Opinion
2:20-cv-04446-SAL-MGB
08-30-2021
Erin Leon Hines, Plaintiff, v. Sergeant Judd, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Erin Leon Hines (“Plaintiff”), a state detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action alleging violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed, with prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
BACKGROUND
The Complaint alleges that on or around October 27, 2020, at the Georgetown County Detention Center, Defendant Judd used a racial slur in addressing Plaintiff. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4-5.) Plaintiff claims that despite reporting Judd's use of the epithet, Judd continues to call Plaintiff “bad names.” (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff requests that Judd be removed from his position with the Georgetown County Detention Center and seeks $20,000 for “mental damages.” (Id. at 6.) This is the extent of Plaintiff's Complaint.
After reviewing these allegations, the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his Complaint was subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Dkt. No. 6.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the undersigned gave him an opportunity to cure the deficiencies identified in the original pleading by filing an amended complaint with the Court. Instead of filing an amended complaint, Plaintiff later filed a motion to appoint counsel, suggesting that he did not understand the undersigned's instructions and needed an “illustration” of how to complete a § 1983 complaint. (Dkt. No. 10.)
The undersigned ultimately denied Plaintiff's motion, finding no exceptional circumstances that would otherwise warrant the appointment of counsel. (Dkt. No. 12.) The undersigned did, however, provide Plaintiff additional guidance with respect to remedying the deficiencies in his Complaint and granted him an extension to file an amended pleading. The order warned Plaintiff that failure to file an amended complaint or cure the pleading deficiencies within the prescribed time period would result in summary dismissal with prejudice. (Id. at 2.) To date, Plaintiff has not filed any amended pleading or factual allegations, and the time to comply with the undersigned's order has lapsed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). This action has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Indeed, a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In order to satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations, ” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Wellerv. Dep'tof Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 39091 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”). Such is the case here.
DISCUSSION
As noted above, Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 based on Defendant Judd's alleged use of racial epithets and offensive names towards Plaintiff. It is well-established that § 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994). In other words, a civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). Thus, “[t]he first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed.” Albright, 510 U.S. at 271; see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (explaining that to state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law).
Although Plaintiff does not expressly identify which of his constitutional rights were violated in the instant case, the undersigned assumes that he intends to allege unconstitutional conditions of confinement pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. (See Dkt. No. 6 at 2.) See Aiken v. Hall, No. 1:17-cv-97-FDW, 2017 WL 5985940, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Dec. 1, 2017) (explaining that the Fourteenth Amendment protects pre-trial detainees from inhumane conditions of confinement in the same way the Eighth Amendment protects inmates). Indeed, while the Constitution “does not mandate comfortable prisons, ” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), prison officials must at the very least provide humane conditions of confinement. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (noting that “prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In order to establish unconstitutional conditions of confinement, the plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating the serious deprivation of a basic human need (the objective prong) and deliberate indifference to the jail conditions by the defendant(s) (the subjective prong). Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). To demonstrate that a deprivation is extreme enough to satisfy the objective prong, the plaintiff must allege a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions, or demonstrate a substantial risk of such serious harm. Wilson v. N.R.A.D.C., No. 7:19-cv-00771, 2020 WL 497166, at *2 (W.D. Va. Jan. 30, 2020); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) (noting that “only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities . . . are sufficiently grave to form the basis of [a constitutional] violation”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
With respect to Judd's alleged name-calling, the undersigned finds that such conduct- although reprehensible-falls short of a constitutional violation. As explained in previous proper form orders, verbal abuse and harassment by prison officials does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. (See Dkt. No. 6 at 2-3; Dkt. No.12 at 2.) See Henslee v. Lewis, 153 Fed. App'x 178, 180 (4th Cir. 2005); see also Mosley v. Pritt, No. 1:20-cv-00142, 2020 WL 5047418, at *2 (N.D. W.Va. July 29, 2020), adopted, 2020 WL 5046302 (N.D. W.Va. Aug. 26, 2020) (“Name-calling alone cannot form the basis of a constitutional violation because a person has no liberty interest at stake.”). “Likewise, racial epithets do not implicate constitutional rights because, no matter how abhorrent or reprehensible a racial epithet may be, it cannot itself form the basis of a § 1983 claim.” See Mosley, 2020 WL 5047418, at *3 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Moore v. Drew, No. 4:09-cv-2046-RMG-TER, 2011 WL 587098, at *6 (D.S.C. Jan. 18, 2011), adopted, 2011 WL 587092 (D.S.C. Feb. 9, 2011) (finding use of racial epithet against inmate insufficient to demonstrate constitutional violation). Thus, Judd's treatment of Plaintiff, without more, is insufficient to state an actionable claim to relief under § 1983. And because Plaintiff has not amended his Complaint to include any further allegations, this action is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
CONCLUSION
The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court summarily dismiss this action in its entirety with prejudice. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (noting that where the district court has already afforded an opportunity to amend, the district court has the discretion to afford another opportunity to amend or can “dismiss the complaint with prejudice, thereby rendering the dismissal order a final, appealable order”).
In light of the undersigned's conclusion, the Clerk of Court shall not issue the summons form or forward this matter to the United States Marshal Service for service of process at this time.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).