Hill v. Williams

Full title: CARMEN HILL, Plaintiff, v. LARRY WILLIAMS, et al., Defendants

Court: United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

Date published: Aug 12, 2008

No. 4:08CV00967 ERW (E.D. Mo. Aug. 12, 2008)

Opinion

No. 4:08CV00967 ERW.

August 12, 2008

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

E. WEBBER JR., District Judge

This matter is before the Court upon the motion of Carmen Hill for leave to commence this action without prepayment of the filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Upon consideration of the financial information provided with the motion, the Court finds that plaintiff is financially unable to pay any portion of the filing fee. As a result, plaintiff will be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Additionally, the Court has reviewed the complaint and will dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. An action is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis in either law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. V. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).

In reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must give the complaint the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court must also weigh all factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff, unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

The Complaint

Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981- 1986 for alleged deprivation of her personal property. Named as defendants are Larry Williams (City Treasurer), the City of St. Louis Parking Violations Bureau (the "Bureau"), and Jay Nixon (Missouri Attorney General). The complaint seeks declaratory and monetary relief.

Plaintiff alleges that on June 27, 2008, someone with the Bureau placed a "boot" on her car. Plaintiff claims that she was never notified by the Bureau that she owed it any debt that would give rise to the seizure of her car. Plaintiff says that the manner in which her car was immobilized violated municipal statutes.

Plaintiff does not allege that any of the named defendants had any personal involvement in the alleged deprivation of her civil rights. Rather, plaintiff says that the defendants are liable for the alleged wrongdoing under the theory of respondeat superior.

Discussion

To establish a claim under § 1981, plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendants purposefully and intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of race. See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982); Edwards v. Jewish Hosp., 855 F.2d 1345, 1351 (8th Cir. 1988). Nothing in plaintiff's complaint indicates that any actions taken by defendants were motivated by purposeful race discrimination. Therefore, plaintiff's § 1981 claim is legally frivolous.

"Liability under § 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the alleged deprivation of rights." Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990); see also Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985) (claim not cognizable under § 1983 where plaintiff fails to allege that defendant was personally involved in or directly responsible for the incidents that injured plaintiff); Boyd v. Knox, 47 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1995) (respondeat superior theory inapplicable in § 1983 suits). In the instant action, plaintiff has not set forth any facts indicating that any of the defendants were directly involved in or personally responsible for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. As a result, plaintiff's § 1983 claim is legally frivolous.

To establish a claim under § 1985(3), plaintiff must establish that (1) she is a member of a class suffering from invidious discrimination, and (2) defendants' actions were motivated by racial animus or some other type of class-based discrimination.United Bhd. of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 834-39 (1983); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (plaintiff must allege these two elements to state § 1985(3) claim). As noted above, nothing in the complaint indicates that defendants were motivated by purposeful discrimination. As such, plaintiff's § 1985(3) claim will be dismissed as legally frivolous.

Because a § 1986 action is dependent upon the existence of a § 1985 claim, plaintiff's § 1986 claim is also frivolous. See McIntosh v. Arkansas Republican Party-Frank White Election Committee, 766 F.2d 337, 340 (8th Cir. 1985).

For each of these reasons, the Court will dismiss this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. #2] is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or cause process to issue upon the complaint because the complaint is legally frivolous or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or both.

An appropriate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.

So Ordered.