Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-1650 (JBS).
August 2, 2000
Dennis Blake, Esq., Brown and Connery, Westmont, New Jersey, Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Christopher H. Westrick, Esq., Golden, Rothschild, Spagnola, Lundell, and Levitt, P.C., Bridgewater, New Jersey, Attorneys for Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Leone Industries.
Scott A. Lazar, Esq., Hahn Howarth, Parsippany, New Jersey, Attorneys for Third-Party Defendant H.A.G. Steel Contractors, Inc.
OPINION
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of third-party defendant H.A.G. Steel Contractors, Inc. ("H.A.G.") for summary judgment against the claim of third-party plaintiff Leone Industries ("Leone") for indemnification. In early 1999, Leone, a glass manufacturer, contracted the services of H.A.G., a steel manufacturer, for reparation of a glass furnace. During the project, Thomas Hinderberger, a H.A.G. employee, was killed when a wall of refractory brick and/or block collapsed. Leone seeks indemnity from H.A.G. in the wrongful death action brought against Leone by Pamela Hinderberger on behalf of her husband. In this motion, H.A.G. claims that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law in the indemnity suit either because the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act bars recovery against an employer for injuries sustained during employment or, alternatively, because there is no factual basis for the claim that H.A.G. agreed to indemnify Leone for injuries occurring on Leone's premises. For the following reasons, the Court will grant H.A.G.'s motion for summary judgment against Leone's indemnification claim.
BACKGROUND
Leone is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in Bridgeton, New Jersey. (Leone Mat. Facts at ¶ 1.) At this location in late 1998 and early 1999, Leone operated a glass manufacturing plant with two glass melting furnaces. (Id.) In or around September 1998, it became necessary for Leone to demolish and rebuild the older of these two furnaces (herein referred to as Furnace No. 1). (Id.) Accordingly, in late November or early December, Lawrence Barrickman, Leone's Director of Technical Service, contacted H.A.G., a Georgia corporation in the business of steel fabrication and erection, regarding the rebuilding of Furnace No. 1. Prior to this initial contact, there had been no business dealings between H.A.G. and Leone. (Id.)
Upon being contacted by Leone via telephone, H.A.G. visited Leone's site in Bridgeton. (H.A.G. Ex. H, Testimony of Larry Barrickman at 41-44.) Shortly thereafter, H.A.G. sent four letters to Leone containing proposals for the work to be done. (H.A.G. Ex. G at 53.) All four letters were dated between December 5, 1998 and December 8, 1998. The first letter was a detailed description of the work involved in the fabrication and erection of the new furnace steel and the estimated cost of each. (H.A.G. Ltr. dated Dec. 5, 1998, H.A.G. Ex. D.) The proposal contained four lists, a list of the work included in the estimated cost and a list of the work not included in the estimated cost for both the erection and the fabrication of the steel. (Id.) The second letter contained a breakdown of the labor, travel, and material rates for the project. (H.A.G. Ltr. #2 dated Dec. 5, 1998, H.A.G. Ex. D.) The third letter was identical to the first except that it contained a revised estimated cost for the steel erection and an estimate for the demolition of the existing furnace. (H.A.G. Ltr. dated Dec. 7, 1998, H.A.G. Ex. D.) This letter was signed by Mr. Ronald Whaley, an employee of H.A.G. (Id.) The fourth and final letter, sent to Leone on December 8, 1998, contained a proposal for the fabrication and erection of the refiner and forehearth steel for the new furnace. (H.A.G. Ltr. dated Dec. 8, 1998, H.A.G. Ex. D.) Pursuant to these proposals, Mr. Barrickman prepared a purchase order for the work, indicating the estimated cost of time and materials for various phases of the project. (H.A.G. Ex. F.) No other information passed between H.A.G. and Leone prior to the start of the project. (H.A.G. Ex. G at 53-56.) The work for the project was estimated to begin on February 1, 1999. (Id at 53.)
Thomas Hinderberger, an ironworker employed by H.A.G., began working on the Leone project in early February. (H.A.G. Ex. A at ¶ 8.) On February 8, 1999, during the demolition phase of the project, Mr. Hinderberger was fatally injured when a wall of refractory brick and/or block collapsed. (Leone Counter-St. of Mat. Facts at ¶ 21.) On February 9, H.A.G., upon the request of Leone, produced a Certificate of Insurance detailing H.A.G.'s coverage. (H.A.G. Ex. G at 56-60.)
Following the accident, the United States Department of Labor conducted an investigation and subsequently issued a Citation to H.A.G. for four violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA"). (Leone Mat. Facts at ¶ 23.) The violations included the following: (1) employees were not trained in the recognition and avoidance of hazards associated with the job site; (2) the employer had not conducted an engineering survey to determine the conditions of the framing floors and walls and the possibility of an unplanned collapse of any portion of the structure prior to the demolition of the furnace; (3) the employer did not continually inspect the refractory to ensure that a collapse could not occur; and (4) the walls, more than one story in height, were permitted to stand alone without lateral bracing. (Id.) The record does not indicate that OSHA investigated Leone's operations with respect to H.A.G and its employees.
Following the accident, Mr. Hinderberger's family applied for and received workmen's compensation benefits from the workmen's compensation carrier for H.A.G. (See H.A.G. Ex. J, Employers First Report of Accidental Injury.) Shortly thereafter, Mr. Hinderberger's wife, Pamela Hinderberger, brought a wrongful death action against the companies involved in the rebuilding of Furnace No. 1, namely, Leone Industries, KTG Systems, Inc., Robinson Contractor's, Inc., and Bridgewood Piping Company. Specifically with respect to Leone, the plaintiffs alleged that Leone, by reason of their carelessness and negligence, committed and caused a dangerous condition to exist which led to the death of Mr. Hinderberger. (Certification of Scott A. Lazar at ¶ 2.) In response, Leone filed a third-party complaint seeking indemnity from H.A.G. based upon the theory of implied indemnification. Leone alleged that H.A.G.'s obligation to indemnify Leone arose from its breach of the duty, implied in the contract between the parties, to perform its services in a safe and workmanlike manner. (Leone Counter-Statement of Mat. Facts at ¶ 19.)
In the present motion for summary judgment H.A.G. claims that Leone's third-party complaint must be dismissed as a matter of law on the grounds that the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. § 34:15-7, bars recovery against an employer (H.A.G. Br. at 4) or, on the alternate grounds, that there is no factual basis for Leone's implied indemnification claim against H.A.G. (Id. at 6.)
DISCUSSION
The present suit is before this Court on a motion for summary judgment initiated by third-party defendant H.A.G. Steel Contractors, Inc. Specifically, H.A.G claims Leone's indemnity suit must be dismissed as a matter of law either because (1) the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. § 34:15-7, bars recovery against an employer (H.A.G. Br. at 4), or (2) there is no factual basis for the claim that H.A.G. agreed to indemnify Leone. (Id. at 6.)
For the reasons discussed herein, this Court finds that there is no factual or legal basis for Leone's indemnification claim against H.A.G. and accordingly grants summary judgment in favor of third-party defendant, H.A.G. Steel.
A. Summary Judgment Standard
A court may grant summary judgment when the materials of record "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Hersh v. Allen Prods. Co., 789 F.2d 230, 232 (3d Cir. 1986);Lang v. New York Life Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 118, 119 (3d Cir. 1983). A dispute is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable rule of law.Id. Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. Id.
In deciding whether there is a disputed issue of material fact, the court must view the evidence in favor of the non-moving party by extending any reasonable favorable inference to that party. See Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1080-81 (3d Cir. 1996);Kowalski v. L F Prods., 82 F.3d 1283, 1288 (3d Cir. 1996); Meyer v. Riegel Prods. Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 n. 2 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.dismissed, 465 U.S. 1091 (1984). The threshold inquiry is whether there are "any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 250; Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 329-330 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248) ("[T]he nonmoving party creates a genuine issue of material fact if it provides sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find for him at trial").
The moving party always bears the initial burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, regardless of which party ultimately would have the burden of persuasion at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 706 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023 (1990).
However, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders other facts immaterial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-323. In such situations, "the burden on the moving party may be discharged by `showing' that is, pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325;Brewer, 72 F.3d at 329-330 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23) ("When the nonmoving party bears the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party may meet its burden on summary judgment by showing that the nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient to carry its burden of persuasion at trial.")
The non-moving party, here the third-party plaintiff, "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of" its pleading in order to show the existence of a genuine issue. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). They must do more than rely only "upon bare assertions, conclusory allegations or suspicions."Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1010 (1985) (citation omitted); see Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324-25.
Once the moving party has carried its burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, "its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Thus, if the non-movant's evidence is merely "colorable" or is "not significantly probative," the court may grant summary judgment.Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50.
B. Analysis
In the present case, H.A.G. claims that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law in Leone's indemnity suit because (1) the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act bars recovery against an employer once the employee, or those on his behalf, has received compensation for the injuries sustained or (2) there is no factual basis for Leone's claim that an indemnity agreement, either express or implied, existed between the parties.
1. Whether the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act, N.J.S.A. § 34:15-7, bars recovery
H.A.G. first claims that § 34:15-7 of the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act precludes the indemnification suit brought against them by Leone. Specifically, H.A.G. contends that §§ 34:15-7 and 8, which provide that the Workmen's Compensation Act is to be the sole remedy for employees unintentionally injured at work and that compensation for such personal injuries, or death, shall be made according to the schedule contained in §§ 34:15-12 and 13 of the Act, prevents them from indemnifying Leone for Mrs. Hinderberger's recoveries, if any. (See H.A.G. Br. at 4, citing N.J.S.A. § 34:15-7 and 8.) After a review of the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act and relevant New Jersey law concerning third-party rights, it is clear that N.J.S.A. § 34:15 does not bar an indemnity agreement between an employer and a third-party.
The relationship between the employer, employee and third-party tortfeasor is governed by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Port Authority v. Honeywell, 222 N.J. Super. 11, 18 (App.Div. 198 7). Under the Act, an employee who has received workmen's compensation benefits from his or her employer for an injury sustained at work is not entitled to then pursue a tort action against the employer. According to the Act, an employer "`renders itself absolutely liable for the scheduled and fixed compensation to the injured party'" and, through acceptance of these benefits, the employee agrees to forsake a tort action against the employer. Id. (quoting Schweitzer v. Elox Div. of Colt Industries, 70 N.J. 280, 287 (1976)). Thus, according to the Act, Mrs. Hinderberger effectively waived her right to seek tort recovery from H.A.G. once she accepted workmen's compensation for her husband's death. However, even though the Act precludes the employee from filing suit against its employer, the Act does not prevent the employee from recovering damages from a third-party tortfeasor whose negligence played a role in the injuries sustained. See id. (citing Ramos v. Browning Ferris Industries, 103 N.J. 177, 183 (1986)). Thus, Mrs. Hinderberger's tort suits against Leone, et al., are consistent with the Act's policies and "the implicit legislative determination that the employer's negligence, if any, shall not effect the liability relationship of the parties." Id. at 19.
Once the employee decides to file suit against a third-party tortfeasor, as is his or her prerogative under the Act, the third party tortfeasor has a limited scope of rights under the Act. According to the Act, because an employer is not subject to tort liability once an employee receives workmen's compensation benefits, the employer is also not subject to the provisions of the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law.Id. at 18. Practically speaking, this means that a third party tortfeasor sued by an injured employee cannot implead a negligent employer into the suit seeking contribution. Id. Thus, under the Act, Leone could not implead H.A.G. into Mrs. Hinderberger's wrongful death action, despite any responsibility that H.A.G. may have had in Mr. Hinderberger's death. However, the Act does not prevent the employer from agreeing to indemnify a third-party for injuries sustained by employees while at work. Either "through an express agreement" or "under a theory of implied indemnification" the employer may assume a contractual duty to indemnify a third-party. Id.
Thus, the Workmen's Compensation Act does not automatically preclude Leone's suit seeking recovery from H.A.G. to the extent Leone is found liable to the plaintiff. Rather, according to New Jersey law, a third-party is able to seek and obtain indemnification from an employer as long as there is, inter alia, an express or implied contractual duty to do so. See Id. at 18. This Court finds that H.A.G. has not shown that as a matter of law, the Workmen's Compensation Act bars recovery against H.A.G., and summary judgment on this aspect of H.A.G.'s claim is denied accordingly.
2. Whether there is any factual basis for a claim of contractual indemnification by express or implied agreement between H.A.G. and Leone
H.A.G. also contends that there is no factual basis for Leone's claim of contractual indemnification because there was no communication between the two companies giving rise to either an express or implied indemnity agreement. H.A.G. alleges that, prior to Mr. Hinderberger's accident, the only information exchanged between itself and Leone were four work proposals between December 5 and 8 and subsequent purchase orders. According to H.A.G., none of these documents contained an express agreement to indemnify Leone or any language that could be construed as an implied agreement to indemnify Leone. (H.A.G. Br. at 8.)
Even construing all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of Leone as non-movant, the Court finds that Leone has failed to create a genuine issue as to whether there was an indemnity agreement, express or implied, between the parties. Accordingly, the Court will grant summary judgment in favor of H.A.G. as a matter of law.
New Jersey law creates a right to indemnification in two situations: (1) where a contract explicitly provides for indemnification and (2) where a special relationship between the parties creates an implied right of indemnification. See Honeywell, 222 N.J. Super. at 19-20.
In the present case, it is undisputed that there was no explicit agreement between Leone and H.A.G. providing for indemnification. The New Jersey Superior Court has determined that "a contract will not be construed to indemnify the indemnitee against losses resulting from its own negligence unless such an intention is expressed in unequivocal terms." Id. at 19.
It is clear from the record in the present case that the parties did not provide for indemnification in any express terms. Prior to Mr. Hinderberger's accident, none of the documents which passed between H.A.G. and Leone, namely the work proposals and purchase orders, discussed the parties' responsibilities to workers who might be injured on the job. Following Mr. Hinderberger's death, H.A.G.'s Certificate of Insurance was the only information exchanged between H.A.G. and Leone relating to the parties' responsibilities in the event of injury. The Certificate, however, was an explanation of H.A.G's coverage and did not affect Leone's responsibility or liability in any way. Thus, no documentation of indemnification was produced throughout Leone and H.A.G.'s relationship. Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to the existence of an explicit indemnity agreement between the parties.
Having concluded that no reasonable fact-finder could find that Leone is entitled to indemnification through an express agreement, the Court next turns to discuss whether Leone has created a genuine issue with respect to the existence of an implied indemnity agreement.
The New Jersey Courts have created a two-pronged test for determining whether an implied indemnity agreement exists. "`As a general rule, a third-party may recover on a theory of implied indemnity from an employer only when [1] a special legal relationship exists between the employer and the third-party, and [2] the liability of the third-party is vicarious.'" Id. at 20 (quoting Ramos v. Browning Ferris Industries, 103 N.J. 177, 188-189 (1986)). Because a right of indemnity is created as an equitable remedy "to prevent a result which is regarded as unjust," a party who is at fault "[o]rdinarily may not obtain indemnification for his own acts. Id. Thus, the courts require that the indemnitee be "without fault and his liability be merely constructive, secondary or vicarious in order to make a claim for indemnification." Id. For reasons now discussed the Court finds that Leone has failed to meet even the first prong this test, and the Court will grant summary judgment against Leone's claims against H.A.G.
Generally speaking, there are two types of relationships that qualify as a "special legal relationship" for indemnification purposes. In the first type of special legal relationship, the parties maintain "a generally recognized special relationship permitting indemnification."Allied Corporation v. Frola, No. Civ.A.87-462, 1993 WL 388970, at *10 (D.N.J. Sept. 21, 1993). These "generally recognized" relationships typically include bailor-bailee, lessor-lessee, union-union member, and employer-employee. Id. New Jersey has refrained from expanding this list to include other common relationships, such as that between vendor and vendee or purchaser and manufacturer, explaining that in these instances the employer's duty to act in a non-negligent manner is owed to the employee and not to the third-party. Arcell v. Ashland Chemical Co., Inc., 152 N.J. Super. 471, 492 (L. Div. 1977). And, in cases where exceptions have been made, the parameter of the exceptions has been extremely limited. See Allied, 1993 WL 188970 (court refused to hold that purchaser of contaminated property had a special relationship with seller, finding that an exception is to be made only in instances where (1) the purchaser is innocent, unsuspecting, and bore the sole responsibility for remedying the wrong, and (2) the seller engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity).
The second type of relationship that courts have held to be a "special legal relationship" for indemnification purposes is one that "displays unique factors that manifest the parties' intent to assign responsibility to the potential indemnitor." Id., at *10 (citing Somarelf v. American Bureau of Shipping, 704 F. Supp. 59, 61 (D.N.J. 1988)). In Port Authority v. Honeywell, the New Jersey Superior Court found that an implied indemnity agreement existed between a contractor and third-party based upon the contractor's promise "to exercise every precaution to prevent injury to [his employees]." 222 N.J. Super. at 23. The Honeywell Court cautioned, however, that "every contract does not contain an implied promise to perform work in such a way as to protect its employees from harm," and that, in the case before them, the employer's intention to safeguard his employees was "express and manifest." Id. Thus, absent a contractor's express statement indicating an intention to take responsibility for the safety of his employees, "unique factors" giving rise to an implied indemnity agreement will most likely not exist under New Jersey law.
In Rommel v. U.S. Steel Corp , 66 N.J. Super. 30 (App.Div. 1961), cert. den . , 24 N.J. 580 (1961), the employer and the third-party entered into a contract which provided that the safety of all persons employed by the subcontractor on the third-party's premises would be solely the subcontractor's responsibility and that the subcontractor would take all reasonable measures and precautions to prevent injuries. Id . at 41. Despite these statements, the court found that the subcontractor "did not undertake to expressly or impliedly pay for damages caused by Steel's negligence," and held that while the third-party had a claim against the contractor for a breach of contract, it did not have a claim for implied indemnification. Id . at 42.
Turning to a discussion of the present case, the Court finds that, for the following reasons, a "special legal relationship" does not exist between H.A.G. and Leone that could give rise to an implied indemnity agreement. The facts do not show that Leone and H.A.G. maintained a generally recognized special relationship, nor do they show that the parties intended to assign responsibility to H.A.G.
First, the Court finds that a "generally recognized" special relationship does not exist between H.A.G. and Leone. As mentioned previously, New Jersey has recognized the relationships between bailor-bailee, lessor-lessee, union-union member, and employer-employee as satisfying the special legal relationship requirement of implied indemnification. See Arcell, 152 N.J. Super. at 492. It is clear that the relationship between H.A.G. and Leone, one of contractor-owner, does not fall into one of these defined relationships.
Having determined that the relationship between contractor and owner is not a "generally recognized" relationship giving rise to indemnification, the Court must next decide if such relationship warrants an addition to be made to the narrowly defined class of generally recognized relationships permitting indemnification. After careful consideration, the Court finds, for the following reasons, that it does not. First, like in the relationship between purchaser and manufacturer or vendor and vendee, discussed in Arcell, supra, the Court finds that the contractor does not owe a duty of due care to the owner, but rather to its employees. Therefore, absent an explicit agreement providing for indemnification, the owner is liable for its own negligent acts. Secondly, adding a category of relationships to the list of generally recognized relationships permitting indemnification would be to defy the narrow boundaries set by courts in the past. It is clear from Allied andArcell, discussed above, that exceptions to the defined list will only be made in a limited set of cases that manifest extenuating circumstances. Thus, expanding this list to include a contractor-owner relationship would be contrary to New Jersey law.
Finding that the relationship between H.A.G. and Leone is not a "generally recognized relationship," the Court next considers whether the relationship between H.A.G. and Leone "displays unique factors that manifest the parties' intent to assign responsibility to the potential indemnitor." Allied, 1993 WL 388970, at *10. For the following reasons, the Court finds that "unique factors" do not exist between H.A.G. and Leone.
As mentioned previously, the New Jersey Superior Court has found that unique factors manifesting an intent to assign responsibility existed where a contractor explicitly stated that he would "exercise every precaution to prevent injury to [his employees]," Honeywell, 222 N.J. Super. at 23. In the present case, there was no such promise by H.A.G. or any communication between the parties that could be construed as a promise by H.A.G. to take responsibility for employees injured on the job. As mentioned previously, prior to the start of the Leone project, H.A.G. sent four work proposals to Leone. These documents contained lists of the work to be performed and the estimated cost of the work. They did not contain language relating to employee safety or responsibility for employee injuries. The record also indicates that Leone possessed a H.A.G. brochure. The brochure contained a list of the work that H.A.G performs, statements of customer service, and declarations that H.A.G. has "innovative and knowledgeable" employees. These assertions, without more, do not amount to a promise by H.A.G. to protect the safety of its employees or to indemnify Leone in the event employees are injured. The record also shows that after the start of the project, H.A.G. sent Leone time sheets detailing the number of hours worked, the rates, and the cost of materials. (Leone Ex. H at 33-35.) Leone referred to these time sheets to calculate H.A.G.'s pay and nothing more. (Id.) Thus, the record establishes that both prior to the start of work and after, the parties in no way addressed their responsibilities to workers injured on the job. The Court in Honeywell limited its holding to only those promises which are "express and manifest" and this Court must be careful not to overstep those boundaries. Accordingly, the Court finds that the relationship between H.A.G. and Leone does not manifest "unique factors" giving rise to a "special legal relationship."
Leone claims that the contract between itself and H.A.G. contained unique factors that displayed H.A.G's intentions to indemnify Leone. Specifically, Leone contends that the mere existence of a contract between contractor and contractee is an implicit promise by the contractor to work in a safe and workmanlike manner. Thus, Leone claims that the same "unique factors" that existed in Honeywell and gave rise to a special legal relationship exist in the present case. Even viewing the facts in light most favorable to Leone, i.e . , assuming that there is indeed a contract between the parties, a fact disputed by H.A.G., the Court finds that Leone's contention is contrary to New Jersey law. While it is true that the Supreme Court has held that in the context of maritime cases a special relationship exists between a contractor and a ship owner giving rise to an implied warranty of workmanlike service, the same principal has not been applied to non-maritime cases. Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp . , 350 U.S. 124 (1956). In the field of maritime contracts, generally the cases are governed by Federal Maritime Law and state rules neither govern or condition its liability. Somarelf v. American Bureau of Shipping , 704 F. Supp. 59 (D.N.J. 1988). Thus, the same principles do not apply in the context of non-maritime contracts, and, accordingly, such law is not controlling on this court. Furthermore, in Port Authority , the New Jersey Superior Court held that to the extent the Supreme Court decision in Ryan could be construed as holding that every contract contains an implied promise by the contractor, the Honeywell court disagrees with such a declaration as a matter of New Jersey law. 222 N.J. 11 at 27. Accordingly, the Court finds that the mere existence of a contract between contractor and contractee, in non-maritime cases, does not create an implied promise to work in a safe and workmanlike manner, and thus, does not, by itself, give rise to a "special legal relationship" or an implied indemnity agreement.
Based upon the above reasoning, the Court finds that Leone has not created a genuine issue as to whether a special legal relationship between H.A.G. and Leone exists. Because the Court finds that the first prerequisite for a finding of implied indemnification, a special legal relationship between the parties, has not been satisfied, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to the existence of an implied indemnity agreement. Consequently, the Court does not reach the issue of whether Leone has satisfied the second requirement for a showing of implied indemnification, under Ramos, supra. Accordingly, this Court grants summary judgment in favor of third-party defendant, H.A.G. Steel, and the third-party complaint will be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court grants H.A.G.'s motion for summary judgment on the indemnification claim brought by Leone Industries, and Leone's third-party complaint will be dismissed. The accompanying Order is entered.
ORDER
THIS MATTER having come before the court on the motion of third-party defendant, H.A.G. Steel Contractors, Inc., for summary judgment against third-party plaintiff Leone Industries, and the Court having considered the submissions of the parties, and for the reasons discussed in the accompanying Opinion of today's date;
IT IS on this ___ day of August, 2000 hereby
ORDERED that third-party defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED , and all claims arising from Leone's third-party claims against H.A.G. Steel are DISMISSED; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the remainder of this case shall proceed to trial in the normal course.