Hileman v. Bank Trust Co.

5 Citing cases

  1. Kimble v. Rental

    65 Ohio Misc. 17 (Ohio Misc. 1980)   Cited 7 times

    However, it is probable that a contract entered into by a consumer and a retail establishment, which authorized a repossession that constituted a breach of the peace, would violate public policy and would be unconscionable and unenforceable. See R. C. 1302.15, 1345.03 and Hileman v. Harter Bank Trust Co. (1962), 174 Ohio St. 95. R. C. 1309.46 provides:

  2. General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Timbrook

    170 W. Va. 143 (W. Va. 1982)   Cited 9 times

    gree with those courts that have recognized breakings and unauthorized entries of debtors' dwellings to be breaches of the peace that deprive creditors or repossessors of self-help default remedies.Accord, Evers-Jordan Furniture Co. v. Hartzog, 237 Ala. 407, 187 So. 491 (1939); Cox v. Stuart, 229 Ala. 409, 157 So. 460 (1934); Manhattan Credit Co. v. Brewer, 232 Ark. 976, 341 S.W.2d 765 (1961); Henderson v. Security National Bank, 72 Cal.App.3d 764, 140 Cal.Rptr. 388 (1977); Renaire Corp. v. Vaughn, 142 A.2d 148 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Quest v. Barnett Bank, 397 So.2d 1020, 1023 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1981); Raffa v. Dania Bank, 321 So.2d 83, 85 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1975); Pierce v. Leasing International, 142 Ga. App. 371, 235 S.E.2d 752, 755 (1977); Census Federal Credit Union v. Wann, 403 N.E.2d 348, 351 (Ind.App. 1980); Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400 (1934); Hawkins Furniture Co. v. Morris, 143 Ky. 738, 137 S.W. 527, 528 (1911); Burgess v. Katz, 10 La.App. 355, 120 So. 526 (1929); Hileman v. Harter Bank and Trust Co., 174 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E.2d 853 (1962); M.J. Rose Co. v. Lowery, 33 Ohio App. 488, 169 N.E. 716 (1929); Stewart v. F. A. North Co., 65 Pa. Super. 195 (1916); Soulios v. Mills Novelty Co., 198 S.C. 355, 17 S.E.2d 869 (1941); Childers v. Judson Mills Store Co., 189 S.C. 224, 200 S.E. 770, 774 (1939); Lyda v. Cooper, 169 S.C. 451, 169 S.E. 236 (1933); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Smithey, 426 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Tex.Civ.App. 1968). A creditor has a legitimate interest in getting collateral from a defaulting debtor.

  3. Sackett v. Hall

    478 S.W.2d 381 (Mo. 1972)   Cited 2 times
    In Sackett, 478 S.W.2d at 382, the plaintiff brought an action for damages for the "value of personal property alleged to have been taken" and for actual and "punitive damages claiming conspiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his business."

    The Supreme Court of Ohio has held a similar provision in a chattel mortgage void as contrary to public policy. Hileman v. Harter Bank Trust Co., 174 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E.2d 853. The Supreme Court of California in Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Cal.2d 597, 12 Cal.Rptr. 488, 492, 361 P.2d 20, 24, 6 A.L.R.3d 161, 167, said: "[A] provision in the lease expressly permitting a forcible entry would be void as contrary to the public policy," as set out in forcible entry and unlawful detainer statutes. See also Spencer v. Commercial Co., 30 Wash. 374, 71 P. 53; see also annotation 6 A.L.R.3d 177, 186, where it is said: "An increasing number of jurisdictions uphold what seems to be the modern doctrine that a landlord otherwise entitled to possession must, on the refusal of the tenant to surrender the leased premises, resort to the remedy given by law to secure it; otherwise he would be liable in damages for using force or deception to regain possession.

  4. Marine Midland Bank-Central v. Cote

    351 So. 2d 750 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)   Cited 12 times   1 Legal Analyses

    E.g., Northside Motors, supra; Raffa, supra; C.I.T. Corp. v. Short, 273 Ky. 190, 115 S.W.2d 899 (1938); Dearman v. Williams, 235 Miss. 360, 109 So.2d 316 (1959); Rea v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 257 N.C. 639, 127 S.E.2d 225 (1962); Helfinstine v. Martin, 561 P.2d 951 (Okla. 1977); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cole, 503 S.W.2d 853 (Tex.Civ.App. 1974). E.g., Evers-Jordan Furniture Co. v. Hartzog, 237 Ala. 407, 187 So. 491 (1939); Renaire Corp. v. Vaughn, 142 A.2d 148 (D.C.Mun.App. 1958); Girard v. Anderson, 219 Iowa 142, 257 N.W. 400 (1934); Hileman v. Harter Bank Trust Co., 174 Ohio St. 95, 186 N.E.2d 853 (1962); Childers v. Judson Mills Store Co., 189 S.C. 224, 200 S.E. 770 (1939). E.g., Dominick v. Rea, 226 Mich. 594, 198 N.W. 184 (1924); Wilson Motor Co. v. Dunn, 129 Okla. 211, 264 P. 194 (1928); Voltz v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 332 Pa. 141, 2 A.2d 697 (1938); A.B. Lewis Co. v. Robinson, 339 S.W.2d 731 (Tex.Civ.App. 1960).

  5. Cherno v. Bank of Babylon

    54 Misc. 2d 277 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that the use of a key that was "unauthorizedly obtained" by bank employees to enter the premises which caused the landlord to "only call for the police and request to the bank employees that they leave the key when they were through" did not constitute a breach of the peace

    Under the circumstances that existed during the times the bank's employees entered the premises, there was as a matter of law no breach of the peace, Wood v. Phillips, 43 N.Y. 152, 156. In reaching that conclusion, the court has overlooked neither the tenet of construction to achieve uniformity (Uniform Commercial Law, ยง 1-102, subd. 2, par. [c]) nor Girard v. Anderson ( 219 Iowa 142), Evers-Jordan Furniture Co. v. Hartzog ( 237 Ala. 407), Hawkins Furniture Co. v. Morris ( 143 Ky. 738), Hileman v. Harter Bank Trust Co. ( 174 Ohio St. 95), and Sturman v. Polito ( 161 Misc. 536), cited by plaintiff. The statement in Sturman which plaintiff quotes was dictum and is inconsistent with the decisions in People v. Halliday ( 237 App. Div. 302) and Mendelson v. Irving ( 155 App. Div. 114).