Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:20-CV-2397
12-23-2020
JEFFREY D. HILL, Plaintiff v. LYCOMING COUNTY GOVERNMENT, Defendant
(BRANN, D.J.) ()
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
I. INTRODUCTION
On December 21, 2020, Jeffrey D. Hill ("Plaintiff") initiated a civil action in federal court against the Lycoming County Government alleging that numerous state and federal statutes were violated, and continue to be violated, by a 2004 property tax assessment that was performed on his property. (Doc. 1). Along with his Complaint, Plaintiff filed an application seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis and a Motion for injunctive relief. (Docs. 2, 3).
This case is not Plaintiff's first one in this court. As previously noted by this Court, Plaintiff has filed no fewer than 55 civil actions in this district, virtually all of which have ended in dismissal, most on the grounds that Plaintiff's claims were frivolous or malicious. Report and Recommendation, Hill v. Umpstead, No. 4:15-CV-587 (Mar. 27, 2015), ECF No. 3 adopted by ECF No. 5 (M.D. Pa. June 25, 2015). This case also isn't Plaintiff's first case concerning his objections to the 2004 property tax assessment. Plaintiff has filed at least six complaints over the last sixteen years (including this one) related to the 2004 property tax assessment in Lycoming County. See Hill v. Nassberg, No. 4:04-CV-2444 (M.D. Pa.) (dismissed, dismissal affirmed on appeal); Hill v. Nassberg, No. 4:05-CV-1336 (M.D. Pa.) (dismissed, dismissal affirmed on appeal); Hill v. Carpenter, No. 4:08-CV-591 (M.D. Pa.) (dismissed, dismissal affirmed on appeal); In re Jeffrey Hill, No. 4:11-MC-243 (M.D. Pa.) (dismissed); Hill v. Century 21, No. 1:11-MC-297 (M.D. Pa.).
Plaintiff's conduct of filing a large number of meritless lawsuits from 1988 through 2011 resulted in the imposition of a sanction requiring that Plaintiff "receive certification from a magistrate judge prior to filing a future civil action within the Middle District of Pennsylvania." Order, Hill v. Carpenter, No. 4:08-CV-591 (M.D. Pa. Feb 26, 2011), ECF No. 18. However, the enforceability of that sanction was called into question in a Third Circuit opinion in 2016. Mandate of USCA, Hill v. Umpstead, No. 4:15-CV-587 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2016), ECF No. 9-2 (noting that "the District Court's pre-filing injunction - which 'sanction[ed] Hill by requiring him to receive certification from a magistrate judge prior to filing a future civil action within the Middle district of Pennsylvania' - fails to comport with our direction that it 'impose more tailored sanctions against him.'").
To the extent that the 2011 sanction is still enforceable, I DECLINE to certify this action for filing because there is no plausible claim alleged. However, even if the sanction is unenforceable, this case should alternatively be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. PLAINTIFF'S LITIGATION HISTORY IN THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Our story in this case begins in 1988, when it appears Plaintiff initiated his first civil action in this Court. All cases were filed pro se and Plaintiff sought leave to proceed in forma pauperis. By September 1996, Plaintiff had filed approximately 42 separate actions in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Hill v. Gates, 940 F. Supp. 108, 109 (M.D. Pa. 1996). On September 3, 1996, United States District Judge James McClure issued an Order directing Plaintiff to show cause as to why sanctions should not be imposed. Id. In that Order, the court "indicated that it would consider as an appropriate sanction the issuance of an order rendering Hill subject to the same restrictions with respect to litigation under § 1915 as are applied for prisoners." Id. On September 18, 1996, Judge McClure imposed a series of restrictions (explained in 51 paragraphs at the conclusion of his order) to Plaintiff's ability to file cases in this district, including (but not limited to):
(1) requiring Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $5.00 and to deposit $5.00 per month until the full filing fee was paid in each civil action filed (failure to pay, and keep making payments would result in dismissal), id at 113-114; and
(2) barring Plaintiff from bringing any further civil actions if he has "on 3 or more occasions after the date of [the September 18, 1996 order],
brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed pursuant to this order on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Id. at 114.
In April 2008, Plaintiff ran afoul of the 1996 sanction by filing his third frivolous lawsuit. On April 4, 2008, Judge McClure issued an order that states as follows:
4. Pursuant to our September 18, 1996 order in M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 96-1572 and our authority to impose sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiff's complaint is dismissed based on his filing at least three civil actions in the courts of the United States since the date of that order that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim. Alternatively, the complaint is dismissed on the merits under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim.Hill v. Carpenter, No. 4:08-CV-591, 2008 WL 936927 at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 2008).
5. Plaintiff is ordered not to bring any civil action in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. We warn plaintiff that a failure to comply with this court order may result in contempt proceedings being brought against plaintiff.
Plaintiff appealed Judge McClure's April 2008 Order to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. On April 22, 2009, the Third Circuit affirmed Judge McClure's dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint, but vacated the imposition of sanction. Hill v. Carpenter, 323 F. App'x 167, 168 (3d Cir. 2009). In doing so the Circuit explained:
The District Court clearly was within its discretion to impose sanctions against Hill, as his filings in this case contained wholly inappropriate language and showed a complete lack of respect for the Court and the judicial process. Moreover, the instant case is but one of many non-meritorious actions Hill has filed over the years, and it is not the first
instance in which Hill has used disrespectful and abusive language. Nonetheless, there is no indication that the Court gave Hill adequate notice and an opportunity to respond before imposing sanctions. See Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3d Cir. 1993) ("If the circumstances warrant the imposition of an injunction [restricting a litigant's ability to file future law suits], the District Court must give notice to the litigant to show cause why the proposed injunctive relief should not issue."); see also In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (3d Cir. 1982) ("[The litigant] should have been provided with an opportunity to oppose the court's order [enjoining him from filing future cases] before it was instituted.") The imposed sanctions, which bar Hill from ever bringing another lawsuit in the district, were also overly broad. See In re Packer Ave. Assocs., 884 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir. 1989) ( "There simply is no support in the law for permitting an injunction prohibiting a litigant from ever filing a document in federal court."); see also Brow, 994 F.2d at 1038 ("[T]he scope of the injunctive order must be narrowly tailored to fit the particular circumstances of the case before the District Court."). Thus, we must vacate the Court's injunction barring Hill from bringing any future civil suit in the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
In lieu of the vacated injunction, we recommend that the District Court-after providing notice and an opportunity to respond-consider adopting an order requiring Hill to obtain certification from a United States Magistrate Judge before bringing any future action in the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Such an approach has been endorsed by Courts of Appeals, see, e.g., Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181, 186-94 (5th Cir. 2008) (upholding an injunction preventing an abusive litigant from filing claims in any federal district court, bankruptcy court, or agency without court permission); Ortman v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 807, 811 (6th Cir. 1996) ("[I]t is permissible to require one who has abused the legal process to make a showing that a tendered lawsuit is not frivolous or vexatious before permitting it to be filed."); In re Packer Ave. Assoc., 884 F.2d at 748 (requiring a litigant to obtain leave of the district court before filing any action relating to a particular bankruptcy case); Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 332 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[D]istrict courts in this circuit may issue an injunction to require litigants to obtain the approval of the court before filing further complaints."), and it would prevent Hill from pursuing frivolous actions without denying him access to the courts.
In addition, it may be appropriate to impose contempt sanctions against Hill for his blatant violation of the order prohibiting him "from filing any document which is replete with offensive, derogatory material." Order at 10, Hill v. Gates, 940 F.Supp. 108 (M.D. Pa. 1996). Hill's complaint and appellate filings are brimming with vile and outrageous remarks that demean the judiciary and warrant a strong rebuke.Id. at 171-172.
In December of 2010, Plaintiff's case was reassigned to United States District Judge Yvette Kane. On January 6, 2011, Judge Kane issued an order directing Plaintiff to show cause why sanctions (in the form of requiring Plaintiff to obtain certification from a Magistrate Judge before filing any new civil case) should not be imposed. Order to Show Cause, Hill v. Carpenter, No. 4:08-CV-591 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 2011), ECF No. 16. On January 19, 2011, Plaintiff filed a response. Response, Hill v. Carpenter, No. 4:08-CV-591 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 2011), ECF No. 17. On February 16, 2011, Judge Kane issued an order imposing a sanction that Plaintiff be "required to obtain certification from a United States Magistrate Judge prior to filing a future civil action within the Middle District of Pennsylvania." Hill v. Carpenter, No. 4:08-CV-591, 2011 WL 676810 at *2 (M.D. Pa. Feb 16, 2011). In doing so, Judge Kane explained:
On January 6, 2011, pursuant to the recommendation of the Third Circuit, the Court issued an order on Hill to show cause why he should not be required to obtain certification from a United States Magistrate Judge prior to filing a future civil action within the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. No. 16 at 4-5); see also Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 332 (3d Cir. 1990) ( [D]istrict courts in this circuit may issue an injunction to require litigants to obtain the approval
of the court before filing further complaints."). On January 19, 2011, Hill filed a twenty-one page document, with exhibits, entitled "Response to 'Judge' Kane's 1-6-11 Rule to Show Cause." (Doc. No. 17). Although this document is docketed as a response, it is wholly unresponsive to the Court's January 6, 2011 Order, contains vitriolic and unwarranted language, and continues the long pattern of abusive posturing by Hill.Id. at 1-2.
The Court has provided Hill with notice "to show cause why injunctive relief should not issue." Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir. 1987). In this notice, the Court informed Hill that he faced potential sanctions in the form of having to obtain certification from a magistrate judge prior to filing a future civil action within the Middle District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. No. 16 at 4-5). Hill has failed to adequately respond to this notice. Therefore, pursuant to the recommendation of the Third Circuit, the Court will sanction Hill by requiring him to receive certification from a magistrate judge prior to filing a future civil action within the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
Since that sanction was imposed Plaintiff filed four new civil cases (including the one that is the subject of this Report & Recommendation).
On July 25, 2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint that "cite[d] to no federal statute conferring jurisdiction on this Court, contain[ed] no jurisdictional recitals beyond an assertion that the pleading [was] a 'civil rights. . . racketeering complaint,' and simply reassert[ed] Hills longstanding, and discredited, complaints regarding the invalidity of the 2004 real estate assessments in Lycoming County." Report and Recommendation, In re Hill, No. 4:11-MC-243 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2011) ECF No. 6. United States Magistrate Judge Martin C. Carlson issued a report explaining that: (1) the claims were barred by res judicata; (2) the claims were barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) the RICO claim was not plausibly alleged in the complaint. Judge Carlson recommended that "the complaint be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and that Hill not be certified to file this pleading with the Court." Id. Plaintiff appealed the Recommendation issued by Judge Carlson before it had been reviewed by a District Judge. The Third Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. In re Hill, No. 4:11-MC-243 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2011) ECF No. 9. On August 30, 2012, Judge Kane adopted Judge Carlson's Report and Recommendation. In re Hill, No. 4:11-MC-243 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 12, 2011) ECF No. 9. Plaintiff did not appeal.
On October 3, 2011, Plaintiff filed a complaint that, once again, alleged claims relating to the 2004 property assessment process in Lycoming County. Report & Recommendation, Hill v. Century 21 Appraisals, No. 1:11-MC-297 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2011), ECF No. 3. On October 5, 2011, Judge Carlson issued a report explaining that: (1) Plaintiff's claims were barred by res judicata; (2) Plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) Plaintiff did not plead a plausible federal RICO or fraud claim. Id. Judge Carlson recommended that the complaint be "dismissed with prejudice as frivolous and that Hill not be certified to file this pleading with the Court." Id. On August 30, 2012, Judge Kane adopted Judge Carlson's Report & Recommendation. Order, Hill v. Century 21 Appraisals, No. 1:11-MC-297 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2012), ECF No. 9. Plaintiff did not appeal.
On March 24, 2015, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging, in large part, "a conspiracy between municipal officials that resulted in his prosecution and incarceration for 5 ½ years on sundry 'trumped-up' criminal charges, all of which occurred decades ago." Report & Recommendation, Hill v. Umpstead, No. 4:15-CV-587 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2015), ECF No. 3. The complaint also concerned a dispute between Plaintiff and the "borough officials related to snow removal over the recent winter months." Id. On March 27, 2015, United States Magistrate Judge Karoline Mehalchick issued a report explaining that Plaintiff's claims related his criminal convictions (which occurred more than a decade before the complaint was filed) were barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and Plaintiff's claims related to the snow removal were insufficient to support a plausible RICO or civil rights claim. Id. Judge Mehalchick declined to certify Plaintiff's complaint for filing because it was "legally and factually frivolous" and recommended that the complaint be dismissed pursuant to the February 2011 sanction order. Id. On June 25, 2015, United States District Judge Matthew W. Brann adopted Judge Mehalchick's recommendation and dismissed Plaintiff's case. Order, Hill v. Umpstead, No. 4:15-CV-587 (M.D. Pa. June 25, 2015), ECF No. 6. Plaintiff appealed. On February 2, 2016, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued an opinion affirming the dismissal of Plaintiff's lawsuit because the claims alleged had no merit. However, in doing so, the Circuit remarked:
District Courts in this Circuit may issue an injunction to require litigants who have engaged in abusive, groundless, and vexatious litigation to obtain approval of the court before filing further complaints. See Chipps v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Middle Dist. of Pa., 882 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir. 1989). We have recognized, however, that a pre-filing injunction is an extreme remedy which must be "narrowly tailored and sparingly used." Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 332 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting In re Packer Ave. Assocs., 884 F.2d 745, 747 (3d Cir. 1989)). "Narrowly tailored" means fitting the language of the injunction to the particular circumstances of the case. Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3d Cir. 1993). Thus, we have approved of an order "directing that the litigant not file any section 1983 claims without leave of court and that in seeking leave of court, the litigant certify (1) that the claims he wishes to present are new claims never before raised and disposed of on the merits by any federal courts, (2) that he believes the facts alleged in his complaint to be true, and (3) that he knows of no reason to believe his claims are foreclosed by controlling law." Abdul-Akbar, 901 F.2d at 333. Here, the District Court's pre-filing injunction - which "sanction[ed] Hill by requiring him to receive certification from a magistrate judge prior to filing a future civil action within the Middle District of Pennsylvania" - fails to comport with our direction that it "impose more tailored sanctions against him." Hill, 323 F. App'x at 172. Despite this failure, however, the District Court properly dismissed Hill's complaint because, for the reasons provided below, his claims lack merit.Mandate of USCA, Hill v. Umpstead, No. 4:15-CV-587 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 14, 2016), ECF No. 9-2.
B. PLAINTIFF'S FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THIS CASE
Plaintiff alleges that, on July 28, 1999, Plaintiff's mother transferred her home to Plaintiff's brother. (Doc. 1, p. 10). At the time of that transfer, Plaintiff alleges that he "had a life estate deed" with his brother, and that he "paid all of the property taxes." Id. Plaintiff does not say where his mother's (now brother's) property is located or if it is the same property that he took ownership of in 2015, discussed below.
According to the Complaint, in 2004 the Lycoming County Commissioners (Richard Nassberg, Rebecca Burke, and Ernie Larson) hired Century 21 appraisals to perform a fair market value property reassessment for 2004. Plaintiff alleges that the Commissioners and Century 21 implemented a per-lot property value assessment, as opposed to assessing and therefore taxing land based on acreage. Plaintiff alleges that this system of property taxation is unfair, and disproportionately impacts certain groups (including low income individuals, racial minorities, and illiterate individuals). He also alleges that the County Board of Assessment covered up this activity by "summarily deny[ing] and dismiss[ing] all appeals in violation of due process and equal protection." (Doc. 2, p. 7). Although criticizing these procedures generally, Plaintiff does not allege that he made any challenge to the 2004 property tax assessment on his own behalf.
In 2015, Plaintiff's brother transferred ownership of a property located at 306 Washington Street, in Muncy Pennsylvania to Plaintiff. (Doc. 1, p. 4).
On December 21, 2020, Plaintiff lodged a Complaint against the "Lycoming County Government" alleging a series of claims, arising under state and federal civil and criminal statutes concerning the 2004 Lycoming County property tax assessment. (Doc. 1). Along with his eleven-page Complaint, Plaintiff submitted 117 pages of exhibits. Plaintiff also submitted a Motion requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and a Motion seeking injunctive relief. (Docs. 2, 3).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff appears to allege a series of claims under a combination of federal civil and criminal statutes, including: 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (due process and equal protection claims); 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (a civil RICO claim premised on the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341); violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242. Plaintiff also cites to the following state statutes in his Complaint: 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 911 (RICO); 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3701 (robbery); 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3922 (theft by deception); 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3923 (theft by extortion); 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 4107 (deceptive/fraudulent business practices); and 72 Pa. C.S.A. § 5020-402 (tax statute).
Plaintiff does not ask for any kind of relief in his Complaint. However, in his Motion for Injunctive Relief, Plaintiff requests:
(1) Injunctive relief (see attached motion)(Doc. 3). III. LEGAL STANDARD
(2) Class Action Certification (see attached assessment records)
(3) Summary Judgment (or 12-member jury trial)
(4) Qui Tam/False Claims Act-Modified (31 U.S.C. § 3719-3733)/Whistleblower Act Damages
(5) Punitive Damages (Bounds & Smith, US Supreme court precedent) for deliberate indifference/reckless disregard and racketeering by respondent (Restatement (2nd) of torts § 908 (1965))
This Court has a statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of pro se complaints brought by litigants given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Specifically, the Court is obliged to review the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), which provides, in pertinent part:
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that -
(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or
(B) the action or appeal--
(i) is frivolous or malicious;
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
In performing this mandatory screening function, the Court applies the same standard that is used to evaluate motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed the evolving standards governing pleading practice in the federal courts, stating that "pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009). "[A] complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief." Id. at 211. It also "has to 'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Id.
To test the sufficiency of the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must conduct the following three-step inquiry:
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 1950. Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief." Id.Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and '"however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, "pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013). Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a pro se complaint must recite factual allegations that are enough to raise the Plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a "short and plain" statement of a cause of action. IV. ANALYSIS
In his Complaint in the above captioned case, Plaintiff is bringing a series of claims arising out of the 2004 property tax assessment in Lycoming County. These same events that have given rise to at least five (5) prior lawsuits filed by Plaintiff in this district. The prior lawsuits, which span more than a decade, have all been dismissed for various reasons.
In what appears to be Plaintiff's first lawsuit about the 2004 Lycoming County property tax assessment, claims in both an original and amended complaint were dismissed due to a lack of standing. Hill v. Nassberg, No. 4:04-CV-2444 (M.D. Pa.). Plaintiff did not proclaim any ownership interest in an affected property. Id. This dismissal was affirmed by the Third Circuit on appeal.
In 2005, Plaintiff filed a second lawsuit about the 2004 Lycoming County Property Tax assessment. Hill v. Nassberg, 4:05-CV-1336 (M.D. Pa.). In that case, Plaintiff alleged that his damages arose from increased rental cost caused by the 2004 property tax assessment. Id. Plaintiff's claims were, once again, dismissed due to a lack of standing. Id. The Court also found that the declaratory and injunctive relief against prospective collections of property taxes was barred by the Federal Tax Injunction Act. Id. That dismissal was affirmed by the Third Circuit on appeal.
In 2008, Plaintiff filed a third lawsuit about the 2004 Lycoming County property tax assessment. The substantive claims were all dismissed. The Court found that: (1) Plaintiff's claim under the Major Fraud Act (18 U.S.C. § 1031) because the only subsection allowing for a civil action was not applicable to the facts of the case; (2) Plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 claims were barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) Plaintiff did not plead a plausible RICO claim. The same order also imposed a sanction. Although the sanction was overturned, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the substantive claims, and added that:
The Tax Injunction Act prohibits a federal court from enjoining "the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C. § 1341. Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that "taxpayers are barred by the principle of comity from asserting §1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in federal courts" so long as "plain, adequate, and complete" remedies are available in state court. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981). As we have repeatedly explained:
[t]aken together, the Tax Injunction Act and the Supreme Court's decision in McNary make clear that a federal court cannot entertain a suit posing either an equitable or legal challenge to state or local taxes . . . if a sufficient remedy . . . is available in state court.
Kerns v. Dukes, 153 F.3d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1988).
This Court repeatedly has held that the Pennsylvania state courts provide a "plain, speedy, and efficient" remedy for challenges to a county's assessment of real property taxes. See e.g., Gass v. County of Allegheny, Pa., 371 F.3d 134, 137-38 (3d Cir. 2004). Indeed Hill has not demonstrated that the state's "fully-developed administrative and judicial apparatus" by which a taxpayer may challenge an assessment
of his property, see id. at 140, has become inadequate or unavailable since Gass. Hill's challenge to Lycoming County's tax reassessment thus fails for want of subject matter jurisdiction and was dismissed properly by the District Court.Mandate of USCA, Hill v. Carpenter, No. 4:08-CV-591 (M.D. Pa. Ma 14, 2009), ECF No. 15-2.
In 2011, Plaintiff filed two more cases involving the 2004 Lycoming County Property tax assessment. Plaintiff's claims in both of these cases were dismissed because: (1) the doctrine of res judicata barred consideration of Plaintiff's "oft-litigated" complaints concerning the 2004 Lycoming County real estate assessment process; (2) Plaintiff's civil rights claims were barred by the two-year statute of limitations; and (3) Plaintiff did not plead a plausible civil RICO claim. In re Hill, 4:11-MC-243 (M.D. Pa.); Hill v. Century 21 Appraisals, No. 1:11-MC-297 (M.D. Pa.).
Plaintiff's claims in this Complaint have no merit and, although not discussed in detail in this Report and Recommendation, would be subject to dismissal for any number of those reasons.
A. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES ARE BARRED BY THE TAX INJUNCTION ACT AND THE PRINCIPLE OF COMITY
As explained by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals:
The Tax Injunction Act prohibits a federal court from enjoining "the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State." 28 U.S.C. § 1341. Additionally, the Supreme Court has held that
"taxpayers are barred by the principle of comity from asserting § 1983 actions against the validity of state tax systems in federal courts" so long as "plain, adequate, and complete" remedies are available in state court. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 116 (1981).Smiles v. County of Berks, 778 F. App'x 84, 85 (3d Cir. 2019).
As we have explained, "[t]aken together, the Tax Injunction Act and the Supreme Court's decision in McNary make it clear that a federal court cannot entertain a suit posing either an equitable or a legal challenge to state or local taxes ... if a sufficient remedy ... is available in state court." Kerns v. Dukes, 153 F.3d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1998). !
This Court has repeatedly held that the Pennsylvania state courts provide a "plain, speedy, and efficient" remedy for challenges to a county's assessment of real property taxes. See, e.g., Gass v. County of Allegheny, Pa., 371 F.3d 134, 137-38 (3d Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff does not request any relief in his Complaint, but does request injunctive relief in an accompanying Motion. (Doc. 3). Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief is barred by the tax injunction act. In that same Motion, Plaintiff also requests "whistleblower damages" and "punitive damages." The federal claims alleged in the Complaint arise under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and the Federal RICO Statute 18 U.S.C. § 1961. As noted above, taxpayers are barred from asserting actions for damages under the principle of comity as long as there is a plain, speedy, efficient state remedy. See Lehigh Valley Properties, Inc. v. Portnoff Law Associates, No. 19-4892, 2020 WL 19854889 at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2020) (finding that a plaintiff's § 1983 and RICO damages claims arising out of the collection of taxes are barred by the principle of comity). Although Plaintiff did generally allege that many of appeals were filed and then denied, he does not allege that he ever filed an appeal or what happened if or when he did. These allegations are not enough to demonstrate that there is no "plain, speedy, and efficient remedy" for challenges to a county's assessment of real estate taxes.
While Plaintiff does not reference it in his Complaint, among the 117 pages of exhibits Plaintiff filed is a completed two-page Lycoming County Assessment Appeal Form regarding 306 South Washington Street, Muncy, PA 17756. (Doc. 1-3, p. 11). The appeal form, dated July 7, 2004, is signed "Jeffrey D Hill for Michael B Hill" and lists "Michael B Hill c/o Margaret L Hill" in the form's field for the name and address of the property owners. Id. The form does not indicate if or when it was filed, if or when it was accepted, or, if accepted, how it was ruled on. Id. The exhibits do not appear to contain such a decision, and Plaintiff does not allege how the appeal process as to this appeal, if submitted, was not plain, speedy, and efficient.
B. THE COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION OVER ANY REMAINING STATE LAW CLAIMS
Where a district court has dismissed all claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the Court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Whether the Court will exercise supplemental jurisdiction is within its discretion. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 2009). That decision should be based on "the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).
Ordinarily, when all federal law claims have been dismissed and only state law claims remain, the balance of these factors indicates that these remaining claims properly belong in state court. Id. at 350. This case is no exception. I have concluded that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's federal claims for damages based on the principle of comity and lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief under the Tax Injection Act. The Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over any of Plaintiff's state law claims.
C. LEAVE TO AMEND SHOULD BE DENIED
If a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim, "a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). In this case, because the Court lacks jurisdiction over any of Plaintiff's claims based on the principle of comity and the Tax Injunction Act, granting further leave to amend would be futile. V. RECOMMENDATION
To the extent the sanction imposed by the February 2011 Order is enforceable, I DECLINE to certify Plaintiff's Complaint. However, it is RECOMMENDED in the alternative that:
(1) Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) be GRANTED;
(2) Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim, and that leave to amend be DENIED;
(3) Plaintiff's pending Motion for Injunctive Relief (Doc. 3) be DENIED as MOOT;
(4) This case can simply be resolved because it fails to state a claim. However, a straight dismissal does not address the possibility of sanctions. Given this litigant's history with the courts I also recommend that the Court consider the issue of sanctions by either:
Date: December 23, 2020(a) Issuing a very specific Order to Show Cause why sanctions should not be imposed; or,
(b) Remand the case to me for further proceedings on an appropriate sanction that addresses both this filing and any future filings with this court.
BY THE COURT
s/William I . Arbuckle
William I. Arbuckle
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE OF LOCAL RULE 72.3
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.Date: December 23, 2020
BY THE COURT
s/William I . Arbuckle
William I. Arbuckle
U.S. Magistrate Judge