Opinion
21-cv-05230-YGR (RMI)
09-19-2023
CYMEYON V. HILL, Plaintiff, v. T. LEMON, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RE: DKT. NO. 34
ROBERT M. ILLMAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the court is a Notice of Breach of Settlement and Motion to Compel (dkt. 34) filed by Plaintiff Cymeyon Hill. Plaintiff requests that the District Judge order the undersigned to enforce the settlement agreement, compelling the Deputy Attorney General (“DAG”) assigned to this case to comply with terms of the settlement agreement by “resolving Plaintiff's filling fees within the Eastern District [of California].” Id. at 1. This Motion was referred to the undersigned for the preparation of a report and recommendation. See Order of Referral (Dkt. 36). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends that the Motion be denied.
BACKGROUND
In the past few years, Plaintiff has filed several cases in this court and, in early Spring of 2022, the following six (6) cases were referred to the undersigned for settlement proceedings: Hill v. Black et al, 4:20-cv-05900-YGR; Hill v. J. Beltran, et al, 4:20-cv-06557-YGR; Hill v. Mendosa, 4:20-cv-07375-YGR; Hill v. Camacho et al, 4:21-cv-02431-YGR; Hill v. Officer Macias, 4:21-cv-03189-YGR; Cymeyon Hill v. T. Lemon et al., 4:21-cv-05230-YGR. Thereafter, the undersigned engaged the parties in several settlement conferences which ultimately resulted in a global settlement agreement, resolving all claims against all parties in all six (6) cases. That agreement was reduced to writing and, at the final conference, the court confirmed with the parties that the matter had settled, that the agreement had been executed, and that the joint stipulation of dismissal would be filed shortly. See Minute Entry for Settlement Conference held on April 13, 2023 (Dkt. 30). A joint Stipulation for Voluntary Dismissal (dkt. 43), executed by Plaintiff, was filed on April 14, 2023, followed by an Order Lifting Stay and Dismissing Action with Prejudice (dkt. 32) entered by the District Judge.
DISCUSSION
Defendants argue that the court should deny this motion for lack of jurisdiction, because “[w]hen a district court dismisses an action with prejudice pursuant to a settlement agreement, federal jurisdiction usually ends. Ordinarily, a dispute arising under a settlement agreement is a separate contract dispute requiring its own independent basis for jurisdiction.” Kelly v. Wengler, 822 F.3d 1085, 1094 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Indeed, in the present matter, the court dismissed this case with prejudice and did not retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. See Order Lifting Stay and Dismissing Action with Prejudice (dkt. 32). Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion is due to be denied for lack of jurisdiction.
Moreover, even if the court were to reach the merits of Plaintiff's Motion the results would be the same. The basis for Plaintiff's request for the court to compel compliance with the settlement agreement stems from Plaintiff's assertions that he has been improperly assessed filling fees on a case (or cases) that he has filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California (“Eastern District”). Plaintiff states that he is a civil detainee and a non-prisoner but is still being made to pay filling fees as a prisoner, presumably in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Indeed, this court has previously determined that Plaintiff was “not a ‘prisoner' subject to the provisions of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act . . .[and b]ecause Plaintiff is not a ‘prisoner,' the provisions of section 1915-that require prisoners who seek to proceed IFP to submit a copy of transactions in their inmate account and provide that the full filing fee be paid in installments- do not apply to him.” Hill v. Black et al, 4:20-cv-05900-YGR, Order of Sep. 3, 2020 (Dkt. 10) at 1. Thus, this court has not assessed Plaintiff filling fees under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”).
Hill v. Black et al, was originally filed in the Eastern District and then transferred to this court.
During the settlement proceedings, Plaintiff expressed frustration that the United States District Court for the Central District (“Central District”) had imposed filling fees under the PLRA on one or more of his cases and asked for assistance in the matter. The DAG assigned to this case, out of a courtesy to Plaintiff, agreed to contact someone at CDCR to make them aware of this court's finding as to Plaintiff's filling status in this case. According to the Affidavit attached to Defendants' response to this Motion, CDCR was able to identify an accounting error which stemmed from Plaintiff's filling of Hill v. Natural Vision Medical Group, et. al., 4:21-cv-07600-YGR (an unrelated case that has now been dismissed) in the Central District, the Central District's assessment of a filling fee, the transfer of that case to this District, and the Central District's later recission of that fee. See Def.'s Resp. Dec. (Dkt. 35-1) at 2. In any case, the DAG's efforts resulted in CDCR removing those fees from Plaintiff's internal CDCR inmate obligations account. See id.
The current case was also originally filed in the Central District of California.
What Plaintiff claims here is that the same DAG has failed to abide by the terms of the global settlement agreement by not resolving any PLRA fees that have been assessed against Plaintiff by the Eastern District. This was not a term of the global settlement agreement, much less a material term subject to enforcement. What the DAG did for Plaintiff in reference to the Central District case was help clear up a CDCR accounting error, not alter a determination by the Central District regarding Plaintiff's filing status. Nor could he. Nor could the CDCR. Nor could this court. The same applies to any fees assessed by the Eastern District.
It is possible that the Eastern District has mistakenly assessed those fees against Plaintiff. It is also possible that they are properly imposed. In any case, it is clear that CDCR, by and through the DAG, could not and did not agree to such a term. The Settlement Agreement, signed by Plaintiff, contains no such term and expressly states that “The consideration recited in this Agreement is the only consideration for this Agreement, and no representations, promises, or inducements have been made to the parties, or any of their representative, other than those set forth in this Agreement.” Def.'s Resp. Exh. A (Dkt. 35-2) at 4. The agreement further states that “This Agreement constitutes a single, integrated agreement expressing the entire agreement of the parties, and there are no other agreements, written or oral, express or implied, between the parties, except as set forth in this Agreement.” Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion is due to be denied.
In essence, Plaintiff is attempting to improperly turn the DAG's voluntary act of courtesy in an unrelated Central District case into a term of the global settlement agreement here, and apply it to an unrelated Eastern District case, thereby ensuring that no good deed goes unpunished. The better course of action for Plaintiff might be to forward a copy of any of the orders making determinations on his filing status in this court to the Eastern District (or even a copy of this Report and Recommendation).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the court does not have jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement in this case, and alternatively, Plaintiff has failed to allege a breach of the settlement agreement and the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's Motion be DENIED.
Any party may file objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Court within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) & (C); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Civil L.R. 72-3. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court's order.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.