(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hill v. State, 309 Ga.App. 531, 533, 710 S.E.2d 667 (2011). Moreover, where, as here, the case involves a criminal statute “if it is open to more than one reasonable interpretation, it must be construed strictly against criminal liability, and in favor of the individual facing criminal liability.”
In this case, the State failed to procure an indictment against C.B. within 180 days of the date she was detained. Thus, pursuant to the mandatory language of that section as well as recent precedent of this Court, the superior court lost jurisdiction of the case and was required to transfer the case to the appropriate juvenile court. Hill v. State, 309 Ga.App. 531, 710 S.E.2d 667 (2011); see also Nunnally v. State, 311 Ga.App. 558, 559(1), 716 S.E.2d 608 (2011). And, in any event, the transfer from the superior to the juvenile court has not been challenged.
(Emphasis in original.) Hill v. State, 309 Ga.App. 531, 533, 710 S.E.2d 667 (2011). Thus, because Hill was not indicted within 180 days of his detention, “[u]nder the plain language of the statute, it was mandatory that the case be transferred back to the juvenile court.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hill v. State, 309 Ga.App. 531, 533, 710 S.E.2d 667 (2011). The plain language of OCGA § 17–7–50.
(Emphasis supplied.) Hill v. State, 309 Ga.App. 531, 533, 710 S.E.2d 667 (2011), citing Spivey v. State, 274 Ga.App. 834(1), 619 S.E.2d 346 (2005). Ga. L. 2006, p. 172 § 2/SB 135.
1 was not waived and the judgment of conviction on his plea could be vacated. See Hill v. State, 309 Ga.App. 531, 533, 710 S.E.2d 667 (2011). The record reflects that at the hearing on the motion to transfer, Walker argued that the transfer order from the juvenile court had not been filed with the court clerk, although it had been “signed by the judge.”
(Citation omitted.) Hill v. State, 309 Ga.App. 531, 533, 710 S.E.2d 667 (2011).Here, the literal text of the statute is plain, and we must apply it as written.
State, 323 Ga.App. 864, 868, 748 S.E.2d 501 (2013) (180-day time limit was not tolled when the accused was released on bail, and superior court lost jurisdiction once that time limit expired without the case being presented to grand jury, absent a motion by the State to extend the time); State v. Armendariz, 316 Ga.App. 394, 397 (1), 729 S.E.2d 538 (2012) (the clock did not stop running when some charges were deemed invalid, and superior court lost jurisdiction when the 180-day period expired without an extension); In the Interest of C.B., 313 Ga.App. 778, 780, 723 S.E.2d 21 (2012) (superior court lost jurisdiction when 180-day time limitation expired, and juvenile court could not transfer the case back to superior court, as any subsequent indictment would be void); Nunnally v. State, 311 Ga.App. 558, 561 (1), 716 S.E.2d 608 (2011) (once the 180-day time period expired without an extension, the superior court lost jurisdiction of the case, and the grand jury lost authority to indict); Hill v. State, 309 Ga.App. 531, 532–535, 710 S.E.2d 667 (2011) (superior court lacked jurisdiction when the juvenile was indicted because the 180-day time limit had expired long before). If the child waives prompt presentation before the time has expired, the condition that divests the superior court of jurisdiction—the expiration of the time—never comes into being. Put another way, the jurisdiction of the superior court falls away only when the clock runs out, but so long as the clock is running, the child may agree to stop it.