Opinion
December 20, 1961
In an action to recover: (1) damages for breach of agreement of employment as sales agent on a commission basis; (2) the expenses incurred at defendant's instance and request in connection with such employment; (3) damages for defendant's breach of the agreement by inducing plaintiff's employees to deal directly with defendant; (4) damages for defendant's conduct in wrongfully and maliciously inducing plaintiff's employees to breach their employment relations with plaintiff; (5) damages for libel in that defendant inserted a false advertisement in a trade magazine to the effect that plaintiff's salesmen were salesmen for defendant, and that plaintiff had discontinued her business; and (6) the reasonable value of plaintiff's services and the expenses incurred by plaintiff at defendant's request, the defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County, dated May 4, 1961, as struck out items 2 (a), 14, 15 (c), (d) and (e), 17 (a), 18 (c) and (d), 20 (a) and 26 (g) from its demand upon plaintiff for a bill of particulars. Defendant in its answer denies the material allegations of the complaint. As affirmative defenses, defendant pleads the Statute of Frauds and payment. Defendant's demand for particulars contained 157 items; plaintiff moved to vacate the demand on the ground it was onerous. The Special Term granted the motion to the extent of striking out certain demands on the ground they were irrelevant or immaterial. Order modified by reinstating only subdivision (a) of item 14 in the defendant's demand for the bill of particulars. As so modified, the order insofar as appealed from, is affirmed, with $10 costs and disbursements to plaintiff. Said subdivision (a) of item 14 requires plaintiff to set forth the names and addresses of her employees, but only as to those who, it is alleged, were induced to send orders directly to defendant instead of to plaintiff. Since the special damages sought by plaintiff are alleged to have been caused by defendant's conduct in inducing plaintiff's employees to send orders directly to defendant, the defendant is entitled to a bill of particulars giving the names and addresses of those persons who were so induced ( Santoro v. Star Crescent Milling Co., 244 App. Div. 750; Hainbach v. York Feather Down Corp., 273 App. Div. 814; Kosiorek v. Hodgkinson, 278 App. Div. 852). Plaintiff's time to serve the bill of particulars pursuant to defendant's demand as thus modified, is extended until 20 days after entry of the order hereon. Nolan, P.J., Beldock, Christ, Pette and Brennan, JJ., concur.