Opinion
2022 CA 0703
12-22-2022
CALVIN J. HILL, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE EXECUTOR OF THE SUCCESSION OF ELNORA JOHNSON HILL v. TMR EXPLORATION, INC., PARK EXPLORATION, INC., AND VITOL RESOURCES, INC,
Brent K. Delee Kirby J. Guidry Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Plaintiffs, Calvin Hill, et al. Chad A. Aguillard Ali Zito Shields Thomas A. Nelson New Roads, LA Counsel for Plaintiffs-in-Intervention/ Appellants, Roosevelt Hill, et al. Monique M. Edwards Baton Rouge, LA and Isaac Jackson, Jr. Plaquemine, LA Counsel for Plaintiff-in-Intervention, Felix Hill Randall S. Davidson Wm Lake Hearne, Jr. Shreveport, LA and Scotty E. Chabert, Jr. Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Raymond J. Lasseigne Susan Daigle Lafayette, LA Counsel for Defendant, Gemini Insurance Co. Robert I. Siegel Alistar M. Ward Jonathan S. Ord New Orleans, LA Counsel for Defendants, National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, New Hampshire Insurance Co., and AIG Specialty Insurance Co., formerly known as American International Specialty Lines Insurance Co. Patrick J. McShane Danica Benbow Denny Kathleen P. Rice New Orleans, LA Counsel for Defendant, Chaucer Corporate Capital (No. 2) Limited James C. Percy Thomas McCall Tiffany Dupree Baton Rouge, LA and Krystal P. Scott Houston, TX Counsel for Defendants, Sunoco Partners Marketing & Terminals, L.P.; Sunoco Logistics Partners Operations G.P., LLLC; and Sunoco, Inc. R & M's (collectively) Sunoco P. Matthew Jones Nena M. Eddy Baton Rouge, LA and David Leefe Jacques C. Mestayer New Orleans, LA Counsel for Defendant, Schlumberger Technology Corporation James A. Holmes New Orleans, LA Counsel for Defendant, Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
Appealed from the Eighteenth Judicial District Court in and for the Parish of West Baton Rouge State of Louisiana Docket Number 41,245 Honorable Tonya S. Lurry, Judge Presiding
Brent K. Delee Kirby J. Guidry Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Plaintiffs, Calvin Hill, et al.
Chad A. Aguillard Ali Zito Shields Thomas A. Nelson New Roads, LA Counsel for Plaintiffs-in-Intervention/ Appellants, Roosevelt Hill, et al.
Monique M. Edwards Baton Rouge, LA and Isaac Jackson, Jr. Plaquemine, LA Counsel for Plaintiff-in-Intervention, Felix Hill
Randall S. Davidson Wm Lake Hearne, Jr. Shreveport, LA and Scotty E. Chabert, Jr. Baton Rouge, LA Counsel for Defendant/Appellee, Raymond J. Lasseigne
Susan Daigle Lafayette, LA Counsel for Defendant, Gemini Insurance Co.
Robert I. Siegel Alistar M. Ward Jonathan S. Ord New Orleans, LA Counsel for Defendants, National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, New Hampshire Insurance Co., and AIG Specialty Insurance Co., formerly known as American International Specialty Lines Insurance Co.
Patrick J. McShane Danica Benbow Denny Kathleen P. Rice New Orleans, LA Counsel for Defendant, Chaucer Corporate Capital (No. 2) Limited
James C. Percy Thomas McCall Tiffany Dupree Baton Rouge, LA and Krystal P. Scott Houston, TX Counsel for Defendants, Sunoco Partners Marketing & Terminals, L.P.; Sunoco Logistics Partners Operations G.P., LLLC; and Sunoco, Inc. R & M's (collectively) Sunoco
P. Matthew Jones Nena M. Eddy Baton Rouge, LA and David Leefe Jacques C. Mestayer New Orleans, LA Counsel for Defendant, Schlumberger Technology Corporation
James A. Holmes New Orleans, LA Counsel for Defendant, Halliburton Energy Services, Inc.
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., GUIDRY, AND WOLFE, JJ.
OPINION
WHIPPLE, C.J.
Plaintiffs-in-intervention, Roosevelt Hill, et al., ("the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention") appeal the November 18, 2021 judgment of the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, sustaining a peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata filed by defendant Raymond J. Lasseigne and dismissing with prejudice their claims against Lasseigne. For the following reasons, we affirm.
The Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention are Roosevelt Hill; Alven Grevious; Leo Hill; Demetria Jones; Kathryn Devezin-Joyner; Douglas Joseph Sweeney; Debbie Marie Sweeney; Jacqueline Amanda Sweeney; Taylor Sweeney; Rachel Sweeney; JeVaughn Smith and Sonya Smith, appearing as guardian of the minor child, Kristina Marie Charles; Ella Johnson; Victor Johnson; and Lorenzo Hale.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This matter involves claims for alleged subsurface trespass and depletion of minerals beneath property owned in indivision by all plaintiffs, the original "Calvin Hill plaintiffs," the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention, and plaintiff-in-intervention Felix Hill (at times collectively referred to as "plaintiffs"). As pertinent to the proceedings herein, the Calvin Hill plaintiffs filed their original petition on February 4, 2014, naming as defendant, among others, TMR Exploration, Inc. ("TMR"), and on July 10, 2014, they filed a First Supplemental and Amending Petition, naming Lasseigne, the president of TMR, as defendant. The Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention filed their original Petition for Intervention on November 19, 2014, naming various defendants, including TMR and Lasseigne, and in his original Petition of Intervention filed on December 16, 2014, Felix Hill also named TMR and Lasseigne as defendants. Plaintiffs subsequently filed several supplemental and amending petitions, adding more parties and amending their claims.
On the record before us, as designated by appellants, the Calvin Hill plaintiffs are: Calvin J. Hill; Charles Edward Hill; Marian Hill Walker; Esquemon Anthony Hill; Rhonda Foster; Dr. Russell Hill; Vincent Hill; Jeffrey Hill; Shawn Hill; Mary Charles a/k/a Mary Hill; Kendra Hill; Bernadette Hill; Kenneth Amorio; Monica Whitaker; Dionne Hill; DuWana Hill; Kimsiana Hill-Lathan; Andre Hill; Napoleon Whitaker; Mary Ativie; Merion Jean Johnson; Camesha Stanton; Annette Whitaker-Woods; Pernell Hill; Eurilee Hill; Karen Maze; Amos Lagarde; Ida Mae Hill Johnson; Shirley Lockman; Burnett Grevious; Albert Grevious; Stalette Brown; Emelda Hill; Amanda Harris; Leon Whitaker; Craig Hill; LaCora Whitaker; Lee Whitaker; Rodney Hill; Edward Hill; Marcus Johnson; Terrol Sanders; and Oran Hill.
The facts as alleged in plaintiffs' original and supplemental and amending petitions are as follows. Plaintiffs are the owners of various undivided interests in a 22.768 acre tract of immovable property more particularly described as being located in the North 1/3 of Lot 5, Section 93, Township 7 South, Range 10 East, Parish of West Baton Rouge ("plaintiffs' property"), all tracing their ownership interests to the Successions of Peter Hill and Elnora Johnson Hill.
On May 16, 2007, TMR filed an application for permit to drill for minerals Section 93, Township 7 South, Range 10 East, in West Baton Rouge Parish, with the Louisiana Commissioner of Conservation ("the Commissioner"). However, the plat attached to TMR's May 16, 2017 permit application erroneously identified "A. Wilbert's Sons, LLC" as the sole owner of all property located in Section 93, Township 7 South, Range 10 East, thus failing to acknowledge plaintiffs' ownership interests in the section. Two days later, on May 18, 2007, the Commissioner issued TMR a permit as the operator to drill the well designated as the "A. Wilbert's Sons, LX.C. 93 No. 1."
Thereafter, TMR filed an amended permit application with the Commissioner in June of 2007, identifying the well's "proposed bottom hole location" at certain proposed coordinates. An amended permit to drill to the proposed bottom hole location was issued to TMR, effective June 1, 2007. Ultimately, the bottom hole of the well was completed at different coordinates located underneath plaintiffs' property, without their knowledge or permission.
In February 2008, TMR filed an amended application to drill, showing the bottom hole location of the well at different coordinates under plaintiffs' property, but again erroneously showed A. Wilbert's Sons, LLC as the sole owner of the property in Section 93. Thereafter, the Commissioner issued TMR an amended permit to drill, effective January 3, 2008, listing the bottom hole location of the well under plaintiffs' property.
Because the bottom of the well was directionally drilled and is located approximately two miles underneath plaintiffs' property, there was no indication of its presence from the surface of plaintiffs' property, thus preventing them from learning of the presence of the bottom hole of the well underneath their property until December 19, 2013, when they were informed of the situation by a surveyor.
With regard to the claims asserted against Lasseigne, the Calvin Hill plaintiffs, the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention, and Felix Hill all alleged that Lasseigne, acting within the course and scope of his employment, directed and/or coordinated the operations of TMR, including the employees of TMR, in connection with the drilling and production of the minerals from underneath plaintiffs' property. Further, plaintiffs alleged that Lasseigne "knew" of plaintiffs' ownership interests in Section 93, but made a "conscious decision" to not pursue obtaining leases from plaintiffs after being presented with information concerning how many owners there were. Plaintiffs also contended that Lasseigne, with "gross disregard," directed that the well be drilled to its final location. Finally, plaintiffs alleged that Lasseigne "had actual or constructive knowledge, or is presumed to know" that the bottom of the hole was located underneath their property and that he knew or should have known that the minerals being produced were coming from underneath the plaintiffs' property.
TMR and Lasseigne filed various exceptions to plaintiffs' claims asserted against them. Specifically, on January 8, 2015, TMR and Lasseigne filed exceptions, including a peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription, to the Petition for Intervention, First Amending Petition for Intervention, and Second Amending Petition for Intervention of the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in- intervention, contending that these plaintiffs' claims against TMR and Lasseigne had prescribed. On February 2, 2015, TMR and Lasseigne also filed exceptions, including a peremtory exception raising the objection of prescription, to Felix Hill's Petition of Intervention, contending that his claims against TMR and Lasseigne had prescribed. Additionally, on February 18, 2015, TMR and Lasseigne filed exceptions, including a peremptory exception raising the objection of prescription, to the Calvin Hill plaintiffs' Second Supplemental and Amending Petition, contending, in part, that the Calvin Hill plaintiffs' claims against them had prescribed.
The exceptions filed by TMR and Lasseigne in response to the various petitions, petitions of intervention, and supplemental and amending petitions were first heard on May 6, 2015, at which time the issue of prescription as to the claims asserted against Lasseigne was reset for hearing on June 3, 2015. Thereafter, following the June 3, 2015 hearing, the trial court rendered judgment dated July 1, 2015, ordering, among other things, "that the peremptory exception of prescription of any claims against Raymond J. Lasseigne pursuant to La. R.S. 12:1501 and 1502 is GRANTED and all claims against him are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE" ("the July 1, 2015 prescription judgment"). (Boldface emphasis added).
From this July 1, 2015 prescription judgment, the Calvin Hill plaintiffs appealed. On appeal, this court reversed the trial court's ruling on prescription as to the Calvin Hill plaintiffs, concluding that the trial court had erred in finding that their action against Lasseigne was prescribed. Hill v. TMR Exploration. Inc.. 2016-0566 (La.App. 1st Cir. 6/13/17), 223 So.3d 556, 560 & n.7, 566, writ denied. 2017-1163 (La. 10/27/17), 228 So.3d 1227.
In the appeal of the July 1, 2015 prescription judgment, this court specifically noted that while the intervening plaintiffs appeared at the hearing on TMR and Lasseigne's exception of prescription, and counsel for the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention argued in opposition to the exception, intervenors had not sought a new trial in connection with the July 1, 2015 judgment's ruling on prescription, nor had they challenged the prescription ruling with this court. Thus, this court stated that it made no determination as to the status of the claims of plaintiffs-in-intervention. Hill v. TMR Exploration. Inc.. 2016-0566 (La.App. 1st Cir. 6/13/17), 223 So.3d 556, 560 n.7. writ denied. 2017-1163 (La. 10/27/17), 228 So.3d 1227.
Thereafter, on August 16, 2018, in the trial court below, the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention filed a Fourth Supplemental and Amending Petition, again naming Lasseigne as defendant and restating the same claims against him. In response, Lasseigne filed an Exception of Res Judicata, contending that the trial court's July 1, 2015 prescription judgment was a final judgment rendered against all plaintiffs, dismissing all claims against Lasseigne. Lasseigne asserted that because only the Calvin Hill plaintiffs had appealed that judgment and won reversal, the July 1, 2015 prescription judgment was a valid and final judgment between all other plaintiffs and Lasseigne, thus preventing the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention from pursuing any further claims against Lasseigne.
Additionally, on October 2, 2018, Felix Hill filed a First Supplemental and Amending Petition of Intervention, again naming Lasseigne as defendant and also reasserting the same claims against him. Lasseigne likewise responded to Felix Hill's amended petition of intervention by filing an Exception of Res Judicata, asserting that because Felix Hill had not appealed the trial court's July 1, 2015 prescription judgment dismissing all claims against Lasseigne, that judgment was final as to Felix Hill.
Following a hearing on Lasseigne's exceptions of res judicata, the trial court denied both exceptions by judgment dated February 28, 2019. Lasseigne then sought review of the trial court's ruling through an application for supervisory writs to this court. On supervisory review, this court granted Lasseigne's writ application as to the trial court's denial of his exception of res judicata directed to Felix Hill's First Supplemental and Amending Petition of Intervention, stating, in part, as follows:
All claims asserted by Felix Hill, plaintiff-in-intervention, against Raymond J. Lasseigne were dismissed with prejudice on July 1, 2015. Felix Hill did not seek a new trial in connection with the July 1, 2015 judgment nor did he appeal from this judgment. See Hill v. TMR Exploration, Inc., 2016-0566 (La.App. 1st Cir. 6/13/17), 223 So.3d 556, writ denied, 2017-1163 (La. 10/27/17), 228 So.3d 1227. A judgment of dismissal with prejudice shall have the effect of a final judgment of absolute dismissal after trial. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1673. A final judgment is conclusive between the parties except on direct review; it acquires the authority of the thing adjudged if no further review is sought within the time fixed by law or if the judgment is confirmed on review. Avery v. CitiMortgage, Inc. 2008-2052 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/13/09), 15 So.3d 240, 242 (citations omitted). Although some of the plaintiffs successfully appealed from the July 1, 2015 judgment, a final judgment cannot be set aside or changed on appeal except as to those who are parties to the appeal. DePhillips v. Hospital Services District No. 1 of Tangipahoa Parish, 2017-1423 (La.App. 1st Cir. 7/18/18), 255 So.3d 1, 5, writ granted, cause remanded, 2018-1386 (La. 12/17/18), 258 So.3d 584. Therefore, the July 1, 2015 judgment is a final judgment as to Felix Hill and bars relitigation of his claims against Raymond J. Lasseigne... .Hill v. TMR Exploration, Inc., 2019-1096 (La.App. 1st Cir. 11/25/19), 2019 WL 6318445, *1 (unpublished). Thus, this court reversed the trial court's denial of Lasseigne's exception of res judicata directed to Felix Hill's First Supplemental and Amending Petition of Intervention, granted the exception, and dismissed with prejudice the claims asserted against Lasseigne by Felix Hill. Hill, 2019 WL 6318445 at *1.
However, because Lasseigne's writ application included a copy of only the exception of res judicata he filed as to the claims asserted against him by Felix Hill, this court ruled that he was not entitled to dismissal of the renewed claims of the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention on supervisory review. Hill v. TMR Exploration, Inc., 2019-1096 (La.App. 1st Cir. 12/12/19) (rehearing denied), 2019 WL 6318445 (unpublished).
Thus, on May 22, 2020, Lasseigne filed a Second Exception of Res Judicata as to the Fourth Supplemental and Amending Petition filed by the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention, again asserting that their failure to appeal the trial court's July 1, 2015 prescription judgment dismissing all claims against Lasseigne precluded them from pursuing further claims against him. Following a hearing on Lasseigne's exception, the trial court rendered judgment dated November 18, 2021, sustaining the exception and dismissing with prejudice the claims of the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention against Lasseigne. From this judgment, the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention appeal.
DISCUSSION
The peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata is based on the conclusive legal presumption that there should be no relitigation of a thing previously adjudged between the same parties. Mitchell v. Aaron's, Inc., 2018- 0131 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/21/18), 257 So.3d 812, 814. Res judicata bars relitigation of a subject matter arising from the same transaction or occurrence of a previous suit and promotes judicial efficiency and final resolution of disputes. Wicker v. Louisiana Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company. 2018-0225 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/21/18), 257 So.3d 817, 821. Louisiana Revised Statute 13:4231 provides for res judicata, in pertinent part, as follows:
Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or other direct review, to the following extent:
* * *
(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those causes of action.
(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them, with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its determination was essential to that judgment.
For res judicata to preclude a second action: (1) the first judgment must be valid and final, (2) the second action must involve the same parties, and (3) the cause(s) of action asserted in the second suit must have existed at the time the final judgment was rendered and must arise out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the first action. Wicker, 257 So.3d at 821.
A valid judgment is one rendered by a court with jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties, and a final judgment is one that disposes of the merits in whole or in part. LSA-C.C.P. art. 1841; LSA-R.S. 13:4231, Comments- 1990, comment (d). A judgment of dismissal with prejudice shall have the effect of a final judgment of absolute dismissal after trial. LSA-C.C.P. art. 1673. A final judgment is conclusive between the parties except on direct review. It acquires the authority of the thing adjudged if no further review is sought within the time fixed by law or if the judgment is confirmed on review. Avery v. CitiMortgage, Inc.. 2008-2052 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/13/09), 15 So.3d 240, 242.
Once a final judgment acquires the authority of the thing adjudged, no court has jurisdiction, in the sense of power and authority, to modify, revise or reverse the judgment, regardless of the magnitude of the error in the final judgment. Tolis v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 95-1529 (La. 10/16/95), 660 So.2d 1206, 1206-1207. A claim that a prior adjudication was incorrect because of an erroneous interpretation of law, or because of reliance on a legal principle later overruled, is immaterial to the application of res judicata in a following proceeding so long as the requirements of res judicata are met. McClendon v. State. Department of Transportation & Development. 94-0111 (La. 9/6/94), 642 So.2d 157, 160.
The doctrine of res judicata is not discretionary and mandates the effect to be given to final judgments. Wicker, 257 So.3d at 821. The party pleading the objection has the burden of proving facts essential to sustaining the objection. Mitchell 257 So.3d at 814. The res judicata effect of a prior judgment is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Mitchell, 257 So.3d at 814-815.
The instant case clearly satisfies the requirements for the application of res judicata. First, the July 1, 2015 prescription judgment was rendered by a court with jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties, and the judgment fully and finally disposed of all claims between the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention and Lasseigne. LSA-C.C.P. arts. 1841 and 1915(A) (4); Kadair v. Hampton, 2013-1171 (La.App. 1st Cir. 7/10/14), 146 So.3d 694, 700 n.8, writ denied, 2014-1709 (La. 11/7/14), 152 So.3d 177; Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Bynum, 2003-1671 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/14/04), 879 So.2d 807, 810 n.l, writ denied, 2004-1926 (La. 11/15/04), 887 So.2d 479. Moreover, the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention again named Lasseigne in their Fourth Supplemental and Amending Petition for Intervention, asserting against him the same causes of action arising out of the same occurrence as the earlier dismissed claims.
We note that Lasseigne failed to introduce the July 1, 2015 prescription judgment as an exhibit at the hearing on the res judicata exception. The Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention likewise did not introduce any evidence at the hearing, although they did attach exhibits to their opposition, including the July 1, 2015 prescription judgment. Although evidence not properly offered and introduced cannot be considered, even if it is physically placed in the record, the prescription judgment was rendered in the same proceeding as the instant exception, and a court may take judicial notice of its own proceedings. Constantin Land Trust v. Pitre Industries, L.L.C.. 2016-0993 (La.App. 1st Cir. 7/10/17), 225 So.3d 1089, 1093, writ denied. 2017-1644 (La. 11/28/17), 230 So.3d 224. Furthermore, this court considered the July 1, 2015 prescription judgment in Hill and recognized that "the trial court sustained TMR and Lasseigne's exception of prescription as to all of the claims against Lasseigne" and that the signed judgment dismissed with prejudice "any claims" against Lasseigne pursuant to La. R.S. 12:1501 and 12:1502. Hill, 223 So.3d at 560. Concerning the claims of the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention disposed of in the July 1, 2015 prescription judgment, this court further noted that counsel for the intervenors appeared at the hearing and "counsel for the Roosevelt Hill, et al. intervenors argued in opposition" to the exception of prescription, but the intervenors did not seek a new trial in connection with the prescription judgment or challenge the trial court's ruling on appeal. Hill. 223 So.3d at 560 n.7. Therefore, we conclude that Lasseigne's failure to introduce the July 1, 2015 prescription judgment is not fatal to his exception.
Nonetheless, the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention argue in their second assignment of error, as they did in the trial court below, that an exception exists to the application of res judicata herein, pursuant to LSA-R.S. 13:4232(A)(1) ("A judgment does not bar another action by the plaintiff ... [w]hen exceptional circumstances justify relief from the res judicata effect of the judgment.")- The "exceptional circumstances" provision of LSA-R.S. 13:4232(A)(1) is likely to be applied most often in complex procedural situations, in which litigants are deprived of any opportunity to present their claims because of some quirk in the system which could not have been anticipated or perhaps to factual scenarios that could not possibly be anticipated by the parties or decisions that are totally beyond the control of the parties. Chaisson v. Oceanside Seafood. 97-2756 (La.App. 1stCir. 6/29/98), 713 So.2d 1286, 1289. This discretion to grant relief from a valid, final judgment for exceptional circumstances is necessary to allow the court to balance the principle of res judicata with the interests of justice. The court must exercise this discretion on a case-by-case basis and grant such relief only in truly exceptional cases; otherwise, the purpose of res judicata would be defeated. LSA-R.S. 13:4232, Comment-1990; Chaisson, 713 So.2d at 1288.
The Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention contend that res judicata should not apply because this court previously reversed the July 1, 2015 prescription judgment as to the Calvin Hill plaintiffs, and that reversal has now become law of the case. However, the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention conflate the doctrine of law of the case with the doctrine of res judicata in cases involving final judgments. As set forth above, a final judgment is conclusive between the parties if no further review is sought within the time fixed by law or if the judgment is confirmed on further review. Moreover, once a final judgment acquires the authority of the thing adjudged, no court has jurisdiction, in the sense of power and authority, to modify, revise or reverse the judgment, regardless of the magnitude of the error in the final judgment. See Tolls, 660 So.2d at 1206-1207.
In the instant case, the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention are attempting to reassert claims against Lasseigne after the July 1, 2015 prescription judgment ended the litigation between them and Lasseigne. Their claims against Lasseigne were dismissed by a valid final judgment, of which they did not seek review and which, therefore, was not reversed as to them. See Gladnev v. Anglo-Dutch Energy. L.L.C.. 2019-93 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 10/2/19), 280 So.3d 964, 972-973, (giving res judicata effect to prior judgments in the same proceeding). Under the facts of this case, we conclude that the failure of a party to appeal a judgment does not constitute the type of exceptional circumstances warranting relief from the res judicata effect of a valid and final judgment. Thus, we find no merit to the argument that the law of the case doctrine creates exceptional circumstances herein relieving the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention from the res judicata effects of the July 1, 2015 prescription judgment, where they failed to seek review of that judgment.
For the same reasons, we find no merit to the argument asserted by the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention in their third assignment of error that their status as co-owners in indivision of plaintiffs' property should somehow allow the appeal of the July 1, 2015 prescription judgment by the Calvin Hill plaintiffs to inure to the benefit of all co-owners. Although some of the co-owners successfully appealed the July 1, 2015 prescription judgment, a final judgment cannot be set aside or changed on appeal except as to those who are parties to the appeal. Hill. 2019 WL 6318445 at *1 (unpublished); see also Thompson v. Iberville Parish School Board. 372 So.2d 642, 645 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied. 374 So.2d 650 (La. 1979) (where judgment on appeal is reversed as to one defendant on appeal, trial court's judgment was nonetheless final as to other defendant that did not appeal the judgment).
Finally, with regard to the argument of the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention in their first assignment of error that Lasseigne never "specifically pled" the exception of prescription as to their claims against Lasseigne under LSA-R.S. 12:1501 and 12:1502, we note that this argument was not presented in opposition to Lasseigne s second exception of res judicata below. Issues that were not raised or addressed by the trial court or that are raised for the first time on appeal will generally not be considered by the appellate court. Uniform Rules- Courts of Appeal, Rule 1-3; Allstate Life Insurance Company v. Smith. 2016-1225 (La.App. 1st Cir. 9/15/17), 233 So.3d 1, 4. Moreover, while the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention contend (for the first time on appeal) that the trial court's ruling on prescription as to Lasseigne was addressed only as to the Calvin Hill plaintiffs' claims against Lasseigne and thus, was not applicable and had no legal effect as to them, we note that the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention designated the portions of the record as the record on appeal herein. See LSA-C.C.P. art. 2129. However, in doing so, they failed to include the transcripts of either the May 6, 2015 or the June 3, 2015 hearings on TMR and Lasseigne's exceptions. Because this issue was never raised before the trial court in opposition to Lasseigne's second exception of res judicata, we decline to consider this assignment of error. See Smith, 233 So.3d at 4.
Nonetheless, with regard to the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention's claim on appeal as to the "lack of specificity" of Lasseigne's exception of prescription filed in response to their claims, to satisfy LSA-C.C.P. art. 927(B)'s requirement that the exception of prescription be "specially pleaded," the exception must be presented in a formal pleading. Bergeron v. Houma Hospital Corporation of Sisters of St. Joseph. 514 So.2d 1192,1194-1195 (La.App. 1stCir. 1987), writs denied. 517 So.2d 812 (La. 1988). The record on appeal demonstrates that Lasseigne in fact filed a formal exception of prescription as to the claims asserted against him by the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention.
CONCLUSION
For the above and foregoing reasons, the trial court's November 18, 2021 judgment, sustaining the Second Exception of Res Judicata filed by Raymond J. Lasseigne and dismissing with prejudice the claims asserted against him by the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention, is hereby affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed against the Roosevelt Hill plaintiffs-in-intervention.
AFFIRMED.