Highland Securities Company v. Hecht

5 Citing cases

  1. Abou-Khadra v. Mahshie

    4 F.3d 1071 (2d Cir. 1993)   Cited 49 times
    Holding that district court committed "plain error" in allowing double recovery for plaintiff for both breach of release and breach of underlying contract

    Hecht held only that a RICO plaintiff may not recover damages for acts that are not predicate racketeering acts. Appellants' fear that the jury might have awarded such damages in the instant matter is groundless. Reading the instructions as a whole, we are satisfied that the jury was clearly informed of the various alleged acts that might support an award of damages. Finally, Abou-Khadra argues that the district court should not have permitted Bseirani to recover for fraud and RICO violations that, Abou-Khadra asserts, were simply claims that the CSE and SPPI contracts were breached. See Highland Sec. Co. v. Hecht, 145 A.D.2d 393, 536 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1988). This claim also was not raised in the district court and hardly constitutes plain error.

  2. Fashion House, Inc. v. K Mart Corp.

    892 F.2d 1076 (1st Cir. 1989)   Cited 248 times
    Holding that where a contract is found to be ambiguous, a court may further consider extrinsic evidence in determining whether uncertainty exists

    It is an elementary concept that, to recover for fraud, a claimant must show that the asserted damage was caused by reasonable reliance upon the opposing party's false representations. See Highland Securities Co. v. Hecht, 145 A.D.2d 393, 536 N.Y.S.2d 67, 68 (1988); Hi-Way Motor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 398 Mich. 330, 247 N.W.2d 813, 816 (1976). Under both New York and Michigan law, each element of a claimed fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

  3. Champion Titanium Horseshoe, Inc. v. Wyman-Gordon Investment Castings, Inc.

    925 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)   Cited 19 times
    Holding that magistrate's denial of leave to file an amended pleading should be subject to reconsideration de novo since it is dispositive of proposed new claims

    Moreover, the proposed amended complaint itself undercuts any claim of reliance, for it avers that, despite knowledge of Wyman's alleged tardiness and shoddiness, Champion continued to do business with Wyman well into 1994. See generally J H Stolow, Inc. v. Epstein Becker Green P.C., ___ A.D.2d ___, 639 N.Y.S.2d 25, 25 (1st Dep't 1996); Highland Securities Co. v. Hecht, 145 A.D.2d 393, 393, 536 N.Y.S.2d 67, 68 (1st Dep't 1988). Finally, as to plaintiff's fall-back position that "[l]ater, defendant deliberately stopped manufacturing the horseshoes in order to induce a desperate Champion to turn over its business to Wyman," Proposed Amended Complaint at ΒΆ 29, this is not only irrelevant on its face to any claim of fraud in the inducement but is also contradicted by the proposed amended complaint's own allegations that, well after the take-over proposal was rejected in September, 1994, Champion and Wyman continued to do business, albeit in much the same haphazard manner as previously.

  4. MASS OP LLC v. PRINCIPAL LIFE INS.

    2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 31540 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009)

    Additionally, plaintiff must prove that he believed and justifiably relied upon defendant's statement and was induced by it to engage in a certain course of conduct and that, as a result of such reliance, plaintiff sustained pecuniary loss (Id). A mere failure to fulfill a promise will give rise to an action for breach of contract but not a fraud claim ( Highland Securities Co. v Hecht, 145 AD2d 393 [1st Dept 1988]). However, a false statement of intention is sufficient to support an action for fraud, even where that statement relates to an agreement between the parties ( Graubard Mollen v Moskowitz, 86 NY2d 112, 122).

  5. Schad v. Antonia Eliana Alves Chagas

    2005 N.Y. Slip Op. 30546 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005)

    Similarly, and in light of the above, Schad's fifth and sixth causes of action for fraud, which is based on the alleged misrepresentation in paragraph 4.1.7 of the Contract, lack merit. Moreover, "a cause of action for fraud does not arise when the only fraud charged relates to a breach of contract (Highland Securities Co. v Hecht, 145 AD2d 393, 536 NYS2d 67 [1st Dept 1988]). And, "[a] contract action may not be converted into one for fraud by the mere additional allegation that the contracting party did not intend to meet his contractual obligation" (Id. citing Comtomark, Inc. v Satellite Communications Network, Inc., 116 AD2d 499, 500, 497 NYS2d 371).