Opinion
3:21-cv-3169-B-BN
12-22-2021
LISA HILL, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF TEXAS and DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendants.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Lisa Hill filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking $3 million in damages from Defendants State of Texas and Dallas Police Department (the DPD), alleging that, on January 11, 2021, an unnamed Dallas police officer falsely arrested her. See Dkt. No. 3. Hill neither paid the $402 filing fee nor moved for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). United States District Judge Jane J. Boyle referred Hill's complaint to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for screening under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. And the undersigned enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that the Court should dismiss Hill's claims with prejudice.
Legal Standards
A district court is required to screen a civil action filed IFP and may summarily dismiss that action, or any portion of the action, if, for example, it fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). “The language of § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Black v. Warren, 134 F.3d 732, 733-34 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
And “[i]t is well-established that a district court may dismiss a complaint on its own motion under [Rule] 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may granted.” Starrett v. U.S. Dep't of Defense, No. 3:18-cv-2851-M-BH, 2018 WL 6069969, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2018) (citing Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing, in turn, Shawnee Int'l, N.V. v. Hondo Drilling Co., 742 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1984))), rec. accepted, 2018 WL 6068991 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 20, 2018), aff'd, 763 Fed.Appx. 383 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 140 S.Ct. 142 (2019).
A district court may exercise its “inherent authority ... to dismiss a complaint on its own motion ... ‘as long as the procedure employed is fair.'” Gaffney v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 294 Fed.Appx. 975, 977 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Carroll, 470 F.3d at 1177 (quoting, in turn, Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054 (5th Cir. 1998)); citation omitted). And the United States Court of Appeals for Fifth Circuit has “suggested that fairness in this context requires both notice of the court's intention to dismiss sua sponte and an opportunity to respond.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Lozano v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, FSB, 489 F.3d 636, 643 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting, in turn, Carroll, 470 F.3d at 1177)); accord Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2021) (“The broad rule is that ‘a district court may dismiss a claim on its own motion as long as the procedure employed is fair.' More specifically, ‘fairness in this context requires both notice of the court's intention and an opportunity to respond' before dismissing sua sponte with prejudice.” (citations omitted)).
Notice is provided through these findings, conclusions, and recommendations (the FCR), and the period to file objections to the FCR (further explained below) affords an opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Starrett, 2018 WL 6069969, at *2 (citations omitted).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim under either Rule 12(b)(6) or Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) “turns on the sufficiency of the ‘factual allegations' in the complaint, ” Smith v. Bank of Am., N.A., 615 Fed.Appx. 830, 833 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per curiam)), as neither the IFP statute nor the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted, ” Johnson, 574 U.S. at 11.
Instead, plaintiffs need only “plead facts sufficient to show” that the claims asserted have “substantive plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that they contend entitle them to relief. Id. at 12 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. And “[a] claim for relief is implausible on its face when ‘the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.'” Harold H. Huggins Realty, Inc. v. FNC, Inc., 634 F.3d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679); see also Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 899 (5th Cir. 2019) (“‘Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief' is ‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.'” (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; citing Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he degree of specificity necessary to establish plausibility and fair notice, and therefore the need to include sufficient factual allegations, depends on context.”))).
While, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions, and, while a court must accept all of a plaintiff's allegations as true, it is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, will not suffice. See id.
This rationale has even more force here, as “[p]ro se complaints receive a ‘liberal construction.' Even so, ‘mere conclusory allegations on a critical issue are insufficient ….'” Brown v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 985 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Carlucci v. Chapa, 884 F.3d 534, 538 (5th Cir. 2018), then United States v. Woods, 870 F.2d 285, 288 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam)). And “liberal construction does not require that the Court ... create causes of action where there are none.” Smith v. CVS Caremark Corp., No. 3:12-cv-2465-B, 2013 WL 2291886, at *8 (N.D. Tex. May 23, 2013).
“To demand otherwise would require the ‘courts to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a pro se plaintiff” and would “transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.'” Jones v. Mangrum, No. 3:16-cv-3137, 2017 WL 712755, at *1 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 23, 2017) (quoting Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985))
Analysis
To start, insofar as Hill sues the State of Texas, “the Constitution affords States sovereign immunity against suit.” Sullivan v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 986 F.3d 593, 595 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890)). And “[t]he State of Texas has not waived its sovereign immunity from section 1983 claims. Nor has Congress abrogated sovereign immunity from section 1983 claims.” Jennings v. Abbott, ___F.Supp.3d___, No. 3:20-cv-583-E, 2021 WL 1990858, at *3 (N.D. Tex. May 11, 2021) (citing NiGen Biotech, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 804 F.3d 389, 394 (5th Cir. 2015)). Any claim against Texas should therefore be dismissed.
Hill fares no better to the extent that she sues the DPD. A plaintiff may not bring a civil action against a servient political agency or department unless that agency or department enjoys a separate and distinct legal existence. See Darby v. Pasadena Police Dep't, 939 F.2d 311, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1991). In Darby, the Fifth Circuit held that, “unless the true political entity has taken explicit steps to grant the servient agency with jural authority, the agency cannot engage in any litigation except in concert with the government itself.” Id. at 313. As judges in this district have repeatedly recognized, the Dallas Police Department is not a jural entity subject to suit. See, e.g., Hagwood v. Dall. Police Dep't, No. 3:15-cv-2622-L-BN, 2015 WL 6688721, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 11, 2015), rec. accepted, 2015 WL 6690045 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2015); see also Combs v. City of Dall., 289 Fed.Appx. 684, 686 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of “the DPD as a defendant because it is a servient political department that does not enjoy a separate and distinct legal existence from the City of Dallas, ” as the plaintiff failed to “show that the City of Dallas granted the DPD the capacity to sue or be sued as a separate and distinct entity” (citing Darby, 939 F.2d at 313)). Any claim against the DPD should therefore also be dismissed.
But, because she is proceeding pro se, the undersigned liberally construes Hill's claims to be against an unnamed individual Dallas police officer and will consider the content of her complaint under this construction.
Attached to Hill's complaint - and thereby made “part of the pleading for all purposes, ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c) - are filings from a Dallas County criminal misdemeanor proceeding against her, State v. Hill, M2151413 (Dall. Cnty. Crim. Court No. 11), see Dkt. No. 3-1 at 1-3. For the purpose of screening Hill's allegations, the Court may also take judicial notice of the public record in this proceeding under Federal Rule of Evidence 201. See Basic Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Dynex Capital, Inc., 976 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 2020); Stiel v. Heritage Numismatic Auctions, Inc., 816 Fed.Appx. 888, 892 (5th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
See also In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007); Gill as Next Friend of K.C.R. v. Judd, 941 F.3d 504, 511 (11th Cir. 2019).
The public record in this misdemeanor proceeding reflects that Hill was arrested on January 11, 2021 for assault causing bodily injury/family violence. And, while Hill's complaint incorporates a Conditional Dismissal of this proceeding, see Dkt. No. 3-1 at 1, the public record reflects that the proceeding remains pending. This implicates Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Section 1983 “is an express authorization from Congress permitting federal courts to enjoin state proceedings in order to protect federal rights.” Gates v. Strain, 885 F.3d 874, 880 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972)). But this provision of federal law “does not ‘qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding.'” Id. (quoting Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 243; citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-47).
Under Younger, a federal court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction when to do so would result in the interference in certain, select state proceedings. And Younger abstention “applies only to three exceptional categories of state proceedings: ongoing criminal prosecutions, certain civil enforcement proceedings akin to criminal prosecutions, and pending civil proceedings involving certain orders ... uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions.” Google, Inc. v. Hood, 822 F.3d 212, 222 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 78 (2013) (quoting, in turn, New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368 (1989)); internal quotation marks omitted). Ongoing state criminal prosecutions include those for misdemeanor offenses. See Blakely v. Kelly, No. 3:16-cv-2801-K-BN, 2016 WL 6581283, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 12, 2016) (collecting cases), rec. accepted, 2016 WL 6566539 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2016).
The doctrine requires that federal courts decline to exercise jurisdiction over a state criminal defendant's claims when three conditions are met: “(1) the federal proceeding would interfere with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the state has an important interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim; and (3) the plaintiff has an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.” Bice v. La. Pub. Defender Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); internal citations omitted); accord Hood, 822 F.3d at 222-23.
But Younger abstention “applies only where there is ‘no question that [a complaint] allege[s] injuries under federal law sufficient to justify the District Court's retention of jurisdiction.'” Boyd v. Farrin, 575 Fed.Appx. 517, 519-20 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 204 (1988); citing Marts v. Hines, 68 F.3d 134, 135 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1995); citation omitted). And the Fifth Circuit has “interpreted this limitation to mean that a stay is not required where the district court determines that the claim for damages is frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.” Id. at 520 (collecting cases). Such is the case here.
So, turning to the sufficiency of the factual allegations, Hill's complaint mostly details her difficulties with neighbors. These difficulties are well documented, including with copies of electronic messages. But, insofar as Hill asserts that her Fourth Amendment right against false arrest was violated by an unnamed Dallas police officer, Hill offers no details showing that her arrest was not supported by probable cause.
The Constitution “contemplates searches and seizures based ‘upon probable cause.'” United States v. Bass, 996 F.3d 729, 737 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). Accordingly, “[t]he Fourth Amendment protects citizens from false arrests - that is, arrests unsupported by probable cause.” Defrates v. Podany, 789 Fed.Appx. 427, 431 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 204 (5th Cir. 2009)). And “[a] constitutional claim for false arrest, which [Hill] brings through the vehicle of § 1983, ‘requires a showing of no probable cause.'” Arizmendi v. Gabbert, 919 F.3d 891, 897 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Club Retro, 568 F.3d at 204).
The United States Supreme Court has defined probable cause as the ‘facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.'” Piazza v. Mayne, 217 F.3d 239, 245-46 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)). “The facts must be known to the officer at the time of the arrest” and “must be particularized to the arrestee.” Club Retro, 568 F.3d at 204 (citations omitted). And a court “will find that probable cause existed if the officer was aware of facts justifying a reasonable belief that an offense was being committed, whether or not the officer charged the arrestee with that specific offense.” Id. (citation omitted); see also McLin v. Ard, 866 F.3d 682, 694 (5th Cir. 2017) (“[P]robable cause is the ‘sum total of layers of information and the synthesis of what police have heard, what they know, and what they observed as trained officers.'” (quoting United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367, 376 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting, in turn, United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883, 895 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc)))).
As to the facts and circumstances supposedly known by the officer arresting Hill on January 11, 2021, all Hill alleges is that, earlier in the day, Latosha Carmack, with whom Hill and her daughter were staying, “called the Dallas police, ” after which an officer took Hill and her daughter away from Carmack's apartment; that, later the same day, Carmack and her daughter threatened Hill and her daughter; that, when Hill and her daughter returned to the apartment complex later that day, Carmack had placed Hill's belongings outside Carmack's apartment; that, once Carmack realized that Hill and others were removing the belongings, “Carmack and her daughter and son” began “to open the front door and grabbing some of our belongings from by the outside of the door and throwing them at” Hill and her daughter; that Hill's “daughter said Latosha threw a red marker out the apartment at us and she throw it back. That's what Carmack marked her son chest with, and called the EMS and the Dallas police and fabricated like I done that fake mark on her son”; that, when the Dallas police officer arrived at the apartment, the officer arrested Hill and did not inform her of the charges against her. Dkt. No. 3 at 3-8.
These allegations fail to state a plausible Fourth Amendment violation.
As to leave to amend, the undersigned concludes that Hill has stated her best case based on the lengthy complaint that she filed and that justice does not therefore require that the Court automatically grant Hill leave to amend her allegations. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice.
That said, the time to file objections to the FCR (further explained below) allows Hill an opportunity to explain how she would cure the deficiencies in her complaint and thus show the Court that her case should not be dismissed with prejudice at this time and that the Court should instead grant her leave to amend her claims. See Scott v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 16 F.4th 1204, 1209 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (“A court should freely give leave to amend when justice so requires, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2), but a movant must give the court at least some notice of what his or her amendments would be and how those amendments would cure the initial complaint's defects. Thomas v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 832 F.3d 586, 590 (5th Cir. 2016). If the plaintiff does not provide a copy of the amended complaint nor explain how the defects could be cured, a district court may deny leave. McKinney v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 309 F.3d 308, 315 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming denial of leave to amend where plaintiffs ‘failed to amend their complaint as a matter of right, failed to furnish the district court with a proposed amended complaint, and failed to alert both the court and the defendants to the substance of their proposed amendment').”).
Recommendation
The Court should dismiss Plaintiff Lisa Hill's claims with prejudice.
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).