We inquire whether the filing of the motion for a new trial before the entry of the final judgments renders the motion a nullity in light of the language of the rule. In Highway Commission v. Fisch-Or, 241 Or. 412, 399 P.2d 1011, on reh'g 406 P.2d 539 (1965), the Supreme Court held that, under former ORS 17.615 (1963), a motion for a new trial filed before the time that the judgment was entered was viable and timely. Former ORS 17.615 (1963) required that a motion be filed "within" 10 days of the entry of the judgment.
Neither do we address the complications that can arise when the motion to reconsider is filed before the judgment is entered, as occurred in this case. See Highway v. Fisch-Or, 241 Or. 412, 399 P.2d 1011, opinion modified 406 P.2d 539 (1965) (motion for new trial filed before entry of judgment was timely, in absence of adversary's objection). PETERSON, C.J., concurring.
As a consequence, the two terms are occasionally used interchangeably. In Highway Com. v. Fisch-Or, Inc., 241 Or. 412, 399 P.2d 1011, 1012, on reh. 241 Or. 412, 406 P.2d 539 (1965), we said: "There is some doubt whether in the relevant statutes the `filing' of a judgment is intended to mean the same as the `entry' of a judgment." ORS 17.615, for example, provides that a motion for a new trial must be filed within ten days after the "filing" of the judgment sought to be set aside, and that the motion must be decided within 55 days from the "entry" of the judgment.
ORCP 64 F(1) requires only that a motion for new trial be filed "not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment" and such a motion is timely notwithstanding that it is filed before entry of judgment. Highway Commission v. Fisch-Or, 241 Or 412, 417-18, 399 P2d 1011, opinion modified, 406 P2d 539 (1965) (motion for new trial filed prior to entry of judgment timely); Way v. Prosch, 163 Or App 437, 442, 988 P2d 422 (1999) (same). Thus, it is of no consequence that plaintiffs motion was filed before entry of the judgment.
This would be true even though the offer was fully understood and no conditions were attached, such as the dispute, between the parties, over accounts receivable and the sale of the building and land. Vol. 1, Orgel on Valuation 2d, § 148; State Highway Comm'n v. Fisch-Or., Inc., 241 Or. 412, 399 P.2d 1011, 406 P.2d 539 (1965); State By & Through State Highway Comm'n v. Morehouse Holding Co., 225 Or. 62, 357 P.2d 266 (1960), and State of Oregon v. Cerruti et al., 188 Or. 103, 214 P.2d 346, 16 A.L.R.2d 1105 (1950). While the offer was not admissible for the purpose of establishing value, I do believe the offer, insofar as it was valid, would be admissible for the purpose of determining whether the MacKnights exercised honest, or reasonable, business judgment in connection with the transaction.
This court has consistently interpreted the term "filing" to mean that filing of a document "occur[s] when [the] document is given to a clerk with the intention that it be filed." See Blackledge v. Harrington, 289 Or. 139, 143, 611 P.2d 292 (1980) (interpreting the term "filed" in a statute relating to appellate notice); see also Charco, Inc. v. Cohn, 242 Or. 566, 571, 411 P.2d 264 (1966) (using the same interpretation of the term "filed" in a statute relating to the transmission of orders signed by a judge to the court clerk); Highway Commission v. Fisch-Or, 241 Or. 412, 415, 406 P.2d 539 (1965) (using the same interpretation of the term "filed" in statute relating to motions for judgments notwithstanding the verdict); Bade v. Hibberd, 50 Or. 501, 503-04, 93 P. 364 (1908) (using the same interpretation as the general definition of the term "filed" with respect to court documents). See also Black's Law Dictionary, 628 (6th ed 1990) (defining "[f]iling with the court" to mean the "[d]elivery of legal document to clerk of court or other proper officer with intent that it be filed with court").
Oregon has recognized that experts in land condemnation cases may rely upon the out-of-court discussions by others involved in sales of real property as a proper basis for forming their opinions on the value of property. See, Highway Commission v. Fisch-Or, 241 Or. 412, 399 P.2d 1011, 406 P.2d 539 (1965). Similarly, prior to the adoption of OEC 703, we have held that expert medical witnesses may base their opinions at trial upon medical charts and records not in evidence to the same extent that they would rely upon the same documents in the treatment of their patients.
Filing occurs when a document is given to a clerk with the intention that it be filed. If a statute requires an act to be done within a number of days after an order is "filed," the time is measured from the date when the order is given to the clerk for filing, regardless of the date of entry. Highway Commission v. Fisch-Or, 241 Or. 412, 415-16, 399 P.2d 1011, 406 P.2d 539 (1965). ORS 19.026 (1), however, does not refer to filing; it refers to "entry."
We recognize that the allowance by the trial court of plaintiff's motion for a new trial must be affirmed if any of the grounds for that motion are well taken. Highway Commission v. Fisch-Or, 241 Or. 412, 418, 399 P.2d 1011, 406 P.2d 539 (1965). On the other hand, the trial court may properly order a new trial only where there is a basis for a finding of substantial prejudicial error.
Nevertheless, an order of a trial court granting a new trial will be upheld if any ground in the motion is adequate to sustain such action whether or not it was the basis for the trial judge's ruling. Goggan v. Consolidated Millinery, 242 Or. 328, 331, 409 P.2d 174 (1966); Highway Commission v. Fisch-Or, 241 Or. 412, 418, 399 P.2d 1011, 406 P.2d 539 (1965). This court usually defers to the trial court's determination of the prejudicial effect of any error which is committed. Stoneburner v. Greyhound Corp. et al, 232 Or. 567, 570, 375 P.2d 812 (1962).