The officers received no response at the door. However, while they prepared to leave, the officers observed appellant pull into the driveway. The officers approached appellant, identified themselves, and expressed concern regarding the welfare of Hollis and Sunnye. Appellant told the officers his parents were "fine," but stated that they were with his aunt in Ruyle, Texas. After some additional conversation, appellant voluntarily signed a consent to search his parents' residence. Inside the home, the officers discovered a locked bedroom door, sealed with masking tape. The officers also observed a folded towel laid at the foot of the door and a white powder spread on the carpet in front of the door. According to appellant, the room was infested with flies, and he sealed the door to prevent the smell of bug spray from permeating the house. Appellant asked the officers to wait four hours before searching the sealed room to give the bug spray time to dissipate. However, appellant agreed to allow the officers into the room after Sergeant Larkin promised to reseal the door. Sergeant Larkin searched the bedroom while Sergeant Balchunas waited with appellant in the living room. Inside the bedroom, Sergeant Larkin discovered the bodies of Hollis and Sunnye laid on a bed. Returning to the living room, Sergeant Larkin conducted a pat-down search of appellant and instructed appellant to sit on the living room couch. As appellant waited, he reached under the couch and retrieved a hidden rifle. Appellant placed the rifle barrel under his chin, but the officers wrested the rifle away from him. Galveston police officers eventually arrived, and appellant was arrested. Drs. Charles Harvey, Harrell Gill-King, Sparks Veasey, III, Lloyd White, and Paul Radelat testified as expert witnesses regarding cause of death. Dr. Harvey determined that Sunnye died approximately one year before her body was discovered. He further concluded that Hollis died approximately two to six months before appellant was arrested. Furthermore, Dr. Harvey opined that, despite dying several months apart, both Hollis's and Sunnye had similar fractures in the hyoid bone and thyroid cartilage. Drs. Harvey, Gill-King, and Veasey observed signs of hemorrhage around the fracture sites. Although both bodies exhibited signs of potentially lethal disease, Drs. Harvey, Gill-King, and Veasey concluded Hollis and Sunnye died from strangulation. Drs. White and Radelat testified that the evidence was inconclusive regarding the cause of death. Although they both noted the fractures of Hollis's and Sunnye's hyoid bones and thyroid cartilage, neither Dr. White nor Dr. Radelat observed conclusive evidence of hemorrhage in either body. Without ruling out strangulation as a possible cause of death, Drs. White and Radelat testified that the evidence did not lead them to the conclusion that Hollis and Sunnye were strangled. II. ANALYSIS
In two issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his convictions. We disagree. A person is guilty of murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 19.02 (Vernon 2003). To determine whether evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 737 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and is free to believe or disbelieve all or part of a witness's testimony. Jones v. State, 984 S.W.2d 254, 257 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). We ensure only that the jury reached a rational decision and do not re-evaluate the weight and credibility of testimony. Muniz v. State, 851 S.W.2d 238, 246 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). To determine whether evidence is factually sufficient to support a conviction, we view the evidence in a neutral light and will set aside the verdict only to prevent manifest injustice. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). In conducting a factual-sufficiency review, we engage in a two-prong test to determine whether there is some objective basis to find: (1) the evidence in support of the jury's verdict, although legally sufficient, is nevertheless so weak that the jury's verdict seems clearly wrong and unjust; or (2) in considering conflicting evidence, the evidence in support of the jury's verdict, although legally sufficient, is nevertheless against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 414-15. An accused's guilt may be proven with direct or circumstantial evidence. Smith v. State, 56 S.W.3d 739, 744 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001 no pet.). Proof through circumstantial evidence is not subject to a more rigorous standard than is proof by direct evidence. Id. (citing McGee v. State, 744 S.W.2d 229, 238 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989)). In evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, we may not focus on a part of the evidence in isolation but must consider all the evidence in order to recognize the significance of any single piece. See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 779 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). Appellant contends the State presented no evidence that he caused the deaths of his parents, and that the State's evidence raises only a suspicion of guilt. Appellant seems to argue that the State's contention that Hollis and Sunnye died due to strangulation is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Appellant notes that the testimony of Drs. White and Radelat controverted the State's experts testimony regarding the cause of death. Further, appellant notes that Dr. Harvey's testimony was not credible because he contradicted statements that he made during an earlier proceeding, and his use of "rehydration" during the autopsy was not a technique recognized by the other testifying experts. However, the jury was in the best position to judge credibility of the witnesses, and we defer to its judgment unless the record clearly indicates a different result. See Johnson v. State, 23 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). At trial, Dr. Harvey testified that in cases of manual strangulation, the neck of the victim will often exhibit fractures in the hyoid bone and thyroid cartilage as well as hemorrhage at the fracture sites. Every expert witness noted the necks of both Hollis and Sunnye exhibited a fractured hyoid bone and fractured thyroid cartilage, and Drs. Harvey, Gill-King, and Veasey observed evidence of hemorrhage at the fracture sites. Drs. Harvey, Gill-King, and Veasey each concluded that Hollis and Sunnye died due to strangulation, although they could not categorically rule out natural causes of death. However, neither Dr. White nor Dr. Radelat observed conclusive signs of hemorrhage, and they could not conclude Hollis and Sunnye died from strangulation. The jury was entitled to decide the weight, if any, to assign to Dr. White's and Dr. Radelat's testimony when evaluating the expert witnesses' credibility. See Johnson, 23 S.W.3d at 9. With its guilty verdict, the jury must have decided the State's experts were credible, and that Hollis and Sunnye died from strangulation. After reviewing the evidence in the record, we cannot conclude the jury's finding was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, notwithstanding the challenges to Dr. Harvey's credibility and Dr. White's and Dr. Radelat's controverting testimony. Appellant further argues that there is no physical or testimonial evidence demonstrating he murdered his parents. However, at trial, the State established that appellant moved to Galveston in 1995 to take care of his parents, who by the late 1990s were in poor health and suffering from dementia. Appellant was his parents' sole caretaker from 1995 until their deaths. Further, although Hollis and Sunnye died months apart, while in appellant's care, both suffered similar injuries suggestive of strangulation while in appellant's care. Each of the State's experts concluded that Hollis and Sunnye died due to strangulation. Additionally, the evidence demonstrated that appellant lived in his parents' home from 1995 until his arrest on September 1, 2000, remaining in the house with his parents' corpses after their deaths. Appellant used his parents' retirement and social security income to support himself both before and after their deaths, and he attempted to conceal their deaths from friends, family, and law enforcement officials. At trial, appellant admitted that he placed his parents' bodies in the bedroom to decompose. Appellant also repeatedly lied regarding his parents' welfare and whereabouts. At various times after his parents' deaths, he told inquirers that Sunnye was unavailable because she was in bed most of the time, his parents were living in an unlicensed nursing home, and his parents were traveling. Appellant further admitted placing a note on the front and back doors of his parents' house in an attempt to dissuade people from entering the home. Finally, appellant attempted to commit suicide when Sergeant Larkin discovered Hollis's and Sunnye's bodies. Appellant argues that his living in a house with their bodies, using their incomes for support before and after their deaths, laying their bodies in a bed to decompose, and concealing their bodies from friends, family, and law enforcement does not prove he murdered his parents. Appellant also argues the State's expert witness testimony regarding the causes of Hollis's and Sunnye's deaths is not probative regarding his guilt because, even if they were strangled, the expert testimony does not prove he committed that strangulation. Additionally, appellant contends there is no evidence he possessed the requisite culpable mental state for murder. However, as stated above, an accused's guilt may be proved with either direct or circumstantial evidence. Smith, 56 S.W.3d at 744. Additionally, a jury may infer intent from a defendant's acts, words, and conduct, from the method of committing the crime, and from the nature of the wounds inflicted on the victim. Hart. v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 64 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). The jury heard testimony that, even though Hollis and Sunnye died months apart, both of their bodies exhibited similar injuries indicating strangulation. Their injuries were caused while appellant lived in their house acting as their sole caretaker. Further, appellant attempted to conceal his parents' deaths from friends, family, and law enforcement officials inquiring about their welfare by hiding their bodies in a sealed bedroom, lying about their welfare and whereabouts, and placing signs on their house to deter people from entering. We conclude that, rather than raising mere suspicions of guilt, the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's verdict. After examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the jury the could have found appellant intentionally and knowingly caused the deaths of Hollis and Sunnye. Further, after examining the evidence in a neutral light, we cannot conclude that the evidence in support of the jury's verdict is so weak that the jury's verdict seems clearly wrong and unjust, or in considering conflicting evidence, the jury's verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Appellant's two issues are overruled. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.