Ed.) c. 32, §§ 80 and 81, as amended and more especially as affected by St. 1938, c. 326, and ordering removal of their names from the list of members of the contributory system and the repayment to each of them of the sums previously deducted from his pay with interest from the date of the filing of the bill, together with costs. Hinckley v. Retirement Board of Gloucester, 316 Mass. 496. Hayward v. Retirement Board of Brockton, ante, 371. There is nothing to indicate that the rights of these plaintiffs as herein determined will not be recognized by the individual defendants, and it cannot be assumed that they, when the law has been interpreted, will fail to take the proper steps to carry out its provisions.
WILKINS, J. This case is governed in its main aspects by Hinckley v. Retirement Board of Gloucester, 316 Mass. 496. The plaintiffs, regular police officers of Brockton, bring a bill in equity against the members of the retirement board of that city, the city treasurer, and the city itself, seeking to enjoin deductions from their salaries made on the ground that they are members of the contributory retirement system established by St. 1936, c. 318, § 1, inserting §§ 26-31H in G.L. (Ter.
By contrast, in the language addressing police officers, fire fighters, and certain employees of municipal departments, the statute uses "money paid for holidays" and "salary" when discussing what is to be included as "regular compensation." All words, clauses, and parts of a legislative enactment should be given force and effect and no part is to be brushed aside unless no other rational course is open. Hinckley v. Retirement Bd. of Gloucester, 316 Mass. 496, 500 (1944). Where words in a statute are used in one part of a statute in a definite sense, they should be given the same meaning in another part of the statute.
In so holding we should fail to give all the words and phrases of the 1958 act that force and effect which is theirs. Hinckley v. Retirement Bd. ofGloucester, 316 Mass. 496, 500. Meunier's Case, 319 Mass. 421, 423. Gillam v. Board of Health of Saugus, 327 Mass. 621, 623. Milton v. Metropolitan Dist. Commn. 342 Mass. 222, 225. They would be rendered ineffectual and barren of meaning. Selectmen of Topsfield v. State Racing Commn. 324 Mass. 309, 314. That some consequent hardship may be attendant upon this holding cannot deter us in the face of the clear and unambiguous language of the 1958 statute taken as a whole.
Rosenberg v. Robbins, 289 Mass. 402, 411. Hinckley v. Retirement Board of Gloucester, 316 Mass. 496, 500. Meunier's Case, 319 Mass. 421, 423.
There is no question but that the plaintiff, if a member of the contributory retirement system, cannot maintain this bill. Hinckley v. Retirement Board of Gloucester, 316 Mass. 496. Hayward v. Retirement Board of Brockton, 317 Mass. 371. He contends, however, that he is not such a member. He urges that he is still, to all intents and purposes, a janitor; that he, accordingly, is subject to G.L. (Ter.
Nevertheless, the Legislature of 1914 used both words, and tautology is not readily imputed to the Legislature. Commonwealth v. McCaughey, 9 Gray, 296. Hinckley v. Retirement Board of Gloucester, 316 Mass. 496, 500. But whatever would have been the construction of the word "offensive" and of the word "disorderly" in the part of the section with which we are now principally concerned before the enactment of St. 1943, c. 377, it is plain that the act of 1943 accomplished a revision of the entire section, and that its purpose was to simplify, to clarify, to modernize, and to make more precise an ancient statute some of the terms of which were difficult to define and had come to have a flavor of obsolescence.
McArthur Brothers Co. v. Commonwealth, 197 Mass. 137. Boston Albany Railroad v. Commonwealth, 296 Mass. 426. Spence, Bryson, Inc. v. China Products Co. 308 Mass. 81. But the entire chapter in which the definition appears must be construed as a whole, and the question is not whether a hospital is expressly exempted but whether a hospital comes within the sweep of the chapter in the light of its declared underlying and predominant aim and object. Universal Machine Co. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commission, 301 Mass. 40. Commissioner of Corporations Taxation v. Baker, 303 Mass. 606. Hinckley v. Retirement Board of Gloucester, 316 Mass. 496. In passing it might be noted that the express exemption of the Commonwealth and cities and towns might have been inserted to free them from being affected by the chapter because of such operations, commercial in character, as the distribution and sale of water, electricity and gas.
The legislative intent is to be ascertained from the statute as a whole, giving to every section, clause and word such force and effect as are reasonably practical to the end that, as far as possible, the statute will constitute a consistent and harmonious whole, capable of producing a rational result consonant with common sense and sound judgment. Fluet v. McCabe, 299 Mass. 173. Commissioners of Public Works v. Cities Service Oil Co. 308 Mass. 349. Hinckley v. Retirement Board of Gloucester, 316 Mass. 496. Commissioner of Corporations Taxation v. Chilton Club, 318 Mass. 285, 292. When § 2 is read with § 1 of said c. 217, there is no room for the application of the doctrine of repeals by implication, Commonwealth v. Bloomberg, 302 Mass. 349; Ryan v. Marlborough, 318 Mass. 610, because § 2 specifically designates the only portion of § 20 of St. 1920, c. 586, intended to be repealed.
Commonwealth v. Bloomberg, 302 Mass. 349, 352." Hinckley v. Retirement Board of Gloucester, 316 Mass. 496, 500. This principle is particularly applicable where the prior statute is of long standing, of uniform application to municipalities, and designed to safeguard public funds.